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ABSTRACT 
This research aims to unravel whether joint policies and supranational solutions can be forged 
within the sui generis 'laboratory' of the European Parliament (EP). enabling a European 
collective identity to emerge rather than simply the sum of national sentiments, preferences and 
ambitions. In particular, it intends to ascertain whether vested national interests expressed by the 
various Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been overcome within their respective 
political groups, on the way to becoming effective and cohesive parties at European level. In 
order to validate or refute the above hypothesis, foreign policy, traditionally regarded as a sacred 
domain and stronghold of the nation state, is taken as a yardstick. 
Whilst bearing in mind the EP's limited competence in this field, the question at the heart 
of the thesis is whether the European Parliament is likely to become a genuine international actor 
or whether it is likely to remain a forum for discussion, functioning as the 'voice of conscience' 
and 'dissent' of the Community and its member states. As such, the research explores the 
parliamentary dynamics behind the definition of a common position vis-a-vis two major events 
of the 1990s: the Gulf and the Yugoslav crises. A qualitative investigation into the role of the 
political groups combined with a quantitative analysis of MEP voting behaviour is carried out in 
order to assess the interactions within and between the political alignments of the polychromatic 
Europarliamentary spectrum with respect to the aforementioned cases. Whereas the political 
groups reached a level of internal cohesion vis-a-vis these crises, the views of the European 
Parliament appeared rather ambiguous due to intergroup divergences. 
It is the contention of this thesis that the political groups have come to constitute 
embryonic transnational political parties which are deemed to play an increasingly important role 
in the development of the European Parliament, in the evolution of party politics at European 
level as well as in the European Union's policy-making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. General Context of the Research 
In the wake of the phenomenon of globalization, due inter alia to the development of technology, 
mass communication and international trade, national boundaries are gradually being transcended 
in economic, political and cultural terms. The traditional distinction between domestic and foreign 
policy has slowly, but inevitably become more and more blurred. 
As the former President of the European Parliament (EP) Klaus Hansch maintains, "[ w]e 
have reached the point where ( ... ) foreign policy has in fact become domestic politics" (Hausch, 
1996, 344). The close interface between international and national spheres has generated greater 
public interest in international affairs. As a result, although its reins remain securely in the hands 
of governments' leaders, EP attention has increasingly been turned towards foreign policy. 
The active participation of national parliaments in the international arena is still viewed 
sceptically by many constitutional lawyers, politicians and specialists in the field of international 
relations. The possible involvement of the European Parliament in foreign policy-making is seen 
as an even more unlikely and remote prospect. Cynics point out that it is vain to assess the views 
of the political groups (PGs) or individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) since 
their declarations are not legally binding and are often "so futile in terms of bringing results" 
(Coombes, 1979, 117). The weakness of the EP along with the absence of a fully-fledged 
European Foreign and Security Policy have often discouraged MEPs from even attending relevant 
debates and voting sessions. And yet, some consider that this state of affairs has conferred a new 
impetus to the urgency for a wide programme of institutional reforms, with special emphasis on 
the EP's quest for greater powers in order to combat the democratic deficit within the European 
Union (EU). As defined by the EP, this deficit consists of "the combination of two phenomena: 
(i) the transfer of powers from the Member States to the EC and (ii) the exercise of these powers 
at Community level by institutions other than the European Parliament, even though, before the 
transfer, the national parliaments held power to pass laws in the areas concerned" (TOlLSsai1ll 
Report, 1/2/1988, 10-11). Karlheinz Neunreither distinguishes three elements of democratic 
deficit. The first is the lack of a balance of powers between the executive and the legislative 
branches at European level, whereby the executive is not elected by a majority of Parliament and 
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is not accountable to it. The second is the lack of accountability to its citizens that a powerful 
union of democratic states, such as the EU, might be expected to display. The third is the absence 
of genuine European political parties and pan-European media, with the consequence that it is 
only with great difficulty that citizens can get objective information (Neunreither, 1994, 3(0). 
This deficit is deemed to persist as long as crucial policy areas such as foreign policy remain 
outside the realm of Europarliamentary and, therefore, public accountability. 
One of the premises underlying this thesis is that the EU member states have to decide 
whether they intend to forge a supranational political entity which would enable the EU to play 
a leading role on the world stage, bearing in mind that this decision would entail substantial 
adjustments to the systems of governance both at European Union and member state levels. 
Parallels can be drawn with the critical stage in the mid-1980s when the EC was working towards 
the completion of the internal market ideal. In its White Paper of 1985, the Commission of the 
European Communities boldly stated: 
Europe stands at the crossroads. We either go ahead - with resolution and detennination 
or we drop back into mediocrity. We can now either resolve to complete the integration 
of the economies of Europe; or, through a lack of political will to face the immense 
problems involved, we can simply allow Europe to develop into no more than a free trade 
area (COM (85) 31Ofm, pt. 219). 
The question at the heart of this thesis is whether the European Parliament is likely to 
become a real international actor or whether, conversely, it is likely to remain a 'voice of 
conscience' and 'dissent' for the European Union and member state policies. 1 The first 
possibility stresses the factor of efficiency, asserting that the aim of the EP should be to project 
a united and consistent image in order to make an impact on EC/EU decisional institutions, and 
thus, to exert a degree of influence on third countries' governments and parliaments as well as 
on international organizations. The former chairman of the Socialist Group, Rudi Arndt, 
highlights the fact that originally the two largest political groups, the Socialists and the Christian 
Democrats, used to be at loggerheads, wishing to "display pure ideology" and "to show the other 
political camp how clever our own ideas were and how wrong theirs were", rather than pursue 
a large majority (Arndt, 1992, 65). Subsequently, the need to reach a consensus within the House 
According to Gunnar Sj9Stedt's definition, an international actor consists of a unit in the international system 
which possesses 'actor capability' being 'discernible from the external environment' , and having a minimum 
degree of internal cohesion (Sj9Stedt, 1977, 6-13). However, when referring to the relationship between 
actorness and the democratic deficit, it must be borne in mind that were the European Union to become a 
real international actor, a democratic deficit could persist. Conversely, the deficit could be overcome and the 
European Union could still fail to become an international actor. This uncertainty has impeUed the EP to 
carve its own niche and tread its own path in the quest to increase its international status. 
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was acknowledged as being the only viable solution which would enable the EP to exert its rather 
limited constitutional powers and to prevent "overblown verbiage" from becoming the \ery 
embodiment of what the philosopher Gustave Thibon defines as "the reflection of [an] atrophied 
reality" (Antony, 2311011990, 79). During the so-called 'meeting of the giants' held just before 
the beginning of the second EP legislative period, the two groups decided that, for pragmatic 
reasons, "there was no point in a mutual flexing of ideological muscles" and that "the only 
sensible strategy was to achieve the appropriate majorities". Since then, what Martin Westlake 
calls "the Socialist-Christian Democrat Oligopoly" has effectively dominated EP proceedings 
(Westlake, 1994b, 186). 
This view contrasts with that of the opposing camp which emphasizes that the EP needs 
to focus on democracy by simply remaining a forum for discussion where pluralism and diversity 
should be encouraged in order to ensure that all distinct opinions of society are fully represented. 
As the former EP President Pierre Pflimlin claims, "Parliament's role is not to produce 
majorities, but to state positions clearly", especially on issues of international politics (Pflimlin, 
1992, 70). 
The paradox raised by these two fundamental but opposing concerns - efficiency and 
democracy - remains unsolved, inevitably determining a state of perpetual tension within the 
European Parliament. The different cultural and political backgrounds of MEPs may lead to 
dramatically diverse expectations as to the performance of political groups and the European 
Parliament in EU policy-making. Two extreme situations are represented in relation to the EP: 
at one end, dictatorship and, at the other, anarchy (Westlake, 1994a, 25). The first, underpinning 
constitutional conservatism, results in stability while the second, symbolizing parliamentary 
incoherence, results in instability. Both consequences are, however, undesirable. Dictatorship 
would lead in the medium and long-term to a stalemate, denying Parliament the most relevant 
dialectical and dynamic prerogatives that stem from exchanges of views and verbal confrontation. 
Anarchy would lead to chaos and prevent Parliament from functioning, undermining its bargaining 
power vis-a-vis the other institutions in order to influence EU policy (Westlake, 1994a, 25). To 
avoid such extreme degeneration of efficiency and democracy, it is important to look closely at 
the internal dynamics of such a unique and multinational parliamentary body to assess \vhether 
and how these two fundamental but opposing concerns can be accommodated to a degree of 
mutual satisfaction. A premise for the thesis is the need for an appropriate 'trade-off between 
these apparently irreconcilable necessities when dealing with issues of foreign policy, traditionally 
regarded as a crucial policy area and one where nationalist sentiments are likely to emerge 
(Lodge, 1996, 205). 
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2. Research Objectives 
The research intends to discover whether, within the sui generis 'laboratory' of the European 
Parliament, joint policies and supranational solutions can be forged by pursuing a holistic 
approach that emphasizes a collective European identity, rather than simply the sum of national 
sentiments, preferences and ambitions. By gauging the specific involvement of the respective PGs 
against their claimed allegiance to 'European' as opposed to 'national' interests, it is possible to 
assess whether they are becoming effective and cohesive parties at European level. 
The general aim of the thesis is to assess whether a 'Europeanization' process has been 
taking place within the European Parliament. The research appraises the level of cohesion within 
the European Parliament and political groups, the extent of intergroup negotiations, the frequency 
of compromise and coalition-building, the level of affinity between political groups as well as the 
level of transnationality within the various groups, with respect to two key cases. 2 In order to 
confirm or refute this argument, foreign policy, regarded as one of the most sensitive policy 
areas, is taken as a yardstick to assess whether the EP succeeded in transcending conventional 
state frontiers or whether conflicting national interpretations were still at the heart of the 
parliamentary debate. This can assist in clarifying whether "the territorial/national dimension" or 
the "party/ideological dimension" dominated the pursuit of political groups' goals (Hix, 1993, 
45). 
3. Methodology 
As Fulvio Attina. argues, parliamentary debates over topical international issues have symbolic 
rather than functional connotations, given the limited competence of the EP in foreign policy. The 
level of affinity in the attitudes and voting patterns of the EP political groups on foreign affairs 
are generally high, due in part to the negligible value of the texts of virtually cost-free resolutions 
which are therefore easy to agree on (Attina., 1990, 572). Nevertheless, as Luciano Bardi 
remarks, when the content of resolutions involves more critical issues, as in the defence sector, 
such a large consensus undoubtedly decreases (Bardi, 1994, 369). An investigation into MEPs' 
attitudes vis-a.-vis two major international crises is an excellent analytical tool to indicate the 
effective level of cohesion and transnationality reached within the European Parliament and PGs. 
The tiJrmulae employed for calculating the indices of agreement. similarity and transnationalilY are explainl'd 
in detail in the Appendix. 
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and to validate or refute the above assumptions. The two cases are examined using a three-tiered 
analytical framework: the first briefly outlines the EC's position while the second and the third 
levels of analysis, respectively, focus on the EP and its sub-units, the PGs. 
This investigation is undertaken through a review of all the relevant Europarliamentary 
debates, significant EP political and legislative resolutions as well as motions for resolutions on 
the Gulf and Yugoslavia.3 Gathering some of the motions was made highly problematic due to 
the unfortunate parliamentary practice that texts of non-adopted motions are not kept in any 
libraries, not even those of the EP; they are often discarded by the political groups themselves. 
The archives of the Translation Division of the Secretariat of the European Parliament based in 
Luxembourg have been a mine of information. It was here that, after carrying out thorough 
searches, most of these texts were eventually located. Testimony has also been provided by some 
MEPs and officials who closely followed the political and economic developments in the Gulf and 
former Yugoslavia. 
Through both a qualitative analysis of the debates and a quantitative analysis of MEP 
voting behaviour, it is possible to counteract the anomalies of each approach when taken 
separately. Specifically, a qualitative analysis may be tainted by the researcher's subjective 
perception when reading through debates, resolutions and explanations of vote. A quantitative 
analysis of roll-call votes (RCVs)4 may be misrepresentative of the real level of cohesion within 
groups due to the long preparatory stage the motion for a resolution undergoes prior to voting and 
the symbolic rather than politically concrete value of a vote that carries with it the weight of 
public accountability (Bardi, 1996, 104). 
The cohesion of the various political groups is measured with the index of agreement 
(IA), elaborated by Fulvio Attina from a variant of Stuart Rice's formula (Attina, 1990, 564, 
Rice, 1928, 208-209).5 Tables are calculated on percentages of the roll-call votes of each group 
for individual and joint motions for resolutions, amendments and paragraphs tabled over the 
period between September 1990 and May 1991 for the Gulf crisis, and between February 1991 
3 The EP acts consist of two formal categories based on the basis of the impact they have on the EC decision-
making process: legislative and budgetary acts which fall under the Community legal framework and the 50-
called own initiative political resolutions which do not belong to the EC structure and, therefore, are not 
legally binding. These texts are drafted on the initiative of groups or individual members on urgent and 
topical problems, sometimes following oral questions or as responses to statements issued by the Council or 
Commission. 
.. Roll-call voting consists of a process whereby the names of MEPs and their modalities of votes are recorded. 
This information is made available to the Parliament, political groups and the general public since it is 
published in the OfficilJl JOIU1llU of tM European Communities - Series C 'Information and Notices'. 
, Attinl's formula has been used by other researchers such as Bay Brzinski (1995), Raunio (1997) and Scully 
(1997) in their respective RCV analyses of the European Parliament. 
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and July 1992 for the Yugoslav crisis. The empirical validity of this analysis rests on the central 
proposition that cohesion provides stability in groups and is a sign of the development towards 
identifiable European parties. 
The voting affinity between groups is assessed by employing Stuart Rice's . index of 
voting likeness', also illustrated in the Appendix, but referred to in this dissertation as voting 
similarity percentage (VSP) (Rice, 1928). The composition of the groups is taken into 
consideration in order to evaluate what impact the more or less heterogenous configuration of the 
PGs may have on their level of cohesion. Any modification incurred between 1990-1992 is 
therefore duly registered and taken into consideration. Indices of transnationality of voting 
behaviour (lTv) are compared to the index of transnationality of composition (ITc) in order to 
assess whether and to what extent PG voting behaviour proves to be more transnational than PG 
composition and to demonstrate whether foreign policy functions as a catalysing factor of 
trans nationalization within the group or, on the contrary, whether it perpetuates and consolidates 
the traditional tendency towards a nationalist approach. The ITv-s on the Gulf and Yugoslavia 
policies are calculated on the highest modality of vote, which is assumed to represent the official 
position of each political group, with respect to the examined RCVs. A comparison of the data 
of this index of transnationality with those of the cohesion coefficient serves to judge whether 
group heterogeneity represents an inhibiting factor for reaching internal cohesion, undermining 
members' ability to achieve consensus. Two formulae based on Douglas Rae's index of 
fractionalization are used to compute ITc and ITv-s with regard to the cases (Rae, 1967). 
4. Overview of the Case Studies 
The international political scene over the last decade has witnessed two major events: the invasion 
of Kuwait by Iraq and the conflict in former Yugoslavia. The Gulf crisis marked the end of the 
Cold War era, showing the concurrent dangers and the challenges posed by the sudden 
disappearance of one ofthe superpowers, the Soviet Union. As such, it represented the first major 
test for the New World Order. The crisis in former Yugoslavia, which was the first outbreak of 
sustained military fighting on the European continent since the end of the Second World War, has 
been selected for its geographical proximity to the Community, the magnitude and duration of the 
conflict as well as the human, political and economic consequences for Europe. Both cases, 
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commonly regarded as proving grounds for European Political Cooperation (EPC),6 seriously 
challenged the ability of the then Twelve in the management of international crises. The periods 
examined are August 1990 until May 1991 for the Gulf crisis and January 1991 until July 1992 
for the Yugoslav crisis. These time frames were chosen, in the first case, to include the invasion 
of Kuwait in August 1990 until the beginning of the withdrawal of the allied troops from Iraq in 
the post-war period and, in the second case, the escalation from economic and constitutional crisis 
to war up to a few months after the recognition of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Christopher Hill has argued that "[t]here are, of course, contrary arguments about the 
value of case-studies, from those who believe on the one side that the case-approach does little 
more than dress up history, without transcending the limits of all phenotypical work, in producing 
non-commensurable results, and on the other that cases inevitably miss the deeper, more 
impersonal forces of long duration which shape choice without always being revealed at the point 
of surface decision" (Hill, 1991,5). However, pursuing the case-study path could provide impetus 
for developing a broad survey and generating a more general debate on the internal dynamics of 
the European Parliament with respect to foreign policy. 
s. Academic Contribution 
Although the literature on both the European Parliament and European foreign policy has 
proliferated in recent years, becoming overwhelmingly vast and rich in content and diversity, the 
above areas of research have rarely been combined in a systematic analysis. Virtually no studies 
have focused on the interface between the EP, especially its political alignments, and foreign 
policy since EPC's formal inauguration under the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). Despite the 
welter of studies on the European Parliament, only a few publications have focused on the 
European Parliament and Foreign Policy, notably Gaja (1980), Weiler (1980), Fontaine (1984), 
Lodge (1988) in her contribution to Sondhi's book, Penders (1988), Neunreither (1990) in his 
contribution to Edwards and Regelsberger's book, Elles, J. (1990), Millar (1991), Monar (1993), 
Prout (1992, 1993, 1994), and two unpublished theses: Stavridis (1991) and Dupagny (1992). In 
a wider context, Bardi (1997) also examines the powers of the European Parliament, the 
desirability of EP transnational party cooperation and the future of European security and defence 
6 European Political Cooperation (EPC) was an intergovernmental forum for discussion, consultation and the 
coordination of member states on foreign policy issues. It was introduced in 1970, institutionalized by the 
Single European Act in 1986 and superseded by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) created 
by the Treaty of European Union in 1992. 
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policy. With reference to EP political groups, an interest was expressed by Geoffrey and Pippa 
Pridham (1981). After a few years of neglect, research into the PGs has been rev i ved by the 
studies of authors such as Lodge (1983a), Delwit and de Waele (1995), Westlake (l994a) and 
jointly by Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton (1992, 1995), Julie Smith (1995) and Bardi (1996), to 
quote just a few. Yet, only Neunreither (1990) and Lodge (1988) have looked more specifically 
at the trinomial 'EP-PGs-foreign policy'. Attina has pioneered the study of EP voting behaviour 
analysis (Attina, 1995,39), subsequently undertaken by Bay Brzinski (1995), Raunio (1997), Hix 
and Lord (1997) and Scully (1997). Attina and Raunio have both referred in their respective 
works to foreign policy, yet due to the wider range of areas examined, they devoted only part of 
their research to this aspect, without testing their statistical data against an in-depth examination 
of the parliamentary debates. 
Neither inter- nor intrapolitical group behaviour has so far been explored in depth, 
whether on a separate or a comparative basis with regard to the chosen cases. This thesis attempts 
to fill such a lacuna by breaking new ground with a qualitative-quantitative analysis of 
parliamentary reaction towards the above foreign policy issues. As such, it could be regarded as 
a contribution to both research areas, while also trying to give a new stimulus to the debate on 
the democratization of foreign policy through an examination of the 'efficiency versus democracy' 
dilemma. 
6. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis begins by outlining various theories of European integration. Specifically, the first 
chapter endeavours to place them in the realm of the three traditional schools of International 
Relations, as classified by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull, respectively: realist, 
rationalist/internationalist and revolutionist/universalist. 7 In the light of the above theoretical 
assumptions, some tentative observations are offered on the role being played or to be played by 
the European Parliament and its constituent political groups in the path towards a united Europe. 
An overview of European integration theories can assist in identifying which conceptual 
framework to refer to in order to promote the development of a role for the European ParI iament 
in this sphere, and for the formation and evolution of transnational political groups. This 
theoretical journey suggests bridging the self-inflicted boundaries between the wider field of 
See the lectures by Manin Wight edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Poner (1991) and The Anarchical 
Society by Hedley Bull (1977. 1995). 
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International Relations (lR) and the sub field of European integration. 
Chapter II seeks to construct a detailed profile of the internal structure and rele\"ant 
organization of the European Parliament as well as its constituent political groups, with reference 
to foreign policy. 8 After a short introductory section on the reasons for the desirability of a 
greater participation of the European Parliament in the formulation and supervision of a common 
foreign policy, the development of the EP's role in European foreign policy is then outlined from 
the advent of the Paris and Rome Treaties in the 1950s to the signature of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in June 1997.9 The external relations of the European Community IU nion, which are 
subject to the supranational regime of EC Law as well as the intergovernmental structure of 
European Political Cooperation, renamed as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
under the Treaty on European Union (TEU), are considered. lO Chapters III and V set out brief 
historical backgrounds and general appraisals of the Community's political, economic and military 
involvement in the Gulf and former Yugoslavia. The multifaceted attitude of the European 
Parliament towards these events is then ascertained, providing examples of the EP relating to and 
working within the EPC and, occasionally, the EC environment. 
Chapters IV and VI aim to shed some light on the stances taken by the political groups 
of the European Parliament in the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, respectively. II After addressing the 
specific contributions of the PGs and, therefore, their levels of influence in defining the EP's 
responses, these chapters turn towards the analysis of voting behaviour in order to measure the 
level of internal party cohesion as well as the extent of transnationality and voting similarity 
between groups. The chapters represent the analyticalloei of the thesis, the core of the research 
pertaining to intragroup cohesiveness and intergroup cooperation aimed at designing common 
strategies to influence and determine the EP's official position. 
8 The chapter stresses the exceptional character of the constituent political groups in the European Parliament. 
gathering representatives from member states' sister parties, naturally inclined to bring their own political 
and ideological traditions and experiences, which sometimes are hardly comparable with one another. The 
history and the character of Western European political parties reveal that deep-rooted national differences 
exist between them since they are founded on distinct historical and social backgrounds. See von Beyme 
(1985), Ware (1996), Allum (1995), Smith, G., (1972), Hancock et al. (1993), Mair. P. and Smith. G. 
(1990). Urwin and Paterson, eds. (1990) and Katz and Mair, eds. (1994). 
9 This comprehensive examination has been conducted in order to give an updated insight on the development 
of European foreign policy. However, it is important to bear in mind that both case studies analyzed in this 
dissertation fall within the pre-Maastricht legal and political framework. 
10 The CFSP constitutes the second of the three pillars on which the Europe Union is based. 
II For the list and composition of the political groups within the European Parliament during the 1990-1992 
period see Tables I a-I g in Chapter n. 
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By summarizing and comparing the specific results which emerged in the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis undertaken in the above cases, an assessment can be made as to whether 
there is a general trend towards the formation of a genuinely supranational European Parliament 
and whether the EP political groups are likely to be raised to the rank of European political 
parties. 
I International Relations and European Integration Theory: 
The Role of the European Parliament 
Over the past fifty years, the pace of European integration has often accelerated, slowed or 
reversed itself in response to external political and economic events, confirming or refuting the 
validity of various theoretical assumptions and predictions. It is important, therefore, not to look 
at this phenomenon in isolation, but within the realm of international relations and to consider the 
European Union as part of a wider system, "a segment of international society" (Taylor, 1996, 
90). Conceptualizing European integration cannot be seen exclusively as the application of 
detached and abstruse notions relevant only to Western Europe, but in a much broader sense, as 
an important component of the literature on world politics with its roots entrenched deep in the 
history of political thought (Keohane and Nye, 1993, 384-401). 
Winding through the maze of International Relations and European integration theories 
can be a lengthy and arduous challenge. The following overview, which is by no means 
exhaustive, intends to illustrate briefly the major theoretical assumptions relevant to European 
integration and set them, where possible, within the mainstream of International Relations theory, 
an explicit linkage which is too rarely made. In order to further highlight their relevance to this 
thesis, an attempt is also made to identify the role played or to be played by the European 
Parliament within the various original theoretical models, which are used as hermeneutic devises. 
Finally, variants of relevant concepts are tailored to allow for a theoretical conceptualization of 
political groups in the Europarliamentary environment. I 
The most comprehensive and, at the same time, detailed surveys of the traditional set of European integration 
theories are those of Pentland (1973), Harrison (1974) Taylor (1983) and George (1985). A more recent 
effort at reviewing the main theoretical contributions with extracts of their key authors is offered by O'Neill 
(1996). However, these books devote little or no space to the remit of the European Parliament and its 
transnational political groups in the various International Relations and European integration theories. The 
role of the political groups are often subsumed into the general analysis on interest groups. Corbett (1998) 
attempts to redress this omission to some extent by examining the role of the European Parliament in light 
of the following approaches to European integration: constituent federalism, gradualist federalism, 
neofunctionalism, interdependence theory and intergovernmentalism. He also looks at the expectations within 
the academic and political circle of the elected Parliament by also briefly referring to the development of 
political groups inside the EP arena. Webb (1983) makes only a brief reference to the Parliament in her 
review of integration theories. Other books focus on the parliamentary powers in the federal model (Spinelli. 
1957, 1958, 1960, 1972; Wheare, 1963). Others touch only briefly on the place of parliamentJr~ 
developments in the federal and neofunctionallogics (Marquand. 1980). An attempt to study the possible role 
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1. The 'Trilogy' of International Relations Theory 
Three main traditions have emerged in the history of political thought: realism embodied by 
Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, rationalism or internationalism by Hugo Grotius and 
universalism or revolutionism by Immanuel Kant. 2 However, these traditions "are not like three 
railroad tracks running parallel into infinity" and tendencies have often surfaced merging their 
characteristics. The above 'trilogy' , largely followed, modified and contested, remains a milestone 
in the study of International Relations (Wight and Porter, 1991, Bull, 1977, 1995). 
1.1 Realism and Neorealism 
In the realist image, international relations are mostly characterized by warfare of all against all, 
best illustrated in Hobbes' axiom Bellum omnium contra omnes. Hans Morgenthau elaborates 
further this concept, claiming that: 
International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims 
of international politics, power is always the immediate aim; Regardless of the instrument 
employed, the ultimate aim of foreign policy is always the same: to promote one's 
interests by changing the mind of the opponent (Morgenthau, 1973, 27 and 333). 
States compete for power and, in such a confrontation, moral principles are the first to be lost 
(Brown, 1992, 97). By considering national security as a priority, realists are especially concerned 
with actual or potential conflict between states. They advocate a state-centric view of international 
relations and regard nation states and not international organizations as the only "durable units" 
in society and the real motors of change (Weiler and Wessels, 1988, 238). Realism reflects the 
tenet that influential states hold the reins of the world and bear direct responsibility for 
international order (Banks, 1985, 15). International organizations may aspire to the status of 
of the European Parliament and the political parties in the European integration process by using 
neofunctionalist theory is made by Sweeney (1984). And yet, the most accurate analysis of the political 
groups remains that undertaken by Haas (1958) who devotes Chapter IV of his book to the supranational 
political parties in the ECSC Common Assembly. Several studies including that by Geoffrey and Pippa 
Pridham (1981) focus on the historical development or on the organization and working of the politica1 
groups, neglecting however their role in integration theories. The historical evolution of the EC underlying 
the emergence of the various theoretical approaches over time has been outlined by William Wallace and Julie 
Smith (1995). 
1 Although agreeing in principle on the trilogy of philosophical thought, Martin Wight and Hedley BuD used 
a different tenninology. Wight's classification consists of realism, rationalism and revolutionism while BuU's 
classification includes realism, internationalism and universalism. 
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independent actors, but their ambition has not so far been achieved to any significant extent. 
In the early 1970s, after having dominated for two decades, the theory began to falter 
only to re-emerge invigorated under the emblem ofneorealism (Little, 1985,7-'+). Its proponents. 
including Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner, George Modelski and Robert Tucker. 
explain state behaviour in conditions of anarchy, while stressing the importance of structure 
within the international system and how this may influence state conduct. For some neorealists 
such as Robert Keohane, the modern world is woven into interdependent relationships, but the 
term interdependence, like a web, conveys the negative connotation of vulnerability which should 
be fought or at least minimized. However, interdependence does not denote equality between the 
parties since not all states are vulnerable to the same extent (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993, 55-56). 
This coming to terms with interdependence was rejected by theorists belonging to the orthodox 
realist tradition pursued by Waltz. Both realists and neorealists, nevertheless, maintain a net 
distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics where the former dominates the latter (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993, 7). 
1.1.1 Realism in the Context of European Integration 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Schuman Plan, which catalysed the reconciliation 
of two historical enemies, France and Germany, and the consequent efforts to develop further 
economic, political and social relations between Western European countries, represented for 
realists a serious anomaly (Groom, 1990,9-10). Any attempt at replacing the nation state system 
with another form of supranational government was considered artificial and highly hazardous, 
inevitably leading to its destruction and subordination to a third power. In the realist logic, not 
only would the establishment of a supranational European Union not enhance Europe's 
international capability, but it would even deprive the nation state of this capacity (Weiler and 
Wessels, 1988, 238-239). 
Modern realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, therefore, believed that 
the European integration process, embarked on mainly in reaction to Cold War bipolarism, would 
come to a halt with the fall of the Iron Curtain (Waltz, 1979,70-71, Mearsheimer, 1990,5-56). 
In the eyes of realists, European integration can be justified by the fact that a more integrated and 
institutionally elaborated international organization can better serve, at least provisionally, national 
interests. As such, the EU embodying a confederation of sovereign states becomes the instrument 
for the member states to achieve their own national objectives (Cameron, 1992, 28-29). However, 
should they no longer feel the necessity of this membership, the states reserve the right to 
withdraw. The intergovernmental institutionalization of EPC/CFSP is acceptable in as far as it 
cements existing interstate bargains. This view is aptly outlined by Inis L. Claude: 
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It is evident that the long-term evolution as well as the current functioning of the 
Community institutions is fundamentally a matter to be determined by the national 
governments concerned. Supranationality has contrived no genuine escape from sovereign 
states. It may be a step toward federal unity, but it is a step taken by governments, which 
retain the capacity to decide whether to take further steps forward, to stand still, or to 
retreat (Claude, 1964, 1965, 1971, 103). 
a) The Role of the European Parliament in the Realist Model 
As seen in the previous section, realism is hardly conducive with the supranational development 
of the European integration, regarded as anathema because it leads to an artificial system whereby 
the state loses the prerogative of promoting its bias (Weiler and Wessels, 1988, 238). As such, 
the realist thesis reaffirms the primacy of member states' governments and excludes any 
significant functions for supranational organs including the European Parliament. Realists argue 
that the general state of anarchy that characterizes the EP as a multinational platform for 
discussion does not make it a suitable and efficient decision-making institution, especially when 
dealing with foreign policy issues. The view that "strong supranational institutions are ( .. ) the 
antithesis of intergovernmentalism" is not fully shared by Andrew Moravcsik who maintains that 
they can instead serve the purposes of the member states (Moravcsik, 1993, 507). 
With regard to the European Parliament's political groups, their interactions are regarded 
by realists as a 'zero-sum game', where the extent of the gain for one side corresponds to the loss 
for the other (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993, 241). It is obvious that one actor holds more power than 
another if it can contribute more effectively to defining and shaping policy results. Its power over 
a coalition decision can be confirmed when its unilateral revocation of support means jeopardizing 
the feasibility of the coalition agreement. The more potential coalitions a group can destroy the 
greater its bargaining power (Raunio and Matti, 1995). The capacity of political groups to inspire 
and define parliamentary policies can be assessed through the concept of power and compromise 
in the light of 'game' and 'cooperative' theories. 3 Duncan Snidal's analysis of relative gains and 
patterns of cooperation produces results relevant to the understanding of the dynamics of political 
groups over policy-making within the European Parliament. Political groups enhance their 
possibilities of safeguarding themselves by building coalitions and generally the less well united 
their respective rivals are, the safer and more powerful they are. If the political groups decide to 
cooperate, each of them receives on every occasion a constant return to scale (Snidal, 1993. 176. 
192). 
Game theory relates to the interactions between at least two actors, while cooperative theory focuses on the 
dynamics of a concerted decision-making process achieved by establishing coalitions. 
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1.2 Rationalism/Internationalism 
Rationalism/internationalism, exemplified in the work of Grotius, Descartes, Spinoza and 
Leibnitz, emphasizes the exercise of reason as the unique basis for belief in contrast with the 
passive acceptance of authority or spiritual revelation (Wight and Porter, 1991, 13). It stresses 
the value of 'international and institutionalized intercourse' in the context of international society. 
whilst it acknowledges the moral strain exerted on the decision-making process, the pressure and 
distress of rationalizing political power and justifying the recourse to war, by appealing to the 
principle of the choice of the 'lesser evil'. In the Grotian Societas quasi politica et moralis 
diplomacy and trade prevail during the pacific intervals by attempting to institutionalize interstate 
dealings. Rationalists reject the 'high-low' politics dichotomy and hierarchy and often regard 
socio-economic issues as being as vital as military and foreign policy (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993, 
229).4 
1.2.1 Rationalism in the Context of European integration 
It is possible to locate within the rationalist tradition, albeit to different degrees, four theories of 
European integration - functionalism, neofunctionalism, pluralism and consociationalism - for 
reproducing the Grotian image of 'international society' and for their emphasis on 'international 
and institutionalized intercourse'. The various players are assumed to find benefit through mutual 
interactions in what is defined as a "variable - or positive sum game" (Mitrany cited in Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993, 241). 
a.1) Functionalism 
Functionalism is one of the traditional approaches of international integration which is commonl y 
associated with the rational school of thought for its characteristic of surrendering ideology to 
"enlightened self-interest" under the influence of economic growth, for its modest and pragmatic 
character of adapting to changes, for its problem-solving approach and for contemplating the 
primacy of economics in international relations as an antidote to the application of traditional 
power politics (Wallace and Smith, 1995, 140, Taylor, 1990, 126, 136 and Harrison. 1974.28-
29. 66). Yet, it can also be set within the realm of revolutionism for its universalist vocation 
Besides Wight and Bull's classifications. Viotti and Kauppi distinguish three streams of political thought: 
realism, pluralism and globalism (Viotti and Kauppi, 1993). Many of the features of rationalism fI:ferred to 
within this chapter can also be found within Vioni and Kauppi's definition of pluralism. 
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envisaging the creation of a world society, for its ambition of bypassing the role of national 
governments and gradually eliminating the nation states and for reviving the concept of 'historical 
determinism' present in the work of Comte and Marx.5 A functionalist reading of integration is 
neither based on traditional national units nor aimed at the creation of a superimposing regional 
state, as that would not solve the present discontents, but only perpetuate and magnify dangerous 
political cleavages at a higher level (Pentland, 1973, 75-76, 149). The telos is, rather, that of 
establishing technical and depoliticized units specializing in specific functions, which might lead 
to the creation of a world federation (Mutimer, 1994, 29). This entails the gradual demise and 
substitution of the state-system by an administrative network that fulfils the needs of the emergent 
global community. Functionalists are interested in eliminating the state-system in the process of 
building a welfare-oriented world society whilst acknowledging that along with international 
organizations, nation states remain basic units in the international society. 
Borrowing Charles Pentland's metaphor, the functionalist logic sees the state in the 
context of international cooperation as "the insect in a carnivorous plant" which while "attracted 
ever inward by the benefits, it finds that behind it the avenues of retreat are progressively 
blocked" (Pentland, 1973, 82). By definition, modem society generates a myriad of technical 
problems that can best be resolved by experts as opposed to politicians. A successful collaboration 
in one particular technical field or functional area would lead to further collaboration in other 
related fields by means of the spillover mechanism. Governments recognize the common benefits 
to be gained by such cooperative endeavours and allow for their further expansion (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 1993, 241). This can also allow for cooperative distribution mechanisms to balance out 
some of the disparities within society, whilst recognizing, however, the impossibility of realizing 
a 'perfect world' (Taylor, 1990, 179). 
Functionalists accept the net 'high' and 'low' politics dichotomy, which is also reflected 
in the distinction between Community and CFSP pillars (Mutimer, 1994, 26, Lodge, 1983b, 12). 
They also express their preference for concentrating on non-political aspects in the international 
workshops "where the nations shed their conflicts at the door and busy themselves only with the 
cooperative use of the tools of mutual interests" which may be thwarted by the increasing 
tendency to politicize all international issues (Claude, 350-353). In the words of David Mitrany, 
"[s]overeignty is not effectively transferred by diplomatic formula, but via a function". The 
accumulation of partial transfers of tasks from one sector to another leads eventually to "a 
, As Charles Pentland notices. not all functionalists agree with this determinist view and, in panicular with 
R. Lemaignen's belief that European integration represents a subsequent phase of the 'irreversible' 
phenomenon of nation absorbing province absorbing tribe (Lemaignen, 1964, 209-210 cited in Pentland, 
1973, 6S). 
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translation of the true seat of authority" and to the achievement of world society (Mitrany, 1966, 
35). 
a.2) The Role of the European Parliament in the Functional Model 
The definition of institution in functionalist terms, which can be easily applied to the European 
Parliament, is not only of a conventional organization with buildings and officials, but of 
"recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge" (Young, 1980,337). In the 
functional model, the European Parliament has not only to ensure a fair system of 'check and 
balance' within the European Union, but to accommodate the views of members belonging to 
different nationality and ideology. 
Although explicitly referred to the interest groups and bureaucratic and technocratic 
elites, their mechanisms of interaction can be compared to those of EP political groups, 
characterized by gradual changes of MEPs' attitude and greater propensity for cooperation. The 
emphasis is on the process of 'social learning', whereby MEPs "are weaned away from their 
allegedly irrational nationalistic impulses toward a self-reinforcing 'ethos of cooperation'" within 
their respective political groups and within the European Parliament and become more aware of 
their 'real mutual interests'" (Pentland, 1973, 73, quotation 84). This slowly allows for the 
materialization of new loyalties, directed at first not to the European Parliament, the common 
institution, but mainly to the other members of the group. These loyalties are not mutually 
exclusive and can be 'fractionated': just as a community is the sum of its functions, so loyalty to 
that community is the sum of particular loyalties to agencies in the community which satisfy 
functional needs" (Pentland, 1973, 264, quotation 85). MEPs' loyalties are assumed to be based 
largely on utilitarian assessment of the degree to which the European Parliament and the political 
groups gratify their individual needs. 
b.1) Neofunctionalism 
Set between the rationalist and revolutionist tradition of international relations, neofunctionalism, 
also known as 'federal functionalism', combines some elements from both functional and federal 
theories. Integration is considered a process for the creation of a 'political community' which 
resembles the 'supranational state' proposed by federalists (Pentland, cited in Lodge, 1-5). Along 
with federalists, neofunctionalists disdain the Tonnian model of society, the Gemeinschaft. which 
embodies a community whose aim is the attainment of the general welfare and whose roots are 
based on common loyalties and feeling of duty. They replace it with the Gesellschaft model. a 
pluralist type of society where conflictual interests coexist and where cooperation and integration 
can be reached through a convergence of interests (Taylor, 1983, 3-5). In the eyes of many 
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neofunctionalists, the objective of integration is still blurred but may lead to the establishment of 
a federation where national sub-systems yield, function by function, their authority to a central 
federal body (Leonardi, 1993,5, Cameron, 1992, 28). Although envisaging a supranational state 
as the end product of integration, neofunctionalists do not exclude non-federal forms of political 
system and direct their attention towards the process rather than the goal. As the process 
advances, the nation state is no longer the basic unit of analysis and transnational interactions 
beyond the management and control of national governments become increasingly more frequent 
(Keohane, 1993, 386). Unlike the functionalist universal tenet, neofunctionalism focuses on the 
establishment of a regional integration (Mutimer, 1994, 27). However, both theories place great 
emphasis on the concept of spillover,6 described by Leon Lindberg as 
a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which 
the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in tum create a 
further condition and a need for more action, and so forth (Lindberg, 1963, 9). 
The original goal of economic integration may be achieved by furthering the transfer of 
competence in other policy areas from member states to European Community level. Ernst Haas 
applied the concept of spillover to the ECSC which, by creating a common market in the sector 
of coal and steel production, raised the necessity for integrating the entire energy resources of the 
Community, such as nuclear energy covered by the Euratom Treaty in 1957, and gas and oil 
covered by the EC Treaty, and eventually led to the establishment of a common market for all 
goods and services. By the late 1960s, earlier predictions of progress in the field of political 
integration failed to occur, obscuring the general validity of this theory. Haas himself had to 
admit that a spillover from economic to political sectors and a shift of authority and legitimacy 
from national to supranational level were no longer automatic, but only probable (Haas, 1966, 
93). And yet, despite its imperfections, for some authors, such as Andrew Moravcsik and Jeppe 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, "[n]eofunctionalism is by no means obsolete" (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, 
19), indeed it "remains the sole attempt to fashion a coherent and comprehensive theory of 
European integration" (Moravcsik, 1991, 43-75). 
b.2) The Role of the European Parliament in the Neofunctional Model 
Haas's definition of integration extends to "the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward 
6 George (1991, 21-2.+) introduces a distinction between 'functional' and 'political spillover', while Tranholm-
Mikkelsen (1991,4-6) identifies three kinds of spillover: 'functional', 'political' and ·cultivated'. The latter's 
distinction is followed by Hix (1995a. 2). 
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a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national 
states" (Haas, 1958, 16). Integration is seen as a process in which politically significant elites 
"gradually redefine their interests in terms of a regional rather than a purely national orientation" 
(Hodges, 1978, 245). Whenever such a constellation of interests emerges, it results in a greater 
role for the central institutions and in the fostering of the integration process. The role of these 
institutions, including that of Parliament is crucial for the creation of a supranational state 
(Pentland, 1973, 122-123, 149). Neofunctionalists attribute great importance to elite interaction, 
usually formalized in system-wide institutions. These institutions sometimes act as arbiters, 
passive registrars of the results of the conflicts inevitably arising in such a system. Political 
consensus evaporates because the central institutions are not powerful enough to create the support 
for further integration. 
Neofunctionalists focus on the degree of alteration of elite behaviour through learning 
(Sweeney, 1984,25). Herbert Kelman's models of attitude-change can be applied to theories of 
integration and in particular to neofunctionalism and can make explicit the effects of conflict-
resolution among MEPs within their groups and within the European Parliament (Pentland, 1973, 
256).7 Individual attitudes are based on two components the 'cognitive element' related to the 
perceptions of the political world and the 'affective element' related to loyalties, values and sense 
of community (Pentland, 1973, 127, 129). 
According to neofunctionalists, the leaders of political groups support policies enhancing 
integration not out of general principles or ideologies, but on the basis of advantages perceived 
in specific situations. In addition, they may seek access to political processes operating beyond 
the national level. In both cases, while MEPs' loyalties may not change fundamentally, their 
perception of their political group and the European Parliament does in view of the fact that these 
institutions gradually become the most important source of benefits (Pentland, 1973, 256). 
Tensions occur to trans nationalize these groups, and gradually a new political outlook emerges 
to support such changes. In the neofunctionalist outlook, representative assemblies are supposed 
to deal with at least some areas of people's everyday life and to establish control over crucial 
sectors of governments more effectively than old-style national parliaments, which tend to lack 
expertise and are remote from the central decision-making. 
Kelman's analysis includes three levels of attitude-change: compliance. identification and illlernalization. 
Compliance operates through the promise of economic. political or symbolic reward. identification occur ... 
mainly through the satisfaction of psychological needs and imema/izalion results from the enhancement, lIt 
personal values. but the main external stimulus is likely to he new information gained through cnmmumcatJon 
or interaction. 
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According to Haas, 
Parliamentarians ( .. ) are part of the institutions which shape the emerging European 
political community (..) [they] are crucial actors on the stage of integration ( .. ) [as 
potential legislators and as catalysts for fostering the process of integration] (Haas, 1958, 
390). 
This view IS shared by Moravcsik who recogmzes the fundamental role of the European 
Parliament in fostering the process of EU integration and pressing for further reforms by "acting 
above the nation-state". Yet he rejects supranational institutionalism as a variant of 
neofunctionalism along with the assumption that international institutions and transnational interest 
groups play a major part in the integration process, independently from the member states 
(Moravcsik, 1991,43-75). 
Neofunctional integration theory suggests that a supranational entity like the European 
Parliament, representing the 'general interest' of the Union, seeks to increase its powers in order 
to oppose the attempts of member states' governments to put their own individual interests 
forward. Together with the federalists, the neofunctionalists believe that central institutions 
gradually would substitute national bodies in the exercise of decision-making (Ifestos, 1987, 73), 
by virtue of the spillover effect "across functional and to political sectors" (Cameron, 1992,25). 
The EP's acquisition of formal powers is advocated and seen as a form of progress towards 
further integration. Its compartmentalization into specialized committees, where MEPs and 
officials who are experts in their various sectors work side by side, makes Parliament the ideal 
combination of a political and technical institution. 
Early neofunctionalists attached particular importance to the role of political parties in the 
European integration process as "carriers of values and ideologies whose opposition, identity or 
convergence determines the success or failure of a transnational ideology" (Haas, 1958,5). Their 
creation and development within the European Parliament may be seen as a way to legitimize, 
expedite and foster the integration process. Party integration stems from political and cultivated 
'spillover', embodying the aspiration to elevate the elites in the European Parliament's spectrum 
to the status of European parties (Hix, 1995a, 2). Neofunctionalist incremental strategy is aimed 
at encouraging group interactions, to "upgrade the common interest" by educating its members 
to understand the advantages of working together which would ultimately lead to the emergence 
of truly transnational bodies, showing more loyalty to the European Parliament than to any other 
political authority, and to their political group rather than to the national party (Wallace and 
Smith. 1995, 145). 
The integration process can be evaluated by the level of involvement of the above 
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institutions and their capacity for representing and combining the conflicting interests of the 
various member states. The European Parliament can therefore fulfil an important mediatory role 
as a permanent forum for debate, conflict-resolution and coalition-building whereby members 
become acquainted with new rules and are progressively drawn to readdress their loyalties from 
the national to the central echelons (Pentland, 1973, 117). 
This view is not shared by David Marquand, who argues that neofunctionalism is 
"apolitical if not anti-political; and [ ... ] aparliamentary if not quite anti-parliamentary. 
Parliaments, after all, reflect political opinion and give expression to political demands. If 
integration were a technical process rather than a political one there could be no place in it for 
a Parliament" (Marquand, 1980, 1). On these lines, the powers of the Assembly of the Coal and 
Steel Community and the Assembly of the European Economic Community were extremely 
limited. However, as Marquand himself admits, "it seems clear that ( .. ) the founding fathers 
believed that [the parliamentary element] would expand as time went on" (Marquand, 1980,2). 
In this sense, two fundamental neofunctionalist attributes need to be highlighted: supranationality 
and political elites. The application of the principle of supranationality would require certainly 
a more active role of the 'supranational institutions' in the EU decision-making process. The 
political elites could find in the European Parliament the forum to lobby their political and 
economic objectives. 
If parties to a conference enjoy a specific and well-articulated sense of participation, if 
they identify themselves completely with the procedures and codes within which their 
decisions are made, they consider themselves completely 'engaged' by the results even 
if they do not fully concur in them (Haas, 1958, 522). 
In relation to the intra- and intergroup decision-making, Haas's three modes of accommodation 
can be applied. The first consists of reaching the 'minimum common denominator', the second 
involves 'splitting the difference' and therefore finding a compromise between the parties, the 
third and final implies 'upgrading the common interest', focusing temporarily on the areas of 
consensus and hoping that the areas of disagreement eventually fade (Taylor, 1983, 8, 0hrgaard, 
1997, 3, 16). Of the three strategies, "the second and the third yield the greatest amount of 
progress towards the goal of political community", although only the last mode epitomizes the 
veritable contribution to the integrative process (Haas, 1961, 369). As the German MEP Otto von 
Habsburg emphasizes, "the learning process of parliamentary representatives is witnessed by the 
fact that we have succeeded, after some hard negotiating, in agreeing on a common text" 
(Habsburg, 9/10/91, 165). 
For neofunctionalists, passionate politics and ideological clashes \\'ere to be replaced with 
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a problem-solving strategy, which was used effectively by the two mam groups within the 
European Parliament, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats as the only way to be able to 
make an impact on the other Ee institutions and on decision-making, as can be seen in the 
following chapter. However, the neofunctionalist motivation towards integration was considered 
reductionist by many since it inferred that loyalties followed rational perceptions of interest rather 
that non-rational assumptions of identity (Wallace and Smith, 1995, 146). 
One of the major concerns of neofunctionalists revolves around the process of 
socialization, which results from "the combined effects of the organizational context of decision-
making, the pressures of the crisis situation, the force of habits and procedure, the interaction 
with other political actors, the awareness of a commitment or need to agree, and similar features 
of the political setting, to force actors to a redefinition of their situation, interests and methods" 
(Pentland, 1973, 130). In Lindberg's words, 
"[p]articipants in the activities of central institutions may develop multiple perspectives, 
personal friendships, a cornraderie of expertise, all of which may reflect back upon the 
national governments and affect future national policy-making" (Lindberg, 1963, 10). 
Lindberg's observation may be applied to the members of the European Parliament working in 
close contact within political groups, specialized committees and inter-parliamentary delegations. 
This process is particularly conducive for the purpose of this thesis since it entails the mechanisms 
to bring about the required shifts of loyalties of parliamentarians to their political groups and the 
European Parliament, as a result of close and continuous working relationship (Taylor, 1983, 9, 
Lodge, 1989, 40-41, Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, 5, 14, 0hrgaard, 1997, 3, 15-17). 
Neofunctionalist theory discerns between the 'cognitive' and 'affective' factors of individual 
attitudes. The former relates to the perception of the political world, the expectation concerning 
the sources of interest-fulfilment. The latter, which is less 'rational' and is connected with 
loyalties, values and the sense of community, is favoured by neofunctionalists. Given the strong 
orientation towards utilitarian satisfaction and the various sources of such satisfaction, political 
attitudes of individuals tend to be multiple and internally divided (Lindberg, 1963, 6). Hence, 
shifts of loyalties and expectations are not deemed to be either total or simultaneous, but gradual. 
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c.l) Pluralism 
Pluralist/transactionalist or communication school8 can be placed within the realm of rationalism 
in both its descriptive and normative elements for its emphasis on international and 
institutionalized intercourse. Karl Deutsch, its main architect, envisaged as the objecti\'e of 
integration the realization of a political community consisting of an international system of 
developed nation states which, albeit without a common government, is characterized by a high 
level of international communications and transactions. Closer diplomatic and commercial contacts 
foster "a sense of shared community and trust" which make war between members inconceivable 
(Wallace and Smith, 1995, 153). However, there is no evidence that those institutions emerging 
to promote cross-border cooperation and communication, represent the "embryo of a supranational 
state" (Pentland, 1973, 29). 
Non-state actors represent a focal point in the pluralist paradigm, for their interactions 
within the states and other non-state actors operating across national borders. States are not 
integrated entities, but are composed of bureaucracies, interest groups and individuals that attempt 
to influence foreign policy through competition, coalition building, conflict and compromise. 
Against this background, pluralists challenge the notion of the state as a rational actor because, 
to establish a consensus or, at least, a minimum winning coalition, is a process different in kind 
from what is usually meant to be a rational and optimal decision. 
On pluralist assumptions, integration reflects the "attainment within a territory of a 'sense 
of Community''', by turning previously separate units into components of a coherent system and 
by fostering transactions between societies and changes in public attitudes within societies. And 
yet, there is no requirement for the abolition of the nation state nor for the creation of a unitary 
supranational state (Deutsch et al., 1957, cited in Ifestos, 75). Within a pluralistic security 
community, individual governments retain their legal independence (Hodges, 1978, 244). The 
process of adjustment in various spheres seems to constitute the terminal situation and not a 
process leading to a 'supranational state', although pluralists prefer the community-model to the 
state-model advocated by many federalists (Taylor, 1975, 13). 
8 Pluralist, transactionalist and communication school are terms used to refer to Karl Dt:utch's integration 
theory. Some scholars such as Charles Pentland (1973) call it pluralism, others, including William Wallace. 
and Julie Smith (1995), refer to it as transactionalism and, finally, Laura Cram (1996) speaks of 
transactionalism/communication school. 
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c.2) The Role of the European Parliament in the Pluralist Model 
According to the pluralists, the telos of integration consists of "an international system of 
developed nations" with no central governmental institutions. They admit the possibility of 
attaining in future a supranational European dimension, but deny that this might result from 
popular or parliamentary clout since governments still hold the monopoly over the destiny of their 
respective countries. Although designating the direct relationship between citizens and the 
European Parliament, pluralists acknowledge the restricted popular and therefore parliamentary 
involvement in international politics. In brief, in the pluralist paradigm, "no ( .. ) government is 
likely to put itself in a position of being swept out of power by a surge of popular internationalist 
[or Europeanist] feeling" (Pentland, 1973, 33, 38, quotation 63). 
Deutsch envisaged an increase in international communications and transactions that would 
encourage "a sense of shared community and trust". In particular, he stressed the importance of 
socio-psychological factors in community building, also associating loyalties with the capacity to 
provide security (Hodges, 1972, 19). This emphasis on the integrative effects of communications 
between members and its socio-psychological aspects can be easily applied to the political groups 
and to the European Parliament as a whole. 
d.l) Consociationalism 
The term 'consociationalism', coined by Arend Lijphart in 1968 and resurrected by Hans Daalder 
in 1974, refers to a model for deeply divided societies, a speculative instrument for solving 
disputes of inter-ethnic nature and a new pattern of international integration which has been 
applied by Paul Taylor to the European integration process (Taylor, 1990c, 172-173, 176). The 
theory, drawn from the domain of comparative politics, focuses on two main concepts: 
'consociation', regarding vertical relations between the states and the collectivity, and 'symbiosis', 
regarding horizontal relations between the states (Taylor, 1996, 79). 
The peculiarity of consociationalism lies in its ability to combine an advanced regional 
integration with the survival of existing national sovereignties. Its strategy focuses not on 
mitigating antagonisms between nations, but creating a framework within which dissenting 
minorities gain some degree of autonomy. The European Union can be regarded as a case of 
'cohabitation' of sovereign states which although preserving their distinctive cultures deliberately 
replace competitive political attitude with what Gerald R. McDaniel defines as 'politics of 
smoothness' (Glidllingspolitik) or the practice of accommodation and compromise aimed at 
reaching mutual understanding (MacDaniel, 1963, ci ted in Chryssochoou, 1994, 20-21). 
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d.2) The Role of the European Parliament in the Consociational Model 
Following the consociationallogic, the European Parliament, in its holistic approach, could host 
diverse interests by giving birth to a new socio-political entity which goes beyond the simple sum 
of its components. The ambition of creating transnational political groups is not within the scope 
of consociationalism which instead envisages the formation of multinational groups that can still 
maintain their political unity even without surmounting national barriers. The model allows for 
MEPs to coexist and collaborate within a group without the need of sacrificing their national 
identity to the accomplishment of their respective interests, and contends that despite language. 
religious and ethnic differences, a certain level of group cohesion can be achieved. 
'Symbiosis', used synonymously with 'mutualism', refers to a harmonious partnership 
between different entities in which the 'symbionts' eventually benefit from the association. It 
implies a state of affairs whereby two or more actors learn to live with each other, test their 
strengths for cooperative interactions and, if necessary, reconcile a welter of distinct and often 
conflicting interests in a mutually acceptable and advantageous manner rather than embarking on 
an exhaustive competition at the expense of the others' vital interests (Chryssochoou, 1994, 19-
20). 
Efficiency in the EP policy-making and activities can be achieved, according to this 
theory, by establishing a positive-sum game at PG and EP levels to accommodate both 
supranational, national and ideological predicaments, paving the way towards the formation of 
consociational partnership: an elaborate system of cooperative subcultures which practically means 
the achievement of a balance of advantages and costs for all the participants involved in regional 
decision-making, irrespective of their national, subnational or supranational origins. This would 
reconcile two opposing necessities: 'democracy' underpinning the need for the expression of all 
various opinions and 'efficiency' relating to the capacity of the segments to formulate policies by 
hammering out agreements through the practice of appeasement and compromise. 
1.3 Revolutionism/Universalism 
Revolutionists/universalists9 identify themselves with the moral unity of international society 
claiming to be totally committed to its achievement through the establishment of transnational 
social bonds between citizens of the various states and the gradual overcoming of the absolute 
supremacy of the state and of interstate barriers (Halliday, 1994, 99). Universal renovation and 
9 Terminology used respectively by Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. 
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radical transformation are constant attributes of this doctrine, which is not exclusi\ely addressed 
to states but to international organizations, transnational actors and their interactions. In antithesis 
with the realists, revolutionists reject the artificial dichotomy between 'high' and 'low' politics 
emphasizing that economic factors serve to explain the dynamics of the international sYstem 
(Viotti and Kauppi, 1993, 8, 10-11, 18). 
1.3.1 Revolutionism/Universalism in the Context of European integration 
a.I) Federalism 
A myriad of interpretations surrounds the concept of federalism, as reflected in its various 
theoretical underpinnings as well as in the political branches of federalist thinking. The moderate 
and more pragmatic branch falls perfectly within the rationalist school of thought for the emphasis 
on international and institutionalized intercourse. The radical and idealistic branch recalls aspects 
of the revolutionist/universalist tradition of Althusius and Rousseau with its intention of 
transcending the conventional nation states and its ambition of transforming international realities 
by going beyond the construction of a society of states. To this utopian vein belong writers such 
as Guy Heraud and C.L. Kohr who believe that by encouraging a new common political culture 
it is possible ultimately to create a world society and government (Harrison, 1974, 45). 
Integration is seen as a dramatic, revolutionary process as "the time becomes ripe for change" 
(Taylor, 1975, 12). This view is reiterated with vigour by Denis de Rougemont who insists that 
to establish this model of federation is "the primary, long overdue and decisive task, the real leap, 
the revolutionary and creative action without which we shall not leave the present plane of 
impossibilities " (de Rougemont, 1967, 348). 
Nevertheless, federalism shares the realist premIse of the birth of the Hobbesian 
Leviathan, a supreme ruler entrusted with the authority to maintain order and peace by the people 
in order to escape from the dangers of the anarchic 'state of nature' (Pentland, 1973, 147). 
Some authors, such as Murray Forsyth, focus on federalism 
as a type of government founded upon a foedus or treaty between states. It is the 
process by which a number of separate states raise themselves by contract to the 
threshold of being one state (Forsyth, 1981,2). 
In this context, the nation state is seen as a basic political unit that needs to be accommodated 
rather than abolished. By contrast, for others such as Heraud the nation state is nothing but a 
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'historic accident' which rational federal development would supersede. He visualizes a Europe 
des ethnies composed of collectivities naturally united by language and other cultural traditions 
and much more equal and manageable entities that the nation states (Harrison, 197-+, 45). This 
view is based on the Kantian tradition of International Relations which stresses moral imperatives 
enjoining not simply cooperation among states but rather the overthrow of the system of states 
and its replacement by a cosmopolitan society where the European federation is a step as well as 
a required catalyst (Bull, 1977, 1995, 25). Federal Europe can be created "on the widespread 
destruction and disillusionment brought about by the war by providing an attractive alternative 
to the rebuilding of the nation-state system with its inherent rivalries" (de Rougemont, 1965 cited 
in Hodges, 1978, 241). And yet, while representing the first and most well-known approach of 
European integration, federalism has been often denied recognition as a real theory in the 
traditional sense, for its explicit normative content and for privileging the description of the final 
goal over the scientific analysis of method and procedure (Mutimer, 1994,8). The final condition 
of integration presents an alternative to "national atavism and insularity" by proposing the creation 
of a federal union among previously sovereign powers (O'Neill, 1996, 23). 
While agreeing in principle on the goal of European integration, federalists disagreed on 
the methods to be employed to achieve a fully-fledged federation. The maximalists, among whom 
was Altiero Spinelli, author of the 1941 federalist Ventotene Manifesto and founder of the 
Mouvement Federaliste Europeen (MFE), believed that European integration was a process to be 
achieved through political means (Harrison, 1974,49). More specifically, maximalists intended 
to promote an international campaign aimed at persuading public opinion and mobilizing political 
forces which would culminate with the setting up of a Constituent Assembly, elected by universal 
suffrage (Marquand, 1980, 1). This assembly would draft a federal constitution endowing powers 
to the central government with regard to budget, foreign policy and defence, including provisions 
for safeguarding fundamental and minority rights. This text would be finally submitted either to 
national parliaments for ratification or directly to European citizens by means of popular 
referenda. Minimalists gathered under the Action Europeen Federaliste (AUF), to which eventually 
Spinelli converted, took the more pragmatic view that the federal goal could be achieved by 
gradual steps through the establishment of organizations such as the ECSC, EURATOM and 
European Economic Community (Harrison, 1974, 50). This dichotomy inherent to federalism 
makes it rather difficult to place this approach within the mainstream of IR theory. 
The great merit of federalism rests in the ability to reconcile the integration process with 
the necessity of preserving diversity, an element which represents a precondition of any kind of 
integration in Europe and of the prerogatives of the European Parliament. By dividing political 
power between central and local powers, the federal model represents a very attractive strategy 
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for uniting groups of states possessing diverse interests and satisfies the often mutually exclushe 
criteria of efficiency and democracy (Hodges, 1978, 241). Within a federal union, not only 
national, but also regional and local interests are duly represented. This emphasis on model 
privileges decentralization and, therefore, conforms to the logic of subsidiarity, a principle which 
Britain has promoted and which is now enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (Mutimer, 
1994, 18). The essence of federalism lies in the decentralization of power and not, as is wrongly 
perceived especially in Britain, in "a greedy form of government in which central government 
progressively deprives [ ... ] national governments of power, making them subordinate to the 
central authorities" (Lodge, 1983b, 9). According to Juliet Lodge, the hostility of certain 
politicians to the idea of a federal evolution of the European Union may often arise from 
ignorance and misunderstanding of its main principles. 
a.2) The Role of the European Parliament in the Federal Model 
Federalists give a salient position to the European Parliament which represents the focal point for 
the integration process for its ability of promoting the European idea and offering a platform for 
discussion (Spinelli, 1966, 154)10 and embodies the Lower House of the European federation, 
comparable to the US House of Representatives or the German Bundestag (Lodge, 1983b, 9-10). 
Together with the Council, which would become a legislative Upper House, the EP would rule 
"with the executive over all the spheres of activity placed under its control by the federal 
constitution" (Haas, 1958, 394). Federalists demand the expansion of direct and indirect 
democratic controls over the execution of foreign policy and the realization of the democratic 
system of 'check and balance' in the form of greater parliamentary powers at European, national 
and regional levels. 
In line with the Kantian perspective, the EP's vocation is to promote a "European 
perspective and not one that would be only the sum of the national ones" (Spinelli cited in 
Burgess, 1989, 135). This transnationality/supranationality element characterizing the federal 
approach is central to this doctoral thesis which intends to test the feasibility of this goal within 
the EP and the PGs through an investigation into two case studies, the Gulf and Yugoslav crises. 
For federalists. common needs or fears have the effect of producing common perception of the 
sort of political solution required, as well as the common loyalties to support it. Conununication 
and interaction constitute the basis of a collective learning process towards an increased 
awareness, trust and loyalty between the members of the groups. "assumed to be self-reinforcing. 
10 Altiero Spinelli, one of the founders of the Ventotene Manifesto and supponer of the revolutionist method, 
eventually cOIm:ned to the 'Community method' (Spinelli 1966, 154). 
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rather like the ascending spiral of 'escalation'" (Pentland, 1973, 252). Federalists assign great 
relevance to the presence of 'political will' and 'elites' favourable to a shift of powers from 
national to supranational institutions (Ifestos, 1987, 71). However, they allow for multiple levels 
of political allegiance, so that Members of the European Parliament can remain loyal to their 
constituency, nation and EU which, albeit of varying intensities, are not incompatible or 
conflicting. The approach presupposes that the desirability of European Union is widely accepted 
and envisages the establishment of new habits of collaboration between groups, new decision-
making mechanisms as well as the emergence of new attitudes or mentalities, but recognizes that 
the shift of loyalties towards the centre is not total (Pentland, 172-174). This engrenage differs 
from neofunctionalist spillover in so far as it lacks the latter's dynamic characteristics. For 
Reginald Harrison, it implies "the enmeshment of member units and the 'locking-in' of whatever 
integrative steps are achieved. It is likely to be limited in scope. It does not assume continuous 
progress and is not, therefore, invalidated by the conservative forces of adjustment which may 
be asserted in response to change" (Harrison, 1974, 244). 
The establishment of central institutions, endowed with certain autonomous powers, an 
effective decision-making process and democratic control, which would lead to the formation of 
genuine European political parties, is necessary for the fostering of the integration process 
(Harrison, 1974, 244). 
Conclusion 
The endeavour of locating European integration theories within the wider theoretical spectrum of 
International Relations has proven to be ambitious and challenging, mainly due to the difficulty 
of incorporating such a variety of concepts, often overlapping, within clear-cut classifications. The 
main theoretical assumptions relevant to European integration do not always remain in a fixed 
position within the three IR traditions since they often combine elements of different schools of 
thought. This is partly because, as Hedley Bull states, 
[t]he modem international system reflects all three of the elements singled out respectively 
by the Hobbesian, the Kantian and the Grotian traditions: the element of war and struggle 
for power among states, the element of transnational solidarity and conflict. cutting across 
the divisions among states, and the element of co-operation and regulated intercourse 
among states. In different historical phases of the states system, in different geographical 
theatres of its operation, and in the policies of different states and statesmen, one of these 
three elements may predominate over the others (Bull, 1977, 1995. 39). 
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And yet, such an attempt has been made with the aim of generating a debate that has been 
neglected for too long in academic literature. Another difficulty arises from the fact that "the term 
'integration' glitters with a multiplicity of meanings" (Abelshauser, 1994, 1), ranging from the 
creation of a fully-fledged federation of the states of Europe to the establishment of a loose 
concert of independent states: the Gaullist Europe des Patries. While the former stresses the 
totality of central institutions with a great emphasis on the position of the European Parliament, 
the latter focuses on nationally-based centres of decision-making, denying any role to the 
European Parliament. 
European integration was strategically negotiated, therefore, as a 'journey to an unknown 
destination' to enable member states' governments as well as the proponents of the various 
integration theories to interpret freely the real meaning of this nebulous term. The final hindrance 
to the explanation of European integration also stems from the fact that it is not a single definable 
event, but a "continuous series of processes" not comparable to other regional or international 
organizations (Harrison, 1974, 22-23). Any search for a self-contained formula able to describe 
theoretically the evolution of this phenomenon is "doomed to fail" as its interpretation requires 
recourse to different notions and analytical methodologies from social science and history (Hill, 
1994, 104-105). It is, therefore, not surprising that no single IR and integration theories can 
explain adequately the role of the EP and political groups in the integration process. Depending 
on one's adherence to the realist or federalist perspective, the EP's functions will vary 
enormously. Aspects of two contesting approaches under the banners of federalism and 
neofunctionalism are particularly relevant in terms of maximization of the EP's competence. The 
process of transnationalization within the European Parliament and its political groups can be seen 
in the revolutionist perspective of overcoming national barriers, overthrowing the system of states 
and replacing it with a universal community. Both paradigms accord a vital role to the European 
Parliament, retaining the view that the transfer of decision-making from the national governments 
to the central institutions is crucial to the integration process. Functionalism, neofunctionalism, 
pluralism and consociationalism recognize that, through a 'learning-by-association' process, 
members of the European Parliament develop a stronger cooperative ethos which can modify both 
their perceptions of political life and their feelings toward each other. They all perceive political 
groups, which are "composites of subnational, national and supranational elements" as generators 
of attitudes enhancing integration, although only rarely is this notion expressed in a theoretically 
coherent fashion (Pentland, 1973, quotation 222, 242, 251, 262). 
An in-depth analysis of the traditional integration theory has largely been overlooked in 
recent years. In particular, the learning and adaption processes within the European Parliament 
need to be filtered into any theoretical account of the integration process. The learning of 
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cooperative habits stressed by functionalism, the effects of elite-interactions indicated by 
pluralism, the formative influence of institutions emphasized by federalism, the socialization 
process analysed by neofunctionalism and the phenomenon of symbiosis emphasized by 
consociationalism - all of these notions that rely on similar assumptions represent useful 
conceptual tools for an understanding of MEPs' interactions. Pluralists and functionalists rely 
upon the generalized process of 'social learning' while neofunctionalists focus their interest on 
a more restricted process of attitude change among those individuals within a political group or 
within the Europarliamentary arena characterized by an active reorientation towards political life 
and by a high rate of political participation. This factor, which is examined in the second part of 
the thesis, is a crucial indicator of the achievement of the overall process of integration. 
The application of socio-psychological insights to the study of political integration can be 
helpful with regard to MEP behaviour within the political groups within the European Parliament, 
often neglected by theorists of integration. The extent to which elite attitudes are reliable 
indicators of the probable direction of integration depends on such factors as the internal cohesion 
of the groups, the structure of the decision-making institutions, the general distribution of power 
in the institution concerned, and the degree to which particular issues such as foreign policy affect 
deep-seated values or feelings among the general public. In addition, regular contacts among 
MEPs of different nationalities, either within political groups or the European Parliament, can 
generate the forging of 'European' attitudes and are important factors in enhancing integration. 
In summary, the previous theoretical survey has been helpful in reaching the conclusion 
that, while no single approach seems to capture the phenomenon adequately, a number of 
elements derived from integration theories can assist us in the search for an explanation of the 
expanding role of the European Parliament in ED policy-making and the evolution of the political 
groups. The Europarliamentary arena and the various political groups operate as a living 
laboratory, where an experiment has been undertaken - that of placing together members 
representing various national and political approaches with the aim of studying their interactions. 
Bearing these theoretical observations in mind, the following parts of the thesis focus on the 
involvement of the European Parliament in foreign policy and the influence of its constituent PGs 
in shaping the EP's stance over two major events of international politics, namely the 1990-1991 
Gulf crisis and the 1991-1992 conflicts in former Yugoslavia. 
II European Foreign Policy and the European Parliament 
Having constructed the conceptual framework for the European Parliament and its political groups 
in the wider context of International Relations and European integration theory, the thesis turns 
to look at the largely sui generis Europarliamentary environment, its configuration and 
organization with particular regard to its international activities. A brief outline of the reasons for 
the participation of the EP in the formulation and supervision of EC/EU international affairs 
follows. The competence gradually acquired by the EP in this field is then analysed through the 
following stages: 
1) The Treaties of Paris and Rome 
2) The Single European Act 
3) The Treaty of Maastricht 
4) The Treaty of Amsterdam 
This examination covers the increasingly interwoven areas of EC/EU External Relations 
and European Political Cooperation (EPC), later replaced by the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP)I which, in line with the so-called consistency principle,2 constitute the basis for 
a broad and holistic European foreign policy (Ginsberg, 1989).3 And yet, this distinction is 
External Relations refer to the EC/EU relations with third countries and international organizations in 
economic and trade issues. EPC/CFSP refers to the ECIEU political relations with third countries and 
international organizations, where sovereignty is fundamentally retained by all participating member states. 
It is appropriate to underline that, whatever the terms used External Relations versus European Political 
Cooperation and its successor the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Economic Relations versus Foreign 
Policy, and Low Politics versus High Politics, the basic distinction remains the same: while the development 
of foreign economic relations is derived from the provisions of the Community Treaties, the political aspects 
of external relations and its agreements are not contemplated in the Treaties in their original and subsequent 
amended form (Weiler, 1980, 154). There is a vast literature on EPC and its evolution into CFSP that 
includes Allen, Rummel and Wessels, eds. (1982), Allen and Pijpers, eds. (1984), Hill (1983a, 1996), 
Holland (1991), Ifestos (1987), Nuttall (1981-1987, 1992a, 1993), Pijpers et aI., eds. (1988), Ginsberg 
(1989), Schoutheete (1980, 1986) and Regelsberger et aI., eds. (1997). 
1 Article C of the Common Provisions of the TEU states: "The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency 
of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and 
development policies". 
3 In Roy Ginsberg's words, "Foreign policy activity in the EC is a process of integrating policies and actions 
of the member states toward the outside world. The resulting BC policies and actions are generated toward 
non-members and international organizations on political, diplomatic, economic, trade, and security-related 
issues" (Ginsberg, 1989, 1). 
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maintained in the chapter to reflect the diversity of the EP's functions in the Community and 
EPC/CFSP jurisdictions, respectively. By way of conclusion, a general appraisal of the progress 
EP and PGs have achieved in both areas is provided. 
1. The European Parliament and its Political Groups 
Among the European and international assemblies which have been created throughout history, 
such as the Nordic Council, the Atlantic Assembly, the Western Union Assembly and the United 
Nations General Assembly,4 all of which are still in existence and operating, the European 
Parliament is by far the most progressive in its ambition to become the prototype of a genuine 
transnational democratic institution (Jacobs, Corbett and Shackleton, 1995, xxi). One of the EP's 
peculiarities is the adoption and the evolution of a group-system based on political rather than 
national allegiance. 5 This institutionalized process of coordination of policy positions by political 
groups, gathering members ofthe same ideological tendency often from different countries, within 
the broad framework of the European Union, represents a significant catalysing factor for the 
integration process and a step forward in finding a solution to the democratic deficit of the 
European Union (Pridham and Pridham, 1981). 
Despite numerous weaknesses, the political groups represent, as Fitzmaurice argues, "an 
inevitable fact of modern political life", the core and the essence of parliamentary activities 
(Fitzmaurice, 1975, preface, xiii). With the exception of EP Rule 29, no mention was made of 
the existence of the PGs either in the texts of the original Treaties or in the Single European Act. 
Official recognition came only with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, with the introduction of Article 
138a which states that: 
Political parties at the European level are important as a factor for integration within the 
Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political 
will of the citizens of the Union. 6 
For a historical survey of the evolution of the party groups in these assemblies, see Henig and Pinder, eds. 
(1969), Haas (1958, 1960) and Merkl (1964). 
This structure was first introduced within the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 1953, the forerunner of the European Parliament, but the political groups assumed authentic 
political form and visibility only following the 1972 first enlargement of the European Communities and after 
the 1979 first direct election to the European Parliament, as it was referred to from 1962. 
6 The proposal of including the above article in the TEV text was advanced only at a late stage during the 
Maastricht negotiations by the Chairmen of the European party political federations, the former Belgian 
Prime Minister Wilfried Martens tor the European People's Party, Guy Spitaels for the Confederation of 
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Although suggesting that transnational parties enhance the process of integration by creating a new 
European awareness which may supersede national and nationalist thinking, this article makes 
G;nly a cautious reference to the action of political parties at European level leaving "the matter 
of their possible setting up and operation to the discretion of civil society". 7 
However, as Richard Corbett notices, 
Although the Treaty article has no direct legal consequences on the status of European 
political parties, its existence gives encouragement and legitimacy to the process, already 
underway (albeit very gradual), of strengthening the structures and procedures of 
transnational party political cooperation [in the European Union] (Corbett, 1994, 219). 
Subsequently, the Tsatsos Report, which was adopted by the EP on 10 December 1996, sought 
"to set forth and clarify the 'constitutional' mission and framework defined by Article 138a of the 
Treaty for the emergence of European political parties and the manner in which their continued 
development can be encouraged by the institutions of the European Union". The EP 
Report/Resolution stressed the need for regulating the legal status of the European political parties 
and defined the political parties as political associations represented in the European Parliament 
that voice opinions on aspects of European policy and international policy and are "involved in 
the process of expressing political will at European level in some other, comparable way" (EP 
10/12/96). 
Socialist Parties and Willy de Clercq for the Federation of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reformist 
Parties (Corbett, 1994,218). 
7 This view was also expressed by a minority within the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European 
Parliament opposing the adoption of the Tsalsos Report on the constitutional status of the European political 
parties of 30 October 1996. 
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2. The European Parliament's Configuration and Political Groups' Composition 
Over the years the number and the size of the political groups within the European Parliament 
have varied also to reflect the changes within the European Community/Union, in particular 
following the accession of new member states (Jacobs et aI., 1992, 1995). The present EP 
configuration extends to 626 members from 15 countries gathered in 8 political groups, except 
for the Independent members. However, since the case studies analysed in the thesis cover the 
period between 1990-1992, this section focuses on the PGs' configuration in that specific time 
frame. 
As illustrated in Tables 1 a-If, the 1990-1992 EP spectrum was populated by 10 political 
groups (except for the Independent members). The Socialists were the most numerous and 
gathered MEPs from far left state interventionist to more moderate social democrat parties. In 
terms of size, it was closely followed by the Christian Democrats, the European People's Party 
(EPP). Having been historically dominated by the German Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) 
Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) and Italian Democrazia cristiana (DC), after 1989 it became far 
more open to the inclusion of other Community groups within its ranks. As could be expected, 
due to the large size of both groups, their members were representative of all 12 states of the 
Community. The third largest group, albeit considerably smaller, was the Liberal, Democratic 
and Reformist Group (WR) with members of 10 different nationalities. Ideologically it was also 
rather heterogeneous with a combination of members from centre-right parties and a left oriented 
minority. It should be noted that, on 12 December 1991, the liberal leader Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing left to join the Christian Democrats, after his failed attempt to establish closer links 
between the LDR and EPP and create a more solid centre-right within the European Parliament. 8 
However, the goal of strengthening the centre and centre-right forces, especially with a 
view to gaining seats in the 1994 European elections and the prospect of EU enlargement towards 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was achieved by the European Democrats (ED). 
Consisting almost exclusively of British Conservatives, they joined the EPP as affiliated members 
on 1 May 1992 (Kohl, EPP Conference, 7/1991). This took place some eighteen months after the 
resignation of Lady Thatcher as Prime Minister and party leader in Britain, and would have been 
inconceivable otherwise, given her anti-federalist view and the 'rod of iron' with which she ruled. 
The European Democratic Alliance (EDA), dominated numerically by the French Gaullists, also 
included members of the Irish Fiamla Fail party along with a few Spanish and one Greek MEPs. 
8 Other French members of the group, Alain Lamassoure, Jeannot Lacaze and Robert Hersant. followed the 
liberal leader into the EPP. 
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Stemming from ideological schisms, the extreme left wing of the European Parliament was split 
into two groups the Left Unity (LU) and the European Unitarian Left (EUL).9 The former 
comprised members of the French, Greek and Portuguese communist parties and one MEP from 
the Irish Workers' Party. They shared an orthodox communist ideology and overall were hostile 
towards further European integration. The latter was composed essentially of members of the 
Italian Reformist Communist Party, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) , which represented a 
strong opposition force in the complex Italian political scene at the time. In February 1991, 
following the Rimini conference, the party embraced new concepts of political democracy as well 
as a new socialist doctrine and renamed itself as the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) , 
the Democratic Party of the Left. While the German, French, British and Spanish Socialists 
recognized the new-born party, the Italian Socialist Chairman Bettino Craxi refused to recognize 
the PDS, vetoing its incorporation in the Socialist International for fear that it would interfere 
with the strategy of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). This prevented the EUL from merging with 
the Socialist group within the European Parliament right up until the beginning of 1993. This 
eventual increase in members of the Socialist group was aimed at counterbalancing the British 
Conservatives' move to the EPP group. 
In addition, there were the European Right (ER) and the Rainbow group, the so-called 
technical groups, which incorporated members from different parties, and in the case of the latter, 
with even dissimilar political convictions, who joined simply in order to be able to benefit from 
certain administrative and economic facilities and procedural rights exclusively available to official 
political groups. The ER consisted almost exclusively of members from Jean-Marie Le Pen's 
Front National and the Italian Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) up until 1989, when due to the 
admission of a German Republican MEP with differing views over the South Tyrol issue, the MSI 
broke away to sit as independents. During the 1990-1992 period, it consisted of Le Pen's 
followers along with a few German and Belgian right-wingers. Due to their extreme nationalistic 
views, condoning and promoting strict immigration regulation and discriminatory laws, the ER 
was almost completely ostracized by other EP groups. 
The Rainbow group gathered members from eight different nationalities and represented 
a very loose political grouping, from anti-market Danes to Lombard regionalists, Lega Lombarda, 
Flemish federalist party, Volksunie and one Irish Independent Member. As a result, it had little 
political coherence and most members often spoke in their own names rather than on behalf of 
the group. 
9 The two groups had experienced a difficult cohabitation within the Communist group in previous legislations. 
as reflected in the low level of voting cohesion of the group (Attina. 1990). 
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Following the 1989 EP election, the Greens made a smooth transition from being Green 
Alternative European Link (GRAEL), a contingent of the Rainbow group, to a new independent 
political group in the European Parliament. Being biased towards ecological rather than political 
concerns, it was difficult to classify this group within the traditional left-right spectrum. Its party 
members were more closely aligned to left-wing elements within the EP over social issues, whilst 
being more closely aligned with right-wing elements in resisting further European Integration. 
Commentators, such as Knut Heidar and Ruud Koole, refer to political groups as 
"organized group[s] of members of a representative body who belong to the same (extra-
parliamentary) political party organization" (Heider and Koole, 1996,6). Yet, this model becomes 
highly problematic when applied to the European Parliament where the majority of the PGs, not 
only of the so-called technical groups, "are loosely coordinated umbrella organisations linking 
representatives from like-minded parties but with few formal structures, no real mechanisms for 
party discipline, and little internal cohesion" (Marsh and Norris, 1997, 155). Unlike the national 
parties, PGs are not directly answerable to the electorate for their actions and EU citizens are 
therefore deprived of their rewarding or punishing prerogative, based on the evaluation of the 
PGs' performance and effective commitment to represent their own interests (Attina, 1994, 3). 
As Euro-elections are still essentially based on national political affiliation rather that EP political 
group membership, the only constraints on the MEPs derive from their respective national party. 
This explains the reason why members generally look after their relationships with their home 
parties more attentively than with their political groups in the European Parliament (Auina, 1995, 
39). However, by virtue of a process of socialization, as discussed in Chapter I, 
[MEPs) feel increasingly more at home within the family of their European-minded 
group, and isolated in their own party at home. On many issues a British Conservative 
MEP is nearer to a French or German Socialist of the European Parliament than to a 
Conservative MP from Westminster, and a French Gaullist in the EP is nearer to his 
Christian Democrat colleague there than to a French Gaullist at home (Ionescu, 1996, 
353). 
Between June 1990 and June 1991, the configuration of the LDR, ED, Greens, EUL, 
EDA and LU remained unaltered while that of the EPP and Socialists varied negligibly and those 
of the Rainbow and the ER changed slightly. 10 Between June 1991 and July 1992 major changes 
occurred within the EPP with the entry of 5 French and one Spanish MEPs, followed on 1 May 
10 As shown in Tables 1 a-I f, the marginal numeric variations in group composition between June 1990 and July 
1992 did not affect significantly the various indices of transnationality on PG composition (lTc). For the 
formula of ITc see Appendix. 
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1992 by the merger of the European Democrats with the EPP enlarging the group by 32 British 
and 2 Danish MEPs. With regard to the Socialist group no major change took place with the 
departure of only one Portuguese MEP, as shown in Table Ie of EP composition of April 1992. 
The LDR registered a decrease of 4 MEPs with 6 French deserting the group, marginally 
compensated by the joining of one Spanish and one German MEP. Some marginal changes 
occurred within the Greens which went from 29 to 27 members, the European Democratic 
Alliance from 22 to 20 members, the European Right from 17 to 14 members, the Rainbow 
Group increased from 14 to 15 and then 16 members while the number of the Independent MEPs 
oscillated throughout the whole period from 10 to 9 and finally 12 members. 
3. The Nature and Role of Political Groups in the European Parliament 
Although the political groups within the EP can be seen as the embodiment of the distinct 
opinions of the European citizens, an excessive party polarization can be detrimental for 
parliamentary efficiency and its influence on policy definition since internal disagreements may 
diminish the EP's ability to pressurize the Council and the Commission. For this purpose, in the 
1960s and 1970s the traditional left-right dimension was discouraged as a deliberate move of 
"neutralizing ideology" within the European Community and of preventing the replication of 
traditional national cleavages at the European level which might hamper the integration process 
(Weiler, 1992, 33). In addition, it was felt that in order to gain more influence and playa 
propulsive role in policy-making, the EP should become more cohesive rather than engage itself 
in a hopeless ideological struggle between its groups. Even the Socialists and the Christian 
Democrats recognized this fundamental need by agreeing to cooperate. The resulting oligopoly 
inevitably raised protests from other groups that feared remaining at the fringe of political 
dialogue whenever their views did not conform to the Socialist and Christian Democrat policy 
line. This danger appeared to have been mitigated over the period considered in this thesis, 1990-
1992, by the fact that the ED, LDR and the EDA were politically close to the EPP, with the ED 
eventually joining, while the Greens and the Italian Communists held very similar views to the 
Socialists. As such, these groups could exert their influence by tipping the political scales 
(Westlake, 1994b, 187-189). 
However. as strongly argued by Robert Ladrech, the striking left-right omission in the 
parliamentary environment, initially based on historical and functional exigencies, needs to be 
readdressed in order to become more visible and identifiable to the EU citizens: 
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In th~ light of the heterogeneity of the groups and the absence of a government-opposition 
polanty, the left-right division could serve as the means by which public opinion 
comprehends not only the role of party groups within the EP but EU policy issues in 
general (Ladrech, 1991, 295). 
In a national party members have little liberty while within a political group MEPs enjoy, overall, 
an extraordinary freedom from restrictions imposed by the whips whose task is to ensure 
parliamentary attendance and supervise members' voting behaviour. 11 
Rule 2 of the EP Rules of Procedure proclaims that: 
Members of the European Parliament shall exercise their mandate independently. They 
shall not be bound by any instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate (EP Rules 
of Procedure, 2/1996). 
A paradox is inherent to the MEP's office between four distinct and sometimes antithetical needs: 
the exercise of individual political conscience in fulfilment of the principle of independence, 
regard for the opinion of constituents, loyalty to national party and loyalty to the political group. 
The last requirement, reflected in the level of group cohesion, is the object of study in Chapters 
IV and VI which investigate PGs' voting behaviour on the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, respectively. 
Instructions, especially on critical votes are issued by the groups, although the so-called 
free vote is accepted in some cases, particularly within small groups (Jacobs et aI., 1995, 92). 
MEPs have the right to deliver their opinions by also taking into serious consideration the views 
of their constituents. Having faced a similar dilemma in their own time, two eminent politicians 
Edmund Burke and Robert Peel criticized the practice of authoritative instructions or mandates 
which represented "a fundamental mistake of the whole order" by requiring members to obey, 
to vote, and to argue for blindly and implicitly, regardless of "the clearest conviction of [their] 
judgement and conscience" (Burke, 3/11/1774 in Hill, B.W., 1975, 158). The office of 
parliamentarians should not be held under "servile tenure" or any other obligations but "those of 
consulting the public interests and of providing for the public safety" (Peel, cols. 92 and 95). 
The central authority of the national political parties has extended to the European 
Parliament's environment due to the strong links between national and European political 
platforms. National parties can therefore exert their sanctioning power of expelling members and 
deselecting them for the following elections at national and European level. In January 1998, two 
11 The word 'whip', originally belonging to fox-hunting terminology. refers to the rider who bas the task of 
inducing the others to keep hunting the same fox. The whip system stemming from the Anglo-Saxon 
parliamentary tradition spread subsequently to other countries' legislatures. 
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Labour MEPs, Ken Coates and Hugh Kerr were expelled from the Socialist group of the 
European Parliament following their application to sit with the Greens as a protest against the 
planned welfare cuts announced by the British Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair (Butler, 
17/1/98). Again from the words of Peel, it may be seen that party dominance is not only a 
phenomenon of contemporary parliamentary systems . 
. .1 am under a personal obligation for holding the great office which I have the honour 
to occupy. I see it over and over again repeated, that I was placed in that position by a 
party, and that the party which elevated me to my present position is powerful enough 
also to displace me ... 
Already torn between loyalty to the national party and freedom of conscience, 
Europarliamentarians also have to consider their relation with their political group and bear the 
consequences of their unjustified absences from important votes or rebellious acts, by facing 
disciplinary measures which may range from the exclusion from such key tasks as rapporteurs 
or as members of delegations to the payment of fines. While traditionally power is centralized in 
the case of Socialist, Communist and the Christian Democratic and Conservative parties, it 
appears rather diffuse in the case of the LOR, EDA and Green groups. By assessing the level of 
group cohesion in the Gulf and Yugoslav cases, the thesis also indirectly tests the accuracy of the 
above general statement. 
As regards the conflict of loyalty between national and European obligations, it can be 
resolved through the logic of subsidiarity that foresees three levels of competence: local, national 
and European. The German MEP Klaus Hansch and former President of the European Parliament 
states that he is "a European deputy, elected in Germany, in a certain region of Germany" with 
specific interests in his constituency, similar to those of any national deputy, and if necessary 
particular German national interests. And yet, he firmly believes that "the best way to serve 
national interests, German interests, is in cooperation and joint European policies in certain fields" 
(Hansch, cited in Ionescu, 1996, 354). 
4. The Foreign AtTairs Activities of the European Parliament and its Political Groups 
During the week before a plenary session, the national components of the political groups decide 
among themselves over what official position to take and if they intend to comply with their 
respective government's policy line (Lodge, 1988, 129). Their decisions are then discussed within 
the political groups in order to reach an agreement. In order to have an impact on the EP arena, 
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individual political groups need to present a strong and unified position. This presupposes 
overcoming internal divisions and achieving party cohesion (Nugent, 152-153). The groups then 
decide who among their representatives should speak at the plenary sessions by taking into 
consideration the interests and expertise of individual MEPs, membership in specific committees, 
hierarchy principles, rotation and other general factors. It must be noted that the amount of 
speaking time afforded to MEPs is relatively limited if compared to that granted to representatives 
of most national legislative assemblies. 12 This is mainly due to the vast number of political 
alignments present in Strasbourg and to the fact that the EP operates in periodic as opposed to 
permanent sessions. 13 At the end of the debate members can make brief personal statements on 
certain topics in order to reply to remarks that have been unfairly addressed to them, to clarify 
their position or to notify the House of a change of attitude in the light of new factors which have 
emerged (Rule 108 EP Rules of Procedure). 14 Sometimes the plenary session can be suspended 
when additional elements arise in order to enable the political groups to debate them. In fact, as 
Karlheinz Neunreither highlights, "no important matter is treated in plenary sessions without 
having been discussed previously by the political groups" (Neunreither, 1960, 484). 
At the end of these meetings, the leaders of the various groups convene to consult each 
other over the various major topics on the agenda and to negotiate the list of the urgent and 
topical questions to be discussed. This debate which takes place on Thursdays, represents an 
opportunity for MEPs to express their views on current international issues and attracts the 
attention of the media as well as the governments of the third countries concerned. In addition, 
it is noteworthy for privileging the role of political groups to that of the committees: by virtue 
of Rule 47 of the EP Rules of Procedure, a political group or at least 29 MEPs can request a 
12 
13 
14 
The President, in agreement with the Chairmen of the PGs, allocates a fixed speaking time for each debate 
prior to the opening of the part-session. Rule 83 of EP Procedures set the guidelines (based on the d'Hondt 
system) for such distribution between members with a first small fraction of time equally divided among 
political groups and an additional and larger fraction allocated in accordance with the size of the political 
group. Time is awarded to the Independent MEPs on the basis of the percentage given to the other political 
groups. This is then doubled in order to take into consideration the different opinions of these members. See 
Corbett et aI., 1995, 145. 
Further sessions can exceptionally be convened by the President, at the request of one third of MEPs or at 
the request of the Commission or the Council. 
Rule 8S, EP Rules of Procedures, February 1992 now Rule 108 Rules of Procedures, February 1996 
(unmodified text) states: 
"1. A member who asks to make a personal statement shall be heard at the end of the discussion of the item 
of the agenda dealt with or when the minutes of the sitting to which the request for leave to speak refers are 
considered for approval. 
2. The Members concerned may not speak on substantive matters but shall confine his observations to 
rebutting any remarks that have been attributed to him, or to correcting observations that he himself has 
made. 
3. Unless Parliament decides otherwise. no personal statement shall last for more than three minutes-. 
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debate on topical and urgent subjects if linked to a motion for a resolution regarding human 
rights, natural disasters and international crises. Although the choice and order of these issues is 
usually the result of compromise between the large groups, it is not impossible even for a small 
group to object (Jacobs et aI., 1995, 157, 273). 
By this stage, common texts are often agreed between the various groups, showing that 
the coalition-building process starts much earlier than the actual submission of the motions for 
resolutions at the plenary, in order to facilitate their adoption and generally to improve 
parliamentary efficiency in view of the EP's increased workload (Grunert interview, 24/1/1996). 
No group individually can reach a majority in the European Parliament, hence coalitions are 
necessary for any decision. Whilst this does not imply necessarily that coalitions have to be built 
prior to submitting any text to the plenary, previous consultations certainly ease the process and 
enhance the prospect of the motion being approved (Rocard written interview, 2217/1995). This 
necessity is especially felt by small groups, as the Greek left-wing MEP, Alexandros Alavanos, 
confirmed (Alavanos written interview). 
Negotiations are carried out, debates held, working parties occasionally established and 
meetings between groups' leaders also organized to find out whether joint resolutions can be 
drafted. Political groups can request roll-call votes in order to record their positions on specific 
issues, to monitor members' compliance with the group line or to embarrass other groups by 
forcing them to reveal their opinions publicly (Jacobs et aI., 1995, 160, Westlake, 1994b, 189). 
Roll-call votes can also bear the symbolic function of celebrating parliamentary consensus on 
certain questions (Attina, 1986, 138). 
The main objective of the political groups is to formulate stances encouraging the House 
to translate them into the European Parliament's official policy. If strong intragroup and 
intergroup discrepancies persist and cannot be healed, the ability of the European Parliament to 
influence the Council is greatly weakened. By contrast, the chance that a parliamentary resolution 
may become the object of real interest by the Council can be increased if a the House reaches a 
substantial majority (Lodge, 1988, 129). In this sense, the creation of political groups can assist 
to promote the achievement of parallel national, supranational and international political aims, 
through a process of 'Europeanization' and socialization. 
PGs also play a decisive part in the internal organization of the European Parliament, 
particularly in the appointment of the members of the Standing Committees and of inter-
parliamentary delegations. There are three committees and two subcommittees which cover 
various aspects of the EU foreign policy: the Foreign and Security Committee, previously known 
as Political Affairs Committee with its Subcommittees on Security and Disarmament and on 
Human Rights, the External Economic Committee and the Development Committee. The first can 
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draft recommendations to the Council in its areas of responsibility after obtaining authorization 
from the Conference of Presidents and upon receipt of a proposal tabled by a political group or 
at least by 29 members (Rule 46). In urgent cases, the authorization from the Conference of 
Presidents is provided by the President who can also authorize an emergency meeting of the 
committee concerned (Rule 92). The Subcommittee on Human Rights prepares a detailed yearly 
Report on the situation of human rights in the various regions of the world (Jacobs et al., 1995, 
106, 108-109, 289). The External Economic Committee deals with trade and commercial 
agreements with third countries, whilst the Development Committee monitors EU policy with 
developing countries, the application of the Lome Conventions with ACP countries, tables 
resolutions calling for emergency and food aid and for a more open North-South dialogue 
(Westlake, 1994b, 210-211). Although often their activities overlap, a net division of competence 
is maintained between committees, reflecting the Community/CFSP pillar structure. 
Proposals for recommendations enclosing brief explanatory statements and, if relevant, 
the opinions of the committees consulted are then submitted to Parliament prior to being 
forwarded to the Council (Rule 46). In order to express its opinion in foreign policy, the EP often 
reqUIres an in-depth study on a specific subject, a task which is imparted to competent 
committees. 
The European Parliament also accommodates delegations that represent important 
parliamentary bodies closely involved in the EU international activities through consultation -
mainly with members of the parliaments of third countries. These delegations, which meet 
regularly in the country concerned or in the Union, represent a valuable source of information: 
they represent what David Millar defines as "the eyes and ears of the European Parliament" 
(Millar, 1991, 148). The members of the delegations are selected in order to include 
representatives of most political groups. Unlike the committees, delegations do not have right to 
accede or present reports to plenary, but they can introduce reports to the Conference of the 
Presidents which forwards them, for information, to the competent committee (Neunreither, 1990, 
172). While the plenary sessions remain as "a publicity vehicle for the EP", decisions are 
informally but effectively negotiated by the political groups at committee level (Miles, 12). 
In the fulfilment of their functions, the members of the political groups are assisted by 
officials who pursue administrative tasks, draft working documents and liaise with sister parties 
of the various members states or even with third countries (Jacobs et al.. 1995, 88). Despite the 
introduction of EP direct elections, the different electoral procedures of the various member states 
and the drafting of national lists have so far hindered the realization of the Europeanization 
process. 
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5. Reasons for the Participation of the European Parliament in Foreign Policy 
More than forty years after the establishment of the Treaty of Rome and almost twenty years after 
its first direct elections, the European Parliament remains obscure to many of its citizens who feel 
distanced from the European political platform. Popular indifference, reflected in the poor turnout 
to the EP election, is largely the direct consequence of the minimal attention devoted by national 
media to the EP activities, particularly with regard to foreign affairs. And yet. advances in 
technology, allowing instant media coverage from the remotest corners of the world, have led to 
[an] increase in influence ofthe masses of people over governments, together with greater 
awareness on the part of leaders of aspirations of people, brought about by the new 
dimension for foreign policy operation. Certain foreign policy objectives can be pursued 
by dealing directly with the people of foreign countries, rather than with their 
governments. Through the use of modem instruments and techniques of communications 
it is possible today to reach large or influential segments of national populations - to 
inform them, to influence their attitudes, and at times perhaps even to motivate them to 
a particular course of action. These groups, in tum, are capable of exerting noticeable, 
even decisive, pressures, on their government (88th US Congress Report, 1964). 
This statement, delivered in April 1964 by the US Congress, seems to be accurate now more than 
ever before. Since it is important that European citizens' views are taken into account whenever 
crucial foreign and security issues are at stake, the European Parliament has the task of giving 
voice to popular concerns and of exerting its influence over the Council and the Commission in 
both external economic and political relations of the European Community/Union (Grunert 
interview, 24/11 1996). 
Yet, despite the changes introduced consecutively by the Single European Act, the 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, the EP remains at the margin of decision-making on 
international affairs, due in part to the nature of foreign policy and security "whose 
characteristics, confidentiality and rapidity, are difficult to reconcile with the functioning of a 
parliamentary body" (EP Institutional Affairs Committee, 211111992,23). For these reasons, most 
national legislative assemblies have resigned themselves to playing a limited role in their 
governments' conduct of international affairs. In some member states, such as Great Britain and 
France, the impact of national parliaments on foreign policy can be even more modest than that 
of the European Parliament (Viola, 1997, 112-114). However, as Jorg Monar aptly observes, the 
absence of effective parliamentary participation in foreign affairs at the national level can be 
counterbalanced by the fact that mono-coloured governments not relying on a significant majority 
of their own party representatives and, in particular, coalition governments relying on the support 
of various political alignments. normally avoid adopting foreign policy positions contrary to the 
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opinion of their respective parliaments for fear of being censured (Monar, 1993, I). Conversely, 
the EP is deprived of such a power over the Council. As such, any shift of power from national 
to central government can appear as a threat to sovereignty and democracy within the member 
states (Weiler, 1980, 157-158). It can be argued that the need for developing the European 
Parliament's scrutinizing powers on the executive for the sake of democracy seems pointless 
because democratic control is already exerted at the national level where members states' 
governments are still responsible to their own parliaments. However, when decisions are taken 
collectively by governments at European level, especially with the wider use of majority voting, 
it is exceedingly difficult for national parliaments to exert any form of effective control. Increased 
EP supervisory powers become vital to guarantee the democratic accountability of this policy-
making process and to compensate the loss of accountability to national parliaments (Williams, 
1991, 155). Unfortunately, EP strive to increase its influence have been viewed suspiciously by 
other EC-EU institutions and regarded by national legislatures as an attempt to encroach on their 
already rather limited powers (Monar, 1993, I). Similarly, MEPs from various political groups 
have sought to develop relationships with their national counterparts, but their communication 
channels have often been sabotaged by antagonistic attitudes taken by national parliamentarians 
(Lodge, 1996, 202, 203). 
The absence of an official government-opposition structure can be, nevertheless, an 
advantage as there is no parliamentary engagement to assist the Council and its members can 
express freely their views on international issues by either supporting or criticizing the stances 
taken by the Council and the Commission (Attina, 1994, 3, Monar, 1993, 4, Viola, 1994, 5). 
6. The Development of the European Parliament's Powers in the Context of Foreign 
Policy 
6.1 Community Treaties 
a) External Relations 
The Paris and Rome Treaties of 1951 and 1957, respectively establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC), European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy 
Community (EURATOM), initially granted a very confined consultative role to the Common 
Assembly over the conclusion of association agreements under Article 238 EEC. Subsequently, 
in order to respond to parliamentary demands for a closer involvement in the process of 
concluding agreements the Luns and Westerterp procedures were introduced in 1964 and 1973, 
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respectively whereby the European Parliament would hold a debate prior to the opening of 
negotiations of association and trade agreements with third countries, the Commission would 
regularly inform Parliament and competent committees on the progress of the negotiations of 
association and trade agreements and the Council would communicate to Parliament the content 
of the agreements prior to their conclusion (MacLeod, 1996, 98, Nuttall, 1992, 57). 
In 1982, the two procedures, simply referred as the Luns-Westerterp procedure, extended 
to the negotiations of accession treaties and all international agreements which had important 
repercussions on the formulation and application of Community policies, even if not explicitly 
indicated by the Community Treaties. Finally, in the event of strong EP opposition to the 
conclusion of these treaties, the Council agreed to open a political discussion between the three 
institutions. 
6.2 Single European Act 
a) External Relations 
Under the Single European Act, the role of the EP remained predominantly that of non-binding 
consultation, except for the conclusion of commercial agreements where no EP involvement was 
foreseen. The Council was expected to adopt international agreements in the field of research and 
technological development in cooperation with the Parliament (Art. 130q §2 EEC). However, 
when in 1986 Parliament revised its Rules of Procedure to incorporate the SEA provisions, it 
sought to expand its consultative powers to all international agreements by adopting a wide 
interpretation. 
The SEA also introduced the assent procedure under which the EP had a final say on the 
conclusion of association agreements (Article 238 EEC) and membership agreements (Article 237 
EEC). The Parliament's decisions, if reached by an absolute majority of its component members, 
were regarded as fully binding. Certainly, this represented a turning point for the EP in its 
struggle for power in the EC's international affairs. This assent procedure proved to be an 
important instrument for Parliament to assert its political priorities and as a bargaining tool to 
exercise influence over the decisions of member states' foreign ministers on EPC topics. Over 
the years, the EP made use of this power, rejecting on the ground of human rights violations the 
adoption of several financial protocols to association agreements with Turkey in December 1987, 
Israel following the events in the West Bank and Gaza in March 1988, Morocco in February 1992 
and Syria twice, in February and October 1992 (Corben, 1988). 
Despite the progress achieved, the SEA failed to resolve an important issue relating to 
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external relations: the EP's right to request directly the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to deliver 
its opinion on the compatibility of concluded international agreements with EC Law (Article 228 
(1) EEC). Yet, during the negotiations leading to the signing of the European Economic Area 
Treaty (EEA) , strong pressure from the EP succeeded in forcing the Commission to refer the 
draft Treaty to the Court of Justice for an opinion as to whether it conformed with the 
constitutional principles of the Treaty (Prout, 1992, 3). 
b) European Political Cooperation 
By the beginning of the 1970s, member states started to realize that it was increasingly unrealistic 
to pursue external economic relations without any harmonious and parallel agreements on political 
and diplomatic aspects. A process of information, consultation, concertation and joint action, 
known as European Political Cooperation (EPC) started to take shape among the member 
states. IS However, it was not until the signing of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 that 
EPC was formally institutionalized and the need for the EP to be "associated" with EPC 
proceedings recognized: 
The High Contracting Parties shall ensure that the European Parliament is closely 
associated with European Political Cooperation. To that end the Presidency shall regularly 
inform the European Parliament of the foreign policy issues which are being examined 
within the framework of Political Cooperation and shall ensure that the views of the 
European Parliament are duly taken into consideration (Title III, Art. 30.4 SEA). 
Due to pressures exerted by Parliament in the various reports, among which were the Vedel, 
Blumenfeld, Elles and Martin Reports, 16 member states' governments agreed to confirm some 
pre-existing procedures relating to EPC such as the Presidency's address to Parliament covering 
both EC and EPC issues at the beginning and the end of its term-in-office as well as after each 
European Council meeting; Annual written report to Parliament on progress achieved in the EPC 
sphere; Council Presidency's colloquia with the EP Political Affairs Committee, renamed as the 
EP Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security from January 1992, and Presidency's replies to 
EP oral and written questions on EPC (EPC Bulletin, Doc. 86/090). However, this final EP right 
was effectively 'discovered' as a means of obtaining an official reaction to parliamentary views 
only in 1989. The Presidency, represented by his foreign minister, was required to answer oral 
., For an extensive discussion on the EP's role in European Political Cooperation from the latter's inception 
in the 1970s up to the ratification of the Single European Act see Stavridis, 1991, 331-343. 
16 V~tUl R~port of 1972, Manin R~ports I, II and III were respectively adopted by Parliament on 14 Marcb 
1990, 11 July 1990 and 22 November 1990. Ltuly Elks R~port of 19 January 1978, and Blumenfold R~port 
of September 1986. 
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questions posed by parliamentarians at Question Time, which was extended to foreign policy 
issues in 1975 (Lodge, 1983a, 33). The European Parliament succeeded in inducing the Council 
to provide some feedback to MEPs on international questions following EPC/CFSP meetings. In 
the event that the Presidency was unable to answer all the questions on the agenda, replies were 
to be given in writing and published in the Annex to the Official 10urnal of the European 
Communities. 
In addition, the possibility was introduced of convening special meetings at ministerial 
level with the appropriate parliamentary committee on specific EPC issues. However, in practice, 
only a few ever took place due, inter alia, to the difficulty of arranging additional meetings on 
the already overburdened agenda of Foreign Ministers. Finally, the Presidency committed itself 
to transmit swiftly to the EP all declarations adopted in the context of EPC, a task that was 
subsequently facilitated by the creation of the EPC Secretariat in 1987. 
As regards the expression "due consideration" contained in Article 30 SEA, the Danish 
President-in-office Uffe Ellemann-lensen made clear in September 1987 that it was to be 
interpreted only in the sense of taking notice of EP resolutions, without any obligation of the 
member states to comply with EP opinions. This view was not shared by the Spanish EC 
Presidency, in office during the first semester of 1989, which expressed its intention to look more 
attentively at EP views on foreign policy issues by organizing special information meetings 
between the EP Political Affairs Committee Bureau and the Political Director of the Presidency 
and by sending to the EP written observations with respect to parliamentary positions on EPC 
topics (Monar, 1993, 2-3, Dupagny, 1992, 26-27). Another important step to enhance the 
parliamentary cause was taken in November 1989 when, in a joint session with Chancellor Kohl, 
Fran~ois Mitterand addressed the European Parliament on foreign policy, "the first serving 
President of the European Council to do so" (Clark, 1992, 158, Note 14). 
Despite the progress in the Parliament-Presidency dialogue over EPC, most of the 
improvements introduced by the SEA depended entirely on the willingness of the Presidency 
without involving definite mutual legal and official inter-institutional commitments. The European 
Parliament could "not oblige the Foreign Minister of the Presidency to be present at topical 
debates on foreign policy issues" (Nuttall, 1992, 57). In order to be able to address oral or 
written questions to Ministers, MEPs had to submit them at least five weeks prior to the opening 
of Parliament's sitting (EP Rule 58.2, Rule 59.1). Replies to written questions were relatively 
slow in arriving and often far too general. The three-monthly colloquia with the Political 
Affairs/Foreign Affairs and Security Committee represented the occasion for obtaining more 
substantial information. These colloquia could not serve any purpose since the Foreign Minister 
divulged information only after the events had taken place (Penders, 1988, 43). Finally the 
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outcome of these meetings was strictly connected with the personal attitude of the ministerial 
interlocutor and Parliament was still unable to influence topical foreign policy issues (;-..; uttall, 
1992,57). 
6.3 Treaty on European Union 
a) External Relations 
The Maastricht Treaty confirmed the consultation procedure as the basic form of EP participation 
in External Relations. The European Court of Justice specified that failure on the part of the 
Council to consult Parliament when requested by the Treaty represented a clear procedural 
breach. In principle, the Council had to take into account parliamentary opinion and required a 
fresh consultation in the event that the text finally adopted varied substantially from the text 
submitted to Parliament. 
Under the TEU, parliamentary assent, reached by an absolute majority of votes cast, was 
extended from the association agreements to a wider category of treaties which involved a close 
cooperation with third countries and had important financial implications for the Community. 
However, the value of parliamentary right of assent was reduced by allowing the Council to 
suspend agreements to which the EP had assented without previously consulting it. 
By virtue of its financial powers, the European Parliament could reject the annual budget 
and amend non-compulsory expenditure, impelling and even determining financial priorities in 
the context of External Relations and the financing of aid projects to third countries. 
b) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
Whilst reiterating many of the rules previously established under the European Political 
Cooperation mechanism, the Treaty on European Union sought to bring about improvements in 
this sphere, by replacing it with a new framework named the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). 
The Presidency shall consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic 
choices of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure that the views of 
European Parliament are duly taken into consideration (Article J. 7 TEU). 
However. the vagueness of the expressions 'main aspects' and 'basic choices,' left the application 
of the consultation mechanisms open to wide interpretation. In addition. no clause specified that 
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this consultation should take place prior to Council's decision, as implied by Parliament and at 
least accepted by the Portuguese Presidency of 1992, which also seemed inclined to assume that 
the Council was obliged to ask EP opinion on specific issues before taking a decision. In its 
resolution of 23 October 1992, Parliament stressed that it should be informed not only on the 
majority of the Council's positions prior to their adoption, but also on all related information. 
Nevertheless, the EP acknowledged the peculiar nature of foreign policy and its requirements for 
immediacy and secrecy, by suggesting the involvement of the Committee of Foreign Affairs and 
Security and its Bureau rather than the plenary to ensure prompt EP response to Council's 
positions without jeopardizing their confidentiality (Annex VII, EP Rules of Procedure, 
10/1993).17 
In a subsequent resolution of 2 February 1993, Parliament specified that "the Council 
should consult the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security in advance, possibly via the 
committee's bureau, on the joint positions it intends to adopt and the joint measures it plans to 
take", giving thereby the Parliament "the opportunity of expressing reservations on a particular 
text before it is made public" (Roumeliotis Report, 2/2/1993). The European Parliament deplored 
the fact that the TEU provisions relating to the CFSP were "based on an intergovernmental 
approach which reduced [its] involvement to the mere right to be heard and informed and to the 
possibility of making non-binding recommendations to the CounciL." (Poettering Report, 1994, 
9). 
With the introduction of Article 228a EC, the Treaty on European Union provided for 
the Council's adoption of economic sanctions and therefore "the interruption or reduction of 
relations with a third country [in order] to force or encourage that country to take or desist from 
a course of action" (MacLeod, Hendry and Hyett, 1996, 352). Sanctions, regarded by far the 
most effective instrument of EC external relations under international law, were adopted by the 
member states under the remit of the TEU as a CFSP measure, clearly highlighting the overlap 
between the two areas. Although the reason for such a course of action is strictly a matter of 
foreign and security policy which therefore falls outside the Community sphere, the means of 
achieving these measures belong to the commercial field which falls within Community 
competence. Nonetheless, EP opinion was still not required. In addition, it became evident that 
although the quantity of information made available to the EP had increased under the CFSP 
mechanism compared with the EPC one, its quality had not improved substantially, remaining 
17 AMex vn of the EP Rules of Procedure states that if proceedings at committee level are declared 
confidential the number of people present can be restricted, documents sball be distributed at the beginning 
of the meeting and collected again at the end without any note talcen and that the minutes of the meeting shall 
make no mention of the item discussed under the confidential procedure. 
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often vague and imprecise. Whilst the CFSP structure was seen as "mitigating the absence of a 
European foreign policy" and despite the bridges between the two pillars, the EC and the CFSP, 
regarding collective action, the problem of parliamentary accountability remained unresolved 
(Prout, 1992, 11). 
As a way to increase its weight in the domain of foreign policy, the EP could use other 
instruments in its possession such as budgetary powers on the CFSP administrative and possibly 
operational costs18 (Monar, 1993, 4). The EP could resort to its power of dismissal against the 
Commission which shares with the Council the right of initiating issues in the context of 
international politics. Theoretically, it could even use the motion of no-confidence against the 
Commission as a sign of retaliation against Council and the member states that appointed the 
Commission. Although the Verde I Aldea Repon stressed the strategic importance of effectively 
using this power, in practice, however, the EP never resorted to such a drastic measure which 
requires the approval of a two-thirds majority (Verde 1 A Idea Repon, October 1992). It is unclear 
what would happen if it were exercised and if the EP objected to the reappointment of the same 
Commission by the members states, generating an impasse. In addition, parliamentary ability and 
inclination to proceed against the Commission is narrowed by the fact that the EP and the 
Commission consider themselves as natural allies sharing an interest in the supranational EU 
development. 
In its Resolution on the European Council report for 1991 on progress towards European 
Union, the European Parliament drew attention "to the significant shortcomings in the Treaty ( .. ), 
whose structure, based on 'pillars', fails to incorporate into the EC Treaty the common foreign 
and security policy." Overall, the CFSP did not differ to a very great extent from EPC, nor did 
the position of the European Parliament change significantly in the two areas of EU's foreign 
affairs: External Relations and CFSP. 
The Treaty on European Union did not address the relationship between the legislative 
and the executive, where the executive was represented by two institutions, the Commission and 
the Council. The decision to maintain the Commission as the official representative of the 
European Union regarding the negotiation of economic and trade agreements with third countries 
and the Council when dealing with CFSP issues, contributed to the confusion surrounding the EU 
institutional framework and diminished the credibility of the Union. 
18 Article J 11 (2) TEU stated that CFSP administrative costs will be charged to the IT budget. while the 
operational costs will be charged either to the hudget of the EU member states or, upon unanimous deCision 
of the Council. to the EC budget. 
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6.4 Treaty of Amsterdam 
"The long night of Amsterdam closed on a note of bitter disappointment" for those who expected 
far more daring and radical steps towards to the realization of a federal Union (Dini, 1997, 
xxvii). The Treaty that emerged from the European Council Summit in June 1997 was formally 
signed in October 1997 and will enter into force only after ratification by all member states' 
national parliaments. The text epitomized the talent of politicians "for bridging seemingly 
unbridgeable ( .. ) differences ( .. ) or papering them over" (Common Market Law Review, Vol. 34, 
1997, 767). 
a) External Relations 
Pursuant to Article 300 TEC (ex Article 228), the parliamentary right to information is extended 
to any decision in the field of external trade policy, including the provisional application and the 
suspension of agreements with third countries. In addition, the Article provides for parliamentary 
consultation of international agreement However, as Mendez de Vigo and Tsatsos Report stresses, 
EP consultation is envisaged only after the Council has reached a decision with no chance for 
Parliament to exert any kind of influence (Mendez de Vigo and Tsatsos Report, 5/1111997, 41, 
43). Overall, the EP's involvement in the formulation and negotiation stages of international 
agreements remains marginal as well as its ability of influencing their principle and content. 
b) Common Foreign and Security Policy 
The attempt to develop further a European foreign policy failed since the CFSP's 
intergovernmental essence remained unaltered. During the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC) , Parliament proposed its own designs and strategies and stressed the importance of 
gradually replacing intergovernmental procedures of the CFSP with Community ones based on 
a qualified majority voting in the Council rather than unanimity (Poettering Report, A3-0109/94). 
In the EP's view, the revision proposed in Amsterdam was "confined to enhancing. up to a 
certain point [its] right to information and nothing further". No effective change occurred with 
regard to its involvement in Common Foreign and Security Policy, which remained largely 
outside its sphere of influence and therefore not "subject to fully democratic and controllable 
decision-making procedures" (EP Resolution, 11/3/1993, Doc. PE 170.288, 39). 
In compliance with the new obligation pursuant to the inter-institutional agreement on the 
CFSP finance, parliamentary consultation is introduced to the Council's annual document on the 
main aspects and basic choices of the CFSP, including the financial implications for the 
Community expenditure. Being realistic, the EP did not seek codecision power in the CFSP or 
Chapter II 55 
the right of dismissal over foreign ministers. And yet, ironically, its modest attitude was not 
rewarded considering that even a parliamentary request for obtaining an effective power of 
consultation, especially on the Presidency's negotiation of agreements on behalf of the EU was 
not fully met in Amsterdam. 
Just as the EP is assigned an insignificant role in the CFSP decision-making process 
(merely an enhanced right of information), the new Treaty totally ignores the EP - as 
usual - when agreements are being concluded in the intergovernmental sphere. Obviously, 
this is unacceptable for the EP, and only a change in the legal nature of this pillar can 
really resolve the problem (EP Report, 1517/1997, 39). 
This change would imply a merge of the two pillars and a single external representation of the 
Union. From the European Parliament perspective the Commission would be preferable because 
of its accountability to the European Parliament while the Presidency of the Council could easily 
evade serious parliamentary scrutiny at national and supranational levels (Allott, 1997, 13). This 
along with other reforms strongly advocated by the European Parliament, was ignored by the 
member states who decided instead to maintain the separation between the two areas and to assign 
the Presidency, assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council, the task of representing the 
Union in the sphere of the CFSP (Article 18 TEC, ex Article J.8). 
In relation to general responsibility on revenue, Parliament did not make any progress in 
terms of achieving full equal rights with the Council. Yet, it managed to prevent the adoption of 
the proposal of including the CFSP operational costs under compulsory expenditure, which would 
have resulted in a significant reduction of its power (Mendez de Vigo and Tsatsos Report, 
5/9/1997, 46). Although substantial limits persist on its capabilities in the CFSP, EP may still 
make use of those devices and levers, such as assent power over association and cooperation 
agreements and the budget power, previously mentioned, to persuade and bring pressure on the 
Council and the Commission and maximize its influence on EU foreign affairs. Finally, the 
European Parliament can resort to its 'ace', legally non-recognizable yet politically powerful, that 
is, acting as a moral force and conscience in the international society. It can offer an international 
and official platform for foreign leaders, public figures or members of opposition parties from 
totalitarian countries, allowing them to denounce facts and events which would otherwise remain 
unknown to the political world and the general public. 
After instructing the appropriate committees to carry out investigations and its delegations 
to undertake visits to the countries concerned, the EP can take overt and critical stances against 
EU member states' as well as third countries' governments. These can be a cause of great 
embarrassment to the latter and damage EU member state governments' general reputation for 
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competence. To provide just two examples: the Dalai Lama's address to the European Parliament 
raised public awareness of the Tibetan question and attracted world condemnation of the Chinese 
government, while the speech of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO), increased sympathy for the sufferings of the Palestinian population in Israeli 
occupied territories (Neunreither, 1990, 177, Elles, J., 1990,72). 
7. Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: the Role of the European Parliament and its 
Political Groups 
The fundamental problem of the European Parliament in aspiring to participate in foreign policy-
making consists in the largely declamatory character of its functions in international relations. 
Although it might seem wishful thinking and, to a certain extent, advantageous for the European 
Council Presidency to be sustained by the EP over foreign affairs, this support is neither legally 
nor politically required. Parliamentary opinions and resolutions in this domain are not binding on 
the European Council which is not accountable to the European Parliament. Notwithstanding the 
progress achieved in the relationship between the Council and the Parliament in terms of briefing 
and communication, as previously seen, there continues to be a substantial information and 
consultation deficit between the two institutions as the Council is still far from taking into 
consideration parliamentary opinion. Political groups working on their account either in 
competition or in cooperation with others can fill, to a certain extent, this lacuna (Lodge, 1988, 
127-129). 
As to the method and the modalities according to which the major party groups operate 
in order to influence foreign issues, it emerges that the various groups compete among themselves 
to determine the EP's official policy or to sway a committee in a certain direction by requesting 
an urgent debate, where a good knowledge and insight into issues in question can be an 
advantage. In addition, "the mere existence of a party group does not imply that it will be easy 
to secure consensus within that group as to what the official party line should be" (Lodge, 1988, 
128). Within the political groups it is possible to reconcile differences of views and temper 
extreme opinions in order to achieve a consensus based on political rather than national terms. 
Their efforts to overcome national barriers by an exchange of views among its MEPs are 
maximized when dealing with foreign affairs issues, since the individual members' contributions 
derive from distinctive cultural, historical and geopolitical sensitivities to the questions at hand 
(Silvestro, 1974). 
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As Simon Hix argues, 
When the EU agenda includes [foreign] questions, ( .. ) a system of articulation in the main 
decision-making arenas based on national government representation is inadequate [to 
respond to external challenges and to link] between public wishes and political outputs. 
This is where transnational parties could playa role (Hix, 1995b, 537). 
The presence of political parties constitutes a key factor for enhancing a process of politicization 
within the European Union. On several occasions, the EP political groups have played a major 
part in foreign policy. For example, the Socialists have developed links with sister parties outside 
the EC and contacts with member states' national parties within the ambit of the Socialist 
Confederation. Even prior to the EP direct elections, they sent delegations to Sweden, Norway, 
Austria, Portugal and Malta, providing financial assistance to Portuguese and Spanish Socialist 
parties in their respective election campaigns to restore democracy (Pridham and Pridham, 1981, 
72). 
EP political groups have direct and frequent contacts with their Latin American fraternal 
parties, sharing historical, cultural and ideological traditions (Neunreither, 1990, 172-173,175). 
With the aim of promoting "a pluralistic society based on free elections" and "respect of human 
rights" in the area, the PGs stressed the necessity of establishing a parliamentary interlocutor in 
the region during a series of visits to various Latin American countries. Since 1974, delegations 
of the European Parliament and the Latin American Parliament (LAP) have gathered to address 
topical subjects, although the latter gained its official status only in 1987 (Neunreither, 1990, 175-
176). 
As the British Conservative MEP James Elles argues, another "example of the informal 
but emergent foreign policy role of the European Parliament" can be found in its relationship with 
the Congress of the United States of America, which has developed a similar kind of dialogue 
only with the Canadian and Mexican Parliaments (Elles, J., 1990, 72). Since 1979 biannual 
meetings have taken place alternately in Europe and the United States between the European 
Parliament and the American Congress in order to exchange opinions on three major areas: trade, 
security and institutional matters. During these visits to Washington, the EP delegation also meets 
representatives of US Administration as well as members of the Trades Unions (Palmer, Michael 
1981, 49-50). 
Since the creation of the ASEAN 19 inter-parliamentary organization meetings with the 
European Parliament take place annually alternating the site between ASEAN countries and the 
19 Association of South East Asian Nations (AS FAN). 
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EU (Neunreither, 1990, 177). Periodic meetings also take place between representatives of the 
Japanese Legislative Assembly, the Diet, and the Parliament (Budd, 1991, 144). Despite the 
absence of official parliamentary contacts with the Arab world, members of numerous political 
groups have regular meetings with Arab parliamentarians within the Euro-Arab parliamentary 
intergroup session (Monar, 1993, 5). While the validity of these meetings has yet to be proved, 
they remain important for the European Parliament given the scarcity of information about the 
activities of the numerous regional committees of the Council in Latin America, the Middle East 
and other areas, provided sometimes only through leaks or via the Commission (Grunert 
interview, 24/1/1996). 
Visits of Socialist and later Christian Democrat MEPs to several Central and Eastern 
European countries contributed to opening the dialogue between the European Community and 
the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, laying the basis for the signature of the EEC-Comecon 
(CMEA) common declaration of 25 June 1988 (Groux and Manin, 1985, 70). In the absence of 
certain necessary preconditions, for instance the mutual diplomatic recognition between the then 
European Economic Community and the seven countries of the former Eastern bloc, the European 
Parliament was prevented from acting in any official capacity. Against this background, the 
unofficial role of the political groups was crucial in preparing the ground for this recognition by 
the Central and Eastern European countries and for a new attitude of the then Soviet bloc to 
European integration (Neunreither, 1990, 173). Finally, in September 1988, Lord Plumb, who 
was at that time President of the European Parliament, was able to make his first official visit to 
the Supreme Soviet (Silvestro, 1989, 309). Since EEC recognition and especially following the 
fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, formal parliamentary relationships 
have developed and intensified with these countries with the aim of assisting them in their 
democratization process and of guiding them in the preparatory stages for acquiring full E U 
membership. 
Most political groups cultivate relationships with NGOs in many countries to support 
campaigns against the violation of human rights. They represent a key factor in developing and 
deepening links with corresponding parties in third countries as well as channels of information. 
On the basis of this accurate and constant flow of news, the PGs and ultimately the EP can take 
positions condemning the policies of countries responsible of human rights abuses and attempt to 
exert pressure for the release of political prisoners as well as to save human lives (Silvestro, 
1996,4). 
Political groups share the ambition of defending human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
For instance in 1973, following General Pinochet's coup in Chile, the EP President, reflecting 
the combined concerns of all political groups, expressed deep "concern at the events" and called 
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for a return to democracy. Chile's situation was condemned along with, "the restrictions on ci\'il 
liberties in the [former] Soviet Union" (OlEC Annex 165, 8, cited in Gaja, 1980, 199). This 
strategy of denouncing at the same time violations of human rights in various parts of the world, 
preferably belonging to different geopolitical areas, is adopted to accommodate concerns arising 
from both wings of Parliament (Gaja, 1980, 199-201). In the past while the Socialists tended to 
focus their criticisms primarily on right-wing totalitarian regimes of Latin American countries, 
such as Argentina, Chile and Nicaragua while the Christian Democrats censured mostly the 
communist dictatorships of Central and Eastern European Countries (Silvestro interview, 1996). 
Resolutions on human rights seem to enjoy a wide agreement due perhaps to the EP's 
determination to project externally an image of a united and coherent institution capable of 
exerting a moral force (Attina, 1992, 120-124). Inevitably, the priority given to the factor of 
'efficiency' as opposed to 'democracy' can obscure party identity and alter the voting behaviour 
of its members: 
in [these] circumstances, intra-group cohesiveness as such may lose most of its meaning, 
at least as an indicator of Euro-party institutionalization, particularly because inter-group 
differences would themselves be blurred (Bardi, 1994, 368). 
These general considerations may be useful in the analysis of the reaction of the EP and PGs to 
the Gulf and Yugoslav crises which follows in the next chapters. 
Conclusion 
The above portrayal of the European Parliament has highlighted the unique character of this 
institution, different from any typical national parliament or international assembly. As Richard 
Corbett emphasizes, the European Parliament is the forum 
par excellence where politicians from different Member States are in regular contact. No 
other group of politicians in Europe is in such constant contact with colleagues from other 
Member States. Inevitably, exchanges of ideas between political parties of similar views, 
between members interested in the same issues and between the political elites generally, 
pass through the EP (Corbett, 1998, 71). 
The combination of unofficial initiatives pursued by political groups and official measures taken 
by the European Parliament make it a resourceful and privileged body which relies on instruments 
and opportunities other institutions do not enjoy (Neunreither, 1990, 184). As such, the European 
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Parliament can support and foster the evolution of this politicization process and ensure a more 
incisive and effective impact on European policy-making in all areas, not least in foreign affairs 
(Lodge, 1983a, 40). 
By contrast, an Italian axiom reveals the other side of the coin of party politicization 
where political parties, which represent the quintessence of Europarliamentary life, become 'a 
necessary evil' (un male necessario) or even an 'incurable illness' (un male inguaribile) common 
to contemporary democracies (Silvestro interview, 1996). 
In addition, the chapter confirms the old prejudice surrounding governments' exclusive 
role in foreign policy, to be exercised in total secrecy and away from the 'intrusions' of 
representative organs and the public eye. ED Ministers exercise their foreign policy-making 
independently from the European Parliament, especially in the field of CFSP which is still a broad 
framework rather than an inclusive system. This has triggered MEPs' demands for a more 
transparent and democratic process. A paradox arises between the EP's expectation of being fully 
informed and duly consulted over foreign policy issues and the necessity for secrecy required by 
the Council as a strategic negotiating tool and as a way to avoid embarrassment deriving from 
public disclosure of differences of opinion among its members (Nuttall, 1992, 59). While at 
national level this low profile in the definition of foreign policy is somehow compensated by 
general rights of supervision and censure over the executive, at the European level the Council 
of Ministers remains unaccountable to the European Parliament. 20 By exercising direct and 
indirect pressures over the Council through its national political parties, the EP political groups 
can attempt to counterbalance the absence of EP's official power in foreign policy. They can 
operate as intermediaries, channels of information and communication as well as meeting points 
between national and European political stances. 
The Single European Act and the Treaty of European Union enhanced parliamentary 
involvement in European foreign policy, by introducing a right of assent on many international 
agreements and the need for the Council to take into account EP's views on EPC/CFSP issues. 
Nonetheless, the various reforms have often been interpreted by the Council in minimalist terms, 
highlighting the facts that no legal revision can make up for the lack of political will and that the 
decision over complying with these rules ultimately rests with the member states. The 
Intergovernmental Conference, which culminated with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 
June 1997, has not changed this reality. It even failed to endorse on paper parliamentary requests 
for the establishment of an international personality for the Union, the incorporation of the CFSP 
20 Dominated by the executives, most national parliaments have ceased to be a meaningful mechanism of 
accountability. This represents certainly an aberration in a modern and democratic society (Viola. 1997). 
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in the Community pillar in order to bring together all provisions concerning the various aspects 
of European foreign policy and the fundamental question of establishing an effective parliamentary 
scrutiny over the Council. The extension of majority voting in the context of CFSP, agreed in 
principle by the Fifteen, plus the renewed commitments to inform and consult the EP will once 
again rely on the states' genuine willingness to fulfil them. Against this background, the task for 
the EP remains that of denouncing shortcomings and unsatisfactory institutional developments in 
order to achieve a more democratic European Union. 
In conclusion, the European Parliament is still deprived of the legal and political 
instruments to become a real player on the international scene. The absence of effective powers 
granted to the European Parliament has inevitably shaken public interest and weakened its 
credibility in the eyes of the electorate to the extent that this situation might simply become 
untenable in the future (Harrison, 1990, 146). In an era of internationalization and 
democratization, a more decisive role of the European Parliament and its political groups in 
European foreign policy seems crucial to remedy this 'democratic deficit' within the European 
Union. Mechanisms could be introduced to guarantee Parliament's right to information and 
consultation over Council and Commission's activities in the field of External Relations and 
CFSp.21 And yet, only with the extension to the CFSP of the same competencies enjoyed in the 
area of External Relations or with the incorporation of the CFSP into the Community pillar, will 
the EP be able to perform a role consistent with the responsibilities of an international actor. As 
William Wallace and Julie Smith eloquently state, the European Parliament is still "hobbled by 
the looseness of its constituent parties, by the diversity of the electoral systems and the national 
campaigns through which it is constituted and by the resistance of the majority of national 
governments to any substantial increase in its authority. If there is any reconciliation to be found 
between popular consent and European integration, however, that reconciliation will have to 
include both greater visibility and greater authority for this directly elected Parliament of 
'European peoples'" (Wallace and Smith, 1995, 154). 
21 Joseph Weiler distinguishes between formal or legal legitimacy and social legitimacy. The EU has legal 
legitimacy in so far as all member states consensually allow a certain degree of sovereign powers to be 
surrendered to the EU. There are those that claim that democratic deficit can be overcome if more powers 
are passed to the EP. ensuring far greater parliamentary scrutiny of the executive. However. if the institutions 
still fail to gain popular support. they would fail to gain social legitimacy (Weiler. 1992. cited in Wallace 
& Smith. 1996. 152). 
III The Responses of the European Community and the European 
Parliament to the Gulf Crisis 
Having dealt with the general part of the thesis, its theoretical basis, its analysis of the 
composition and organization of the European Parliament and the political groups and its 
historical account of parliamentary involvement in the wider context of foreign policy, the focus 
of the research now turns to the two case studies. This chapter. in particular, provides a brief 
overview of the main events that occurred in the Gulf region between August 1990 and May 1991 
and analyses the resultant attitudes within the European Community and European Parliament. 
This aims to set the scene for an investigation into the various positions assumed by the European 
Parliament's Political Groups, which is undertaken in Chapter IV. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait amounted to an important challenge to the new world order 
established in the aftermath of the Cold War era as well as a major test for the European 
Community's ability to coordinate action between its members in the framework of European 
Political Cooperation. The crisis erupted at a crucial time for the Twelve on the eve of the 
Intergovernmental Conference which was aimed at revising the EC Treaties and especially for 
Germany at the final stage of negotiations with the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom 
and France over its reunification. 
1. Brief Historical Background on the Gulf Crisis 
The Gulf crisis erupted on 2 August 1990 when the Iraqi army crossed the Kuwaiti border and 
occupied the small Emirate. The invasion was allegedly motivated by the Iraqi claim on Kuwait's 
territory as a part of the Basra region which, together with two other former Ottoman provinces, 
had been unified to form Iraq at the end of the First World War. The breakdown of the Jeddah 
talks to settle the dispute diplomatically offered Saddam Hussein the pretext for taking up arms. 
Relations between the two states were exacerbated by the Gul f states' refusal to support Iraq' s 
economy following its eight-year war against Iran and, in particular, by Kuwait's rejection of the 
Iraqi request to restrict its oil production in order to keep prices high and therefore to maintain 
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or even increase Iraqi oil income. Saddam's personality and ambition to extend his political 
leadership beyond Iraq's borders were also significant factors. Yet, the official reason given by 
the Iraqi government for the occupation was to support an alleged coup d'etat against the ruling 
al-Sabah family. 
Reaction from the international community was not slow in coming: on the same day, at 
the request of Kuwait and the United States, the United Nations (UN) Security Council convened 
and, discounting the absence of Yemen, unanimously adopted Resolution 660 which fiercely 
condemned the Iraqi aggression and requested the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of 
Iraqi troops from Kuwait.I On the following day, the American Secretary of State James Baker 
and the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze issued a joint statement from Moscow, 
urging Iraq to comply fully and immediately with the UN Resolution. The US President George 
Bush, the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the French President Fran~ois Mitterand 
announced respectively that American soldiers would be dispatched to Saudi Arabia, that British 
naval units and aircrafts would be sent to the Gulf region and that the French aircraft-carrier 
Clemenceau as well as other naval units would join US and UK contingents (WEU Assembly, 
1992, 16-26). Saddam's proposal for a wider settlement of the crisis, also entailing the withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from Palestine, Syria and Lebanon as well as the retreat of Syrian troops from 
Lebanon was adamantly rejected by the US Administration, whilst causing divisions in the Arab 
world. Meanwhile, Baghdad announced that the Western hostages taken during the invasion would 
be sent to Iraqi and Kuwaiti military bases in order to deter allied air strikes. This manoeuvre was 
unreservedly condemned by the UN Security Council which demanded that "Iraq take no action 
to jeopardize the safety, security or health of [third countries'] nationals" (UN Resolution 664, 
19/8/1990). 
Eager to show the French public as well as the Arab world his distinctive approach, 
Mitterand presented before the UN General Assembly on 24 September 1990 a four-point plan, 
in the hope that the logic of peace would prevail over the logic of war. According to his plan, 
Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait under the supervision of the international community and, after 
the restoration of the sovereignty of the Emirate, general elections would be called. Furthermore, 
an international conference would be convened to discuss other problems in the Middle East, 
including the Palestinian question. Finally, the issue of establishing a collective security system 
would be addressed with the purpose of reducing weapons procurement (WEU Assembly, 1992, 
20). The plan was not accepted by Britain and the US, but Mitterand's gesture seemed to be 
In August 1990. in addition to its five permanent members, ~ UN Sec~rity Council coos.isted of Canada, 
Colombia, Cuba. Ethiopia. Finland. the Ivory Coast. MalaYSIi. Rumarua. Yemen and laue. 
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appreciated by Saddam who authorized the release of all French hostages by the end of October. 
This 'generosity' on the part of the Iraqi leader was considered as belying the intention of 
breaking international and European solidarity over the hostage issue. Against the commitment 
"not to send representatives to negotiate with Iraq" made by the Twelve on 28 October 1990 
(Europe, 28/10/1990), other member states' governments decided, under strong domestic 
pressures, to authorize or, at least, to close their eyes to the 'pilgrimage' to Baghdad of many 
politicians, public figures and private citizens. 
On 29 November 1990, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678 granting Iraq a 
final chance to withdraw from Kuwait and to implement fully by 15 January 1991 all eleven UN 
Resolutions on the crisis, guaranteeing in return that retaliatory measures would not be taken. 
Should Iraq not comply, the Council authorized "the use of all necessary means ( .. ) to restore 
international peace and security in the area". On the following day, President Bush extended an 
invitation to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz for a meeting in Washington and proposed to 
send Baker to Baghdad. To convey this message and show to the public that no peaceful avenues 
had been spared, a summit was held between Aziz and Baker in Geneva on 9 January. However, 
the seven-hour discussion did not produce the desired results due to the inflexibility of both 
parties (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 260). 
On 14 January 1991, the eve of the expiry of the ultimatum, Mitterand presented before 
the Security Council a last-minute initiative which entailed a commitment of non-reprisal from 
Iraq's Arab neighbours, support for further negotiations regarding Kuwait and the settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict in return for the announcement and commencement of a full-scale exit 
of Iraqi forces from the Emirate, in accordance with a pre-planned timetable. The US rejected 
the French initiative on grounds that ties between the Kuwait and Palestine questions were 
unacceptable, whilst the British drafted a much more hard-line text which risked dividing the 
Security Council. Yet the feared split did not occur as Saddam refused all the proposals, including 
Mitterand's 'olive branch', which proved to be the epilogue of all the attempts to resolve the 
crisis peacefully (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 274). 
On 17 January 1991 at 3 a.m. Gulf time, Operation Desert Storm commenced with US, 
British, French, Italian and Saudi air forces engaging strategic targets such as power stations, oil 
installations, telephone exchanges and roads as well as nuclear, chemical, biological research 
establishments and military bases, also causing civilian casualties. In February 1991, a new peace 
plan was drafted by the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev who proposed a more flexible 
timetable for the withdrawal, a ceasefire at the start of the evacuation, the suspension of 
sanctions, a guarantee of non-aggression and a loose undertaking regarding an international 
settlement to the Palestinian issue. As the Soviets waited for a formal Iraqi response, the French 
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cold-shouldered the Soviet proposal (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 381), whilst Britain and 
the United States objected to the initiative, not least because of its linkage with Palestine and the 
impact that a ceasefire might have in strategic military terms. On 21 February, Saddam delivered 
a speech which seemed a prelude to a clear Iraqi rejection of the proposal, so that when the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister presented in Moscow an official response, the Soviets were surprised to receive 
a conditional acceptance of the plan. Iraqi withdrawal would commence two days after a ceasefire 
and as soon as two-thirds of Iraqi forces had left Kuwait, sanctions against Iraq should be lifted. 
Washington ignored Baghdad's acceptance of Gorbachev's plan, deflected the Kremlin from 
submitting the proposal to the UN Security Council and delivered an ultimatum to Saddam to start 
leaving Kuwait by 23 February and to complete the evacuation within one week. Washington's 
conduct, which in the past would have infuriated Moscow and shaken the world, did not lead on 
this occasion to an irreconcilable wedge being driven between them and, instead, produced only 
mild Soviet criticism. On the morning of 24 February, the land offensive began with allied 
bombers attacking an entire Iraqi convoy, still armed and loaded with plunder, retreating from 
Kuwait City and proceeding north towards Basra. Although the attack was an unmitigated military 
success, forcing Saddam to comply with the UN Resolutions and accelerating the conclusion of 
the war, accusations rose of an inhumane and unnecessary US slaughter against the Iraqis 
(Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 244-245). On 26 February, Kuwait City was liberated and 
two days later, the war between the Allies and Iraq officially ended. 
One of the consequences of the Gulf War was the brutal repression inflicted on the 
Kurdish people in reprisal for their rebellion against Baghdad's totalitarian regime, which led to 
a large-scale migration of refugees towards Turkey and Iran. Margaret Tutweiler, the 
Spokeswoman for the US Department of State under the Bush administration, stressed that 
Washington had no intention of interfering in Iraqi domestic affairs, concluding that the overthrow 
of Saddam Hussein was not one of the aims of the international coalition. Tutweiler's declaration, 
which contradicted previous statements by the British Prime Minister John Major, who had taken 
over from Margaret Thatcher in November 1990, and President Bush, rejected allegations that 
the United States and, in general, the international community had abandoned them after 
instigating rebellion against Saddam's regime (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 411-413). 
On 3 April 1991, the Security Council passed the lengthy Resolution 687 which laid down 
the conditions imposed on Iraq for peace, reiterating the inviolability of the border with Kuwait, 
which would be demarcated with UN assistance and monitored by UN peacekeeping forces. Iraq 
was expected to decommission its chemical, biological and conventional ballistic weapons - and 
associated research and manufacturing plants - as well as accept periodical UN inspections. 
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At the United Nations, a French proposal to provide armed protection for the Kurds was 
rejected by the United States, China and the Soviet Union. However, later in the month, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 688 which introduced into international law the notion of the 
right to intervene in a sovereign state for humanitarian reasons. The United States insisted that 
Iraq should refrain from taking any military action north of the thirty-sixth parallel, warning that 
any attempt to obstruct international assistance to the Kurds would be firmly resisted. Operation 
Provide Comfort was launched to distribute medical and food supplies while the Ee plan for a 
safe haven for the Kurdish population was created. In early May, allied troops withdrew from 
southern Iraq. 
2. The European Community and the Gulf Crisis 
On the same day of the Iraqi invasion, the Twelve meeting in Brussels within the framework of 
European political cooperation issued a statement condemning "the use of force by a Member 
State of the United Nations against the territorial integrity of another state" (Europe, 2/8/1990). 
This was followed on 4 August by an agreement to suspend the Generalized System of 
Preferences for Iraq and occupied Kuwait, to freeze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and to impose an 
embargo on oil imports (Europe, 4/8/1990, 4). Four days later, the Council adopted, under 
Article 113 EC, a regulation banning trade with Iraq and Kuwairl (Resolution 2340/90/EEC). 
The prompt reaction of the Twelve was noteworthy given that the crisis erupted during the 
summer recess. By the end of the month, the Community had allocated some funds to provide 
humanitarian and emergency relief to refugee camps in Jordan and to cover the repatriation costs 
of over 100,000 foreign workers from Iraq and occupied Kuwait. The hostage question was a 
central and crucial matter of concern for the Twelve who warned the Iraqi authorities that "any 
attempt to harm or jeopardize the safety of any EC citizen [would] be considered as a most grave 
offence directed against the Community and all its Member States and [would] provoke a united 
response from the entire Community" (EC Bulletin 7/8/1990, 124). On several occasions, the 
Twelve confirmed their intention to contribute to the settlement of the pending problems in the 
region with the objective of attaining security and stability as well as promoting fairer social and 
economic development. 
Resolution 2340/90/EEC prohibited imports to the Community of all commodities and products from Iraq 
and Kuwait and exports to those countries. 
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The hopes raised for a swift and non-violent settlement of the crisis with the release of 
some hostages were dashed in early September 1990 with the Iraqi violation of Belgian, Canadian 
and French embassies and the arrest of their diplomats following the official annexation of the 
Emirate as Iraq's nineteenth province on 28 August 1990. The condemnation of such an 
infringement of the most basic principle of diplomatic immunity was unanimous among the 
Twelve, as was the decision to take the retaliatory measures of expelling Iraqi military attaches 
as well as monitoring and restricting the liberty of Iraqi diplomatic personnel. The Twelve sought 
to keep open their embassies as long as possible in Kuwait and, for the first time, their embassies 
were required to take over the responsibilities of other EC member states when unable to fulfil 
their tasks3 (Europe, 17-18/9/1990, 3). This system of joint protection outside the Community 
"was a clear sign of European citizenship", revealing that, beyond all its reprehensible 
repercussions, the Gulf crisis had served involuntarily as a catalysing factor for the unification 
process (Andreotti, 12/9/1990, 98-103). 
Meanwhile, as public anxiety grew, distinguished politicians, among whom the former 
British Prime Minister Sir Edward Heath and the former German Chancellor Willy Brandt, went 
to negotiate the liberation of British and German nationals along with a few Italian and Dutch 
citizens. The Belgian government also undertook negotiations for the release of hostages in 
exchange for an imprisoned Palestinian terrorist and the concession of an entry-visa for a 
spokesman of Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council who was eventually expelled. In 
particular, the Belgian government temporarily refused to provide ammunition to Britain so as 
not to jeopardize the outcome of the negotiation, causing a major row between the two countries. 
During November 1990, many other German, Italian, Dutch, Swedish, Belgian and Soviet 
hostages were freed and, finally, on 4 December the Iraqi authorities announced that all remaining 
foreigners detained in the country would be released by 15 January (Gnesotto and Roper, 1992, 
188). The hostage issue, tactically used by Saddam, wrecked hopes for solidarity between the EC 
members. 
In line with the policy pursued since 1980, the Twelve reiterated, on several occasions, 
the necessity to convene an international Middle East conference to address the Palestinian and 
Lebanese questions (Poos, 211111991, 9-11). As Martin Landgraf claims, although it is not 
feasible to ascertain the direct causal nexus between the above intention of the Twelve and the 
critical attitude taken by the majority of the Arab states vis-a-vis Iraq, there was some kind of EC 
influence on their decision not to uphold Saddam's foolish ambition of undertaking a 'holy war' 
3 Such diplomatic assistance was fonnally recognized and enshrined by virtue of the Treaty of the European 
Union, Art. 8c Ee, Part D, Tide D. 
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against the West (Landgraf, 1994,81-82). The Community keenly sought strategies for preventing 
the eruption of further crises in the Gulf region and more widely in the Middle East, not least due 
to its geographical proximity and its members states' oil dependence (Creme, 1991, 8). 
In December 1990, following the announcement of the UN deadline dictated by 
Washington, the EC President stressed that the period of time up until the fixed date was not to 
be interpreted as a "countdown to zero hour for the military option", but as "a goodwill pause" 
aimed at encouraging dialogue (De Michelis, 11112/1990, 64-67). 
On 4 January 1991, the French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas presented a peace plan 
to the EPC which included the following seven steps: 
1) Baghdad's announcement of the acceptance of the UN Resolutions 
2) Assurance that if Iraq withdrew no armed intervention would occur 
3) Acknowledgement of Bush's offer of talks with Iraq 
4) Meeting to be arranged as soon as possible between the EC President and the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister, even if the US-Iraq summit would not materialize 
5) Establishment of talks between the EC Troika4 and the Presidency of non-aligned 
countries 
6) Organization of a post-crisis international Middle East conference 
7) Convening of a general conference on security in the Mediterranean. 
The expectations of achieving a united EC front were soon dashed when the Twelve failed 
to reach an agreement over the most controversial points (3, 6 and 7) of the French proposal. 
Italy, France and Spain were determined to curb the prospect of military intervention and explore 
further peaceful paths despite the winds of war blowing from the Channel and the Atlantic. On 
the contrary, Britain and Denmark adamantly opposed taking any initiative independently of the 
United States other than an appeal to Iraq to abide by the UN Resolutions. The former were 
favourable to a meeting with Tariq Aziz prior to the US-Iraq summit, while the latter, whose 
cautious view eventually prevailed, rejected the idea of a previous European meeting for fear that 
it could be interpreted as evidence that the Community and the American Administration were 
pursuing conflicting policies (Europe 19/12/1990, 7-8/1/1991, 3-4). The Twelve were also faced 
with another dilemma over whether to "convey the agreed coalition message, which would be 
pointless, or convey (, ,) a distinctive European sentiment, ( .. ) which risked a split in the 
coalition" (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 261), Once again, loyalty to the United States 
overruled the desire of the Twelve for political emancipation so that the Community lost 
4 The BC Troika consisted of representatives from Luxembourg which held the presidency, Italy, its 
predecessor. and the Netherlands, its successor. The purpose of the Troika was to ensure a certain continuity 
at the level of the BC Presidency, 
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credibility as a potential peace broker (Dury, 1991, 10). Against this background, it was not 
surprising that on 8 January Iraq decided to decline the Council's invitation for a meeting in 
Luxembourg, on the grounds that the Community did not have an autonomous external policy, 
being instead totally dominated by the United States (Europe, 7-8/1/1991). The Iraqi Foreign 
Minister emphasized in his Geneva press conference that talks with the Community could still be 
arranged if the Troika would travel to Baghdad ready to offer more concessions. The Iraqi refusal 
demonstrated that, in Saddam's eyes, the Community seemed to be little more than a small speck 
on the political map. 
After a careful evaluation of the previous unsuccessful attempts at negotiation by the 
international community, including that of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier 
Perez de Cuellar on 13 January 1991 (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994,270-271), Luxembourg's 
Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, who had taken over the EC Presidency from Italy at the beginning 
of the year, declared that the climate did not allow a new peace initiative. 5 
In an atmosphere of deep frustration and disappointment at EC passivity, France did not 
abandon the idea of pursuing its unilateral course of action and, as seen previously in the chapter, 
on 14 January, President Mitterand submitted to the UN Security Council a last-ditch proposal. 
Despite Soviet support, the plan failed not least due to renewed US and UK opposition over a link 
between the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian questions. This effectively swept aside hopes to hold back 
the tide towards overt military confrontation: "soon after this last attempt, the Gulf crisis became 
the Gulf war" (Closa, 1991, 8). 
The French initiative, introduced without consulting the other EC partners, represented 
a contravention of Article 30 SEA,6 which called for a coherent stance on foreign policy matters, 
and regrettably revealed that the positions taken in the UN Security Council by the two permanent 
members, France and Britain, were not subject to prior agreement at EPC level (Lucas and 
Usbome, 23/1/1991). Following the launch of air strikes, the Twelve voiced their deep regret at 
the recourse to arms, concluding that all efforts had been made by members of the international 
community, including Arab countries, to avert the offensive that Saddam had brought upon 
himself. They strongly condemned Iraq's missile attack on Israeli territory and expressed 
sympathy for the victims, emphasizing that "under the present circumstances, every restraint 
displayed by Israel [should] be interpreted as a sign of strength and not of weakness" (Europe, 
18/1/1991). The Ee member states expressed concern about the consequences of the war with 
S Based on a six-month period, the European Community's Presidency rotates among the Member States. 
6 This article relates to the establishment of European Political Cooperation in foreign policy and the 
subsequent determination of EC member states to formulate and jointly achieve a European foreign policy. 
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respect to the "traditional links of friendship between the Community and the Arab countries" 
(Europe, 17/1/1991). EC Commissioner Abel Matutes highlighted 
the risk of destabilizing certain moderate Arab regimes, such as Egypt and Morocco, or 
those of other countries which belong to the international coalition, due to the pro-Saddam 
Hussein attitude of a part of their ill-informed populations (Matutes, 211111991, 11). 
On 23 January, John Major deplored the different levels of military participation among the 
various EC countries. In Germany's case, due to its historical legacy rather than constitutional 
impediments to military action, Bonn preferred to maintain a low profile. However, to reciprocate 
American, British and French solidarity shown with regard to its unification process, the German 
government offered a large financial contribution to US-UK missions and EC humanitarian 
initiatives, the use of its naval and air bases and a tightening of controls on arms exports (Dury, 
1991, 25, Kaiser and Becher, 42). In comparison with the US, UK and French deployments, 
Italian military involvement appeared modest, yet deserves mention for the determination of its 
government not to hide behind a perfectly plausible constitutional obstacle. Alan Sked argues: 
It is instructive to contrast Germany's self-inflicted constitutional crisis over the Gulf with 
Italy's more positive approach to its real constitutional difficulty (Sked, 1991, 9). 
Specifically, Article 11 of the Italian Constitution stipulates that: 
Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples 
and as a means of resolving international controversies. It agrees, on conditions of 
equality with other states, to such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary for an 
order ensuring peace and justice among nations: promotes and encourages international 
organizations which share such objectives. 
An interpretation strictu sensu of the constitutional predicament would fully justify a non-
interventionist policy. Instead, the sentence referring to repudiation of "war as an instrument of 
aggression" was seen as backing Italy's condemnation of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while 
participating in security operations under the UN aegis as a means to achieve international order, 
"peace and justice" (Guazzone, 1992, 86). 
In view of the intensification of air raids on Iraq and Kuwait, Luxembourg authorized the 
United States to use its airport for the transit of supplies, troops and wounded, committing itself 
to bear the entire costs of these operations. The Dutch government announced that it was prepared 
to dispatch eight Patriot anti-missiles batteries to Israel. 
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The initial cohesion of the Twelve had already started crumbling when increasingly 
pressing circumstances arose, such as the question of hostages and the issue of military 
intervention. In February 1991, the Community and its member states welcomed the Kremlin's 
appeal to Baghdad, although once again they strove to balance internal and external pressures, 
trying not to irritate the US and the UK, which remained sceptical over the effectiveness of 
diplomacy with Saddam (Europe, 19/2/1992). Among the Twelve only France, Britain, Italy and 
Germany were directly informed of the plan with the result that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
meeting the next day could only discuss its content in very vague terms. The importance of 
achieving a stable solution in the Middle East was reiterated and, for this purpose, the decision 
was taken to send the Troika to meet Israeli and Palestinian representatives (Dury, 1991,22). 
The Community and its member states "deeply regret that Iraq has failed to respond 
positively to the appeal of the international coalition" and acknowledged the American 
decision to launch its ground offensive trusting that the liberation of Kuwait would be 
rapidly realized "with a minimum of loss in human lives on both sides" (Europe, 
24/2/1991). 
The EC member greeted with jubilation Kuwait's liberation during the last days of February 1991 
and the official announcement of the cessation of hostilities in the Gulf on 28 February. The 
Council adopted a regulation lifting the sanctions previously imposed on Kuwait (Regulation 
542191). However, the Twelve reproached Saddam's ruthless repression of the Kurds in the 
conviction that "only the path of dialogue with all the parties concerned will allow the shaping 
of a renewed Iraq, united and respectful of the legitimate aspirations of the population groups of 
which the country is made up" (Europe, 28/2/1991). 
On 8 April 1991, the EC Ministers meeting in Luxembourg adopted the British plan for 
the creation of a safe haven in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam's attacks. A few 
days later, the European Community, following the plea from the German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher to seek ways in which the Iraqi President could be called personally to 
account for his invasion of Kuwait, genocide against the Kurds, alleged use of chemical weapons 
and mistreatment of prisoners of war, vainly stated once again to put Saddam on trial for crimes 
against humanity (Buchan, 114/1991, Usborne, 16/4/1991). In addition, on the EC initiative, the 
UN acknowledged the right of intervention for humanitarian reasons on the ground that "national 
sovereignty cannot be an alibi for tolerating massacres of population" (Bar6n Crespo, 16/4/1991, 
99). 
Lastly, it could be argued that EC' s adoption of a programme of sanctions as well as 
emergency aid to those countries most affected by the crisis proved that, when authorized, the 
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Community could function operatively (De Michelis, 1991, 48). And yet, these positive steps 
were overshadowed by disagreements between the EP and the Council of Ministers, for instance, 
over the allocation of the Community's contribution in the Gulf with the result that it took more 
than two months to commit their share of money. Inevitably, the Community remained at the 
margin of the international decision-making, failing to find an alternative to the UK-US inclination 
for a rapid military action. "It was left to the Anglo-Saxon powers, working on the basis of the 
old London-Washington 'special relationship', to set up the mechanisms of response" (Johnson, 
P., 1991, 31). 
Criticisms of the EC' s inability to coordinate the actions of its member states and the 
delay in responding to the American request for military and financial contribution, albeit 
justifiable, were often too simplistic as they failed to recognize that within the intergovernmental 
EPC framework the pace of response on most issues depended totally on the political will of each 
member state government. 
Hence, two diametrically opposed conclusions were drawn from the Gulf lesson: the first 
affirmed that the "hopes for a new world role for a united Europe [seemed to] .. run into the 
Arabian sands", pointing to the reemergence of old national postures and diverging interests 
among the EC member states (Binyon, 17/9/1990). In the second view, the crisis had highlighted 
EC political weakness, thus reinforcing the case for an institutionalization of common foreign 
policy-making that would eventually boost the quest for unification (Ascherson, 3/2/1991, 19). 
3. The European Parliament and the Gulf Crisis 
As the Gulf Crisis erupted during the parliamentary summer recess, it took several weeks before 
official discussions were held on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The complexity of the procedures 
for arranging extraordinary parliamentary sessions accounted, in part, for the delay. 7 However, 
as the Liberal leader and former French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing commented: 
Cumbersome though the procedure for convening an extraordinary sitting may be, this 
was an event that could have justified convening the House especially (Giscard d'Estaing, 
12/9/1990, 109). 
7 Article 139 (2) ofEEC Treaty states that extraordinary sessions can be arranged at the request of the majority 
of its members or at request of the Council or the Commission. The final decision is vested in the President 
of the Buropean Parliament who, after consulting the then named Enlarged Bureau (including the President, 
the Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of all political groups) can convene the House. 
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This overview of the European Parliament's role in the Gulf issue is organized on the basis of 
three stages. The first stage extends between 2 August 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait. and 15 
January 1991, the expiry of the UN deadline. The second stage extends between 16 January when 
Operation Desert Storm started and 28 February when fighting ceased between the Allies and 
Iraq. The third and final stage covers the period between March and May 1991 when the Kurdish 
question hit the headlines. 
a) Pre-War Stage 
As acknowledged by its own members, the European Parliament had proved to be the weakest 
and the slowest among the EC institutions in responding to the events in the Gulf, to the extent 
of waiting forty days after the Iraqi aggression before convening. Not even an urgent meeting of 
the Enlarged Bureau to show at least some kind of parliamentary concern was called until 29 
August 1990. On that occasion, it was decided that, upon Giscard d'Eistaing's proposal, the EP 
would devote the whole day of 12 September to debate the crisis (LDR Communique de Presse, 
29/8/1990). A prompt response from the EP, for instance the convening of an emergency session, 
would have bolstered its cause for more powers in foreign policy. By contrast, parliamentary 
apathy gave weight to the case against such involvement and more justification for the often 
criticized procedure which does not require, due to the urgency of such action, parliamentary 
consultation over the application of sanctions (MacLeod et aI., 1996,353-357). 
A positive element was introduced, however, by the participation in the debate of the Ee 
President-in-office, Giulio Andreotti, following the practice initiated by the Spanish and pursued 
by the French Presidency. As a result, the meeting assumed a more solemn and official character 
whereby no other parliamentary meeting was concurrently held and a vote on a Joint Resolution 
was organized in the same evening at the conclusion of the debate (Cattet, 30/8/1990). 
Since the Iraqi invasion, the House had been regularly informed of the Council's action 
by the EP Delegation on the Relations with the Gulf countries as well as the EP Political Affairs 
and External Economic Relations Committees (Andreotti, 12/9/1990,98). Moreover, as Andreotti 
emphasized, his presence was intended to go beyond giving a simple account of the Council's 
views and to establish, in conjunction with the EP, the necessary strategies to settle the crisis. 
The EP Vice-President, Roberto Formigoni, reported on the visit of the ad hoc delegation 
to the Gulf and the meetings8 with the Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, the Saudi Arabian 
King Fahd Ibn-Abd-al-Aziz, the Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan, as well as other political 
The visit was undertaken on the behalf of the EP Enlarged Bureau by a small parliamentary delegation 
including Roberto Formigoni and Andrea Bonelli (EPP, Italy), Claude Cheysson (Socialist, France), Peter 
Crampton (S(lL'lalisl, UK) and James Moorhouse (ED. UK). 
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authorities, such as the PLO leader Vasser Arafat, the Secretary-General of the Arab League 
Chadly Klibi and representatives of the Kuwaiti government in exile. During the journey, the 
members of the delegation were notified by the EC Presidency, which had provided them with 
an aircraft for their shuttle diplomacy, of the opportunity to extend their mission to Baghdad. Yet, 
despite the willingness of the Labour MEP Peter Crampton and the French Socialist MEP and 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson, the invitation was declined by three votes 
to two (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996). Although the mission would not have changed the 
course of events, this refusal seemed to go against the EP's ambition of becoming an actor on the 
world stage and to contradict the essence of parliamentary tradition and "desire for dialogue, for 
discussion with all peoples of the world, ( .. ) reflecting with absolute clarity [its] views ( .. ), with 
an awareness and a desire to understand and appreciate the views of others .. " (Formigoni, 
12/9/1990, 106-107). In Tunis, Cheysson also secretively spoke with Aziz, in the presence of 
Arafat, stressing that negotiations would not be undertaken until all hostages had been freed and 
Iraq announced its intention of retreating from Kuwait (Freedman and Karsh, 1993, 1994, 171). 
In September 1990, Parliament unanimously condemned the Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait and the detention of foreign civilians for use as human shields against possible attacks on 
strategic Iraqi sites. However, it was split over the "additional" steps to be taken if neither the 
search for a diplomatic solution nor economic sanctions proved sufficient to handle the crisis. The 
centre-right endorsed the military option and pushed for a stronger commitment from the 
Community in case of a war, and the left which rejected the use of force and opposed any 
Western military action other than for defensive purposes (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996). 
Despite parliamentary insistence that the "responsibility for dealing with the crisis should .. 
remain in the hands of the Security Council" (OJECC 260/1990,81), it soon appeared that there 
was little alternative but to transfer the command of forces and control over the conduct of war 
from the United Nations to the United States. The European Parliament also urged the EC 
member states to refrain from undertaking separate initiatives for the release of their nationals and 
called for airlifts in order to provide humanitarian assistance to refugees. Finally, the international 
community was asked to admit its responsibility for having armed Iraq as well as other countries 
in the Gulf and Middle East. On 13 September 1990, the EP President Enrique Baron Crespo 
called an emergency meeting of the Political Committee with representatives of the Commission 
and the Council of Ministers to discuss further the development of the crisis. 
At the sitting of 11 October, none of the 13 Motions for Resolutions on the Gulf was put 
to the vote for failing to reach the required number of participants, following the request to 
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ascertain whether a quorum was present. 9 This legitimate act was widely perceived by the others 
as a boycott perpetrated by ER members. However, the next day, after the Commission's 
statement on oil prices, the Socialists, supported by the Rainbow Group, requested a debate on 
the matter and succeeded in putting to the vote at least this important aspect of the crisis (Dury, 
1991). The EP passed two Resolutions,1O urging steps to be taken to end speculation on the price 
of oil which had doubled since August 1990. MEPs across the political spectrum expressed their 
intention to strengthen EC support for those developing countries threatened by the catastrophic 
repercussions of the Gulf War. 
At the second October session, the EP unanimously adopted by RCV a report, drafted by 
Crampton on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, pertaining to the Community's extension 
of a total embargo to Iraq and occupied Kuwait in accordance with UN Resolutions 661 and 670 
(OJEC C 295/1990, 645, 695). The application of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty was 
recommended as a legal base for this measure, rather than Article 113 EEC, which did not 
envisage any parliamentary involvement in the decision-making process. The roll-call vote, 
requested by the European Democrats, revealed the amazingly low number of23 members present 
in the Chamber. 
In November 1990, the leader of the French Front National and of the ER group in the 
European Parliament, Jean-Marie Le Pen, undertook a journey to Baghdad where he was 
successful in obtaining the release of French and also of other European citizens. This act was 
fiercely condemned by the vast majority of his colleagues as "a sordid piece of political theatre" 
involving the manipulation of hostages and their relatives (Ford, 22/1111990, 249) with the aim 
of deriving a political advantage for [his] party". Le Pen's behaviour was regarded as 
unacceptable and unethical, not least "for the impression .. given that the EP was behind [this 
initiative]" (Sainjon, 22/1111990, 251). As a result, many members requested that the EP disown 
Le Pen's trip and condemn "his shabby opportunism" (Perez Royo, 22/1111990, 250). Finally, 
a suggestion was made, albeit in vain, to set up a delegation of representatives from all PGs, 
preferably led by the EP President, to travel to the region to persuade the Iraqi authorities to 
release all detainees (Ferri, 12/9/1990, 162-163). 
9 OlEC 284/90 states that more than thirteen members rose in support of the request for a quorum check, 
although according to Raymonde Dury (Socialist, Belgium). the European Right was deemed responsible for 
this quorum check (OlEC 3-394/90, 324). However, in accordance with Rule 89 (3) of the EP Rules of 
Procedure of the time envisaged that: "A request that it be ascertained whether the quorum is present. ( .. ) 
must be made by at 'least thirteen Members'. A request on behalf of a political group is not admissible". As 
such the ER, as a group, could not make this request. 
10 Resolution 83-1843/90 (Socialist Group) and Resolution 83-1844190 (Socialist, EPP, LDR, ED, GreeD, EUL, 
LU and Rainbow Groups). 
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In its Resolution of 22 November 1990, the EP condemned the attempt by Iraq to destroy 
Kuwaiti national identity by invalidating all Kuwaiti passports and replacing them with Iraqi 
documents as well as through its plans for mass relocation and deportation to Iraq (OlEC 
C324/1990, 200-201). On the following day, the House passed, by way of RCV, another report 
drafted by Crampton on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, on a Proposal for a Council 
regulation on financial aid for the countries most directly affected by the Gulf crisis (OlEC C 
12/1990,326-327). Crampton's amendments to the original text, particularly the granting of more 
aid to Jordan, were endorsed by the Council, with the European Parliament succeeding on this 
occasion to impose its own views (Crampton interview, 311111996). 
On 12 December, the EP welcomed all diplomatic initiatives, including the proposed visits 
of the American Secretary of State to Baghdad and the Iraqi Foreign Minister to Rome, following 
his visit to the United States. It reaffirmed support for all UN Security Council Resolutions on 
the Gulf crisis, including Resolution 678, stressing, however, that the military option was not "an 
automatic consequence" of the adoption of this UN Resolution and calling "for no military action 
to be taken while there [was] the prospect of a peaceful solution to the crisis" (OlEC C 19/90, 
76-77). In addition, while acknowledging the initiatives already taken by the Council, the EP 
urged the Community, and in particular the Council, to initiate a peace plan and to establish a 
Euro-Arab dialogue (OlEC C 19/90, 76-77). 
As the UN deadline approached, the divisions within the EP became more noticeable with 
the left including the majority of the Socialist Group "not resigned to the inevitability of war" 
opposing the centre-right which acknowledged that, in light of the events, war had become 
unavoidable (Comfort et al., 11/1/1991). The former supported a ceasefire as soon as Iraq began 
its evacuation while the latter required completion of Iraqi withdrawal operations before halting 
the hostilities. 
On 9 January 1991, on the initiative Christine Crawley (Socialist, UK), Eva Quistorp 
(Green, Germany) and Christa Randzio-Plath (Socialist, Germany), 42 women parliamentarians 
of different nationalities from the Socialist, EPP, Green, EUL and Rainbow groups signed an 
appeal for peace in the Gulf, "call[ing] for the intensification of negotiations and the exploration 
of all possible avenues to avoid war and to end the crisis" (Women MEPs' Appeal, 9/1/1991). 
The EP Political Affairs Committee expressed concern at the failure of the US-Iraqi 
summit and disappointment at the refusal of Tariq Aziz to meet the EC Troika after his meeting 
with the American Secretary of State. The committee urged the Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
meeting in Political Cooperation to assess all existing peace plans in order to avoid an armed 
confrontation in the Gulf region through close cooperation with the countries of the Arab League 
and the US Administration (Doc PE 147.883IBUR, 10/1/1991). Finally, it required all necessary 
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StepS to be taken to ensure a more direct involvement of the Parliament in the EC decision-making 
through consultation with the other EC institutions before the UN deadline of 15 January. 
During the week preceding the UN ultimatum, Baron Crespo met Jacques Poos and 
exchanged views with some representatives of the US Congress and the Soviet ambassador. 
Concurrently, in a letter to Sa'di Mehdi Saleh, the President of the Iraqi National Assembly, the 
EP President declined an invitation to Baghdad to open a dialogue between the two parliaments, 
on the ground that the Iraqi government had refused to meet the EC Troika before the fateful day 
of 15 January, urging the Iraqi Parliament to impress on its executive to reconsider the issue 
(Baron Crespo's Letter, 9/1/1991). Furthermore, the Iraqi invitation to the EP President could 
be seen as part of Saddam's general strategy of opening up divisions within the European and the 
Western camps. Whatever the reasons for this decision, Parliament, nonetheless, lost another 
opportunity to take an autonomous view and test its mediatory powers at the international level. 
After failing to convene an EP extraordinary plenary session, the Presidency authorized 
for 14 January an extraordinary meeting of the Political Affairs Committee, regarded as the most 
appropriate parliamentary organ to follow the evolution of the crisis (Baron Crespo's Letter, 
10/1/1991). A final appeal was therefore launched to the Iraqi government to express its intention 
to comply with the UN Resolutions and to the international community to promote other peace 
initiatives (EP Doc 14/1/1991). A meeting of the Enlarged Bureau, open to all MEPs and the 
representatives of the Council and Commission, was convened on 16 January 1991 to discuss the 
evolution of the crisis. 
Towards the end of this first stage of the crisis, a major bone of contention emerged 
between the left and the centre-right of the House with respect to the question of whether 
sanctions had to be allowed more time to work or whether the UN should intervene without delay 
in order to prevent Saddam Hussein from refming his military strategy and organizing further his 
troops. Just before the expiry of the UN deadline, on the initiative of Brigit Cramon Daiber 
(Green, Germany) and Dieter Schinzel (Socialist, Germany), the European Parliament made an 
appeal to members of both the US Congress and the Soviet Parliament "to find a solution other 
than the war for the Kuwait question" as well as "to prepare a more long-term conference on 
security and cooperation in the Middle East". This was intended to reach the American Congress 
before its vote on a Resolution authorizing President Bush's military plan in the Gulf (MEPs' 
Appeal to US and USSR Parliaments, 911/1991). On 12 January 1991, the Congress endorsed the 
decision to use force by 250 to 183 votes in the House of Representatives and 52 to 41 in the 
Senate, showing that the EP had failed to influence the final outcome (WEU Assembly, 1992, 
22). Giscard d'Eistaing's assumption that no debate in the EP or in any other parliament could 
forge a policy over Kuwait proved inaccurate, since the Congress had, nevertheless, the potential 
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to influence a decision and therefore could have changed the course of the events (Giscard 
d'Estaing, 20/2/1991, 122-123). 
b) War Stage 
By mid-January 1991, the prospect of air strikes became inevitable when it appeared that 
sanctions alone could not rapidly achieve the desired effect, or rather that the US was not 
prepared to wait at least for one year to see the results, the time predicted by William Webster, 
the Director of the American Central Intelligence Agency. Realistically, the 'index of the 
parliamentary scale' gradually moved towards a pro-military approach. On the day of the start 
of Operation Desert Storm, members from the left of the EP, including the European United Left, 
the Left Unity, the Greens, the Rainbow and a faction of the Socialists, gathered to express their 
concern 
about the loss of human lives among military personnel and the civilian population, as 
well as ecological damage and the consequences that this attack will have on any efforts 
at peace in the Middle East. [They expressed their] support for peaceful demonstrations 
against the war in Europe and the United States and - even at this late date - [they] 
call[ed] for the cessation of military operations to facilitate the peaceful implementation 
of the United Nations Resolutions. [They] also request[ed] that immediate steps be taken 
to organize an international conference on all the problems of the Gulf region and the 
Middle East, in particular the Palestinian question (European Report, 17-19/1/1991,3). 
This declaration, followed by a torchlight procession through Strasbourg by MEPs and officials 
as a sign of protest for the beginning of hostilities, was received with suspicion by the United 
States Administration and with hostility by Israel (Palmer, John, 22-24/1/1991). Objecting to the 
continuation of the onslaught on the Iraqi population, MEPs spelled out that "a collision between 
one million-plus armed men, using the most modern military technology, would restore neither 
peace nor security" to the Middle East. The EP animatedly debated the EC's failure to agree on 
more than broad principles on a common policy vis-a.-vis the Gulf and the new unexpected French 
initiative which clearly exposed the limitations of "turning the Community into a geopolitical actor 
in its own right" (Johnson, Boris, 23/1/1991). 
On 21 January, on the initiative of the Italian Green MEP Eugenio Melandri, the 
Assembly observed one minute's silence in honour of the victims from both sides in the Gulf 
War. Disappointingly the House rejected his request, made along with 13 other MEPs, to devote 
the whole day of 22 January to a "serious and detailed debate on the Gulf War" in addition to the 
discussion following Council statement on the Gulf scheduled for 21 January (Melandri 
211111991, 3). The main motive for such a decision was, as Price remarked, that Parliament did 
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not need "a long debate over one day and a half but to monitor events as they develop[ ed] during 
the next month" (Price, 2111/1991, 3). 
Frustration was expressed by members, such as Derek Prag (ED, UK), Enrico Falqui 
(Green, Italy), Vassillis Ephremidis (LU, Greece) and Eva Quistorp (Green, Germany), at the 
cancellation of an extraordinary plenary session with just a few hours' notice and the 
postponement of a meeting of the Enlarged Bureau, scheduled for 16 January in Brussels. These 
revocations, meaning that Parliament could not make its views known prior to the actual outbreak 
of the hostilities, were ostensibly justified by the absence of the representatives of other EC 
institutions and that "it would achieve too little too late" (Brock and Guildford, 18/1/1991). In 
reality, they were motivated by a French-inspired campaign to avoid the precedent of holding 
parliamentary sessions in Brussels rather than in its traditional Strasbourg venue. It seemed that, 
"no matter that the Gulf was in flames", the dispute between France and Belgium about the EP 
seat overrode the political question, risking the paralysis of parliamentary activities (Claveloux, 
8/2/1991). 
Eventually, against all the conventional rules, MEPs agreed to hold two special sittings 
in Brussels on 30 January and 6 February 1991, despite French MEPs' opposition,l1 who argued 
that these meetings were worthless since no electronic voting system was available in Brussels and 
no vote could therefore be taken (B3-0120/91). Moreover, on 30 January, the EP convened in 
Brussels a meeting of its Enlarged Bureau open to all its members with the mandate to follow the 
events in the Gulf more closely. The additional plenary sittings provoked new protests from some 
French MEPs who raised once again the question of the legality of the decision to convene a 
parliamentary meeting in a seat other than the official one established in Strasbourg (Dury, 1991, 
21). 
Despite these internal wrangles, however, MEPs were united in their condemnation of 
Saddam, who was considered solely responsible for the war, and in their support for the actions 
of the UN and the allied forces. They also collectively suggested extending controls over the arms 
trade and developing European economic, commercial, political and cultural cooperation with the 
Middle East. Among the EC institutions, only the EP officially backed a proposal for convening 
a permanent Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) based on the 
CSCE model, at the conclusion of the Gulf crisis (Landgraf, 1994,82-83). 
By the beginning of the second stage, a cacophony of voices was resounding within the 
House, opening up old divisions between left and centre-right, preventing the creation of a united 
II All French MEPs voted against the convening of these additional sittings with the exception of the Green 
MEPs Didier Anger and Solange Fernex. 
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parliamentary stance. The Greens, the European Unitarian Left, the Left Unity and the 
Independent left-wingers with a faction of the Socialists unrelentingly opposed the war and called 
for an immediate ceasefire and even the withdrawal of the allied troops from the region. By 
contrast, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the British and Danish Conservatives as well as 
the Gaullists along with some Socialists supported the continuation of air strikes, by taking the 
view that negotiations should not be resumed prior to Saddam's conformity with UN Resolutions 
or the defeat of Iraq. 
In the tragi-comic plenary session of January 1991, even the search for a compromise 
expressing the lowest common denominator among political groups seemed doomed to fail. Due 
to deep tensions between and within its constituent political groups, the European Parliament was 
nearly prevented from voicing its response to the grave developments in the Gulf. Finally. after 
using all political channels, sounding out all possibilities, endeavouring to circumvent ideological 
preconceptions and obstacles, the EP succeeded in incorporating the two disputed references and 
in formulating a common, if vague policy. This delay in reaching an agreement, nevertheless, 
discredited the European Parliament in the eyes of other EC institutions and, more generally, in 
the eyes of the public, as well as attracting harsh criticism from the press. 
Parliament called on Iraq to withdraw its troops from Kuwait under "a binding and rapid 
timetable [which] would make possible an immediate cessation of hostilities and the resumption 
of negotiations" (OlEC C 48, 25/211991, 116). While reiterating its belief that the recourse to 
the use of force reflected a failure, the EP recognized that responsibility for the outbreak of 
hostilities lay with President Saddam Hussein who had rejected all peaceful initiatives. However, 
Parliament considered as a priority to try "to contain the war and to bring it to a rapid conclusion 
with minimum casualties" (OlEC C 48, 25/211991, 116). Finally, it called the Council to 
implement a Community political, economic, commercial and cultural cooperation policy on the 
Middle East. 
As the prospect of land warfare loomed, the divide within the EP deepened further, if not 
along national lines. This culminated on 21 February in total parliamentary disarray which was 
caused by Saddam's speech, with the withdrawal of ajoint text together with numerous individual 
motions for Resolutions (OlECC 72/91,125-127). Finally, Parliament made its final appeal to 
all parties to seize the historic "opportunity afforded by the Soviet Government's offer" (OlEC 
C 72/91, 141). It also called on the Commission to introduce emergency measures to face the 
economic and social consequences of the crisis in the maritime and air transport sectors (OlEC 
C 72/91, 131). The most extraordinary aspect of the EP's reaction to the Gulf crisis, even when 
the land war was raging. was its focus on the future: on the post-crisis era and the role of the 
Community in the settlement of other conflicts in the region, a clear indication of its impotence 
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on the hie et nunc (Levi, 1990, 627). 
c) Post-War Stage 
On 28 February 1991, the day which marked the cessation of hostilities, the Political Affairs 
Committee called upon the Community to take an active part in establishing a lasting peace in the 
region, based on respect for human rights and with due consideration for political, social and 
ecological factors (Info Memo No. 41, 261211991 cited in EPP Report, 711990-711991, 28). In 
the following month, the EP passed a Resolution which raised hopes that the Iraqi regime would 
be based on democratic, peaceful and just principles and that the Palestinian question would be 
finally settled. In particular, the Commission was asked to submit a proposal for reconstruction 
in the Gulf region. Regarding its extraordinary meetings, the EP blamed the Council for 
boycotting two sessions that were supposed to be held in Brussels in order to monitor Community 
actions on the Gulf crisis more closely. In a Resolution tabled by the Socialists, the EP reminded 
the Council that it was obliged to take part and respond to MEPs' requests for information 
concerning its activities. Parliament also reaffirmed its right to decide the place of its meetings. 
A majority believed that the EP had to be in immediate proximity to the other European decision-
making institutions, namely the Council and the Commission, both based in Brussels (Dury, 1991, 
23). 
On 18 April, the EP passed a Resolution on the situation of the Kurds, whereby it 
condemned "the attempted genocide against the Kurds by Saddam Hussein's regime and the 
repression of the Iraqi population as a whole". As such, it urged the EC member states' 
governments "to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice to ensure that these acts 
of genocide are acknowledged and condemned in accordance with the [1948] Convention". The 
Resolution also stressed the necessity for the United Nations "to develop the means of preventing 
totalitarian regimes from perpetrating genocide" ( .. ) if necessary by amending the UN Charter" 
(OlEC C 129/91,141-142). The proposal of putting Saddam on trial for war crimes was also 
raised at talks held at the EP in Strasbourg between Jacques Poos and Perez de Cuellar. However, 
the British Foreign Office Minister Tristan Garel-Jones argued that as long as the Iraqi leader 
remained in power there was no possibility of realizing this plan (Usborne, 16/4/1991). 
The EP condemned Saddam's persecution of the Kurdish and Shi 'ite minorities, urged the 
creation of safe havens under the UN aegis and requested the allies not to withdraw before 
receiving guarantees for the safety of the Kurds (EPP Report, 7/1990-7/1991, 29). At this 
session, following the invitation extended by President Bar6n Crespo, UN Secretary-General 
Perez de Cuellar addressed the House which, like the assemblies of representatives elected by 
peoples, has "natural affinities [with] the United Nations, an organisation of peoples inspired by 
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democratic values" (OIEC 3-404/91, 100). With regard to the Gulf War, he stated that it was not 
a United Nations war and that "the victory of the allied or coalition countries over Iraq [was] not 
a United Nations victory" (OIEC 3-404/91, 100). He also claimed that the new world order 
should take place within the UN framework and not under the false pretence of a multilateral ism 
"camouflaging the pursuit of national or regional interests". He then stressed the need to achieve 
peace in the Middle East and in the world. Finally, the UN Secretary urged parliamentarians to 
use their influence and power to promote some of the necessary steps to achieve this goal, such 
the reduction in arms trade and a total international ban on chemical weapons (OIEC 3-404/91, 
100-101). 
In the following month, the question of emergency relief for the Kurds triggered a dispute 
between Parliament and the Commission. The EP was accused of having delayed humanitarian 
aid on previous occasions, for instance in the case of Russia. Most parliamentarians expressed 
their disappointment with such an unfair misrepresentation, concluding that Parliament had proved 
to be willing to award financial assistance as rapidly as possible even beyond the extent proposed 
by either the Commission and the Council (Lenz, 15/5/1991, 140). 
The Gulf crisis was the focus of intense parliamentary activity prior to, during and after 
the outbreak of the War, between September 1990 and May 1991. Stunned and bewildered by the 
Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the outbreak of war, the EP reflected, as a kaleidoscope, the 
myriad of distinct attitudes taken by national governments, parties and the public (Freedman and 
Karsh, 1993, 1994, 358). Over the length of the crisis, the EP also had exchanges of view with 
the Iraqi Assembly, often via the Iraqi embassy in Brussels. 
Conclusion 
Iraq's sudden invasion of Kuwait inevitably threw into disarray the new international order 
emerging in the post-Cold War period, challenging the European Community's aspiration to make 
its debut as a political actor on the world stage. Iraqi aggression was condemned as a flagrant 
violation of territorial sovereignty, but solidarity and cohesion were undermined by contrasting 
views over whether to take diplomatic or military measures against the Iraqi leader. However, 
Saddam's fmal refusal to leave Kuwait on the eve of the UN deadline of 15 January 1991 and his 
disregard of all diplomatic efforts eventually convinced the Twelve to endorse US military 
strategies. In the crucible of the Gulf War, the EC member states were collectively reduced to 
the rank of secondary actors and failed to cross the threshold of 'high politics'. Their faltering, 
ambiguous and sometimes opposing stances attracted attention as well as inevitable criticism from 
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the media. However, deprived of rapid, centralized and efficient ways of making major decisions 
pertaining to the sphere of foreign policy and defence, the Community could have no real impact 
as a political entity. In this context, the EC institutions had to carry out the delicate and 
demanding task of coordinating separate national responses rather than initiating joint policies 
(Molsi, 1991, 11). The European Community was "one of the casualties of the Gulf War" 
revealing a landscape dominated by member states' divergent political responses and the absence 
of coordination as regards both diplomatic proposals and appropriate military solutions (Giscard 
d'Estaing, 20/2/1991, 122-123). 
However, while accepting many of the above criticisms, it should be recognized that the 
EC's response to the occupation of Kuwait, with the swift adoption of a total embargo against 
Iraq, was exemplary in terms of effectiveness and rapidity, even preceding the United Nations 
and the Arab League (Andreotti, 12/9/1990, 99). Its aid policy in favour of the refugees and the 
frontline countries also proved that the Community could be efficient where it had clear and full 
authority to act. Lastly, the Twelve promoted diplomatic solutions, supported the adoption of UN 
Resolutions and contributed, albeit to a far less significant degree, to the US-led military 
operations. 
Inevitably, the question of the definition of a common foreign policy emerged, in 
particular in the context of the debate on Europe's future transatlantic relationship. Confirming 
the axiom that politicians tend to fit any evidence to suit their own predilections, the war became 
a tool to stress either the impossibility of or the need for the creation of a European Political 
Union. According to the realists, the Twelve's slow and inconsistent reaction to the invasion of 
Kuwait reinforced the argument that the European Community could never attain political 
authority in international affairs. 
Conversely, the advocates of European integration believed that the weakness of the EC 
edifice was responsible for the failure of an effective policy over the Gulf conflict. For this 
reason, and so as to acquire both internal and external credibility, the need was stressed for 
establishing a common European foreign policy and security structure in order to enable the 
Community to gain the political, legal, and fmancial resources to shoulder its international 
responsibilities. 
As regards the European Parliament's response to the crisis, Bar6n Crespo stressed that 
from the outset the EP had firmly condemned Iraqi aggression as well as fully supported the 
personal initiatives of the UN Secretary-General and those of the UN Security Council. 
Furthermore, long before Saddam's attempt to link the invasion of Kuwait with the Palestinian 
issue, which had been used by the Iraqi leader "as a distraction to inflame emotions throughout 
the Arab, and indeed the Moslem world", the European Parliament had called for the gathering 
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of an international conference to solve the Arab-Israeli problem (Bar6n Crespo's Speech, EUI, 
4/2/1991). 
Nevertheless, despite the numerous parliamentary messages to the Iraqi authorities, the 
consultations with member states' governments and national parliaments as well as exchanges of 
views with the US Congress, the EP's stance carried little weight. In fact, the European 
Parliament 'cut a sorry figure' over the Gulf War. Some among its own members recognized 
Parliament's inability to act as a political entity and deplored its unconvincing attempt to "disguise 
in texts lacking direction the internal conflicts of political groups" (De Montesquiou Fezensac, 
13/3/1991, 77). The resulting image of the EP was of a sort of academy where opinions were 
formulated "tardily and bureaucratically" (Fontaine, 13/3/1991, 83). 
The reasons for this marginalization of the EP from the political centre can be attributed 
to the lack of powers and poor cohesion within the parliamentary forum itself, which had 
prevented the building of a solid bloc capable of exerting influence on the other EC institutions. 
Responding to the criticism of poor EP cohesion on Gulf events, President Bar6n Crespo argued 
that a comparison of the debates of the European Parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg with those 
of the US Congress in Washington, revealed that before 15 January the former was slightly less 
divided than its American counterpart (Bar6n Crespo's Speech, EUI, 4/2/1991). 
Furthermore, against the old prejudice that foreign policy is not a parliamentary concern, 
as Andreotti stressed, the crisis "required complete awareness and involvement on the part not 
only of governments and political forces, but all citizens who must be enabled thoroughly and 
clearly to comprehend the reasons which impel us, so that they are then able to give their consent 
to decisions and, where necessary, the required sacrifices." On the assumption that the European 
Parliament represents the will of the people of Europe, "it is from this Assembly, therefore, that 
the most profound statements and influential encouragement must come" (Andreotti, 12/9/1990, 
98). 
On the page of history opened to 2 August 1990, the European Parliament, and indeed 
the Community as a whole, was only able to write a few words in invisible ink. Their 
performance in relation to the crisis, however, has to be examined in the light of many 
extenuating circumstances connected to inadequate institutional mechanisms and powers. What 
remains to be assessed is whether and to what extent this institutional hiatus has effectively 
prevented the forging of a European common approach or rather whether the absence of political 
will and the dominance of national constraints effectively represent the "insuperable obstacles" 
(Hill, 1983b). 
IV The Role of the Political Groups in Forging the European 
Parliament's Stance on the Gulf Crisis 
In order to unveil fully the multifaceted Europarliamentary outlook on the Gulf crisis during its 
three stages - the build-up to war, the war itself and the immediate aftermath of the war - it is 
necessary to look closely at the positions taken by the political groups. This is achieved through 
a review of relevant parliamentary debates, Motions for Resolutions, substantiated by interviews 
with MEPs and an analysis of roll-call votes (ReVs). An attempt is also made to discern whether 
and when dissenting voices emerged, and to measure the levels of cohesion and transnationality 
within the various political groups. An examination of the level of similarity or discord between 
the various groups is also carried out by comparing and combining the respective ReVs of PGs. 
Finally, since "no group operates in a vacuum; each react[ing] to what other groups do and 
[being] in its turn reacted to", the chapter attempts to unravel the complex process of group 
interaction and to detect whether a particular PG or coalition made any significant impact in terms 
of defining or influencing the EP official policy vis-a-vis the Gulf crisis. 1 
The methodology followed for such qualitative and quantitative evaluation has alread~ been explained in the 
Introduction to the thesis, whilst the formulae are illustrated in detail in the :\rpendlx. 
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1. Political Groups' Positions vis-a-vis the Gulf Crisis 
1.1 The Socialist Group 
a) Pre-War Stage 
As early as September 1990, the group recognized that the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait was the 
first real threat to international peace in the so-called New World Order and that a weak response 
to Iraq's defiant behaviour might well set a dangerous precedent encouraging other countries to 
emulate Baghdad. Support was given to the adoption of an international embargo on oil imports 
from Iraq as well as on exports of all goods, including agricultural products other than those 
permitted for humanitarian reasons under UN Resolution 661. The Socialist Chairman Jean-Pierre 
Cot also stressed the need for the European Community to participate in the UN operations aimed 
at enforcing the Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in order to induce Iraq to withdraw 
from Kuwait (Cot, 1990a). The group appeared split over the so-called "additional measures" to 
be adopted in the Gulf, as indicated in the September EP Resolution, because about 80 MEPs 
remained implacably opposed to the war, being influenced by the Greens. This lack of internal 
cohesion made the Socialists more than ever aware of the necessity of seeking a compromise with 
other PGs (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996). 
No negotiations should be undertaken before an unconditional Iraqi departure from 
Kuwait, the re-establishment of the latter's legitimate government and the freeing of all hostages. 
The need was also stressed to avoid engaging in separate negotiations which, even if successful, 
would undermine the chances of the remaining detainees. In the group's view, the Community 
should give assistance to war refugees and to the populations in Egypt and Jordan who were 
suffering from the effects of the sanctions imposed on Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Solidarity with 
these countries should be subject to full compliance with the embargo against Saddam (Cot, 
12/9/1990, 107-108).2 In addition, the Socialists spelled out the need to address the conflicts in 
the Middle East, the crucial issue of arms trade and finally the need for the EC member states 
to improve their political cooperation in the field of foreign policy (Woltjer, 12/911990, 164-165). 
The group appeared fairly cohesive throughout the RCVs leading to the adoption of the 
September Resolution. 3 The final roll-call vote on the whole text, which was requested by the 
Socialists along with the Christian Democrats and the Greens, revealed that out of a total number 
2 See also Paragraphs 11 & 12 of the Joinl Resolution 83-1600. 1602. 1603. 1604, 1623 of 12 September 
1990. OlEC C 260/90.81. 
For the indices of agreement of the individual RC\'s see Appendix. 
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of 145 Socialist members participating in the vote, 136 were in favour, none against and 9 
abstained, among whom were 8 British Labour and one Belgian Socialist members.~ As the 
British MEP Alfred Lomas explained, he refused to "give comfort to those who support[ed] Iraq 
by voting against [the] Resolution". However, due to the omission in the text of an unequi\·ocal 
rejection of war a solution to the crisis, the failure to ban further arms trade to the Middle East 
and to condemn other, similar violations of territorial sovereignty, he could not but abstain from 
voting (Lomas, 12/9/1990, 158-159). 
In early October, the Socialists focused on the humanitarian effects of the CrISIS, 
expressing concern about the hostages and the Kuwaiti population and urging the Commission to 
establish a task force to look closely at the repercussions of the crisis in the Community's 
industrial sector (McMahon, 11/10/1990, 273-274). Attention was also given to the disastrous 
financial consequences of the oil price rise for developing countries, already burdened by a heavy 
public debt. The repayment of the loans of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries equivalent 
to 1,300 billion dollars should be written off to prevent further their economic deterioration (van 
Putten, 1111011990, 274). The Socialists urged the Community to bear the repatriation costs of 
the thousands of Filipino workers who had to flee from Iraq, with serious economic consequences 
for their country which had also been hit by a major earthquake on 16 July 1990 (Visser, 
1111011990, 274-275). 
As the French MEP Gerard Caudron pointed out, the Gulf crisis had given cast-iron proof 
not only of Saddam's totalitarian regime, but also of an "even more evil" dictatorship imposed 
by certain multinational companies. Hence, the Commission should take swift and effective 
measures to control the oil sector, re-establish order to the market and penalize speculators. In 
addition, energy-saving policies should be adopted and the use of alternative energy sources 
promoted (Caudron, 11/10/1990, 284). The majority of the Socialists advocated a diplomatic 
solution, to be carried out at international level rather than via a unilateral EC action (Woltjer. 
2311 0/1990, 81-82). In December, the Socialists welcomed, as a step in the right direction, 
Saddam's decision to free the hostages and finally to comply with the conditions established by 
the UN Security Council. They also welcomed the Council's invitation to the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister to stop in Rome on his return from Washington (Sakellariou, 11/1211990,69-70). The 
group's cohesion seemed to decline further with regard to the UN ultimatum to Iraq, which was 
considered a mistake by the majority who opposed military intervention, in the belief that the 
sanctions would eventually force Iraq to yield (Cheysson, 74-75, Crampton, 76-77, 1111211990, 
Within the Socialist group. the following British Labour members Falconer. Hindley. Lomas. MacGowan. 
Newman. Stewart. Smith A .• West as well as the Belgian Socialist MEP van Hemeldonck abc;[ameJ Irom 
the vote. 
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Newens, 150, Crawley, 151, McGowan, 152, Tongue, 153, Falconer, Hughes, 154. Green, 155, 
Coates 155-156, Elliot, 156, Crampton, 160, McCubbin, 161, Romeos, 162,23/1/1991). 
The Socialists, together with the European Unitarian Left and the Left Unity. tabled a 
Motion for a Resolution which was passed by the House on 12 December, after 5 roll-call \otes 
requested by the British Labour MEP Alexander Falconer and 23 other members (OlEC C 19, 
28/1/1991, 53). Of the 127 Socialist members present, 121 supported the Joint Motion, while 6. 
specifically 3 British Labour, 2 German Social Democrats and one Belgian Socialist members 
abstained from the vote. During the same session, the group almost unanimously, with the 
exception of the Spanish MEP Francisco Javier Sanz Fernandez and the German MEP Rolf 
Linkohr, opposed the approval of the text jointly presented by the Christian Democrats, the 
Liberals and the British Conservatives (OlEC C 19,281111991, 53). The outcome of the RCV 
on Recital E "Whereas the military option is not an automatic consequence of the adoption of 
Resolution 678" displayed a very high index of agreement, 98.40 percent, with 124 votes in 
favour and only one dissenting vote cast by the British MEP David Bowe. The expression "[The 
EP] calls on the United Nations to continue to manage this conflict and calls for no military action 
to be taken" (emphasis added) was endorsed by 124 members while only one member rejected 
it and 2 preferred to abstain from voting reaching an IA equal to 95.28 percent. 
The initial response of the Socialist group, which changed by the end of the pre-war 
stage, was founded on the premise that war should be averted at any costs and that every effort 
should be made to reach a settlement of the crisis through political negotiations and economic 
sanctions. Emphasis was put on full compliance with UN Resolutions and a commitment by the 
international community to address the crucial problem of economic disparities in the region and 
to find a definitive settlement to the Palestinian question (Cheysson, 1111211990, 74-75). 
Throughout this stage, the Socialists registered a very high level of agreement in the RCVs, at 
91. 21 percent. The low level of absenteeism within the group, equal to 29.96 percent, also 
deserves mention. 5 
b) War Stage 
On 16 January 1991, Jean-Pierre Cot together with the Chairman of the European Unitarian Left. 
Luigi Colajanni, issued a common declaration supporting the 'last-minute' initiative by President 
Mitterand (Cot and Colajanni. 1991, PE/GCI08/91). Saddam's disregard for this new peace 
proposal induced the Socialist leader to deem legitimate the military option, albeit strictly limited 
For parameters of interpretation of both index of agreement and level of absent~ism see table in the 
Appendix, Section 1.2. 
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to the liberation of Kuwait. He then criticized the European Community for "cut[ting] a sorry 
figure in the Gulf crisis", stressing the importance of preparing an international conference on the 
Middle East (Tutt, 1991). 
A few days later, at the January session, controversy arose as to whether to back the 
proposal by the German SPD member, Gerd Walter, to call for an immediate halt to the bombing 
by the international coalition or to insist first on the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait. The outbreak of the war found the group increasingly more divided. In expressing its 
disagreement with the US and the allies' decision to initiate military operations in the Gulf a 
faction of the Socialist group, bringing together British, German and Greek MEPs, with the 
Greens, the European Left Unity and the Left Unity appealed for an immediate ceasefire. It is 
noteworthy that Labour MEPs distanced themselves from the position taken by their national 
party, strongly believing that the drastic step of taking military action against Iraq could be 
justified only when all other attempts at negotiations had failed. As such, the EP was asked to 
distinguish itself as the only Community institution and the only parliament in Europe to continue 
supporting a non-military settlement of the crisis (Romeos, 23/1/1991, 162). The Iraqi 
government was urged to grasp the opportunity offered by the Soviet peace plan and the Council's 
disregard of the initiative was denounced. By referring to the fact that only four of the twelve 
member states had received the text of Gorbachev' s proposal, the Socialists stressed the 
importance of coordinating actions between member states (Woltjer, 121-122, Lagorio, 134, 
Romeos, 135-136, Schinzel, 138 and Sakellariou, 139,20/2/1991, Sakellariou, Ford, 9, Dury, 
Collins, 13, 21/2/1991). 
Eventually, the defiant attitude of Saddam induced an increasingly larger section of the 
group to admit that the international community had no alternative but to resort to force. [A note 
of approval was addressed to the Commission for its efforts to assist refugees and to provide 
technical support to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996)]. The group 
pointed out that the West had to acknowledge its responsibility in arming the Arab world by 
urging the leaders of industrialized countries to initiate a joint policy to limit and control 
effectively the sale of arms to the Middle East (Sakellariou, 69-70, Cheysson, 11112/1990, 74-75, 
Morris, 20/2/1991, 139). The danger was envisaged of the conflict being extended into a general 
North-South confrontation taking the "insidious and destructive forms of terrorism and a war of 
religion" (Di Rupo, 23/1/1991, 152). 
Following long discussions within the group as well as III the Chamber between 
belligerents and non-belligerents, a solution was defined by Cot, envisaging a cessation of 
hostilities as soon as Saddam started to evacuate Kuwait (Cot, 23/111991. 126). Furthermore, in 
order to prevent the widening of the conflict in the region. the Greek Socialist delegation 
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recommended that the Security Council impose a ceasefire and resume negotiations for the 
liberation of Kuwait. The necessity of peace and stability in the whole region through a durable 
settlement of the Palestinian, Lebanese and Cypriot questions was emphasized (Romeos, 
23/1/1991, 162). Major Socialist concern was "to contain the war and to bring it to a rapid 
conclusion with minimum casualties" (OlEC C 48,25/2/1991, 115-116). 
The Socialists, presumably in order to detect the position of their own members, requested 
a RCV on the January Joint Resolution tabled in conjunction with the EPP, ED and Rainbow 
group. Among 138 Socialist members who voted, 90 supported the text, 33 rejected it and 15 
abstained. The British Labour members, in particular, were split with 13 voting in favour, 16 
voting against and 8 abstaining. The German SPD members also were divided with 14 members 
endorsing the Joint Resolution, 10 rejecting and 3 abstaining. The Spanish MEPs voted 
unanimously instead for the January Motion. Consequently, the index of agreement was fairly 
low, equal to 30.43 percent. With regard to the Motion for a Resolution on the Gulf and the 
Baltic states, 60 members, including all UK Labour members and over two-thirds of German 
Socialists (52 MEPs) voted in favour, almost all Spanish and French Socialists members voted 
against and only one Spanish MEP abstained. 
The Community appeared unable to respond to the events in the Gulf due not only to the 
absence of a defence and security structure, but to the lack of political will to foster the 
integration process (OlEC 3-398,211111991). Hence, Parliament was encouraged to promote the 
establishment of firmly based Community institutions to tackle security and defence issues. 
Concern was expressed at domestic racist reactions against Arabs and Muslims as well as 
environmental consequences of the conflict. An abstentionist Socialist approach stood out in sharp 
contrast with the other PG positions and a schism re-emerged at the extraordinary sitting held in 
Brussels on 31 January. Whilst the group was united on a number of points relating to the crisis, 
it was unable to paper over the emerging cracks and splits within its ranks over the core issue of 
strategies. As Chart la shows, the trend for the IA during the second stage was very fragmentary 
and irregular, falling to 50.06 percent, the lowest among all the other groups. In this stage, the 
Socialists reached even a lower level of absenteeism of 27.74 than in the previous one. 
c) Post-War Stage 
Following Cot's view that "une guerre juste est inutile si elle n'est pas suivie d'une paix juste",6 
the Socialist Group pleaded that all efforts be made to assist the material reconstruction of the 
whole region, to find the measures necessary to ensure a long-lasting peace and to recreate the 
"A just war is worthless if it is not followed by a just peace" (author's translation). 
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links of trust between Europe and the Arab community (Dury, 1991, 22, Presse illformation, 
281211991). Criticism was directed against the Community's approval of the US decision to 
continue the embargo against Iraq even after its withdrawal from Kuwait (Pagoropoulos, 
13/311991, 87). 
The need for an adequate European defence and security framework was reiterated, this 
time in conjunction with the proposal of setting up an Arab Development Bank (Cheysson, 
13/311991, 75). Since the Gulf War showed the obnoxious consequences of the conduct of 
unscrupulous Western and Soviet entrepreneurs in the arms industry, the Commission should 
monitor arms exports in the region, promote the reduction of the Iraqi, Syrian and also Israeli 
armaments and harmonize the penalties for illegal arms dealers (Sakellariou, 13/3/1991,88-89, 
Ford, 13/3/1991, 90-91, Randzio-Plath, 13/311991, 91-92). The Socialists supported the 
Lamassoure Report regarding the amendment of the 1991 budget so as to provide emergency aid 
to the Kurds (Tomlinson, 14/511991, 81) and applauded the EP for its prompt response to the 
Council proposal enabling the Commission to implement this humanitarian aid programme without 
delay. The preference given by the Community to Israel in previous commercial and association 
agreements should be counterbalanced by developing closer relationships with Arab countries 
(Belo, 15/5/1991, 142). 
In the aftermath of the war, the group seemed to have rediscovered its unity, registering 
its highest index of agreement, 97.46 percent but with a noticeable increase in absenteeism rising 
to 56.42 percent, which remained the second lowest if compared to the other groups' records over 
this stage. The Socialists were unanimous on 6 out of 8 roll-call votes. In the first part of 
paragraph 8 of Joint Resolution on arms exports in the Gulf region of 18 April 1991, "call[ing] 
for better coordination of the European arms industry in the EC internal market with a view to 
reducing surplus capacity and avoiding duplication, particularly in the cost-intensive area of 
research" only one dissenting voice emerged from a Dutch member (B3-0552, 0555, 0562, 0564, 
0565 and 0660/91). The first part of Amendment 1 to Joint Resolution on the situation of the 
Kurds (B3-556/91 et at.) was overall opposed by the group, but was endorsed by 7 members 
including 3 German, one French, one British, one Irish and one Italian MEPs. 
In brief, throughout the whole period of the crisis the Socialists' average index of 
agreement was equal to 73.28 percent, the third lowest outcome among all the parliamentary 
groups, except for the Independent members. Specifically, the rate of cohesion drastically dropped 
between the pre-war and war stages by 41.15 percent. However, these figures need to be 
examined in light of the large size of the group as well as the fairly low absenteeism rate of 33. 17 
at the RCV sessions to avoid misperceptions over what could appear to be a strong Socialist 
inclination to factionalism. 
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1.2 The European People's Party 
a) Pre-War Stage 
The European People's Party Group (EPP) categorically demanded an unconditional Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of the Kuwaiti government and the immediate liberation 
of all Western hostages as preconditions for opening a dialogue with Saddam on broader issues 
afflicting the Middle East. The group's profile vis-a-vis the developments in the Gulf mirrored 
essentially its pro-Atlantic tradition with the endorsement in December 1990 of the UN ultimatum 
(Pesmazoglou, 11112/1990,70). Disappointment was expressed at the passivity of the Community 
which seemed to be 'looking on' whilst the US and the UN were taking decisive actions. A 
common thread running through all the EPP reactions since the beginning of the crisis was the 
intense concern expressed for the need to structure a common EU strategy, independent but 
aligned to existing international alliances such as NATO and the WEU to approach similar events 
more efficiently (Pinxten, 1111211990, 77). Echoing the Socialists, the Christian Democrats 
expressed concern about those countries including Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan and the 
Philippines which were suffering most from the embargo against Iraq, the increase in oil prices 
(B3-1844/90) and the costs of repatriating their workers from Kuwait. Recovery and aid 
programmes were urged for these countries and, in particular, for the Philippines where the 
economic difficulties had been exacerbated by an earthquake. Debt reduction was proposed for 
developing countries in order lift their already fragile economies which had been perilously 
aggravated by the crisis. Finally, airlifts were requested to assist the refugees returning to their 
respective countries. 
Criticizing the Socialists for putting "the oil companies in the free part of this world on 
a par with the arch-villain Saddam", the EPP stated that strategies should be sought for securing 
energy stocks and promoting the production and use of alternative energy resources. For this 
purpose, the International Energy Agency based in Paris should be reinforced and a common 
European energy sector should be established (Salzer, 1111011990, 284-285). 
The crisis amply demonstrated the urgency of setting up a military and security structure 
to enable the Community to coordinate member states' actions (Habsburg, 109, Penders, 120). 
The Christian Democrats were apprehensive about the risks associated with an open military 
conflict which might well conflagrate into a "dirty technological war" with devastating 
consequences for civilians and for the environment as well as serious repercussions in the West-
Arab relations. The EPP members objected, together with the Socialists, to the separate initiatives 
undertaken by the "Baghdad pilgrims" to release the hostages, as they would render the situation 
for those remaining more difficult (Habsburg, 108, Penders, 119-120 12/9/1990). In line with the 
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view of Jose-Maria Aznar, Chairman of Spain's Partido Popular, the Spanish Delegation of the 
EPP voted in favour of the September Joint Resolution, although with certain reservations 
especially with regard to paragraph 8 which did not fully acknowledge the crucial role played by 
the United States in the management of the crisis (Robles Piquer, 12/9/1990, 139). The RCV on 
the September Joint Resolution revealed a high index of agreement within the EPP equal to 95.51 
percent with 87 votes in favour, no votes against and 2 abstentions by the Portuguese MEP Luis 
Filipe Beiroco and the French MEP Jean-Louis Bourlanges. 
In November, the general message proposed by the EPP was that although Parliament 
could not yet opt for peace or war, it had nevertheless the duty to denounce the violence and 
devastation perpetrated by Saddam (Robles Piquer, 22/11/1990, 249). The average index of 
agreement within the EPP Group held during this stage on 19 roll-call votes was extremely high, 
equal to 92.65 percent, showing a very constant trend with the exception of RCVs 17 and 18 
which suddenly marked a drastic drop. In addition, the absenteeism rate of the EPP group \vas 
fairly low, equal to 38.17. 
b) War Stage 
In the group's view, Saddam's fanatic and intransigent attitude had finally dispelled hope for a 
negotiated solution to the crisis in line with the UN objectives, leaving the international 
community with no other choice but to resort to force. In expressing support for the US-led 
armed intervention and calling for German contribution, Hans-Gert Poettering, the German CDU 
Security Policy Spokesman in the EP, stated: 
We Germans cannot stand apart. Germany enjoyed the support of the Western allies for 
forty years; now the West can rightly demand our support, especially for the future (The 
European, 25/1/1991). 
He regretted Germany's decision not to participate militarily due to presumed constitutional 
restraints which did not exist in the text of the German constitution as the Federal Constitutional 
Court ultimately acknowledged (Poettering interview, 25/1/1996). 
In January and February 1991, several MEPs attributed the Community's failure to 
mediate a solution to the crisis to the lack of cohesion between the member states 
(Cassanmagnago Cerretti, 5, Penders, 9, 30/1/1991, Pesmazoglou, 132-133, Poettering, 135, 
Reding, 136, Lucas Pires, 137, Oostlander, 138,20/2/1991). The necessity was stressed for the 
Community to participate more actively in international issues and to set up a European collective 
security structure. The EPP restated its backing for the allied military intervention and land attack 
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against Iraq, reiterating, however, the possibility of reopening a dialogue with Iraq when it began 
to withdraw from Kuwait (Cassanmagnago Cerretti, 5,301111991, Gaibisso, 130, Poettering, 135, 
Reding, 136, Merz, 138-139, 20/211991). The efforts made by the Soviet President Gorbachev 
and by Pope John Paul II to facilitate the swift conclusion of the armed conflict were welcomed 
(Penders, 20/211991, 122). 
In the second stage, the Christian Democrats suffered a slight reduction in their level of 
cohesion, keeping, however, a fairly high index of agreement equal to 87.96 percent. Chart 2a 
displays a fragmented IA trend, dropping to the level of -1.27, with 39 members voting in favour, 
33 voting against and 7 abstentions over Motion for a Resolution 83-120/90. After this steep fall, 
the group found again its cohesiveness, exhibiting a very regular trend in its IA. The level of 
absenteeism was of lower than in the previous stage, equal to 31.68. 
c) Post-War Stage 
After praising the United States for the liberation of Kuwait (Pisoni F., 90, Brok, 91, Lucas 
Pires, 91, Robles Piquer, 92, 13/311991), the Christian Democrats felt that the next step was to 
remedy the ravages of war and embark on the road to peace. In harmony with its political 
conviction, the EPP contemplated the prospect of founding a society on the Christian Democratic 
values of solidarity, respect for cultural differences and safeguarding of the environment (PPE 
document, Dublin, 15-16/5/1990, pars. 6-26-31). 
Numerous questions had to be addressed: restoration of peace in Iraq, a homeland for the 
Palestinians, definitive and internationally guaranteed borders for Israel, acknowledgement of the 
rights of the Kurds, liberation of Lebanon, assistance in the establishment of democratic regimes 
in the area and a North-South dialogue (Pisoni F., 13/3/1991,90). For this purpose, the group 
as a whole supported the idea of convening an international conference and undertaking bilateral 
negotiations alongside parliamentary meetings with representatives of the Maghreb, Mashreq and 
the Gulf states so as finally to reach a long-lasting peace in the region. However, while for some 
the Middle East questions were to be examined in the wider context of the problems afflicting the 
Mediterranean basin, for others they would be better tackled separately (Robles Piquer, 
13/3/1991, 92). However, to enable the Community to make an impact in the Middle East and 
"to influence the fate of the world" a genuinely common and coordinated defence should be 
established under the Western European Union and European Political Cooperation frameworks 
(Fontaine, 13/3/1991, 83). 
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EPP confirmed its full commitment to the realization of the 'United States of Europe' which 
would speak in unison, sharing international responsibilities with the United States reviving the 
traditional Atlantic loyalty and solidarity (Webster, 1994,284, Robles Piquer, 13/3/1991,92). 
The Christian Democrats condemned the Iraqi setting fire to Kuwaiti oil wells which had 
caused huge environmental damages without even achieving any military objectives. In addition, 
the EPP members argued that the European Community and the international community should 
not tolerate further Saddam's continual violations of fundamental rights towards the Kurdish 
minority and all opposition groups (Brok, 13/3/1991,91). In particular, the group succeeded in 
securing parliamentary endorsement of paragraph 5 of the April Joint Resolution on the Kurds 
regarding an appeal to the United Nations to prevent authoritarian regimes from committing 
genocide, if necessary by revising the text of the UN Charter and by elaborating the content of 
UN Resolution 688 (EPP Report of the activities, 9/1991, 29). The EPP believed that immediate 
measures were necessary alleviate the sufferings of the Kurds. In May 1991, it was stressed that 
to ensure the democratic development of this area aid should be granted upon condition of respect 
for fundamental rights (Lenz, 15/5/1991, 140). The level of cohesion achieved in the ReVs on 
the Gulf over this final stage was rather high, the highest registered during the whole crisis, with 
an index reaching 96.77 percent. On 5 of the 8 roll-call votes requested in this post-war stage, 
the EPP reached full unanimity. 
In summary, the overall EPP's index of agreement with respect to the Gulf case was 
much higher than that achieved by the Socialists, achieving the considerable score of 91.15 
percent. The EPP level of absenteeism amounted to 39.69, a figure higher than that attained by 
its major political opponent, but still slightly below the average. 
1.3 The Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group 
a) Pre-War Stage 
The Liberals fully acknowledged the American Presidency's resolute and swift response in the 
Gulf which had deterred Iraq from attacking Saudi Arabia whilst they reproached the EP's failure 
to recognize the key role of the United States (Giscard d'Estaing, 12/9/1990, 109-110, 151-152). 
They criticized the ambiguous 'pseudo-pacifist' expression contained in the September Joint 
Resolution that "only a diplomatic solution [could] finally settle the crisis". This could be 
.' 'bl t" n "giving interpreted as Europe's denial to consider military mterventlOn as a POSSl e op 10 , 
official sanction to a drawn-out waiting game" (Nordmann. 12/9/1990. 155). 
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In their view, no sufficient emphasis was placed on the need for creating a foreign and security 
policy structure capable of dealing with emergencies outside the European geographical area such 
as in the case of the Gulf. The text of the September Resolution did not stress sufficiently the 
urgency of calling on the Community to get out of the impasse and share international 
responsibilities with the United States (Amaral, 12/9/1990, 157). 
The members of the small Italian Republican Party advocated the sending of Italian and 
European military contingents to the Gulf, a position that soon after was supported by the whole 
LDR (La Malfa, 12/9/1990, 121). Despite all the above reservations, the majority of the Liberals 
eventually decided to endorse the Resolution while the members of the Portuguese Socialist 
Democratic Party abstained from the vote, as the text had failed in their opinion to address the 
need to find "a serious and radical solution to the climate of mistrust and confrontation latent in 
the Mediterranean region and the Persian Gulf" (Amaral, 12/9/1990, 157). The Liberals together 
with the Greens and the European Right requested a split vote on the September Resolution, yet 
for diametrically opposite reasons and certainly not for "joining in the ranting and raving of the 
yobbos of the extreme right" (Nordmann, 12/9/1990, 155). The LDR index of agreement over 
the final vote on the whole text was of 29.41 percent, with 22 voting in favour, 9 abstaining and 
2 Belgian MEPs, Jean Defraigne, Fran~ois Xavier de Donnea as well as one French MEP Jean-
Thomas Nordmann voting against. 
Over the following months, the LDR reaffirmed its firm stance against Saddam by also 
advancing the proposal of establishing international criminal procedures against him (de Donnea, 
11110/1990, 273). The group also expressed disappointment at the separate initiatives for the 
release of the hostages, regardless of the common agreement to find a collective solution 
(Nordmann, 251, Veil, 248, 22/1111990). Finally, the group stressed the need for the Community 
to grant financial assistance to countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Turkey in order to contain the 
economic consequences of the crisis (Lacaze, 22/1111990, 252). 
Overall, the LDR shared with the EPP a strict position towards the Iraqi unconditional 
withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of hostages in support of UN Resolutions and US policy. 
The group criticized the absence of coordinated Community actions and called for the 
development of a distinctive and independent foreign policy (Giscard d'Estaing, 12/911990, 109, 
Veil, 2211111990, 248-249 and 1111211990, 70-71, Capucho, 23/10/1990, 82, Veil, 2.f8-249, 
Nordmann, 251, 2211111990). 
As to the means to solve the crisis, the Liberals hoped that diplomatic negotiations and 
economic sanctions would be sufficient, but did not exclude the resort to arms. They 
congratulated the Council on its prompt adoption of trade sanctions which had blocked 97 percent 
of Iraq's revenues coming from oil exports and proposed to impose even a stricter embargo. 
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including a land blockade (Veil, 22111/1990, 248-249). However, in November 1990, as the 
situation deteriorated, the LDR Members became increasingly convinced that only military means 
would force Saddam's hand and stated that the immediate release of the hostages was an absolute 
precondition for any negotiation regarding the Iraq-Kuwait dispute and all other problems in the 
Middle East (Nordmann, 22/11/1990, 251). 
Echoed by leaders of other PGs, Valery Giscard d'Estaing stressed that European security 
policy should be the responsibility of the Community and not just individual member states (17le 
Guardian, 13/9/1990). To prevent "the total marginalization of Europe in the next stage of world 
history" (Palmer, John, 1990, 6), the Community should create a political and security structure. 
Between 12 September 1990 and 15 January 1991, the LDR reached the high index of agreement 
of 76.79 along with a fairly low level of absenteeism of 38.17. 
b) War Stage 
Although acknowledging that war meant the "defeat of sound sense, reason and diplomacy", the 
Liberals noted that "it was not possible to find a diplomatic solution to the Gulf crisis and that 
the only option left was alas to resort to force" (De Clercq, 2211/1991, 21). As such, the 
undertaking of US-led military operations against Iraq to prevent the annexation of Kuwait 
becoming a/ait accompli was strongly supported. No negotiations should be open with Saddam 
prior to his complete surrender and full admission of responsibility of the conflict and no cease fire 
authorized. 
There were, nonetheless, members such as Rafael Calvo Ortega who rejected the idea 
that war was the only possible option (Ortega, 2111/1991, 23). The explanation of vote which 
took place on 23 January triggered a new debate in the House. Simone Veil expressed her earnest 
opposition to the text of the Joint Resolution which attempted "to compromise all positions by 
saying simultaneously that the United Nations Resolutions [would] be observed" while agreeing 
to negotiate "once a start has been made on a total withdrawal from Kuwait", concluding that it 
would be outrageous if the EP were to vote for such a controversial and equivocal Resolution 
(Veil, 23/1/1991, 153). 
The LDR position, which closely mirrored that adopted by the EPP, was further 
underpinned at the Enlarged Bureau meeting on 30 January 1991 in Brussels. Liberals advocated 
the setting up of a European armament agency, placed under the Council of Defence Ministers 
to regulate and monitor the production and export of arms, the strengthening of the embargo 
controls and enhancement of EPC actions in the Gulf region. Support was therefore expressed for 
the realization of a common European foreign policy (de Donnea, 6/211991 5, Giscard d'Estaing, 
201211991, 122-123). During the second stage of the Gulf issue, the group showed a vcry 
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irregular trend in their voting behaviour/ averaging an high index of agreement of 73.63 
percent, and registering a lower level of absenteeism of 31.68 than in the previous stage. 
c) Post-War Stage 
In the aftermath of the war, the Liberals reiterated the view that the crisis had confirmed the need 
for a solid European security policy within the UN framework, aimed to "injecvt a sense of 
purpose and dynamism into the WEU" (Webster, 1994,282). The NATO Alliance would remain 
at the heart of European collective security until a new system, involving all members of the 
Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), could be established. The Liberals 
wished to see the four disjointed foreign policy sectors - EPC, development policy, external 
relations and security - integrated within the Community system (Ashdown, 19/6/1991, 24 and 
26). Hopes were expressed that Europe would "speak with one voice" at least during the peace 
process. The convening of an international conference on the Israeli-Arab question was once again 
proposed, together with a symposium on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (de 
Donnea, 6/2/1991, 5). 
The Liberals refused to support the March compromise text which did not highlight 
enough the outstanding role played by the US force and the efforts made by the international 
coalition in the Gulf. In addition, the text failed to demand the United Nations' commitment to 
regulate arms sales, leading ultimately to the elimination of weapons of mass-destruction in the 
area (De Montesquiou Fezensac, 13/3/1991, 77). 
In April 1991, the group participated in the drafting of the Joint Resolution on the Kurds 
and the Joint Resolution on arms exports, while in May 1991 it reproached the Community for 
failing to respect its promise regarding the Middle East peace process (Amaral, 15/5/1991, 140-
141). 
In the post-war stage, the level of cohesion reached the optimal 100 percent, registering 
a quite noticeable increase between the second and third stage of the Gulf crisis by 26.37 percent. 
This flattering outcome is weakened by the extraordinary rate of absenteeism of 76.02 percent. 
The average degree of cohesion throughout the three-stage crisis touched 79.05 percent, lower 
than that of the other centre-right groups. The Liberals had a conspicuous level of absenteeism 
with an average 54.41 percent of its members deserting the RCV sessions on the Gulf. 
This trend touched the most critical points over Resolution 83-115 of 23 January 1991 proposed by the EDA 
and Resolution 83-0333 of 21 February 1991 proposed by the Greens. 
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1.4 The European Democratic Group 
a) Pre-War Stage 
In September 1990, the European Democratic Group (ED) unequivocally expressed its firm 
condemnation of Saddam's invasion and illegitimate annexation of Kuwait as the nineteenth 
province of Iraq. This act was regarded as an act of aggression against a sovereign country and 
a violation of the most basic rules of international law as well as human rights. The group 
acknowledged the prompt American action in response to the Iraqi threat to invade Saudi Arabia 
and to expropriate its oil resources, which would affect dangerously the economy of industrialized 
countries heavily reliant on Saudi oil imports (The Daily Telegraph, 13/9/1990). As Sir 
Christopher Prout, the ED leader, put it "[n]ot for the first time, Europe ow[ed] the United States 
an immense debt", warning that, if on this occasion the Americans intervened to safeguard out-of-
area European interests, in future this might not occur. 
The inadequate response by the Twelve to Iraqi aggression was due to the lack of political 
organization and defence mechanisms (Prout, 12/9/1990, 110-111). Nevertheless, the Ee's 
conduct was defined as exemplary in the field where it could exert its full supranational powers, 
by quickly enforcing trade sanctions, enacting legislation in order to implement UN Resolutions, 
providing emergency assistance for refugees and proposing aid plans in favour of countries such 
as Turkey, Egypt and Jordan. However, as William Francis Newton Dunn pointed out, other 
countries such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which were also bearing the onerous costs of 
the crisis, also deserved EC and international attention (Newton Dunn, 12/9/1990, 137-138). 
The European Democrats believed that once the expulsion of Iraqis from Kuwait had been 
completed, the causes of the crisis such as the disparities of wealth in the region as well as the 
racial tensions should not be forgotten. In addition, Western countries had to face their 
responsibility for having armed Iraq through the indiscriminate sale of conventional and chemical 
weapons and take adequate measures. Not surprisingly, the group, consisting almost exclusively 
of British Conservatives, reflected the UK government's policy line (Rawlings, 12/9/1990, 155). 
Although naturally preferring a peaceful solution, they remained sceptical about the chances of 
settling the question diplomatically, considering necessary the use of "additional" steps and 
notably military means to liberate Kuwait (Mcmillan-Scott, 12/9/1990, 128-129). The European 
Democrats took the view that only the 'logic of war' could induce Saddam to comply with the 
UN Resolutions. In light of the events in the Gulf, a new international order needed to be shaped 
in which the Community should play its part as a mediator and promoter of international peace 
(Prag. 12/9/1990. 135-136). Making no attempt to conceal his disappointment with the text of the 
September Joint Resolution. which he could not but vote against. Derek Prag conm1ented that this 
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showed "how spinelessly" the left-oriented Parliament reacted on defence issues (Prout, 110-Ill, 
Jepsen, 121, Prag, 135-136, 12/9/1990). 
In early October, the group drafted a Motion for a Resolution,S on the "humanitarian 
consequences of the crisis", urging the Council and the Commission to make all efforts to 
indistinctly guarantee safe return of all foreign citizens detained in Iraq and to establish an official 
ad hoc intergroup with the task to closely follow its developments (B3-1816/90). Like the EPP, 
the ED deplored the Socialists' excessively negative remarks about oil companies, criticizing 
instead the Soviet suppliers for not having complied with their commitments to Yugoslavia and 
other Eastern European countries (Moorhouse, 11/10/1990, 285). 
A substantial degree of group cohesion characterized from the start the ED policy vis-a-
vis the Gulf in this stage, as reflected in its RCV record which reached the remarkable index of 
agreement of 93.68 percent. Moreover, the British Conservatives were the MEPs who most 
diligently attended RCV sessions over the Gulf in this stage. The level of absenteeism calculated 
with respect to its 34 members amounted to low figure of 25.23 percent. 
b) War Stage 
In January 1991, along with the EPP and LDR, the ED endorsed US-led military operations 
against Iraq, especially acknowledging British valuable contribution. The group reiterated the view 
that no negotiation should be carried out with Iraq prior to its complete surrender and full 
admission of responsibility for the conflict. The group reiterated the view that the European 
countries should be grateful to the United States for defending Western interests by bearing "the 
brunt of the financial and human cost" (Prout, 21/1/1991, 16). 
Yet recognizing the efforts undertaken by President Gorbachev in order to avert a land 
war, the group asserted that military operations should not be halted without definite Iraqi 
commitment to the peace plan. Saddam's simple promise of withdrawal could not provide a 
sufficient guarantee, the only acceptable solution remaining an unconditional and irreversible 
retreat from Kuwait monitored by the international community (McMillan-Scott, 6, Prout, 10, 
30/1/1991, Prag, 20/2/1991, 123-124). 
In ED opinion, since Saddam had ignored all peace opportunities, the United Nations had 
no alternative but to authorize the recourse to force and for the international coalition to 
implement it in order to free Kuwait. Further delays regarding intervention, in the hope that 
sanctions would have brought some results, would have meant death and torture for more people, 
S The ED Motion was replaced by a new text agreed with other 8 parliamentary groups. However. due to the 
House heing inquorate. no Resolutions on the Gulf could be voted. 
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allowing "an evil to flourish unabated" (Jackson, C., 13/311991,77). 
The ED joined ranks with the criticisms voiced by the other major PGs at the lack of 
Community leadership and initiative, underlining the need for the Twelve to reappraise their 
political priorities and develop a common foreign policy strategy bringing together the European 
Community, NATO and WEU under the same umbrella (Prout, 10, 30/111991). 
During the second stage, the ED overall index of agreement was 94.86 percent, reaching 
in 15 out of 23 cases a unanimity of vote and in only one case an index of agreement as low as 
64.29 percent, with one abstention, 23 votes in favour, 4 against the adoption of Amendment 1 
to first draft of the January Joint Resolution tabled and later withdrawn by the Socialists and the 
Rainbow group. 
c) Post-War Stage 
In March 1991, the ED expressed its appreciation at the courage and proficiency demonstrated 
by the US-led coalition against the Iraqi enemy in the liberation of Kuwait. The British 
Conservative MEPs also raised the crucial issue of the Iraqi Parliament's recognition of an 
independent Kuwait as well as the parliamentary ratification of the treaties of the 1930s and 1960s 
evoked as one of the reasons for the annexation. 
With regard to the conditions to be imposed on Saddam, the group demanded that the 
Iraqi leader be held responsible for his military aggression, environmental damages as well as 
crimes against the Kuwaiti population, the Allies and his own people (Rawlings, 13/3/1991, 88). 
In addition, sanctions should not be lifted until an adequate compensation scheme was drawn up, 
through, for example, a levy on Iraqi oil revenues (Jackson, C., 13/311991, 77-78). As to the 
wider issues in the region, Patricia Rawlings advocated smaller-scale negotiations, which had 
proven to be successful between Egypt and Israel, rather than large international conferences. The 
question of the Kurds was seriously considered by the British Conservatives who tabled a Joint 
Motion for a Resolution on the subject with the vast majority of MEPs (Rawlings, 13/3/1991, 
88). 
It was argued that Europe could play a valuable role in supporting the creation of a 
Middle Eastern Community with the objective of overcoming the differences between Arabs and 
Israelis as France and Germany had done in 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community (Prag, 2111/1991, 22). The Community should also draw the attention of 
the Middle Eastern countries to the advantages of democracy by reminding them that EC loans 
and assistance would be granted only if human rights were respected and free elections convened 
(Mcmillan Scott, 61211991). 
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The group reiterated throughout the crisis the necessity for Europe to speak with one 
voice on topical questions of international politics (Webster, 1994, 277) and to strengthen its 
structures (Elles, James, 25/1/1991). It advocated a modernization of the British nuclear deterrent 
and the updating of NATO nuclear structures in view of establishing a committed and coordinated 
European defence sector (Webster, 1994, 277). 
The ED showed a quite consistent high level of cohesiveness throughout the crisis, 
reaching its highest index of agreement, 97.50 percent in the post -war stage. Out of 8 ReVs, the 
members voted unanimously on 7 occasions with only one dissenting opinion on Amendment 17 
of the March Joint Resolution (B3-0398, 0402, 0429, 0450 and 0466/91). Overall, the European 
Democrats boasted the highest index of agreement and the lowest index of absenteeism in 
comparison with all groups, by reaching over the whole period of the crisis an exceptionally high 
figure of 94.83 percent with a low rate of absenteeism of 29.41 percent. These figures 
demonstrate how the traditional power and efficiency of their whipping system flowed from 
Westminster to Strasbourg. In this sense, the ED embodied the prototype for the other groups in 
the European Parliament by carrying the torch of cohesiveness and assiduity. 
1.5 The Greens 
a) Pre-War Stage 
The Greens joined the chorus of condemnation at the invasion and annexation of Kuwait 
perpetrated by Iraq. Their position was conceived in light of their pacifist principles heavily laced 
with anti-imperialist sentiments, rather than on any grounds of sympathy for the totalitarian 
regime of the Kuwaiti Royal family (Telkamper, 12/9/1990, 124-125). Furthermore, the unilateral 
deployment of US troops and equipment in Saudi Arabia was as equally reprehensible as 
Saddam's enterprise, not least due to the hypocritical attempt to justify it as a measure officially 
carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. The group also viewed with consternation 
the prospect of constituting a US-led coalition which would symbolize in the eyes of the majority 
of Arabs the "alliance of the strong against the weak, the North against the poor South", 
providing Saddam with a perfect alibi for his bellicosity (Melandri, 12/9/1990, 129). The Greens 
"expressed [their] concern at the fact that escalation through the intervention of a military power, 
in particular the United States, may increase the risk of a bitter conflict, perhaps even as a result 
of unwanted incidents. and provoke uncontrollable and dangerous reactions world-wide" (83-
1618/90). The role claimed by the US of an impartial party and "self-appointed policeman of the 
world" was treated with scepticism and distrust (Aulas, 12/911990, 111-112). 
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The group fully endorsed the UN Resolutions which rejected negotiations with the Iraqi 
government under the pressure of a fait accompli. Sharing the impressions drawn during his 
criticized visit to Iraq, the Italian MEP Eugenio Melandri (Melandri, 11112/1990,71) pointed out 
that the Iraqi authorities were "only waiting for some hint of dialogue" with the West. This 
proved to be true in November 1990, when following the announcement of a US-Iraq meeting, 
news about the release of hostages by Christmas was divulged. 
According to the Greens, the crisis could be settled only through diplomatic means and 
the Community, therefore, should advance proposals for a peace plan, establishing economic 
relations with the Gulf countries in conjunction with a wider development programme, halting 
Western arms exports (Telkamper, 12/9/1990, 124-125) and encouraging a fairer redistribution 
of oil prosperity in the Arab world (Aulas, 12/911990, 111-112). The group, which did not 
participate in the drafting of the first EP compromise Resolution on the Gulf, considered its text 
ambiguous, especially when referring to the possibility of introducing" additional" joint measures, 
tacitly implying military actions (Santos, 152, Piermont, 155, 12/9/1990). Moreover, the 
Resolution failed to address two fundamental questions, namely the search for alternative energy 
sources and the violation of frontiers in other parts of the Middle East and the world (Bettini, 
12/9/1990, 157). 
The group welcomed Council statements and the Commission decision to grant aid to 
refugees from Kuwait and those countries whose economies were significantly affected by the 
crisis (Aulas, 12/911990, 111). Importance was also placed on the economic and financial 
difficulties faced by ACP countries, by supporting the Resolution adopted on 25 September 1990 
by the ACP-EEC Joint Assembly which envisaged the annulment of the debt incurred by these 
developing countries vis-a-vis the Community and its member states. The project of setting up 
a special financial mechanism for the above countries strongly dependent on oil import was also 
vigorously backed by the group (B3-1821190). The Gulf crisis and the consequent increase in the 
price of petroleum products, magnified in the hands of unscrupulous speculators, aroused one of 
the most crucial quandaries of the contemporary industrial society relating to the limited 
availability of energy resources and the necessity of introducing energy-saving measures such as 
speed limits on national and provincial roads as well as looking for alternative and renewable 
resources such as gas, wind and waste (Bettini, 11110/1990, 288). 
Concern was especially expressed about the human and economic implications of the crisis 
for those countries whose population represented an important labour force in the region before 
August 1990. According to the Greens, financial assistance should be granted in order to help 
those governments facing the losses and the costs of mass-repatriation. As the French MEP and 
EP member to the Joint Assembly of the Agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
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States and the European Economic Community (ACP-EEC), Marie-Christine Aulas pointed out, 
the incidents which occurred in October 1990 in Palestine and Lebanon should remind the 
international community that the Gulf crisis could not be dissociated from its geo-political context 
and therefore from the events of the other countries in the region. 
For this reason, the group urged the Community to assist the Arab countries in settling 
their problems rather than exploiting these disputes to its own advantage. An international peace 
conference was called to ensure that all countries involved, including Israel and Syria, would fulfil 
the conditions set by all past UN Resolutions (Telkamper, 12/9/1990, 124-125, Aulas, 
23/1011990, 82). The urgency of shaping a coherent EC policy vis-a-vis the Middle East was 
evident together with the necessity of formulating a new notion of security from the roots 
entailing the adjustment of the whole defence structure of the European continent (Aglietta, 
23110/1990,76-77). 
In November 1990, the Dutch MEP Herman Verbeek claimed that the reason behind US 
intervention in the Gulf was primarily that of diverting public attention from increasingly pressing 
domestic economic problems. As such, the EP had to express its objection to the Community's 
involvement in military actions and to the American misuse of the United Nations for military 
purposes (Verbeek, 2211111990, 250). Overshadowed by the US, the EC had once again missed 
the opportunity to assert its own independent common foreign policy, losing the opportunity of 
being "a force for mediation" between the West and Iraq (Telkamper, 12/9/1990, 124-125, Aulas, 
23110/1990, 82). European 'vassalage' was seemingly confirmed once again in December 1990 
when, following the US Administration's decision to receive the Iraqi Foreign Minister, the 
Community had "pathetically" extended an invitation to Tariq Aziz to stop in Rome on his return 
journey from the United States (Melandri, 11112/1990, 71). Throughout the first stage of the 
crisis, while censuring the Iraqi aggression, the Greens rejected military intervention in the 
region. Aware of the interconnection between the various conflicts as well as their common 
economic and social background, the Greens emphasized that the Gulf crisis needed to be seen 
in a wider context by securing stability and peace in the whole region. 
The Greens appeared divided on the question of whether to reject or abstain from voting 
on the text proposed on 12 September 1990 by the other six PGs. The majority, consisting of 15 
MEPs, decided to vote against the Joint Motion, while 7 opted for abstaining and only one 
member, the German MEP Karl Partsch supported the Resolution, without explicitly or officially 
providing the grounds for his vote at the plenary. 9 By contrast, the Italian MEP Marco Taradash 
9 Aglietta (Italy), Anger (France), Bandres Molet (Spai~). Qui~torp (Germany). Staes ~Belgiu~). TaraoJ,h 
(Italy) and Tazdait (France) abstained from the vote of the Jomt Motion lor a Resolution lIt L September 
1990. 
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explained the reason behind his decision to abstain from the vote taken along with the other 6 
colleagues, stressing that it would be "pointless to approve or disapprove a report, a document 
which [had] little effect on the situation" and criticized the EP for failing to convene at the same 
time as the other national parliaments "to seek to direct policy and the events that were taking 
place" (Taradash, 12/9/1990, 159). 
Overall, in the pre-war stage, the Greens' average index of agreement was the lowest of 
all the PGs, falling to 50.03 percent, clearly showing that the group was tom over the policy line 
to adopt with regard to the Gulf issue. They failed to achieve internal cohesion, also being 
conspicuous by their absence of 50.82 percent. 
b) War Stage 
During the January plenary session, the Greens, together with some members of the Socialist 
group and the members of the European Left Unity, preferred to vote for a Motion requesting 
an immediate ceasefire in the Gulf (Abeles, 1992, 187-188). The group declared itself against 
military confrontation and in favour of a more sustained embargo, as war would evoke the hatred 
of the West from the Arab world. Aulas defined as "infamous" UN Resolution 678, for it showed 
up an absence of awareness and responsibility on the part of its supporters and particularly on the 
part of the American administration. She strongly criticized the United States for its improper use 
of the UN agencies for fixing an arbitrary deadline prior to assessing whether previous measures 
had a chance to reveal their effectiveness. As it soon became clear, this step was "tantamount to 
opting for war [by] stifling at the same time all diplomatic initiatives". She also reproached the 
European Community for being a lapdog to the Bush Administration and denounced as "two-
faced" the approach of the international community with regard to the Gulf and to other 
international crises in Timor, Tibet and Cyprus, which revealed that "the implicit motive is far 
more enlightening than the proclaimed legal one" in the name of international law (Aulas, 
21/111991, 16). 
The Green members supported a further search for a diplomatic solution and a 
determination to avert war. Alexander Langer regretted that President Gorbachev had eclipsed 
the EC with his peace plan admitting that he would have preferred to see Jacques Poos, in his 
capacity of EC President, rather than Mikhail Gorbachev taking this initiative (Philip, Alan, 
1991). The EC should take its own initiatives or support other proposals aimed to halt the 
hostilities. For this reason, the Greens expressed their full backing for the Soviet peace plan, 
which far from being "a vain piece of diplomatic propaganda" was attempting to reach a 
diplomatic breakthrough to the crisis. In order to enable Iraqi troops to pull out without the risk 
of being bombed, a free passage should be afforded. The Greens derided the concept of a 'just 
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war' as medieval and counter-productive in turning Saddam into an Arab hero, while threatening 
the region's ecology. With reference to the numerous proposals and plan debated over future 
settlement of the Middle East problems, Langer sharply pointed out that "[flirst of all ( .. ) [the 
Community should] do something to bring this war to an end. Otherwise it [would be] useless 
bothering about the 'post-war period'''. Only when the armed conflict was over, should the 
Community commit itself to favour the convening of an international conference in order to solve 
the pending problems in the region especially the Palestinian and the Kurdish questions (Langer, 
20/2/1991, 124-125). 
During the war stage the Greens' overall index of agreement was remarkably high. equal 
to 92.78 percent, significantly increasing their rate of agreement by 42.75 points between the first 
and the second stages. This suggests that the Greens went against the grain by passing from a 
situation of deep internal divide to a situation of high consensus. These figures are even more 
surprising in the light of the seriousness and intensity of the period and the fact that the Greens 
included members of almost all EC nationalities who held different views, not least with respect 
to European integration. 
c) Post-War Stage 
A couple of days after the end of the hostilities, the Belgian Green MEP Paul Staes made a brief 
visit to Baghdad where, escaping control and censure, he managed to obtain a more genuine 
picture of the actual condition of the population, deprived of food and medicine which had been 
long blocked at the Iraqi border, despite the fact that UN resolutions had exempted these supplies 
from the blockade, in danger of epidemics due to the shortage of clean water and the impossibility 
of sterilizing it for lack of fuel and gas and living in the terror of the secret police which still 
perpetrated atrocities on civilians (Green Leaves, 1991, 3). 
On 5 March 1991, Co-Chairman Paul Lannoye and Co-vice Chairwoman Solange Fernex 
met a high clerk of the International Court of Justice in The Hague to convey the wish of the 
Group to seethe question of the legality of the Gulf War brought for judgement. By their symbolic 
action, since only the States adhering to the Court can officially appeal to the Court, the Greens 
hoped to bring to public attention the need for a legal clarification of the Gulf case which had set 
a dangerous precedent for further military interventions by the United States under the aegis of 
the UN Security Council. The parliamentarians raised questions on the conformity of Resolutions 
against Iraq and of the military actions undertaken by the allied powers to the principles of the 
United Nations Charter along with the question of discrimination in the settlement of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait if compared to the treatment by the Security Council of similar cases in other 
parts of the region and the world (Green Leaves, 1991. 3). 
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In April 1991, the Greens tabled together with most of the other PGs a Joint Motion for 
a Resolution on the Kurds' plight. They also contributed to the drafting of another Motion on 
arms exports for which along with the Rainbow group, they requested 3 roll-call votes. This 
apparently inconsistent behaviour was explained by Langer, who claimed that although "the only 
really clear-cut solution would be to impose a general production ban on armaments and to 
convert the industries concerned", since such a drastic solution could not be adopted in the short-
term "even a small amount of disarmament and a small amount of conversion [proposed by the 
Joint Resolution were] a step in the right direction" (Langer, 18/4/1991,286-287). For this reason 
as well as with the aim of halting weapon proliferation and arms races, which favoured black 
market sales, the Greens had decided to support the joint text with the exception of one part 
which in their view could be misinterpreted as an open, quasi optional invitation to adhere to this 
initiative, not as an absolute must and ethical duty (OlEC C 129, 122). 
In addition, Brigitte Ernst de la Graete emphasized that the joint text called for the non-
utilization of Article 223 EEC which hindered all EC control over state aid to arms manufacturers 
allowing them "to keep alive, by artificial means, businesses that serve no useful purpose and 
moreover are not economically viable". Overproduction in the arms industry is a strong incentive 
to sell arms abroad without considering any ethical principle. The European Community 
legislation should extend the control of arms exports until the achievement of a total ban on arms 
sale which would gradually lead to a reduction and cessation in the arms production. By giving 
voice to the opinion unanimously held by her group de la Graete concluded: 
The arms trade [was] a bane because it produc[ed] engines of death and also because it 
deflect[ed] large sums of money from things that the world badly needed (Ernst de la 
Graete, 17/4/1991, 142). 
In the final stage, the Greens reached a remarkable index of agreement 92.08 percent, 
though inferior to that reached over the second and most critical period. The group remained 
significantly united, registering only on 2 occasions a very minimal dissent with respect to RCV 
on the second part of paragraph 8 of the loint Resolution on the Gulf crisis and arms exports of 
18 April 1991 and only one abstention with respect to the first part of Amendment 1 of the Joint 
Resolution on the Kurds tabled by all PGs with the exception of the ER group and the 
Independent members. During all three stages the attitude of the Greens vis-a-vis the Gulf issue 
remained faithful to their principled pacifism. Concerned about the increasingly fainter distinction 
between the European Community and NATO competence, the group continued to advocate a 
Europe without military alliances and free from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
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The Greens strongly opposed the project of creating a European military superpower and the 
establishment of a European army (Webster, 1994,282-283). They were favourable to the forging 
of an EC common foreign and security policy, though given the principle that security should not 
be confused with defence, no military purpose should be allowed. Its fundamental objective would 
instead focus on contributing to the solution of international conflicts through non-violent means 
(Fernex, 15/5/1991, 155). 
Overall, throughout the above three stages, the group reached a satisfactory degree of 
cohesion of 76.96 percent, especially given the deliberate lack of whipping policy within the 
group, alongside a percentage of absenteeism of 45.79 at the voting sessions on the Gul f, lower 
than that of other groups. 
1.6 The European Unitarian Left 
a) Pre-War Stage 
As the other PGs in the Europarliamentary arena, the first reaction of the EUL vis-a-vis Kuwait's 
crisis was of open condemnation, joining the chorus of denunciation for the brutal actions and 
invasion perpetrated by Iraq (Papayannakis, 12/9/1990, 122). However, with regard to the 
solutions envisaged, the recourse to military measures was vigorously rejected, the group 
supporting, instead, the enforcement of the embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait as well as 
parallel negotiations in order to restore peace and order in the region. Emphasis was put on the 
principle that nothing should be done outside the scope of the United Nations, which should also 
monitor step by step all developments in the Gulf region (Colajanni, 12/9/1990, 152-153). 
In a particularly articulate and perceptive intervention, which received wide acclaim and 
support within the House, Achille Occhetto, then Secretary-General of the Italian COlTlll1unist 
Party (PCI) and member of the EUL group argued that the old order characterized by the 
Western-versus-Eastern blocs had ceased to exist leaving a vacuum which needed to be filled by 
a new form of world government. In Occhetto's words it should and could" .. be shown that, in 
the new international circumstances, the will of the international cOlTlll1unity can make legitimacy 
and the law prevail" (Occhetto, 12/9/1990, 112). The new world order, better balanced politically 
and economically should entail "a multipolar concept of power, a global review of trade relations" 
between the oil producers and the oil consumers, preventing the old bipolarity East-versus-West 
being replaced by the North-South divide. Europe should accordingly contribute by laying the 
economic and political foundations for a world democracy where all countries coexist peacefully 
(Occhetto, 12/9/1990, 113). 
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The EUL argued that political and diplomatic initiatives should be directed to secure the 
effective application of the sanctions and therefore the total isolation of Iraq. Through these 
pressurizing measures, Iraq's economy would be seriously crippled and eventually collapse, 
forcing Saddam to leave Kuwait. Only after this condition had been fulfilled, would it be possible 
to look for a solution to the Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute which had triggered the invasion. In the group's 
view, the Gulf crisis illustrated the necessity for the active and committed involvement of the 
Community at international level aimed at opening a dialogue with the Arab world and promoting 
a peaceful settlement of the major problems affecting the Middle East, such as the crises in 
Lebanon and Palestine. Closer and more advanced cooperation should be promoted in order to 
secure economic development and social progress through the setting up of a new Mediterranean 
policy. However, in order to fulfil this multiple task and to contribute to the creation of a new 
peaceful world order, the EC was urged to accelerate and complete its unification process 
(Occhetto, 12/9/1990, 112-113). Despite the many vague and unclear aspects of the September 
Joint Resolution, the EUL decided to endorse it, for the commitment to a non-military solution 
given by the Council Presidency and the Commission before the House, for the emphasis put on 
the role of the United Nations and for the intention of convening an international Middle East 
conference (Colajanni, 12/9/1990, 152-153). As the Green MEP Melandri pointed out ironically, 
EUL had voted not for what appeared in the Resolution but for what the Council Presidency had 
stated with regard to the Gulf crisis, though this was not explicitly included in the actual text 
(Melandri, 12/9/1990, 157). In agreement with the majority of the other groups, the EUL 
believed that besides the negative repercussions of the Gulf crisis, speculative movements had 
indisputably played their part in the rise of oil prices. Actions were therefore encouraged to 
prevent further damage to the economy of developing countries. The crisis raised the vital 
question of energy stocks and the necessity of adopting appropriate energy-saving policies at 
regional level (Porrazzini, 11/10/1990, 286). 
The EUL reminded the House that the EC should allocate resources to assist those 
countries including Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania whose economies had greatly suffered from 
the embargo against Iraq (EP Debate, 11110/1990). In November 1990, the group requested the 
EP to disown Le Pen's journey to Iraq to negotiate the release of French hostages and to condemn 
"his shabby opportunism" (Perez Royo, 22/1111990, 250). The EUL members also protested 
against the UN and EC refusal to take immediate political steps to solve the Palestinian question, 
as urged by the EP (Colajanni, 13/3/1991,79-80). 
Referring to the UN deadline for 15 January, the EUL chairman stated that such a date 
should not be interpreted strictu sensu but as a term of reference to put pressure on the Iraqi 
government. In the unfortunate event that after this date Iraq continued its occupation of Kuwait. 
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the international community should consider the military option "neither [as] automatic nor 
inevitable". The UN's ability to respond effectively to this crisis would be crucial for its 
credibility as a mediator in world affairs. The group also supported a more active involvement 
of the European Community, for instance, in the elaboration of a peace plan, thus finally 
removing the US monopoly over the conduct of international politics. The Community should 
make all efforts to promote the establishment of a permanent security structure in the 
Mediterranean. 
The EUL appealed to the international community to pursue a united front in its pro-
embargo policy, in its rejection of drastic military solutions and its search for restoring 
international order through negotiations (Colajanni, 1211211990,71-72). Thus, the group offered 
its full endorsement to President Mitterand's attempt made within a few hours prior to the lapse 
of the ultimatum, to solve the crisis without resorting to drastic military means. 
The EUL, as the Socialists, considered that the basic conditions for an agreement were 
Iraqi acceptance to evacuate Kuwait and the effective starting up of troop withdrawal, negotiation 
over the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute and the organization of an international conference to tackle the 
pending problems in the area. Disappointment was shown at the Community's failure to submit 
an independent peace-plan and a call for an extraordinary meeting of the EP Enlarged Bureau was 
issued to discuss the emergency in view of the UN deadline. 
The group rejected absolutely the 'logic of war' which would bring disastrous 
consequences in terms of loss of human life, delay and perhaps risk of compromising perspectives 
of peace in the Middle East (PE/GC/08/91). From the outset of the crisis, the prospect of a 
military confrontation provoked outright opposition from the European Unitarian Left (EUL) 
which sought a peaceful solution under the UN auspices. All through this stage the official line 
of the group continued consistently and persistently to be that of rejecting force and violence as 
the means for settling the conflict, privileging instead peaceful solutions such as a pro-embargo 
policy and negotiations with the aim of confronting the issue in a wider regional context. Of 
course, it could be argued that the use of sanctions inevitably implies coercive measures involving 
sufferings and sometimes the loss of more civilian than military lives. For this reason, in the 
group's opinion, all efforts would have to be made to spare unnecessary torments to the 
population by preventing the extension of the embargo to medicine and food products. 
The position taken by the European Unity Left was consistent in its search for a peaceful 
solution and its determination to avert war, boasting throughout this first stage the highest average 
index of agreement, 94. 18 percent and with a medium-low level of absenteeism at 38.91 percent 
of its 28 members. 
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b) War Stage 
At the January plenary, the EUL members expressed their regret at the start of the military 
operations by the US-led coalition against Iraq, affirming that this declaration of war would make 
Saddam a hero for the Arab world. Italian Communists strongly argued for a ceasefire and for 
the application of a more sustained embargo. Since the enforcement of a blockade had hitherto 
proven successful, an extension of the embargo would have further weakened the position of Iraq 
(Colajanni, 211111991, 17-18). In their view, it was also necessary to open a Middle East 
conference to prevent the Iraqi leader from using the Palestinian question to attract more Arabs 
to his side. 
Support was given to the Soviet peace plan which, although far from perfect, could be 
elaborated to stop the horrors of the war. The US decision to reject it was therefore deeply 
regretted by EUL members (Colajanni, 13/3/1991, 79-80). The group feared that the hatred 
aroused by the Gulf war in the Arab world would trigger a chain-effect of violence and brutality 
in the region (Colajanni, 211111991, 17-18). Rage and frustration were conveyed at Europe's 
silence with respect to the crisis (Napolitano, 20/211991, 125-126) as a more elevated moral, 
political and civilian stance was expected of the Community and Parliament. The European 
Unitarian Left rejected the speculation that once war had started nothing and nobody could 
intervene to halt it, meaning that one would have to wait for its 'natural' conclusion (Colajanni, 
211111991, 17-18). EUL also criticized the EP and the EC tendency to look ahead to the post-war 
period, failing to address its responsibilities in order to prevent the spreading of the beyond the 
UN mandate (Colajanni, 30/1/1991, 7). 
During the second stage of the Gulf issue the group's overall index of agreement was 
equal to 86.83 percent. Out of 23 roll-call votes which took place, 9 displayed a unanimous view, 
whilst the remaining 14 contained only one or two dissenting voices or abstentions. The greatest 
dissent within the group occurred in relation to Amendment 2 for the Motion for a Resolution B3-
125 of 24 January 1991, when 4 out of 15 members, the Italian MEPs Bontempi, Castellina, De 
Giovanni and a member of the Spanish United Left Party (Izquierda Unida), Perez Royo, voted 
for the adoption of the amendment against the group's opposing line. 
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c) Post-War Stage 
Besides the relief expressed at the end of the conflict and the final liberation of Kuwait, the group 
naturally welcomed the "tentative signs of a desire" to face the problems in the Middle East and 
initially the Palestinian Question. It also fully endorsed "every measure, every initiative, no matter 
who [would] propose it" in order to foster an Arab-Israeli dialogue and to assert the right of the 
Palestinians to a homeland. The Gulf crisis and war had once more exposed the deficiencies of 
the UN structure in terms of the means for applying its own Resolutions and its subsequent need 
for delegating to countries, in particular the United States, the task of enforcing them, with all 
the risks connected (Colajanni, 13/3/1991, 79-80). 
The group blamed the West for its virtually uncontrolled and unlimited supply of arms 
to the Middle East and in April 1991 in a Joint Motion for a Resolution agreed together with the 
Socialist, EPP, LDR, ED, Green, Rainbow and LU groups over the urgency of establishing 
stricter regulations and controls on arms exports. With regard to the humanitarian aid for the 
Kurds the group was among the signers of the Joint Motion for a Resolution by the Socialist, 
EPP, LDR, ED, Green, EDA, Rainbow and LU groups passed by the House in April 1991. 
During the third stage, no member opposed the official line in the RCVs, with the 
exception of the first part of Amendment 1 in the Resolution on the Kurds of 18 April 1991, 
when a Spanish MEP voted against whilst the majority of voting EUL members decided to 
abstain. On all other roll-call voting sessions with respect to the Gulf in the post-war period, the 
group expressed unanimity, although it also suffered from a high level of absenteeism. The 
members of the EUL found themselves in broad agreement over the post-war situation, this raised 
the index of agreement as compared to the previous stages to 96.43 percent. This figure needs 
nevertheless to be assessed against the high level of absenteeism of 75.89 percent. 
Throughout the whole period, the position of the EUL remained virtually unaltered in its 
support for economic and political action and its denial of the use of force, retaining an extremely 
high degree of cohesiveness equivalent to 91.10 percent. The overall rate of absenteeism, although 
still significant, with 45 percent of the members of the group deserting the Chamber, remained 
below the average reached by the other groups. 
1.7 The European Democratic Alliance 
a) Pre- War Stage 
In September 1990, the European Democratic (EDA) harshly criticized the use "of a dual 
vocabulary, of two sets of criteria for judging behaviour ( .. ). of two sets of moral standards": 
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while the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was unanimously denounced as a breach of international law, 
similar cases had in the past systematically been ignored, provoking nothing more than timid 
protests (Perreau de Pinninck, 12/9/1990, 129-130). A distinctive, though complementary position 
was taken by Greek MEP Nianias, Chairman of the delegation for relations with the Maghreb 
countries, who focused his attention on the attempted 'Iraqization' of Kuwait aimed at altering 
the demographic, ideological character of the country, comparing this phenomenon with the 
'Turkization' of Cyprus. Adding his voice to those of other Greek MEPs throughout the EP 
spectrum, he condemned the level of inconsistency shown by the international community when 
dealing with similar events (Nianias, 22/11/1990, 250). For the Spanish MEP Perreau de 
Pinninck more hypocrisy could be seen in the attitude of those countries which had first 
strengthened the hand of Saddam against Iran by supplying conventional and chemical weapons 
and which were now accusing their former client of crimes against humanity (Perreau de 
Pinninck, 12/9/1990, 129-130). 
At the end of September 1990, the Irish MEP Patrick Lane reported on his official visit 
to the Gulf region to discuss with the representatives of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the Kuwaiti 
government in exile and the United Arab Emirates the measures required to face the negative 
economic effects of the crisis. Many OPEC members and Saudi Arabia in particular, had 
increased their offer of oil to cover the loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil production. Against this 
background, it was undeniable that the increase in oil price was the result of speculation rather 
than an effective economic necessity. The international community was asked to find and stop 
those responsible for this pernicious manoeuvrelO (Lane, 11/10/1990, 285). In October 1990, 
the EDA turned its attention to the 'human' aspects of the crisis, expressing anxiety about the fate 
of the many foreign people forcibly held in Iraq.l1 Sympathy was also addressed to the families 
of the hostages, urging the Commission to establish a support fund to assist them in tackling at 
least some practical and financial difficulties. On the refugee issue, emergency aid should be 
granted to those countries where a vast inward movement of people was taking place and extended 
to the whole Middle East area and, in general, all the developing countries whose economies were 
strongly hit by the crisis. The EDA members approved the decision to lift the embargo for 
medical supplies and products for children in order to alleviate further sufferings on the Iraqi 
people (Musso, 23/10/1990, 78). They maintained the view that every effort should be made to 
10 With respect to this problem, the EDA Group tabled a Motion for a Resolution B3-1847/90 which was 
rejected by the House on 12 October 1990 (OlEC 3-394, 325). 
II The Motion for a Resolution B3-1829/90, presented on II October 1990 by de la Malene on behalf 01 EDA. 
on humanitarian consequences of the Gulf crisis. failed to be included in the Joint Motion for a Resolution 
tabled by 8 parliamentary groups. 
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solve the crisis peacefully. In this context, the UN Security Council deadline set for Saddam to 
retreat from Kuwait was received with considerable reluctance and scepticism (Nianias, 
22/11/1990, 250 and 11/1211990 72). 
Worried about the drifting towards war as well as its repercussions in the region, the 
group reaffirmed the belief that an alternative solution could be reached through the application 
of a complete anti-Iraq trade embargo, to be extended, if necessary, to air transport (de la 
Mal(me, 12/9/1990, 114). In the eyes of the EDA, the Gulf experience had revealed that the 
Community was not equipped to face any external challenges and that the process of European 
integration ought to spillover into the security and defence sector, but should not be created 
around the wide framework of CSCE (Musso, 23/10/1990, 78). 
During the pre-war stage, the attitude of the group reflected the cautious stance of the 
French government, torn between its traditional politique arabe and its solidarity with the allies, 
and indeed ambitiously trying to reconcile these two opposite approaches. The group, 
nevertheless, acknowledged and praised the United States and the many Arab States for their 
efficient and prompt military intervention which had prevented further Iraqi aggression in the 
region (de la Malene, 12/9/1990, 114). The EDA remained fairly cohesive in its determination 
to solve the Gulf crisis preferably without recourse to military means. All efforts had to be made 
to ensure an efficient and total trade embargo (de la Malene, 12/9/1990, 114). The average index 
of agreement within the group was as high as 75.42 percent whilst the level of absenteeism was 
of64.11. 
b) War Stage 
In January 1991, the launching of Operation Desert Storm saw an about-turn in the EDA attitude 
as there had not been the "slightest indication from Iraq in response to the peace efforts". 
According to de la Malene, support for this military initiative was not "subject to constraint" 
because he did not believe "in that form of selfishness" which involved being passive and 
expecting others to take on the difficult tasks. The EDA leader also declared his disbelief in the 
virtue of pacifism having personally experienced its failure in Europe during 1938-1939. Despite 
Saddam's attempt at widening the conflict claiming that it was a conflict over oil, for the benefit 
of Israel and the United States, the majority of the group took the view that it was a war for 
international morality. A tribute was paid to the courage of the soldiers who were risking their 
lives in the Gulf (de la Malene, 211111991, 18-19). 
The French Gaullists insisted on a tougher stance, excluding the possibility of an 
immediate ceasefire, acknowledging the need for a European collective security policy (Chabert. 
126, Nianias, 134, 20/211991). The group was not unanimous on this policy. By declaring his 
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preference for a continual embargo to solve the crisis, Lane deplored the decision by the 
international community to resort to the use of force, rejecting calls for a Community strike forc~ 
on the grounds that some member states, including Ireland, would wish to retain neutral status 
(3-401, 131). Concerned about the danger that the coalition would overstep the UN mandate and 
sceptical about the real aims of the war, a few members within the group called for an immediate 
armistice (Nianias, 20/2/1991, 134). They expressed horror at Saddam's use of foreign citizens 
and prisoners of war as human shields in Iraqi military targets, resulting in the loss of life of 
innocent civilians (Lane, 131, Nianias, 134,201211991). Lane briefly greeted Gorbatchev's peace 
initiative lamenting, however, that the Ministers of the EEC Troika had been ignored during their 
visit in Moscow (Lane, 20/2/1991, 131). 
During the second stage of the Gulf issue the group's overall index of agreement was 
equal to 69.64 percent with a level of absenteeism exceeding half of its members, specifically 
53.95 percent. It is significant to note that this rate was the lowest recorded by the EDA during 
the three stages of the crisis. 
c) Post-War Stage 
In the eyes of the EDA leader, although the Gulf war did not bring peace to the whole Middle 
East area, it had improved the chances of achieving it, by shaking the foundations of the Iraqi 
dictatorship and promoting respect for international law. 
The group turned its attention to the question of human rights, stressing the need for 
making the international community aware of the torments inflicted on its own people and the 
Kurdish minority by Saddam as well as the misery suffered by the Palestinians in the territories 
occupied by Israeli authorities. In addition, if the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was regarded as a 
breach of international law, the same principle should be extended to the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and Gaza (de la Malene, 80, Lane, 86, 13/311991). The group urgently demanded a 
settlement of the Palestinian question in order to guarantee a certain stability in the Middle East. 
While the majority of the PGs within the EP seemed to find their unity in the aftermath of the 
conflict, the EDA remained divided over the policies to be adopted with regard to the post-crisis 
situation with a modest index of agreement equal to 75 percent, curiously enough, even lower 
than that of the independent members. The EDA members' turnout was also extremely 
disappointing, the level of absenteeism rising to the staggering level of 82.39 percent. In short, 
through the whole duration of the crisis, the group registered an average index of agreement of 
72.64 percent while the number of members failing to attend the RCV sessions reached 62.36 
percent, the highest registered among all groups, except for the Independent members. 
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1.8 The European Right 
a) Pre-War Stage 
Whilst denouncing Saddam for his brutal aggression against Kuwait, the taking of hostages and 
their placement at strategic sites, the leader of the European Right (ER) Jean-Marie Le Pen 
contended that the regime existing in the country prior to the Iraqi occupation was certainly not 
based on respect for humanitarian and democratic principles (Le Pen, 12/9/1990, 114-116). As 
previously noticed, this view was held by the Greens and the Left, yet with different tones. The 
French politician stressed the importance of examining the reasons for the invasion which 
stemmed from Iraq's historical claim over its former province. As such, the conflict, which 
erupted after long negotiations, should be solved between the countries concerned without external 
interference, in conformity with the UN principle that problems should preferably be dealt with 
at regional level. The ER pointed out the inconsistent behaviour of the international communit\' 
vis-a-vis other cases where territorial state sovereignty had also been breached such as the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Syrian invasion of Lebanon. 
These violations, although generally condemned, had not aroused the same vehement reaction, 
showing that the nature of Western interests was not based on moral principles but on the thirst 
and rapacity for oil. 
The group vigorously contested the September 1990 Joint Resolution for 'reasons of 
principle' well beyond the ground that it had not participated in its drafting. The proposed 
embryonic world government was totally rejected together with "the spurious linkage ( .. ) between 
the plight of our [European] nationals in the region and condemnation of Iraq" (Martinez, 
12/9/1990, 153). In the roll-call survey of 14 voting members, 12 voted against, one abstained 
(the Belgian MEP Karel Dillen) and only one member, the German MEP Johanna-Christina 
Grund, voted in favour, albeit with reservations. In her opinion, the text lacked explicit reference 
to the prospect of using force if Iraqi troops were not evacuated from Kuwait and failed to 
condemn similar violations of territorial sovereignty in the Gulf and Mediterranean area. 
Dissociating herself from the ER official line, Grund refused to back the text tabled by the ER 
group because it did not call for the military deployment of troops in the region and did not urge 
strongly enough the unconditional release of hostages or support for a total embargo against Iraq 
(Grund, 12/9/1990, 154). The index of agreement was therefore on this occasion of 7l.43 
percent. 
Over the 10 RCVs on various parts of the September Joint Resolution, the IA of the ER 
group reached on 2 occasions the optimal figure of 100 percent. on 3 occasions 84.62 percent. 
decreasing in the other cases respectively to 83.33 percent. 66.67 percent and to 45.45 percent. 
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Consensus was reached with regard to the adoption of that part of paragraph 6 relating to the call 
addressed to the international community to implement sanctions against Iraq and for making all 
efforts to promote peaceful solutions and to avert the recourse to force. Paragraph 24 relating to 
the necessity for the Community to take steps against those countries which did not comply with 
the trade embargo against Iraq was also unanimously approved by the ER members. 
The lowest figure referred to paragraph 21 where the EP "recognized the responsibility 
of the international community in having armed the states of the region and calls on the 
Community and its member states to consider urgently how to establish an effective common 
policy to control the export of armaments and of advanced technology with military potential". 
In October 1990 the group expressed deep concern about incidents in Jerusalem where 20 
Palestinian civilians had been killed and several injured by the Israeli police. This new episode 
of violence exposed the inconsistency of the international community when dealing with 
infringements of international law which were "condemned with varying degrees of vigour 
depending on who commit[ted] them". 
The Community should abandon its lethargic attitude and undertake the crucial role of 
mediator in the Middle East disputes, all equally crucial and requiring therefore the same 
consideration by the international community. Their similarities also demanded that a solution to 
all these questions should be sought concurrently. Another fundamental issue raised by the group 
was connected to mass immigration from Muslim countries into the Community which should be 
halted in order to prevent Europe from "continu[ing] to be at the mercy of the threat of an Islamic 
fifth column, the infrastructure of a potentially awful terrorist force" (Dillen, 12/9/1990, 162). 
In October, the ER unsuccessfully submitted to the House a Motion for a Resolution 
calling for the release of French and other European nationals detained in Iraq as a first step 
towards freeing all foreigners wishing to return home. The group believed that increase in oil 
prices was due to profiteers and that the Community and its member states should take to 
safeguard their citizens who should not become "the defenceless victims of the blackmail and 
threats of the oil speculators" (Dillen, 11/10/1990, 285-286). The Community was harshly 
criticized for aligning itself unconditionally with the policy adopted by the American 
Administration without adequate consideration of the situation (Antony, 23/10/1990, 79). 
At the moment of the vote, the ER group, supported by thirteen members, requested a 
quorum check which confirmed that the MEPs' turnout was insufficient to allow the voting of any 
of the thirteen Motions for Resolutions tabled by the various groups on the situation in the Gulf. 
This initiative was considered by many Europarliamentarians to be an obstructive action which 
contributed to crystallizing the isolation of the ER within the House (von der Vring, 11110/1990, 
309). 
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In November 1990, the French MEP Bruno Megret informed Parliament that the mission 
undertaken by the leader of his group had been successful and that many hostages were safely 
returning home. In his words, this initiative exemplified "the only [sensible] course of political 
action" carried out to safeguard the "interests of the nations we represent" (Megret, 22/1111990, 
249). Acknowledging Saddam's goodwill gesture in authorizing the departure of women, children 
and other French and European citizens, the ER suggested that the Community would launch a 
new appeal to the Iraqi government to free the remaining hostages in return for the retreat of the 
international coalition forces deployed in the Gulf region (B3-2032/90). The trust placed in 
Saddam by ER members seemed to have been rewarded when in November 1990 the Iraqi 
government announced its decision to release all the foreign citizens still detained. The policy 
pursued by the group since the outset of what was defined as an 'inter-Arab' conflict was based 
on negotiation and dialogue, a view held in common with the Greens. Despite the affinities of 
approach on the Gulf issue, albeit based on different considerations, the Greens and the Extreme 
Right members did not undertake any joint initiative, confirming the isolation of the latter in the 
parliamentary arena (Uhideux, 11/12/1990, 72-73). 
The European Right which reaffirmed almost unanimously its anti-interventionist stance, 
expressed its preference for de-escalation and negotiation, as demonstrated by the mission 
undertaken by its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. This position appeared to conflict with its traditional 
support for French military actions and, in Fran~ois Heisbourg's words, was "irreconcilable with 
its inflammatory attitudes on Arab matters and anti-immigration policies" (Heisbourg, 1992,29). 
Throughout the pre-war stage, the level of ER cohesion was fairly high, averaging 84.31 percent 
and the rate of absenteeism reached the slightly below average of 44.62. 
b) War Stage 
From the extreme right of the parliamentary arena, Le Pen argued that Saddam was not the only 
one responsible for the war, given Kuwait's provocations, and the fact that the Western powers 
had supplied Iraq and the Middle East with weaponry. Although disagreeing with European 
governments' decision to deploy troops in the Gulf, the group fully sympathized with the soldiers 
sent to fight in an inter-Arab conflict, for Arabs to solve. Their view was that the Community's 
priority should be to limit the scope and duration of the war (Le Pen, 211111991, 19-20). 
According to the interpretation given by Heisbourg, Le Pen had elaborated with racial overtones 
the pro-Iraqi theme that this was exclusively a problem between Arabs, meaning that "this was 
not something for which non-Arabs deserved to risk their presumedly more precious lives" 
(Heisbourg, 1992, 21). As such, the ER indicated that the international community should have 
as its priority to limit the scope and duration of the war (Financial limes, 23/111991), warning 
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that the member states' troops should be kept in Europe as a deterrent to the "lasting threat from 
the East". Despite his trust in Gorbachev, Le Pen did not exclude the possibility that the Soviet 
President could be deposed by a less honourable and therefore more dangerous leader with 
aggressive intentions towards Western Europe. If such a tragic event occurred, the EC member 
states would be unable to protect themselves as many of its soldiers were deployed in the Gulf 
regIOn. 
The group persisted in its backing for the continuation of the economic blockade against 
Iraq and occupied Kuwait, a strategy which had proved successful in the past, as for instance in 
the case of South Africa (Le Pen, 21/1/1991, 19-20). During the Gulf war stage, the group's 
overall index of agreement was equal to 75.25 percent. It also had the worst attendance record 
out of all the EP groups right through this crucial phase with a level of absenteeism of 59.42 
percent. 
c) Post-War Stage 
Deliberately going against the EP's tide and distancing themselves once again from all the other 
PGs, the members of the European Right opposed any contribution by the European Community 
for the post-war rebuilding of Iraq and Kuwait. Despite President Bush's rejection of any form 
of assistance in the region (WEU Report, 1992, 23), the group claimed that the belligerent 
countries participating in the Gulf War and particularly the United States should bear the costs 
of the ruin and misery caused as a consequence of their armed intervention (Blot, 16/4/1991,43). 
By looking at the prospects for the restoration of Kuwait, the group expressed its hope 
"that purges [would] not take over from the abuses of the occupying force" and that a more 
humane and a fairer regime would be established by the ruling al-Sabah Royal family compared 
to that in force in the pre-Gulf crisis period (Gollnisch, 13/3/1991, 81). 
Finally, in Dillen's view, the Community should equip itself with a modem and 
appropriate defence force. Although in the short-term no other option existed but to continue to 
cooperate closely with NATO, in the medium and long-term the European Community should be 
able to face autonomously its security and defence responsibility (Dillen, 15/5/1991, 151). 
The ER showed the highest level of conformity in its voting behaviour pattern, assisted 
by the small number of its members and by the relatively restricted national basis of the group. 
Some of its MEPs took eccentric and provocative attitudes which attracted the attention of public 
opinion, members states' governments and third countries. 
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In the post-war period, the voting behaviour of ER members vis-a-\'is the post-crisis 
policy reached the optimal figure of 100 percent index of agreement, reflecting unanimity within 
the group, though it is also important to point out the very high level of absenteeism of ER 
Members at the roll-call voting sessions, equivalent to 84.17 percent. On average, the extreme 
right members realized during the whole period from September 1990 to April 1991 a very high 
index of agreement of 82.93 percent with a rate of absenteeism slightly above average, 57.76 
percent. 
1.9 The Rainbow Group 
a) Pre-War Stage 
In April 1990, before Kuwait's crisis hit the headlines, the Rainbow group expressed its 
disapproval of Saddam's totalitarian regime for its violation of human rights, especially against 
the Kurdish minority, by calling for an immediate ban on the arms trade with Iraq (OlEC C 113, 
7/5/1990, 144). In September 1990, the group strongly criticized the Community for failing to 
establish a code of conduct for the export of arms and argued that a conference concerning the 
reduction of arms trade should be gathered under the aegis of the United Nations, along with the 
deployment of a permanent UN force in the region (B3-1624/90). 
The group joined the voices of indignation condemning the Iraqi aggression that were 
widespread in the international community, and it fully endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 
whilst rejecting the idea that Western democracies should fight "Machiavellianism with 
Machiavellianism". Human rights should not be ignored for the sake of a cause in which the West 
had decided to take a moral stand (Simeoni, 23110/1990, 82-83). Moreover, it deplored the fact 
that such a strong and unanimous condemnation was not equally expressed in similar cases of 
violations of international law. Demands were advanced for Israel finally to implement the 1967 
UN Resolution by withdrawing from the occupied territories of Gaza and West Bank. Israel and 
Palestine were urged to recognize their respective states within their legal borders. The 
international community had been duly warned not to fall into the trap set by Saddam who 
intended to exploit the Kuwaiti case and transform it into a war between "the rich industrialized 
countries and the ruling classes of the Arab countries on the one side and the poor masses of Arab 
countries on the other" (B3-1624/90). The group maintained that the UN should be the forum for 
handling the issue and all its Resolutions sanctioning economic measures should be applied against 
Iraq. Military means should only be used to give effect to the embargo (Christensen. 116-117, 
Vandemeulebroucke, 154. 12/911990). No government should act beyond the UN mandate and 
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no efforts should be spared in order to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict. 
Although the attitude of the Rainbow group followed closely that of Left Unity, their 
positions diverged in one major respect: while the former called for all armed forces to be placed 
under UN authority, for the latter, military action should only be conducted by the United Nations 
itself to prevent UK and US dominance. The Rainbow group also pointed out the contradictions 
and the hypocrisies emerging from this crisis. The first entailed the presumed violation of the 
democratic rights of Kuwait, although it seemed daring to present this country as a genuine 
example of democracy when only 8 percent of its population had the right to vote. The second 
concerned the destiny of Western soldiers sent to the Gulf, whose lives were threatened by the 
same weapons produced and exported by their own countries. The third evoked the different 
attitudes shown by the Community in other similar circumstances such as the Chinese invasion 
of Tibet when no significant action had been taken (Ewing, 12/911990, 124). 
During the long Iran-Iraq war, Saddam's ambition had served the West's purposes of 
preventing the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism and the subsequent danger of Iranian 
dominance over the oil reserves in the region (Piermont, 12/9/1990, 130). Therefore no sign of 
moral disapproval had been shown against Iraq for the brutality of the means employed and no 
anti-Iraq military coalition had been advocated. On the contrary, the international community 
supplied Iraq with arms. However, in Kuwait's case, the Iraqi leader's ambition to rule the area 
was incompatible with Western interests and the international community suddenly felt obliged 
to denounce the immorality of the action. During the parliamentary session of September 1990, 
the Rainbow group disapproved the text of the Joint Resolution, for failing to highlight the above-
mentioned contradictions and for ignoring the social background of the conflict, notably the 
deeply unfair allocation of welfare in Arab society (Christensen, 12/9/1991, 116-117). By 
defining the joint text "a Resolution of hypocrisy", the Rainbow group attempted to amend its 
contents and clarify some obscure and ambiguous parts, requesting 6 split roll-call votes. The 
group rejected any military involvement in the Gulf, instead insisting upon the enforcement of the 
embargo (Vandemeulebroucke, 12/9/1990, 154). Eventually, when it came to the final vote on 
the whole text, all Rainbow members actually present abstained, with the exception of the Italian 
MEP Francesco Enrico Speroni from the Lombard League and the German Green MEP Dorothee 
Piermont who rejected the Resolution. In Speroni's opinion, the text failed to "adopt a determined 
stance, without doubt, without uncertainty, because by decisive action ( .. ) [which] could also take 
the form of military action, it [would] be possible to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait" (Speroni, 
12/9/1990, 154). For opposing reasons, Piermont voted against the Resolution because it did not 
completely exclude the possibility of resorting to the use of force (Piermont, 12/9/1990, 155). 
In October, the Rainbow group tabled one Motion for a Resolution on speculation on oil 
Chapter IV 131 
prices and participated in the drafting of the Joint Motion for a Resolution together with 8 other 
groups on oil prices (B3-1844/90). The failure of the group with respect to the former Motion 
was compensated by the adoption of the second Joint Motion, revealing once more the necessity 
of coalition and the limit of manoeuvre and potential power of a small group within the EP. By 
capturing the essence of the oil price rise, the Irish MEP suggested that "the difficulty [was] not 
shortage of oil but manipulation of the market by the multinational oil companies" (Blaney, 
11110/1990, 286). As a result, the Rainbow group called for an intervention of governments 
aimed at freezing the prices. 
The position of the group towards the Gulf crisis, which remained unaltered during the 
pre-war stage, was broadly in support of diplomatic initiatives and rejection of the use of violence 
which "would just lead to more humiliation and acrimony" between the West and the Arab 
countries. The accent was also put on the necessity for Europe to promote the gathering of an 
international Middle East conference which would tackle the most serious issues by promoting 
economic and social progress in the area (Simeoni, 11/1211990, 73). During this stage, as with 
the Greens, the average index of agreement of the Rainbow group on the 19 roll-call votes was 
rather low, averaging 53.28 percent and the level of absenteeism was slightly below average, 
equal to 44.59. 
b) War Stage 
The Rainbow group strongly regretted that the embargo against Iraq had not been given more 
time in order to reveal its full effects (Ewing). As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had 
revealed to the US Congress, economic sanctions were producing effective results and, in time, 
they would not have left any other alternative to the Iraqi dictator but surrender. 
Following the start of allied air strikes against Iraq, concern was expressed at the horrific 
effects of the conflict in terms of human loss, ecological disaster, economic and political 
repercussions (Ib Christensen). The group hoped that the war would be of a short duration and 
its damages contained. The scope of the war should be limited to the liberation of Kuwait, without 
any other ambition of destroying Iraq or putting on trial its leader (Ewing). 
In January 1991, the Rainbow group argued that Iraq should be offered the "constant 
opportunity for a ceasefire" (Ewing, 20, Christensen, 22, 2111/1991) upon an Iraqi promise to 
fulfil UN Resolutions and once the retreat had commenced (OlEC 3-398,23/1/1991, 126). The 
unease over military intervention was reiterated at the February plenary, where the US and UK 
were criticized for having dismissed the utility of sanctions too readily (Melis, 20/2/1991, 127-
128). 
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The second stage revealed a higher index of agreement in relation to the preceding period, 
though still counting a fairly high score of 61.18 percent. This was accompanied by a low 
presence of members at the roll-call voting sessions and, in particular, a percentage of 
absenteeism equivalent to 50.43. 
c) Post-War Stage 
In the eyes of the Rainbow group, Europe was impotent when faced with the Gulf crisis since its 
existence as an international actor "was still on the drawing board" and, therefore, the so-called 
'Pax Americana' remained the only feasible solution. However, in the aftermath of the conflict, 
the Community should playa more active role by providing, for example, humanitarian assistance 
to refugees. Banning the arms trade as a step for achieving a total disarmament in the region was 
also highlighted together with the idea of launching a rapid economic development in the Middle 
East (Simeoni, 13/3/1991,81-82). 
The Rainbow group participated in the negotiation of two compromise resolutions on arms 
export and on the situation of the Kurds. The Gulf War provided ample demonstration of the need 
for establishing an effective pan-European security system which should be established within the 
CSCE framework, without however militarizing the Community. The importance was stressed 
of democratizing security policy and proceeding with a meticulous revision of the UN in order 
to provide the organization with the instruments for maintaining world peace (Christensen, 
15/5/1991,151-152). The Rainbow members seemed to have finally found a cohesive position 
during this final stage, registering a very high level of agreement of 91.67 percent. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the position of the Rainbow group with regard to 
the Gulf crisis was less cohesive than that of all other groups. This can be easily attributed to the 
fact that the group was established more for technical reasons than as the result of genuine 
ideological affinity among its members. The Rainbow group achieved the lowest index of 
agreement of 63.47 percent in comparison with the other groups and a level of absenteeism of 
51.88 percent. 
1.10 The Left Unity 
a) Pre-War Stage 
The Left Unity (LU) group strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait as 
well as Saddam's decision to take foreign citizens as hostages. According to the LU the tasks at 
hand were to induce Iraq to retreat from Kuwait, to free all the hostages and to ban the use of 
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force as an instrument to impose its will over another country (Carvalhas, 12/9/1990, 123-124). 
The outbreak of the crisis offered the European Community the opportunity to test its own ability 
to playa role in the international arena, by formulating an independent European viewpoint in 
order to launch or sustain initiatives for a peaceful settlement of the question (Piquet, 12/9/1990, 
116). 
The September compromise text certainly contained indisputable principles, notably the 
resolute denunciation of Iraq's aggression, the demand for a prompt and unconditional retreat 
from Kuwait and the liberation of all the hostages. Regardless of the above elements and the 
aspiration cherished by the Left Alliance of seeing the EP taking a distinct, substantial and 
unanimous position vis-a.-vis the Gulf issue, the group could not vote in favour of the Resolution 
because of its ambivalence and obscurity. In contrast to what paragraph 6 equivocally stated, the 
Community should, through its Parliament, commit itself to look for a political settlement without 
resorting to the use of arms. Moreover, the group fiercely criticized the European Community 
as well as the EP for not daring to reproach the unilateral activities of, for example, the United 
States which had raised the suspicion that their strategic ambitions in the Gulf region were more 
important than solving the crisis (Alavanos, 12/9/1990, 153-154). 
Against the Machiavellian axiom the end justifies the means, the group rejected the resort 
to force, taking the view that a total embargo against Iraq, except for food and medical supplies, 
should be sufficient to isolate Saddam and compel him to adopt UN Resolutions (Piquet, 
12/9/1990, 116). The group pleaded non-intervention on anti-imperialist grounds. Emphasis was 
placed on the Community'S necessity to allow the Americans to establish a hegemony in the 
region (Carvalhas, 12/9/1990, 123-124). In order to avert the risks of escalating the conflict, no 
unilateral military action should be undertaken by the United States or any other country, while 
the armed forces in the Gulf should be put under the UN authority (Piquet, 12/9/1990, 116). In 
Carvalhas' words, "[w]ar [should] be banished and give way to new world processes, to a fairer 
division of resources, to the solution of conflicts by peaceful and political means, to a new 
economic and world order" (Carvalhas, 12/9/1990, 123-124). The Commission should promote 
measures in order to improve energy resources in those peripheral countries highly dependent on 
oil imports and to advance proposals to exploit alternative energy sources. There was a firm and 
united opposition to the governments' intention to establish austerity measures and increase the 
price of oil products which would affect workers, in particular. The group manifested concern 
at the consequences of the conflict for the least favoured countries as well as at the two-faced 
attitude taken by the rich countries in dealing with international issues on the basis of their own 
interests (Carvalhas. 12/9/1990, 123-124). 
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The LU members turned their attention to the economic repercussions of the crisis for 
developing countries as it emerges in the text of their original Motion for Resolution of 8 October 
1990. The Council was urged to establish additional funds for the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries in order to assist them in facing an increasingly difficult economic situation. An 
appeal was also launched for cancelling the debts owed to the European Community and the 
member states by ACP countries. In order to mitigate the poignant situation of refugees, support 
was also given to the EC decision to grant humanitarian emergency aid. The dilemma of the 
thousands of hostages still detained in Iraq was not ignored by the group which joined the 
parliamentary chorus calling for their unconditional release (B3-1818/90 replaced by B3-1779, 
1788, 1808, 1811, 1816, 1818 and 1821190). Following the reassuring news of Iraqi's decision 
to free the hostages, further initiatives towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis should be 
promoted. The Community should open a dialogue with the countries in the Gulf region by 
sending an ad hoc delegation and by convening an international conference to tackle the most 
urgent problems in the Middle East. The group rejected the idea that, after the expiry of the UN 
ultimatum, the international community including the EEC should participate in military 
operations with the objective of restoring Kuwait's sovereignty with the use of force (Ephremidis, 
1111211990, 73). 
When it came to the RCVs on the Crampton Report in November 1990 and on Resolution 
B3-2190 of 12 December 1990, the entire group was absent while, on other occasions, the level 
of presence was rather low. The data computed on the roll-call votes from September to 
December 1990 show a high index of agreement of 86.08 percent. The level of absenteeism at 
the RCV sessions of the LU parliamentarians was very high, 74.81 percent. 
b) War Stage 
The Left Unity voiced its aversion to war, stressing that it would be possible to restore the 
independence of Kuwait by tightening sanctions against the Iraqi invader. The European 
Community should act consistently towards similar cases such as Cyprus and Palestine by 
proffering more than "pious words". 
The LU stressed the importance of maintaining sanctions while it expressed its antiwar 
sentiment, given that there were no clear economic, political or legal reasons for intervening 
militarily. In addition, it stressed the fact that it would be impossible to limit the conflict 
temporarily by containing it to Iraqi territory and there was danger of extending the conflict to 
the whole Arab world. In January 1991, LU rejected the 'logic of war' by promoting, instead, 
a peaceful solution through negotiations and calling for a cease fire . As such, it expressed 
opposition to the compromise Resolution in favour of armed intervention tabled by the centre-
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right and requested a roll-call vote for the Joint Motion for a Resolution negotiated and tabled by 
Socialists, Christian Democrats, European Democrats and Rainbow members. 
In February, the LU reaffirmed the principle that the European Community and the 
Parliament should repudiate a belligerent philosophy and commit themselves instead to a peaceful 
solution of the problem in the area concerned. The LU fully supported the Soviet plan which 
represented "the last chance for a peaceful end to the war without slaughter" and reproached the 
American inflexibility in disregarding the Soviet initiative and its determination to step up a war 
to destroy Iraq which was aimed at gaining political and economic control in the strategic area 
of the Middle East. The group renewed its hope that the United Nations would regain the control 
and settle all the conflicts in the region. Apprehension was expressed about the racist attitudes 
towards Arab and Muslim immigrants emerging in Europe as a consequence of the crisis (B3-
0387/91). At the plenary session on 20 February, the LU group underlined its criticisms of the 
joint US/UK led initiatives overstepping UN mandate (Piquet, 128, Ribeiro, 131-132,201211991). 
As Heisbourg commented, "anti-war motivations included a mixture of avowedly or 
embarrassedly pro-Iraqi attitudes in the leadership of the [French] Communists" (Heisbourg, 
1992, 29). 
The war stage displayed a remarkable level of cohesion within the LU with an IA equal 
to 95.86 percent. The above outcome becomes even more outstanding in view of the fairly low 
degree of absenteeism falling to 33.23. The gravity of the events served as a unifying factor for 
these groups. 
c) Post-War Stage 
Although welcoming the end of the hostilities in the Gulf, the LU reaffirmed the view that the 
liberation of Kuwait could be achieved through political and economic means and the ravages of 
war and the killing of innocent victims made the task of solving the problems of the region more 
difficult. However, looking to the future, the group expressed the need for the European 
Community to contribute to the search for peace and stability in the Middle East area. In order 
to assist this process, the Community should commit itself to implementing reconstruction and 
aid programmes. The United Nations Organization should safeguard the sovereignty and security 
of all countries involved through the establishment of a new international order which was not 
that wished and imposed by the United States but one of "free, independent and sovereign 
peoples" (Piquet, 13/3/1991,82). 
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Along with the other PGs the LV expressed the necessity of achieving a European Union 
entailing a common foreign and security dimension. A new framework should be independent 
from the Atlantic Alliance and its VS leadership. Its main task should consist of defending the 
interests of people, contributing to the peaceful solution of international disputes and promoting 
disarmament (Ephremidis, 15/511991, 152). 
During the post-war period, the LV registered a peak in the rate of absenteeism of its 
members reaching 86.61 percent, the highest of all PGs, except for the Independent members. 
Like the LDR and the ER groups, the LV attained consensus in their voting behaviour vis-a-vis 
the post-crisis policy, with an index of agreement of 100 percent. The LV registered a steady 
increase in its level of voting cohesion over the three stages, averaging an IA equivalent to 92.28 
percent. This impressive result was, however, overshadowed by the medium average level of 
absenteeism of 57.57. However, a reading of the percentages relating to either the level of 
agreement or absenteeism, tend respectively to favour or penalize small groups, providing a more 
favourable or unfavourable interpretation than that emerging when dealing with larger groups. 
Indeed, in small groups, each member has a bigger impact in terms of steering up or down the 
total percentage. 
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2. Level of Transnationality in Political Groups' Voting Behaviour on the Gulf Crisis 
The following section intends to assess whether an effective level of transnationality was reached 
within the various political groups when voting on the Gulf crisis or whether nationalistic 
sentiments and preferences prevailed. This inquiry is carried out by computing an index of 
transnationality on SO roll-call RCVs (lTv) on the Gulf held by Parliament between September 
1990 and May 1991 and is based on the highest voting modality which is assumed to represent 
the official position of each political group.12 
The outcome of this analysis shows that the EPP, Socialist, LDR, Greens, Rainbow and 
LU groups achieved, in decreasing order, a high level of transnationality. This sequence was then 
followed by the ER, the EUL, the EDA and ended with the ED. It is intuitively clear that due 
to its almost mono-national constitution, the level of transnationality within the ED group was the 
lowest. The respective lTv on the Gulf did not correspond proportionally to the index of 
transnationality based on the composition (ITc) of each group. All PGs reflected slightly lower 
levels of transnationality according to voting patterns on the Gulf with the exception of the EUL 
Group which registered a marginal increase. A comparison of the data of both indices of 
trans nationality and agreement for each group can assist in discerning whether heterogeneity in 
terms of nationality was a factor inhibiting internal cohesion. The results show that there is no 
evidence of a correlation between group transnationality and its members' ability to achieve a 
consensus. 
During the war stage, the Socialists appeared split between a pro-intervention faction 
headed by their leader Cot and a non-intervention faction including most British Labour members 
and the French MEP Cheysson, who cast doubts and publicly played an antiwar profile for the 
whole duration of the crisis (Gnesotto, 1992, 29). Eventually a third faction prevailed within the 
Socialist group and within the House in favour of a limited military intervention in the region. 
However, this is refuted in the Gulf case by the British Labour MEPs whose position 
diverged from the interventionist policy dictated by their national headquarters. This decision can 
be regarded as either a brave or a foolish step given that the list of the candidates for both 
European and national elections are drafted by national parties and deselection and ostracism 
could be the price of dissent. The value of this example is further increased by the fact that, in 
general, British Labour members regard the decision of opting out from the official view of the 
party as a particularly serious matter (Bowler and Farrell, 1992, 14). 
I! For the method of compuling see Appendix. 
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Despite the evident difficulties arising from such a multicoloured political and cultural 
landscape, most groups undertook negotiations in order to smooth the edges and achieve a 
majority within the Parliament over the Gulf. Parliamentarians were continually looking over their 
shoulder, concerned about the necessity of providing an image of a coherent and solid political 
forum which might increase the European Parliament's level of influence over the other EC-EU 
institutions as well as third parties. This case study has shown that although forging a European 
identity is still far off, steps have been taken in this direction by the European Parliament, where 
a rather satisfactory average in the level of trans nationality of voting, 0.865 was achieved, also 
if compared to the level of transnationality of its composition of 0.878. 
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3. MEP National Allegiance versus Political Group LoJalty 
A comparison between the indices of agreements for PGs and for national delegations in the 
European Parliament with respect to the Gulf policies suggests that the national loyalty played a 
less significant part than the allegiance to the respective PGs, except for the Rainbow group, 
which however did not have a well-defined political and ideological line. Luxembourg and Spain's 
delegations registered the highest levels of agreements. The first case does not come as a surprise 
due to the small size of Luxembourg's delegation. However, national solidarity does not seem to 
conflict with MEPs' allegiance to their respective groups and generally goes along with their 
strong Europeanist sentiments. Also in the case of the Spanish MEPs, it can be said that group 
allegiance was of more concern than national imperatives. In fact, a closer look at the ReVs for 
the Socialist, EPP, LDR, EUL and Rainbow groups shows that despite the appearances, political 
allegiance prevailed over that of nationality. 
Finally, as has been previously mentioned, most British Labour MEPs, along with the 
majority of the Socialist group opposed military intervention in the Gulf to the great 
embarrassment of their own national party. However, in order to assess the magnitude of the 
factor of nationality, further in-depth research is necessary, based on a comparative analysis of 
the positions of the national parties and the corresponding political groups in the European 
Pari iament. 
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4. Political Groups' Voting Similarity on the Gulf Crisis 
The voting similarity percentages between groups, illustrated in Table 3, has been calculated by 
combining and comparing all 50 roll-call votes taken by Parliament on the Gulf. The EP arena 
appeared divided into a vast nucleus and two incompatible extremes. The large centre embraced 
the EPP, the LDR and the EDA with the ED located to its right and the Socialists and the EUL 
on its left. On the extreme left of the parliamentary axis was Piquet's Left Unity and on the 
extreme right was Le Pen's group which explicitly assumed an isolated and 'outsider position' 
in the EP policy over the Gulf (Jacobs et al., 1990, 98), as all the other groups refused to 
collaborate with it. The Greens, not easily placed within any traditional political alignments, could 
be located in this case on the left wing of the Parliament, showing its strong voting similarity with 
the LU and EUL groups. The Rainbow group, by contrast, was equidistant from all other groups. 
A more marked than normal left-right division seemed to emerge within the House as Piquet also 
confirmed in his interview with the author. The first striking element which emerges from Table 
3 with regard to the Socialists is that the Left the Greens and the LU voting similarities reached 
only medium average figures, meaning that they effectively supported Socialist policy as much 
as the ER. This anomaly could be explained in part by the fact that the prevailing faction within 
the Socialist group took eventually an interventionist stance approaching to the policy advocated 
by centre-right groups. Predictably, the group with the highest voting similarity to the Socialist 
was the EUL with a Voting Similarity Percentage (VSP) equivalent to 76.39, bolstering the 
Socialist-EVL alliance. The second closest group was the Rainbow group followed by the EPP, 
marking a fairly high level of similarity which confirms to a certain extent the commitment of the 
historic alliances between the two 'giants'. 
The centre-right groups including EPP, ED, LDR and EDA showed respectively high 
levels of voting similarity with each other. In particular, the LDR and the ED registered the 
highest VSP between any of the groups over Gulf policies. It was not surprising to find a low 
level of similarity between the EPP, ED and LDR on one side and the LU on the other. Their 
evident policy divergences with the left groups and the Greens could also be seen in their 
respective VSPs, albeit to a lesser extent in the case of the LDR. According to the figures the ED 
and LV displayed diametrically opposed policies on the Gulf issue, marking the two very opposite 
extremes of the EP with the lowest VSP, 25.76. The Greens' high similarity with the LU and 
EUL groups placed them on the left of the parliamentary spectrum. All three groups firmly 
maintained their extreme rejection of the war, their position therefore being distant from that of 
pro-interventionists ED, EPP and LDR groups. The VSP between the Socialist group was rather 
disappointing. 
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The ER group's constant opposition to the parliamentary majority can be shown in its 
voting behaviour, reflecting similarities with the Rainbow and LU groups, even if throughout the 
whole crisis, these groups never forged any coalition or drafted a joint text. Tables 4 and 5 show 
that the extreme right and the extreme left, the latter also including the Green group, remained 
out of the majority coalitions more often than the other groups. 
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5. Intergroup Cooperation in Shaping the European Parliament's Stance on the Gulf 
Crisis 
A glance behind the parliamentary scenes is essential to unravel the complex process leading to 
the adoption or rejection of Resolutions. For this purpose, a RCV analysis along with a more 
general appraisal of the PGs' contribution to the formulation of Resolutions has been undertaken. 
Between September 1990 and May 1991, the European Parliament adopted 21 Resolutions 
covering the various political, economic and humanitarian aspects of the Gulf crisis, of which 2 
were based on reports of the Political Affairs Committee, 15 were group Resolutions, 3 were 
individual group Resolutions and one Resolution which was drafted jointly by MEPs acting in a 
personal capacity. Intergroup coalition emerged unequivocally as the dominant force within the 
House. Broad coalit ions were almost always the rule with respect to the Gulf crisis, with a small 
and often fragmented opposition embodying in all cases the isolated extreme right and 
occasionally the Rainbow group, the Greens and the Left Unity. Many small groups aligned 
themselves with the larger groups and, in some cases, succeeded in obtaining the inclusion of 
amendments to the texts. The Gulf crisis revealed the highest level of successful cooperation 
between the Socialists and the EUL group. Clearly, this revealed that the two groups shared the 
same understanding of the problem and its possible solutions. The 'historic alliance' between the 
Christian Democrats and the Socialists within the European Parliament, dating back to the 1984 
European elections, was also reaffirmed on 10 occasions when the two groups, together with 
others, drafted compromise texts which found the approval of the House. The presence of either 
the Socialists or the Christian Democrats was necessary in order to achieve the required simple 
majority to pass Resolutions. Exceptionally, only in one case did a Joint Resolution, drafted by 
the EUL, the LU and the Greens, without either of the two largest groups as signatory, reach a 
majority. 
By contrast, as indicated in Table 4, individual political groups failed to gam 
parliamentary consensus over their respective texts, with the exception of the Socialists and the 
Christian Democrats. Throughout the whole crisis, the House passed only two resolutions drafted 
individually by the Socialists, respectively in October and December 1990, and only one 
resolution on the speculative rise of oil prices by the Christian Democrats, on 12 October 1990. 
Although no evidence can be found to support the following assumption, it seemed that this 
mutual exchange of favours between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats to support these 
individual Motions for Resolutions stemmed from the urgency for the EP not to remain silent and 
look unconcerned about the events in the Gulf in the eyes of the world. 
Table 4. Breakdown of Adopted and Non-Adopted Motions for Resolutions on the Gulf Crisis 
-
Date I 00i vidual Political Groups Political Groups' Coalitions Individual MEP I C OIllIllitlee ReportS 
Coalition of MEPs 
A NA A NA A NA A NA 
Sept 191Xl 5 (V, ERx2, Rainbow, LV) 1 (EPPIED, S, EDA, LDR, EVL) - - - - -
Oct la 6(S, EPP,EDA, V,EVL,ER) - 1 (SOC, LDR, EVL, EPP, ED, LV, V) - 1 -
(12110190) ( a I I 
EPP) , 
Oct Ib 2 (S,EPP) 3 (LDR, EDA,Rainbow) 1 (S, ED, LV, EPP, LDR, V, Rainbow, EVL) - - - -
( 12110/'X)) 
Oct 2a 4 (lOR, ED, LV,ER) 1 (S, EVL) 
- - -
1 A3-261/90 -
(251 J(J!'XJ) Crampton Report 
Nov 191Xl 
-
5 (Vx3, LDR, ER) 2 (lLDR, EPP, S, EVL, EDA, ED, LV - - - 1 A3-0321/90 
2: S, EPP) Crampton Report 
Dec 191Xl 1 (S) 9 (LDR, V, EPPx2, ER, ED, Rainbow, LV, I (S, LU, EVL) - - - - -
EDA) 
Jan 1991 
- 10 (EDx2, EDAx2, LDR, EPP, EVL, V, LV, ER) I (S, Rainbow) - 1 2 -
Feb 1991 5 (Vx3,lOR,ER) 20: EVL,EPP, LU,S, ED,EDA - - 3 -
2: S, EUL, EPP, LU) (2:a11 S) 
Mar 1991 4 (ER, LDR, EDA, Rainbow) 2 (\:S, EPP, ED, EVL, LU, V - - -
2V, EUL, LV) 
Apr 1991 - 9 (LVx2, Sx2, V, EVL, EDA, EPP, ER) 2 (I :S, EPP, ED, LDR, EDA, V. LU, EUL. Rainbow - - - - -
2: S,EPP,LDR. V,EUL.LV) 
\1:Jj 1991 
-
1 (ER) 2 (1 :S, LDR, EPP, EUL, V, LU & 2: LDR, EPP, V) - - -
A = Adopted 
NA = Non-Adopted (Rejected, Fallen and Withdrawn Motions) 
In addition, two declarations fell: DElS/90, Stephen Hughes and DE04/91 Kenneth Coates. 
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Table 5. Intergroup Cooperation: Adopted Joint Resolutions on the Gulf Crisis 
I I s I EPP I LDR I ED I EDA I V I ElL I ER I Rainbow I LV I 
s x \0 6 6 4 5 11 0 3 9 
EPP \0 x 7 6 4 6 9 0 2 8 
LDR 5 7 x 4 3 5 6 0 2 5 
ED 6 6 4 x 4 3 6 0 2 5 
EDA 4 4 3 4 x 1 4 0 1 3 
V 5 6 5 3 1 x 5 0 2 6 
EUL 11 9 6 6 4 5 x 0 2 \0 
ER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 
Rainbow 3 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 x 2 
LV 9 8 5 4 3 6 \0 0 2 x 
This urgency was felt especially after 11 October when, due to that House being inquorate, no 
discussion or vote was held on the Gulf crisis. Lastly, it is interesting to notice a timid attempt 
by individual MEPs to develop cross-boundary initiatives beyond the domain and control of the 
various parties. This was a direct result of personal relationships of trust and cooperation being 
built between MEPs, irrespective of their political group affiliation and nationality (Oostlander 
interview, 112/1996). This emerging phenomenon seems to echo the process of socialization 
stressed in Chapter I. 
Chart 14 simplifies the impact of the political groups and their control on parliamentary 
activity with respect to the Gulf crisis. The Socialists contributed more than any other group to 
forging parliamentary policies towards the Gulf crisis. In particular, the Socialist group 
endeavoured to bridge the gaps between the left-right blocs, while seeking to overcome its internal 
divisions. Having said this, the Socialists often succeeded in reaching a majority coalition even 
without the Christian Democrats. In one case, the Socialists and the Left groups formed a winning 
coalition against the centre-right front consisting of Christian Democrats, European Democrats 
and Liberals. The Christian Democrats, albeit to a lesser extent, also made an impact on the EP 
stance. The extreme right was systematically excluded from taking part in any coalitions. The 
reluctance of all other groups to be associated with the extreme right-wingers rather than a self-
expressed choice by the ER leadership to distinguish itself from the rest of the House explains the 
marginalization of the far right members as well as their sense of alienation within the EP arena, 
(5.3%) EOA 
(15.8%) EUL 
NB. ER made no impact. 
PG Impact - Gulf Crisis 
Chart 14 
(3.9%) RB 
(19.7%) SOC 
(15.8%) EPP 
(9.2%) LOR 
(9.2%) GREEN 
(7.9%) ED 
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This inquiry does not illustrate all 50 RCVs taken on the Gulf crisis, but only those 
relating to the most controversial texts. At the September 1990 session, all political groups 
unanimously condemned the Iraqi aggression and the seizure of hostages, while vigorously 
advocating initiatives for the convening of a Middle East international conference. Yet, the PGs 
were unable to attain a common standpoint on the measures to be adopted against Saddam, 
exposing at times an embarrassing lack of parliamentary unity. The general attitude of the left, 
comprising the vast majority of the Socialists, EUL, LU, along with the Greens and the Rainbow 
group, was of vigorous opposition to the resort to arms. "By refuting the self-justifications of all 
those who rallied to the so-called 'collective security' action while claiming to hate war, [the 
Greens] contributed to creating a current inside the Parliament that is genuinely hostile to war, 
and demands a concept of security and North-South relations that is not based on deterrence" by 
weapons of mass destruction (Lannoye, 1991, 2). On the other side of the parliamentary 
spectrum, the Christian Democrats and the other centre-right groups including the LOR, EO and 
EDA were inclined to the forceful implementation of the UN resolutions, thus unwaveringly 
supporting the stance of the UK and US governments (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996). In order 
to avert the gloomy prospect of stagnation and immobility in terms of policy definition over the 
Gulf, which had threateningly appeared on the parliamentary horizon, internal EP dynamics 
drifted, after lengthy debates and negotiations, towards a multiparty strategy. Most groups' 
chairmen consulted each other, exchanged views on the contents of the text to be submitted and 
on the strategies to be adopted (Piquet interview, 31/1/1996). 
At the conclusion of the September parliamentary debate, after an exhausting marathon 
of 10 roll-call votes the EP passed a Joint Resolution negotiated between the Socialist, EPP, LOR, 
ED, EDA, EUL groups and by the ad hoc Gulf Delegation, requested once by the European 
Right and the Socialists individually, 6 times by the Rainbow group as well as once by the LOR 
and the Rainbow group jointly. 13 A final roll-call vote on the whole resolution was requested 
by the Greens, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats. Although the Rainbow and the 
European Right tried to play on the uncertainty of some MEPs who did not fully share the views 
expressed by the dominant groups, their efforts were in vain due to the overwhelming numeric 
superiority of the coalition. The September Resolution was a grand compromise, inevitably 
resulting in ambiguity on several aspects. As the parliamentary debates and explanations of vote 
reveal, the different signatories seemed to contradict each other over the interpretation of the real 
meaning of the text, which was therefore endorsed on antithetical grounds. However, in a positive 
13 Ten split roll-call votes were held respectively on Recital A, Recital H, Paragraph 6, Paragraph 11 firs! 
sentence. paragraph 17 excluding one sentence, paragraph 17, paragraphs 20, 21 and 24. Finally. a roll-call 
vote took place on the tex.t as a whole. 
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light, this might be regarded as an acknowledgment of the dialectic ability of the Parliament in 
succeeding to reconcile opposing views (Melandri, 12/911990, 157). 
At the January 1991 session, after six hours of debate, no agreement was reached on a 
common text on the Gulf crisis, following the rejection of a series of amendments proposed by 
various PGs. A final draft tabled by the Socialist and Rainbow Groups, calling for the immediate 
cessation of fighting as soon as there was a declaration of intent by Iraq to evacuate Kuwait, was 
withdrawn by the authors themselves, Jannis Sakellariou (Socialist, Germany) and Jaak 
Vandemeulebroucke (Rainbow, Belgium), given that the original content had been deprived of 
two key points, the condemnation of Iraqi attacks against Israel and the statement that the 
international community had no quarrel with the Iraqi population and the Arab world (OlEC C 
48/1991, 29 and Cot, 23/1/1991, 164). 
After a week of discussions and a lengthy vote, on 24 January 1991 the EP adopted by 
202 in favour, 98 against and 25 abstentions a new text on the conflict in the Gulf, negotiated and 
tabled by Socialists, Christian Democrats, British Conservatives and Rainbow members. The Joint 
Resolution incorporated the two disputed references. On this occasion, the significance of inter-
and intragroup bargaining was stressed by Cot as the only possible way of forging an EP official 
stance on the events in the Gulf, the other alternative being parliamentary silence which would 
be politically inconceivable. It is worth stressing the importance of the adoption of resolutions 
which, although not a legally binding act, represents a relevant indicator of the way MEPs 
conceive their function as representatives of the people and which also consists of an exercise for 
MEPs to take into account the various signals, moods and impressions and turn them into 
coherent policies. In April, the House adopted by 194 votes in favour and 3 abstentions a Joint 
Resolution on arms export negotiated by the Socialists, EPP, LDR, ED, Green, Rainbow, EUL 
and LV (B3-552, 555, 562, 564, 565 and 660). 
As clearly displayed in the above tabulations and statistics, no individual political group 
was in a position to control fully parliamentary voting outcomes. The Socialists greatly influenced 
the parliamentary policy on the Gulf. However, their strength stemmed not only from a clear 
numeric superiority, but also from the capacity and willingness to share coalitions with other 
groups and their acquiescence to compromise. Although owning the largest share of voting power 
the Socialist group would have not succeeded in determining the voting outcome without the 
support of other groups. The Christian Democrats participated in tabling many joint resolutions, 
but failed to create an alternative coalition to that led by the Socialists. Every political group 
possesses a certain, if different, a priori voting capacity naturally linked to its numeric 
composition which is not always directly proportional to its effective power and influence. In light 
of the parliamentary debates and RCVs results, it would be inaccurate to assume that the 
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European Parliament reflected a uniform and homogeneous stance on the Gulf. Instead, a variety 
of political attitudes emerged across the House, requiring repeated multigroup interventions in 
order to reach at least a slender majority which would enable the House to pass its resolutions. 
The overall index of agreement of the European Parliament did not touch great peaks, but marked 
the medium average of 56.13 percent during the first stage, fell to the fairly low level of 36.33 
percent in the second stage and rose to the medium figure of 58.04 percent in the final stage, 
averaging throughout the whole period the medium low percentage of 47.33. 
Parliamentarians on all sides showed a distinct lack of cohesion that weighed them down 
both politically and diplomatically. Yet, despite the fact that it was a unified Parliament that 
vigorously stressed the need to sustain peace and stability in the region and to deal with the 
crucial issues in the Middle East once the Gulf War was over, when the moment actually arrived 
to confront post-war problems, it was disappointing to see that MEPs were reluctant even to 
participate in the voting, with absenteeism reaching the fairly high level of 66 percent. 
Conclusion 
The above qualitative and quantitative analyses suggest that the PGs eventually succeeded in 
uniting their respective members into discernible political entities. In particular the data display 
a certain cohesion within the individual political groups in relation to the Gulf issue, with indices 
of agreement between fairly and extremely high values, whilst highlighting deep discrepancies of 
views within the House as a whole, substantiated by a rather slender level of overall agreement 
of 47.33 along with a rate of absenteeism that was only just within the medium low boundaries 
at 41. 71. It is indisputable that the war stage was the most grievous and controversial period, 
accentuating divisions within Parliament, reducing the levels of agreement attained by most PGs 
in the previous stage and, in particular, breaking up the unity of the Socialists. By contrast, the 
war stage saw higher indices of agreement for the Left Unity, the Green and the Rainbow groups, 
united in their firm opposition to military intervention. Overall, absenteeism decreased during this 
crucial stage, with the exception of the ER and Rainbow groups, reflecting MEPs' concern at the 
events unfolding in the Gulf. 
Throughout the three stages, the voting cohesion was by and large, higher within the 
Christian Democrats at 91. 15 than the Socialists 73.28, counterbalanced. to a certain extent, by 
the latter's slightly lower level of absenteeism of 33.17 against that of the EPP at 39.69. A 
comparison of the voting behaviour of the two largest groups suggests that the Socialists were 
more prone to factionalism than their main political rivals, the Christian Democrats. In decreasing 
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order, ED, LU, EPP and EUL maintained a high rate of cohesion. 
The ED group reached the highest average level of cohesion, 94.83 percent, consistently 
maintaining an exceptionally high index of agreement in all three stages. The Left Unity, the 
European Peoples' Party and the European Unitarian Left then followed with fairly high indices 
of agreement equal respectively to 92.28, 91.15 and 91.10 percent. The result registered by the 
ED was not surprising, if one considers that numerically it was a medium sized group and almost 
exclusively mono-national with members coming from the British Tory Party, with the exception 
of 2 Danish Conservative MEPs. By looking at the ED group, one could mistakenly be led to 
assume that same nationality and affiliation to the same political national party are the imperative 
factors for securing cohesion within the PGs. Although it is unquestionable that they can 
contribute to cementing internal cohesion, the major efforts of transnationalization within the EP 
forum cannot be underestimated. 
The EPP, for instance, the second largest group in the EP and counting MEPs from all 
twelve members states, recorded a remarkably high level of agreement and transnationality in its 
voting, thus proving that the EPP example proved that it is possible to attain a certain 
homogeneity and harmony of views in a large transnational context. The Liberals, who also 
claimed a high level of trans nationality , attained a good internal compromise when voting on the 
Gulf. Considering that all twelve nationalities were represented within the Socialists group, the 
level of cohesion was high, with an index equivalent to 73.28 percent, though lower than those 
of the Christian Democrats, Liberals and the Greens. 
Due to their highly transnational configuration, the Socialist, EPP, LDR, Green and 
Rainbow groups were expected to display a less cohesive approach than the other political groups 
with a more homogeneous structure. Nevertheless, on the basis of the results achieved, there was 
no inversely proportional ratio between the degree of transnationality on group composition and 
the agreement index, indicating that there is no direct link between group heterogeneity and group 
cohesiveness. 
Contrary to the widespread assumption that the political groups lack practice in whipping. 
it can be argued that the Gulf case revealed de facto that there was a certain voting discipline 
within the groups as the official party line eventually prevailed despite a few dissenting voices. 
The largest groups, including the Socialists, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, had their 
whips, even though these often consisted of "nothing more than a list. prepared by the group 
secretariats and circulated to members' benches in the hemicycle before voting periods, setting 
out the recommended group position" (Westlake. 1994a, 238). 
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Other groups, for example, the Green and the Rainbow groups, officially acknowledged 
the principle of free voting (Bowler and Farrell, 1993, 14), individualism and egalitarianism. 
Admission was also ad hoc and transversal bridges were allowed and even encouraged between 
groups. The EDA, a small club-like group dominated by prominent personalities, did not envisage 
any disciplinary actions against its dissenting members (Ewing, 1989, 19-23). 
The centre-right, including the EPP, LDR, ED and EDA groups, scored higher on the 
rate of cohesion as well as on the rate of participation than the left, embracing the Socialists, 
EUL, LU, the Green and the Rainbow groups. However, given their chameleonic nature and the 
consequent difficulty of placing them on the traditional left-right scale, if the Green and Rainbow 
groups were to be excluded from the left coalition, the balance would move in favour of the left. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to underline the fact that the poor level of attendance and 
cohesion by the EDA had a detrimental effect on the average figure for the centre-right parties. 
If one compares the levels of cohesion over the three stages, on the whole the results 
display a small fluctuation in the cases of the ED, EDA, EPP and EUL. The data also show that 
the Socialists, Liberals, the Greens varied greatly in their respective IA over the same period. The 
poor MEP turnout at voting sessions often resulted in a higher level of cohesion, possibly due to 
the easier management of coalition groups which allowed the achievement of joint strategies. 
The modus operandi of the political groups with regard to EP policy-definition over the 
Gulf crisis refutes the allegation that the parliamentary record of debating and voting on the Gulf 
was dismal. However, whilst the vast majority of the groups succeeded overall in forming a 
cohesive stance, the EP as a whole failed to achieve a high level of consensus and to present itself 
as a united political front. In particular, the House was divided in respect of the actions to be 
taken and whether these should include the use of armed force. The figures also exhibit a high 
incidence of abstention and absence among MEPs during ReVs on the Gulf. Both appeared as 
'neutral' ways of averting the dilemma between personal beliefs, acquiescence to national party 
and group loyalty. 
The appraisal of transnationalization along with the comparison of the indices of 
agreement of the national delegations and of the political groups vis-a-vis the crisis are not 
completely gloomy as they show the PGs' attempt to overcome national boundaries and 
differences, by emphasizing political and ideological affinity. Besides the traditional left-right 
division which characterizes most national assemblies, other cleavages may be observed in the 
European Parliament: North versus South and integrationist versus anti-integrationist. 
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Comparing the voting similarities of the various groups with respect to the Gulf issue, it 
appeared that, on the one side, the EPP, ED, Liberals and EDA and, on the other, the EUL, LU 
and the Greens had reached respectively very and fairly high figures creating some kind of 
bipolarity within the House. The Socialists oscillated between the two blocs, overall tipping the 
scale and, therefore, the parliamentary voting outcome. The voting records on the Gulf displayed 
a frequently recurring convergence between the Christian Democrats and the British 
conservatives. On the other side of the Chamber, the Socialist and EUL group exhibited a high 
voting similarity. And yet, coalitions gathering Socialists, EUL, EPP and the other centre-right 
groups were very frequent. Intragroup cohesiveness and intergroup cooperation were based on 
the necessity of reinforcing the capacity of the parliamentarians, almost devoid of influence over 
the Council, to participate in policy-making over crucial foreign policy issues. As no majority 
group exists within the European Parliament, the chairmen of the PGs had to expend all their 
energy in order to cooperate and unite their forces to shape and/or support the same actions, by 
voting accordingly at the plenary. 
During the past years, a quest for group cohesion and intergroup solidarity has been 
pursued by suggesting tougher discipline and voting rules aimed at reinforcing political-ideological 
concepts and party loyalties. Although this thesis does not focus on what could be referred to as 
"the conflict of interest between national and European loyalty" and specifically on the different 
attitudes, if any, between national parties and corresponding EP political groups, it is nevertheless 
important to detect whether transnationalization was achieved with regard to the Gulf crisis or 
whether the factor of nationality prevented group cohesion. The case highlighted the fact that the 
degree to which individual MEPs' liberty was curtailed by their duty to the national party and or 
political group varied widely, In the scramble for a consistent parliamentary response, some of 
the barriers to EP political unity were eventually smashed and tumbled down. As the voting 
analysis indicates, the expansion of the EP role requires the establishment of European party 
structure and organization (Attina, 1990, 574-577), For a correct interpretation of PG level of 
cohesion, the crucial factor of absenteeism, with its limiting and sometimes paralysing 
consequences, needs to be considered. 
The crisis was not a unifying catalyst between the various parliamentary groups and did 
not mitigate political and, to a lesser degree. national divergences. The hypothesis that when 
dealing with foreign policy MEPs tend to show a high level of consensus could not be confirmed 
since the case presented some crucial defence and military issues which inevitably contributed to 
decrease par I iamentary consensus. 
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By way of conclusion, it can be said that in harmony with the values of ethics and 
democracy, it is vital to maintain the multiplicity of political voices which gives a sense of 
dynamism to the parliamentary forum, but in order to enable the EP to function, it is necessary 
to keep these diverging tides within the same political river-bed, especially when dealing with 
serious international crises. 
V The Responses of the European Community and the European 
Parliament to the Yugoslav Crisis 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the main events that occurred in the 
SFRY from January 1991 until July 1992 and to assess the responses of the European Community 
and the European Parliament. This serves as the basis for an investigation into the role and voting 
behaviour of the political groups on the Yugoslav crisis, which is carried out in Chapter VI. 
1. Brief Historical Background on the Yugoslav Crisis 
With the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, a new era of harmony, 
democracy and prosperity seemed to have finally dawned. Yet, regrettably, as the deterrent of 
the Cold War ceased to exist old and new rivalries began to emerge along with the awakening of 
latent ethnic feuds. In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, another 
challenge loomed on the international political horizon, this time right in the heart of the 
European continent: the historically explosive area of the Balkans. 
On 25 June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia officially proclaimed their independence from the 
SFRy. 1 These decisions did not arise suddenly, but were the result of a long process of reflection 
starting in 1986, which stemmed from long-standing political divergences with the newly 
appointed President of the Serbian League of Communists, Slobodan Milosevic. The dramatic 
events which took place in Kosovo in March 1989 certainly exacerbated a mood of distrust, 
feeding sentiments of anger towards the Serbs. Feelings of sympathy were instead directed 
towards the Albanian population, so harshly repressed by the Yugoslav People's Army, 
Jugoslovenska narodna armija (JNA) on Milosevic's orders, following their uprising against 
alleged ethnic discrimination and the envisaged reduction of the autonomy of the province 
On 27 September 1990, the Slovenian Parliament declared legislation promulgated by Federal authorities no 
longer applicable to the Republic. Similarly. on 22 December 1990, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed the 
supremacy of its legislation over Federal law. On 23 December 1990, 88.5 percent of the Slovenian 
population voted in favour of secession from the Yugoslav Federation. On 19 May 1991. 93.4 percent of the 
Croatian electorate opted for independence of the Republic (Kritziotis. 1993). 
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(Bennett, 1995, 11, 142). 
The Federal Parliament and government rejected these claims for independence by 
Slovenia and Croatia seeing them as pure acts of rebellion and interpreting them as veritable 
declarations of war which required immediate intervention of the Federal Army. Fighting erupted 
in Slovenia as a result of the JNA's attempt to take control of the Northern border of the 
Federation, while the Croats failed to comply with the December 1990 pact of mutual assistance 
agreed with the Slovenes. The reason underpinning this evident betrayal was the accord secretly 
concluded with Milosevic to take a stance of neutrality in the case of a Serb-Slovenian conflict. 
Violent inter-ethnic clashes followed in the meantime in the Croatian town of Glina where the 
JNA soon gained ground (Alendar, 1992, 19). 
The eruption of the hostilities in Yugoslavia was uncannily reminiscent of the events of 
1914 with the reappearance of belligerence between states as well as the reopening of the 
"Pandora's box of ethnic and religious conflicts" (Simic, 1993, 2). The assassination of the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by the Serbian nationalist Gavrilo Princip had led to 
Austria's declaration of war against Serbia. This had forced the various European countries to 
take a position either in favour of or against Serbia, triggering the outbreak of the Great War. 
However, as Fred Halliday claims, a full comparison cannot be drawn between the two 
phenomena since the dimension of the conflict which flared up in 1991 remained circumscribed 
and rather limited to communal boundaries without affecting major powers and their mutual 
relationships (Halliday, 1994, 223). 
The Yugoslav imbroglio appeared "to have so much in common with the classical Greek 
tragedy with its element of ananke: at each time point, a number of actors are doing what they 
have been trapped - whether by their own previous actions or those of other actors - into having 
to do, and as result they sink deeper and deeper into catastrophe" (Wiberg, 1992 cited in Simic, 
1993,2). 
The seeds of animosity were sown in the early half of the twentieth century with the 
creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, as Yugoslavia was at first named. The 
Union of 1 December 1918 was not based on equal partnerships between its members, but was 
largely dominated by the Serbs (Bennett, 1995, 32-33), hence fuelling resentment among the other 
two communities. In the wake of the Second World War, this situation was partly rectified with 
the establishment of the SFRY, which provided for a more equitable balance between the 
Yugoslav popUlation, yet not healing completely ethno-religious divisions nor the rancour and 
indignation which had arisen since the outbreak of the conflict, when the Serbs killed thousands 
of Muslims and the Croats conducted an extermination campaign against the Serbs. In addition, 
it can be argued that the creation and consolidation of Yugoslavia as a state entity had arisen 
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mainly from strategic interests and pressures by the founders of the new international order rather 
than from the will of the Southern Slavs themselves. Against this background, the post-war 
Socialist Federation could not survive beyond the death of its founding father, Marshall Josip 
Broz Tito (14 May 1980). With his departure the promise of stability and unity within the 
Federation soon faded away (Hancock, 1993, 50). In the absence of a strong and charismatic 
leader coupled with an increasingly complex economic situation, tensions rose sharply within and 
between the constituent republics. 
In March 1987, as a result of both the high rate of inflation which had reached 100 
percent and the heavy foreign debt equivalent to 20 billion US dollars, an upsurge of social 
discontent spread across the SPRY culminating with a series of protests and strikes. The situation 
deteriorated further to the extent that in 1988 the total foreign debt amounted to the equivalent 
of 21 billion US dollars and the level of unemployment exceeded 15 percent, a figure 
exceptionally high for a country with still a predominantly communist economy. The annual 
inflation rate, which was running at an already high rate of 250 percent (Altichieri, 27/3/87, 6; 
Magas, 1993, 190), soared by late 1989 to a staggering 2,000 percent (Bennett, 1995, 118). 
With the rise to power of the Serbian Communist leader Slobodan Milosevi6, the spectre 
of extreme nationalism had entered the political scene, heightening the concerns and increasing 
the unrest of the Croatian population. These fears were fuelled by rumours that, in case of the 
federal structure collapsing, Serbia would seek by all means to reassert its historical claim over 
the borders with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 2 In October 1990, a stern warning signal was 
given after the declaration of autonomy by Serbs living in Croatia, resulting in clashes between 
them and the Croatian police. By December, with the electoral victory of Milosevi6 for the 
Serbian leadership, the situation had spiralled out of control. These events ran almost concurrently 
with negotiations between the Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Bosnian, Serbian and 
Slovenian Republics over the future constitutional structure of the Federation. However, Belgrade 
rejected all proposals put forward by Slovenia and Croatia for the creation of a confederal system, 
based on the EC' s model. 
Both the weakness of the economy and the government's leadership contributed to 
deepening ethnic cleavages and fomenting conflicts. Certainly, the disastrous economic situation 
had precipitated the political crisis and endangered the territorial and political integrity of the 
Yugoslav Federation. Nonetheless, as Christopher Bennett observes, it soon became evident that 
while economic factors had led "Yugoslavia to the brink of civil war", economic remedies alone 
would no longer suffice in keeping the country united (Bennett, 1995, 118). Drastic economic 
As confirmed at the time by Serbian officials close to Milo~evic (Benetazzo, 1990, 16). 
Chapter V 164 
measures, including wage-freezes for six months, price liberalization and devaluation of the dinar, 
converted and bound to the Deutschmark, brought immediate and astonishing results so that, by 
late February 1990 the rate of inflation had dropped below 10 percent. As a result, the architect 
of this economic miracle, the Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic grew in prestige and the 
esteem of both the Yugoslav people and the international community. Alas, the initial success 
achieved in the economic domain did not follow suit on the political front, where strong contrasts 
persisted and indeed intensified, especially between the Slovenian and Serbian Republics. 
Fifteenth May 1991 brought with it a constitutional crisis when the SFRY failed to appoint 
the Croat Stipe Mesic as Federal President, due to Serbian opposition. This occurrence was 
unprecedented in the history of the Federation and, more precisely, since the introduction of the 
rotation system in the early 1970s to emphasize equality between the republics. In the midst of 
this turmoil, Prime Minister Markovic sought to reassure the population by saying that Parliament 
and government were still functioning and that the Federation was "not spiralling downward 
towards a military coup, a civil war, or, perhaps most numbingly, perpetual political chaos" 
(Tanner, 17/5/91). For many Croatian political leaders, the Serbs' objective was to create an 
atmosphere of disarray, giving a pretext for armed intervention in order to resolve the situation 
to their own advantage. Concurrently, in the Montenegrin Republic, whose communist leadership 
was traditionally pro-Serbia, people began to show signs of restlessness concerning the role 
allotted them by Milosevic as political 'cannon fodder' in Serbia's differences with the rest of 
Yugoslavia. Suddenly, the atavistic loyalty between the two republics seemed to be weakening 
(Tanner, 17/5/91). 
The determinants of the Yugoslav breakdown could be traced to the lack of a stable 
democratic regime and, above all, to the "amplified expression of a national awakening", which 
had become the "moving spirit of the [Yugoslav] drama" (Crnobrnja, 1994, xii, 3). Conversely, 
in line with a "conspiracy theory", the belief was widespread in Yugoslavia that the demise of 
the Federation was being orchestrated by a few outside countries for the attainment of their own 
political ambitions. However, as the former ambassador of Yugoslavia to the European 
Communities, Mihailo Crnobrnja maintains, it is still extremely difficult "to uncover the political 
mechanics and dynamics of converting a respected, stable and relatively prosperous country into 
a new Balkan powder-keg" (Crnobrnja, 1994, xiii). 
The initial response of the international community was to reject the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia, as declared by the American Secretary of State James Baker and by the Ministers of 
Foreign A ffairs meeting in Berlin on 20 June 1991, wi thin the framework of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Remacle, 1992, 34). The United Nations took the 
safer option of a 'wait-and-see' policy over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on the ground 
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that the new independent states would have called for international assistance in order to fight 
violations of their territorial sovereignty, something that the international community was not 
prepared to offer at this stage. Meanwhile, on James Baker's proposal, the CSCE had 
implemented from 9 September 1991 an arms embargo against Yugoslavia, also endorsed by the 
UN Security Council in its Resolution 713 on 25 September. This international sanctioning policy 
inevitably attracted criticism, mainly from the Croats, given that the Serbs had inherited the large 
arsenal of weaponry of the Federation and seized all arms factories to satisfy their demands 
(Remacle, 1992, 37).3 Hence, the embargo did not affect the military capacity of the JNA, but 
accentuated the imbalance in firepower by depriving the Croats4 and the Bosnians of the means 
of defending themselves. 
By assuming that, after all, the Yugoslav tragedy was an exclusively European 
problem, as clearly stated by the US administration, the Community felt the responsibility to take 
the political lead in the handling of the situation (Guicherd, 1992, 159-181; The Financial Times, 
29-30/6/1991). Luxembourg's Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, who had enthusiastically 
proclaimed "this is the hour of Europe /I, believed rather optimistically that after the Brioni 
Agreement the situation was under control (New York Times, 29/6/1991). The EC member states 
rejected the idea of bringing in the United Nations, adopting as 'token gesture' the CSCE in the 
process. This was not questioned by the United Nations, as confirmed by the Secretary-General 
Perez de Cuellar who stated that "Slovenia [was] not an independent UN member ( .. ), [and 
therefore] the UN [had] no role in Yugoslavia", unless the EC and CSCE endeavours failed 
altogether (Steinberg, 1993, cited in Lucarelli, 1995b,4 footnote 10). 
With the appointment ofthe former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as Personal Envoy 
of the UN Secretary-General, the impression was given that the EC would step aside and the UN 
effectively take over. Vance appeared to have supreme confidence in his powers of persuasion 
and did not feel the need for the involvement of the European Community. Differences of views 
and the subsequent lack of coordination sometimes led to friction between the two organizations. 
As the crisis developed, the international community had to come to terms with the demise of the 
Yugoslav Federation and the fait accompli of the birth of the independent republics. The adoption 
of Resolution 743 on 21 February 1992 saw the UN Security Council taking a more decisive role. 
The mobilization of a peacekeeping force was authorized to ensure that sovereignty of the 
Yugoslavia was a large producer of weaponry and a net exporter. In 1991, even after the outbreak of the 
war, despite great domestic demand. Yugoslavia managed to increase its export of military equipment with 
a total sale equivalent to 460 million US dollars (Bennett. 1995. 177. Footnote 16). 
Since May 1990 the Croatian territorial defence force had been disarmed (Bennett. 1995. 117), 
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republics was not breached, and to supervise the ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Federal Army 
and the disbanding of paramilitary forces in four UN protected areas. 
On 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum was held on the independence of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in which a fairly substantial minority of the Bosnian Serbs (25 percent) also 
participated, despite Belgrade's pressure to boycott it. The results expressed the determination of 
the majority of the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be independent but also their wish to continue 
living in a mixed society. However, recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 
the part of the United Nations took place on 7 April 1992, and with it came the deployment of 
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the second largest contingent ever assembled. 
2. The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis 
The Yugoslav debacle seemed an opportunity to establish the Community's place in the post-
bipolar world (Crnobrnja, 16/6/92, 1), its leading role in the European continent (Alendar, 1992, 
18) and to show "what kind of an international actor the EC could purport to be" (Lodge, 1993, 
3). Undoubtedly, the Twelve felt a special responsibility towards Yugoslavia, not least in terms 
of preventing any conflagration of war throughout the rest of Balkans with serious repercussions 
in Europe. The Community also felt some degree of loyalty and interest in the light of the then 
existing trade and cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the Twelve were looking 
for an occasion to test their political cooperation in the field of foreign policy to see whether the 
intergovernmental formula would be sufficient, in view of the reforms to be introduced in 
Maastricht. Following the unfortunate experience in the Gulf War, the EC member states were 
keen to demonstrate in the Yugoslav case, their ability to work jointly, to achieve a common 
position and to take suitable action vis-a-vis Yugoslavia (Lodge, 1993, 2). The EC role, or rather 
its 'mission impossible', was to contain the escalation of violence, but in order to fulfil this 
purpose, the Twelve had first to overcome their own international divisions and eliminate the 
political and institutional hindrance of the unanimity rule in EPC (Remacle, 1992, 3). 
The EC tried to exert pressure on the Yugoslav central authorities by threatening that if 
they undertook any military actions, all EC credits and financial assistance would be immediately 
terminated. In spring 1991, the Community decided to suspend negotiations for the third financial 
protocol of its existing trade and cooperation agreement with the SFRY and dismissed the 
possibility of undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an EEC-Yugoslavia association 
agreement similar to that concluded with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, until the 
Federation had promoted a plan of economic and constitutional reforms, regained a certain 
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political stability, peacefully settled ethnic disputes and taken effective steps towards a visible 
democratic evolution of the country (Millan, 16/5/91, 269-270). 
The Twelve became fully aware of the gravity of the constitutional crisis and the 
deterioration of the political and economic climate, especially after the visit in April 1991 of the 
EC Troika to the SFRY in May 1991 by the Commission President Jacques Delors together with 
the President of the Council Jacques Santer. Yet, the Twelve declared that EC assistance was 
subject to certain criteria, specifically the rotation of the Federal Presidency, the reopening of 
dialogue between nationalities, the protection of minorities and the implementation of MarkoviC's 
economic reforms. In the belief that a united Yugoslavia would be best equipped to become part 
of the new Europe, EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Dresden on 4 June 1991 stated that the 
SFRY would only receive financial aid if it complied with principles concerning human and 
minority rights while also carrying out democratic and economic reforms. In particular, the 
previously agreed five-year aid package for Yugoslavia of 730 million ECUs, consisting mainly 
in loans from the European Investment Bank, would be cancelled. 
Despite the various warning signals launched over the preceding three years by the 
Yugoslav authorities requiring the attention of the West, no diplomatic action was undertaken 
before the declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The hostilities were foreseeable 
and were foreseen and it can be argued that the EC pretended to be taken by surprise by the 
outbreak of violence. Nevertheless, it can also be said that the EC member states did not expect 
the situation to deteriorate to the point of an armed confrontation leading to the dismantling of 
the Federation itself. 
The initial response of the Community, echoed by the United States, was of support to 
the economic plan adopted by Markovic, whose political economy strategy had already allowed 
a remarkable reduction of inflation and was geared towards the achievement of a market 
economy. This policy, in order to succeed, required full commitment and cooperation of all 
constituent republics to maintain a common currency within a united country. The emerging 
tendencies of extreme nationalism were undermined and interpreted as natural, but only transient 
reactions of the people in the post-communist era. In addition, the Community did not 
acknowledge the Yugoslav Republics' desire for independence out of the fear that the partitioning 
of the SFRY may have caused serious repercussions for the geopolitical configuration of Europe, 
triggering a chain reaction in the Balkans with the result of creating a destabilized area at its 
doorstep (EP Paper No. 18, 1993,63). In particular, fear arose that the Yugoslav example would 
create a precedent emulated by the Soviet Union (Nuttall, 1994, 13). Finally, the Twelve shared 
the concern of the international community, highlighted in the previous section, that once these 
republics had been recognized as separate international legal entities, demands for external 
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intervention would become inevitable, venture that they were unprepared or unwilling to 
undertake. As early as 28 June 1991, the European Council had the opportunity to deal with the 
festering situation in Yugoslavia, but failed to formulate a coherent strategy. Particularly 
susceptible to headlines, the EC Foreign Ministers appeared to have gathered without a clear 
objective, in order to be seen to be doing something. A decision was reached to dispatch 
immediately to Yugoslavia the EC Troika5 with the aim of persuading the parties to resume 
negotiations on the constitutional and political future of the SFRY. Although a ceasefire was 
agreed between Slovenian authorities and the JNA, the promise was broken as soon as 2 July, 
followed by another failed attempt made on 5 July. 
Two days later at Brioni, an island town III the south of the Istrian province, the 
Community'S Ministerial Troika brokered an official and long-lasting agreement between the 
Yugoslav Republics. This entailed the acceptance on the part of Croatia and Slovenia to defer the 
implementation of their declarations of independence for three months, the enforcement of a 
ceasefire, the outlining of principles for a peaceful settlement, the establishment of a negotiation 
procedure and the deployment of EC and CSCE observers in Slovenia and possibly Croatia. An 
arms embargo was also imposed on Yugoslavia by the European Community. With the 
Agreement, the Twelve implicitly engaged themselves to proceed with recognition, irrespective 
of the outcome of the negotiations: "The success of the Troika at Brioni carried with it the seeds 
of its own fate" (Nuttall, 14/2/1995). The European Council was rather self-congratulatory with 
its first important diplomatic negotiation, which represented a big step forward in terms of 
European foreign policy-making, increasing member states' confidence about the EC capability 
of becoming a genuine international actor. 
However, European solidarity was shortlived. The proposal of deploying lightly armed 
observers in the SFRY, as suggested by the Secretary-General of the Western European Union 
(WEU) and put forward on the EC platform by France, was opposed by Belgium, Germany and 
Britain. Slovenian resistance to the attacks perpetrated by the JNA and worldwide political 
pressures made a ceasefire possible in Slovenia and on 17 July 1991 the dispatch of fifty EC 
observers, unarmed due to British pressure and financed by national governments. 6 
Once their own safety had been secured and in retaliation for the previous Croatian breach 
5 Up until 30 June 1991. the EC Troika consisted of the Ministers of Luxembourg. Italy and the Netherlands. 
From 1 July 1991. when the Netherlands took over the Presidency of the European Community. the European 
Troika was composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from the Netherlands. Luxembourg and Portugal. 
From I January 1992 to 31 June 1992. it was the turn of Portugal. the Netherlands and Great Britain and 
from 1 July 1992 to 31 December 1992. it was the turn of Great Britain. Portugal and Denmark. 
I> The option of financing military operations under the EC budget. subject to unanimous decision of the 
Council. was introduced later with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (Article J 11 (2) TEU). 
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of their secret accord of mutual assistance, the Slovenes did not support the Croats militarily in 
their fight for independence. attempt to internationalize the conflict by calling on the guarantee 
of the UN Charter. 
By late August 1991, the EC member states seemed to be moving slowly from their rigid 
stance over the future constitutional and political structure of Yugoslavia, according to the wishes 
of its own people (Statements by the Twelve, 20 and 27/8/1991). The continued unmerciful 
intervention of the JNA, which appeared to assume the form of a real military aggression, 
contributed to this change in the Community's policy, solicited by the media and public opinion 
(Alendar, 1992, 19). 
Nevertheless, a full-scale European military intervention was ruled out and the deployment 
of an interposition force of lightly armed soldiers, backed by Germany and France and overall 
agreed by the other EC members, was vetoed by Britain until all warring parties had expressed 
their willingness to accept such intervention and committed themselves to honour the ceasefire, 
and until the international community, in particular the United Nations, had endorsed EC policy 
(EP Paper No. 18, 1993, 63-64). Since these conditions were not fully met Britain refused to 
endorse any proposals to send armed forces to Yugoslavia to the great satisfaction of the Serbian 
leader who resolutely opposed any form of outside interference. 
As Jacques Delors stated, the Community had only three instruments for influencing the 
course of the events in Yugoslavia: public opinion, the threat to recognize Slovenia and Croatia 
and economic sanctions. Enforcement was contemplated, albeit with caution and some 
reservations, especially from the United Kingdom. Failure to attain a settlement through the 
adoption of these policies would mean having to resort to the coercive option (Salmon, 1992, 
248). 
On 7 September 1991, under the EC' s auspices, a peace conference opened in The Hague, 
gathering the representatives of all six republics from the Yugoslav Federation and the EC 
Foreign Ministers with the aim of establishing a permanent dialogue. The idea of convening an 
international peace conference was considered premature by the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, which preferred to wait until a ceasefire had been sustained. However, France, 
Germany and Italy insisted on the immediate opening of the discussions in order to prevent any 
further deterioration of the situation (Lucarelli, 1995a, 8, 10, footnote 12). 
Lord Carrington was appointed Chairman of the EC-sponsored international peace 
conference on Yugoslavia and it was decided that the composition of the chairmanship and the 
support group would not vary so as to conform to the biannual rotation of the Council Presidency 
in order to allow stability and continuity to the work of the conference (Nuttall, 1994, 16). 
Carrington's approach was based on the principle that the Southern Slavs had to find a solution 
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for themselves and that the EC should act as a facilitator rather than an adjudicator wishing to 
impose its own solution. An Arbitration Commission, chaired by Robert Badinter, was set up as 
part of the peace conference in order to express a legal opinion on the various positions of the 
parties to seek an "Arrangement for a General Solution" to the Yugoslav drama, resorting to a 
'carrot and stick' strategy which offered rewards to cooperative parties and administered 
punishments to non-complying sides (Nuttall, 14/2/1995).7 
On 26 September, three working groups were given the task to draft reports on the above 
questions while the perspective of secession was still excluded and fiercely denied (EP Paper No. 
18, 1993, 65). According to Simon Nuttall, the failure of the Arbitration Commission to achieve 
the desired outcome was intrinsic in the composition of its members: Western European 
constitutional lawyers could not work out a possible arrangement in the absence of a proper 
representation and full endorsement of the parties concerned (Nuttall, 14/2/1995). In the 
meantime, after long negotiations with Serbia, EC observers were finally sent on 8 September 
1991, too late to curb the bloodshed, according to the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman. 
As the end of Brioni deadline approached, fighting intensified, confirming that the Serbs 
were effectively using this truce as a consolidation exercise to reassert their supremacy over the 
other factions. The dismal failure of this military-cum-humanitarian operation cast a permanent 
cloud over this kind of intervention. Undoubtedly, three months were not sufficient either for the 
EC observers to pursue their missions or for the belligerents themselves to come to a suitable 
agreement (Nuttall, 14/2/1995). Yet, despite its limitations, the role of the EC observers needs 
to be reconsidered not least for its important humanitarian contribution (Crnobrnja, 16/6/92, 3). 
The initiative was a tangible expression of the EC involvement on the ground, with white berets 
becoming as recognizable as the blue berets, emblem of the United Nations (Nuttall, 14/2/1995). 
Eighth October 1991, which marked the historical date for the implementation of the act of 
independence by Slovenia and Croatia, saw the Twelve still undecided on whether to recognize 
these republics under international law. Ten days later, a plan was established for a "free 
association of sovereign and independent republics" where "comprehensive arrangements 
including supervisory mechanisms for the protection of human rights and special status for certain 
groups and areas" would be put in place (Europe, 15-19/10/1991). The plan was rejected by 
The Arbitration Commission consisted of five Presidents of Constitutional Courts from the EC Member 
States. Robert Badinter (France), Aldo Corosaniti (Italy), and Roman Herzog lGermany) were selected by 
the Twelve, while the remaining two were supposed to be appointed by the SFRY. However. as no 
agreement was reached by the Yugoslavs. the three already appointed chose in their place colleagues from 
Belgium and Spain (EP Working Paper No. 18, 1993. 76). 
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President Milosevic on the ground that it abolished the SFRY itself and represented an act of 
interference in domestic Yugoslav affairs exceeding "the [Community's] role of provider of 'good 
offices'" (Alendar, 1992, 20). 
As Serbia had proved to be stubborn in its attitude, the Community decided to introduce 
restrictive measures against Yugoslavia, whilst retaining the option of providing compensation for 
those republics which had shown their willingness to cooperate in order to reach a solution by 
peaceful means. On 8 November 1991, the EC Ministers, gathered in Rome, decided to suspend 
the EEC-SFRY trade and cooperation agreement, to freeze the ECSC-SFRY agreement, to 
withdraw trade concessions, to restore import quotas on textile products and to exclude 
Yugoslavia from the Community's General System of Preferences as well as from the PHARES 
programme. The European Parliament was also urged to endorse these decisions and the UN 
Security Council was asked to enforce an international oil embargo. As early as 2 December 
1991, economic sanctions were lifted for the cooperative parties, while being maintained against 
Serbia and Montenegro (EP Paper No. 18, 1993, 75). 
The EC member states, in the EPC framework, undertook a series of initiatives by 
organizing diplomatic missions pursued by the Troika of Ministers of Foreign affairs, convening 
a conference under permanent EC chairmanship, dispatching observers as well as imposing 
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. Despite the multiplicity of views the Twelve eventually 
succeeded in reaching a certain unity, shifting to a more realistic policy which accepted the 
inevitable demise of the Federation (Nuttall, 1994, 11-12). 
By December 1991, the Arbitration Commission acknowledged that the disintegration of 
the SFRY was irreversible and that its constituent republics had to re-establish mutual 
relationships by setting up a new association based on the principle of equality between members. 
With the trumping of his 'ace card' over recognition, Lord Carrington was left with the sole 
possibility of negotiating the terms and conditions for the independence of the breakaway 
republics (Nuttall, 14/2/1995). Three main issues needed to be addressed in order to lay the basis 
for a solid and durable association, notably the minority question, the future institutional 
framework and the economic relations between the republics. On 17 December, after nine hours 
of intense discussion throughout the night, the EC Foreign Ministers agreed on the criteria for 
recognition, entailing guarantees for democracy, human rights and protection of minorities, 
commitments that borders would be changed only through peaceful means, signing of an 
8 PHARE: Poland/Hungary Assistance for Restructuring Economies. 
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agreement on the control and non-proliferation of arms as well as support for UN peacekeeping 
initiatives and the EC peace conference. The final condition, ardently forwarded by Greece 
anxious at settling the dispute over Macedonia, was to abandon any territorial claim over EC 
neighbouring countries. 
Fifteenth January 1992 was the date fixed for the EC's official recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia if the Badinter Commission agreed that they had met the fundamental requisites. Yet, 
on 19 December 1991, Germany officially announced that it would proceed along the path of 
recognition. This unilateral decision, effectively to set aside the conditions established by the 
Badinter Commission, deeply irritated the other EC members. Thus, in a final attempt to placate 
the anger of its partners and limit the damage to the EC international reputation, Bonn announced 
that it would undertake open diplomatic relations only after the date officially and collectively 
agreed. 
Meanwhile, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which until then had maintained a low profile and 
conciliatory attitude, decided to take political steps to prevent the expansion of the conflict. In 
particular, the Bosnian government had started negotiations with the EC Dutch Presidency for the 
deployment of European observers in its territory and called for UN intervention from 23 
December (Remacle, 1992, 39-40). In mid-January, the conclusions of the Badinter Report were 
disclosed, revealing that some of the guidelines drawn by the Community had not been followed, 
for instance, by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Whereas for the former only marginal 
reservations were forwarded, for the latter,9 the condition of EC recognition was the convening 
of an internationally monitored referendum on independence which was to be held on 29 February 
and 1 March 1992. \0 Yet, it must be acknowledged that, after the official recognition of Slovenia 
and Croatia, the EC was left with little choice but to consent to the Bosnian outcry for 
independence. "Recognition made no effective difference to Bosnia-Hercegovina's status and as 
Carrington resumed his mediation efforts the Sarajevo government was deemed no more than a 
'warring faction' on a par with the [Serb Democratic Party] in a civil war" (Bennett, 1995, 189). 
The Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegovic felt abandoned when intervention in Bosnia-
9 The Arbitration Committee found that the Croatian constitution "sometimes [falls] short of the obligations 
[concerning the status of its minorities). it nonetheless satisfies the requirement" of general international law" 
(Bennett, 1995, Footnote 19, 179). 
10 Despite the fact that the Bosnian Serbs attempted to boycott the referendum, the outcome revealed a turnout 
of 63 percent of the population and an overwhelming majority of people (over 99 percent) in favour of 
independence including both Bosnian Muslims and Croats (Bennett, 1995, 186; European Parliament. 'The 
Crisis in the former Yugoslavia', 44). 
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Herzegovina was ruled out at both EC and international levels, despite the brave and non-violent 
resistance of the Muslim population to Serbian provocation, in line with the wishes of the 
international community. This sentiment was replaced by a devastating sense of betrayal when the 
EC decided to undertake and endorse a policy of cantonization within the territory of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
Numerous commentators such as Christopher Bennett, Mihailo Crnobrnja, Simon Nuttall, 
David Owen and Eric Remacle have sought to explore the reasons for the blindness or false 
presumptions on the part of the Community vis-a-vis the Yugoslav debacle, to uncover the causes 
of the EC delay and subsequent failure to respond effectively to the emergency in Yugoslavia. 
The crisis unfolded in concomitance with other major political events, such as the process of the 
German reunification, the so-called "Revolutions of 1989" in Central and Eastern European 
countries and finally the outbreak of the Gulf War. It also coincided with a particularly delicate 
moment in the history of the European Community, approaching the last stage of the 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) convened in Maastricht at the end of 1991 (Lodge, 1993, 
2). While engaged in the negotiations on the prospects of establishing a European foreign policy, 
substantial divergences arose between, on the one hand, the Europeanists and, on the other, the 
Atlanticists. The former led by the French government, advocated the incorporation of the WEU 
security mechanism into the European Community structure, whereas the latter, supported by the 
United Kingdom, preferred to retain NATO as the military and defence structure for Europe. This 
difference of views re-emerged especially with respect to the Yugoslav case (Nuttall, 1994, 23). 
The lack of both an existing EC defence structure and an agreement on the definition of a security 
organization for the future clearly highlighted the fact that the EC was not prepared and not 
suitably equipped to deal with an armed confrontation. 
The Twelve sought to play a mediatory role by at first using diplomatic and economic 
formulae. Despite the initial strong EC opposition to the use of force, the Community eventually 
had to come to terms with the fact that some form of "restrained coercive violence" was 
imperative (Gow and Smith, 1992, 56). In addition, it appeared that the Community did not fully 
understand the true nature of the dispute and could not empathize with the people with whom it 
was dealing. In David Owen's words, 
[L]eaders who had no experience of democracy also displayed a callousness of mind in 
which the people's view never seemed to come anywhere near the conference table, 
despite much consulting of assemblies and holding of referenda in circumstances of 
dubious democratic validity. History points to a tradition in the Balkans of a readiness to 
solve disputes by the taking up of arms and acceptance of the forceful or even negotiated 
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movement of people as the consequence of war. It points to a culture of violence within 
a cross-road civilization where three religions, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Roman 
Catholicism, have divided communities and on occasions become the marks of 
identification in a dark and virulent nationalism (Owen, 1995, 2-3). 
This view was not shared by others such as Christopher Bennett who "refuse[s] to accept that 
there was anything inevitable about Yugoslavia's disintegration", rejecting the prejudice "that 
Balkan peoples are somehow predisposed to violence, or that the international corrununity was 
powerless to halt the killing" (Bennett, 1995, viii). In retrospect, it can be claimed that a swifter 
understanding and admission of the gravity of the situation along with prompt financial assistance 
to support the process of economic and political reforms in the SFRY could have prevented the 
degeneration into a ruthless civil war. 
As Juliet Lodge comments, "[w]ith hindsight, the Europeans were slow to perceive the 
seriousness of the situation in Yugoslavia even though it had been slowly deteriorating since 1987 
and especially throughout 1990" (Lodge, 1993, 3). The EC's tardy, confused and inadequate 
response to the crisis was vigorously criticized by Crnobrnja: "Instead of 'Waiting for Godot', 
the EC [should have seized] the opportunity when it presented itself" and should have used the 
economic and financial tools which were more appropriate to its status (Crnobrnja, 16/6/92, 3). 
Nevertheless, as Crnobrnja admits, it would be unfair to attribute the responsibilities for 
the collapse of Yugoslavia to the European Community or any other outsider, as the burden of 
blame cannot but rest on the Yugoslavs themselves (Crnobrnja, 16/6/92, 1). Outright 
condemnation of the Community would be too simplistic as its performance should be seen 
against the hugely intricate Yugoslav background and the attempt to reconcile the following 
principles: territorial integrity, self-determination, \1 rights of minorities, non-use of violence and 
the right to self-defence (Gow and Smith, 1992, 1). 
The analysis of the first two years of the crisis revealed that, after a promising start, little 
progress was achieved on the EC front in terms of foreign policy coordination. The European 
response to the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia was reluctant and incoherent, consisting of 
nothing more than "an aveuglement double de wishful thinkings sans lendemain" (Remacle, 1992, 
31) Y The early ambiguity in EC policy with regard to the recognition issue dissolved to be 
II The principle of self-determination conceived by President Wilson in the aftermath of World War I was 
subsequently enshrined in the Helsinki CSCE Final Act of 1975, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe of 
1990 and the Helsinki CSCE Document of 1992. 
I! "Blindness coupled with wishful thinking without a sense of tomorrow" (author's translation). 
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replaced by the widespread confusion and contrasting views among the member states over the 
issue of military intervention. The problem was not only whether or not to intervene, but rather 
when, how and which military and defence organizations should be involved and which one 
should take the lead in coordinating their activities. 
The EC "with the blessing of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ( .. ) 
and the United Nations Organization ( .. ) had broke red numerous cease fire agreements, instituted 
sanctioning measures against the 'aggressors' and staged a series of conferences on the issue" 
(Nel, 1992). Nonetheless, as violence escalated, the chances for the Community to contribute to 
a peaceful solution became increasingly poorer. All its attempts to deter the use of force through 
the adoption of economic sanctions against Serbia and the exclusion of Montenegro and Serbia 
from the participation in Community aid programmes did not produce the desired effects. 
On a positive note, with hindsight it can be said that the Yugoslav war had at least been 
contained within a relatively small area. The rest of the Balkans had not been consumed by 
conflict and the spillover into Macedonia had at least been successfully prevented. 
3.4 The European Parliament and the Yugoslav Crisis 
The following overview of the European Parliament's role in the Yugoslav cnsls uses the 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992 as a dividing line. Therefore, the first 
stage covers from early January 1991 until 14 January 1992 and the second stage, from 15 
January 1992 until late July 1992. 
3.1 Pre-Recognition Stage 
As early as February 1990 and subsequently in October 1990, long before the outbreak of war 
in the territory of the SFRY, the European Parliament expressed concern at the discriminatory 
policy undertaken by the Serbian authorities against the Albanian population in Kosovo (OlEC 
C 6811990, 138 and OlEC C 28411990, 129). In November 1990, the French MEP Yvan Blot, 
on behalf of the Technical Group of European Right, also endeavoured to draw the attention of 
the House to the growing peril of a civil confrontation, highlighting the forceful intimidating 
actions carried out by the Serbian Communist government (B3-1862/90). 
In the following month, other MEPs such as Paraskevas Avgerinos (Socialist, Greece), 
Nereo Laroni (Socialist, Italy) and Doris Pack (EPP, Germany) spoke of their fears for the direct 
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consequences and possible repercussions of the crisis in the Balkans, the Mediterranean region 
and ultimately in the European continent, urging the EP Foreign Affairs Committee to draft a 
report on the existing situation in Yugoslavia (B3-1941 /90). 
In January 1991, Parliament pointed out that the Yugoslav Federation was "in the midst 
of its most serious crisis since the Second World War. The country, which [was] bogged down 
in ethnic and political rivalries [was] plagued at the same time by economic and social difficulties. 
The Yugoslav model [was] under threat. The process of disintegration [was] moving ever faster 
and little by little the federation seem[ed] to be moving towards a confederation, so irreconcilable 
[were] the positions of the six republics" (PE 146.209). Against this background, in February 
1991 the European Parliament sent to Belgrade and Kosovo its Delegation for Relations with 
Yugoslavia in order to evaluate the country's political and economic developments. 13 In Belgrade 
the MEPs received a briefing by EC ambassadors who expressed their fears about the peril of a 
disintegration of the Federation into two or three separate units: Slovenia, Croatia and the 
remainder of the country. The Delegation also held the tenth interparliamentary meeting with the 
Yugoslav Federal Assembly, 14 talked with representatives from the Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian 
and Montenegrin Assemblies, 15 contacted Serbian intellectuals and exchanged views with Federal 
Prime Minister Markovic. In Kosovo the MEPs engaged in talks with representatives of political 
parties, independent trade unions and other organizations such as the Committee for the Protection 
of Human Rights, the Kosovo Academy of Sciences and Arts and finally met the Serbian 
Governor of Kosovo Moncilo Trajkovic. The visit gave the MEPs "the opportunity to hear at first 
hand the views of all the most important political forces at work in Yugoslavia". As their report 
sharply highlighted, "the country [was] indeed in turmoil" and there was the danger of the 
eruption of violence and of civil war (EP Report 10-15/2/1991). 
Clearly, "politics as such [appeared to be] subordinated to .. ethnic loyalties" and members 
of all Assemblies seemed convinced that "the group to which they belonged was in the right and 
was suffering from discrimination within Yugoslavia and misunderstanding outside". The Federal 
13 The delegation, chaired by Paraskevas Avgerinos (Socialist, Greece), consisted of Pavlos Sarlis (Christian 
Democrat, Greece), Doris Pack (EPP, Germany), Nereo Laroni (Socialist, Italy), Brian Simpson (Socialist, 
UK), Christopher Beazely (ED, UK) as well as Cesare De Piccoli and Giorgio Rossetti (EUL, Italy). 
Beazeley, Laroni and Rossetti were only present on the first two days of the mission. 
14 This four-hour long exchange was the first between the two parliaments since 1989. 
U The Yugoslav delegation, chaired by a Serbian MP Simovic, consisted of members from both chambers of 
the Federal Assembly and included a Croatian member from the Croatian Democratic Union, a representative 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina who was a member of the Party for Islamic Democratic Action and an Albanian 
member of the Federal Chamber from Kosovo. 
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government, in particular, expressed its desperate need for EC assistance to pursue its objective 
"to Europeanize Yugoslavia rather than Balkanize Europe" (EP Report 10-15/2/1991). The report 
concluded that Parliament should not obstruct the signing of the third financial protocol offering 
aid to support Yugoslav economic development and should consider the possibility of establishing 
in future an EEC-Yugoslavia association agreement, similar to those agreed with certain Central 
and Eastern European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary. In conducting 
relations with the Federation and its constituent republics, the Community should continue to 
pressure for guarantees on human rights (EP Report 10-15/2/1991). 
In its Resolution of 21 February 1991, the European Parliament urged in vain the Serbian 
government to halt its repressive policy aimed at destroying Albanian identity and culture in 
Kosovo. Moreover, it insisted against the opinion of its Delegation that the guarantee for human 
and minority rights was an absolute precondition for negotiating financial aid with the Federation 
(OlEC C 72/1991, 131). 
In the following month, the EP Delegation made a two-day visit to Yugoslavia to consult 
the then recently elected members of the Serbian, Slovenian, Croatian and Montenegrin 
Legislative Assemblies and representatives ofthe Federal government. During these consultations, 
the Europarliamentarians stressed several issues: the need to promote a series of institutional 
reforms both within the individual republics and at federal level in order to carry forward the 
passage from a socialist to a pluralist and market economy; the preference of maintaining the 
territorial unity of Yugoslavia, which had represented, at least to the Western establishment, a 
workable model of peace and security in the Balkans and in Europe; the acceptance of the existing 
borders of Europe, in accordance with the principles enunciated at the Helsinki Conference; the 
protection of human and minority rights by all governments; the opening of a more intense and 
systematic dialogue between the republics and the Federal government; the need for the 
emergence of new political groups, thus promoting the process of transformation of the country 
from a single- to a multiparty system, from a society based on expediency to a society based on 
the rule of law, from the veneration of the state to the elevation of individual identity (Sarlis, 
14/3/91,215-216). 
Most of these principles were eventually set out in a Joint Resolution which was signed 
by all EP political groups, with the exception of the European Right and the Rainbow Groups, 
and adopted by the House on 15 March 1991. The vast majority of Members in the European 
Parliament expressed their unwillingness to approve the Commission's decision to continue the 
negotiations for the third financial protocol unless the Yugoslav government confirmed its 
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commitment to respect the pluralism of cultural identities and introduced the necessary reforms 
for an economic transition to a social market economy (Pack 221-222; von Alemann, 222, 
14/3/91). Parliament blocked an aid plan for the equivalent amount of one billion US dollars, 
warning effectively that negotiations on the third financial protocol of the EEC-Yugoslavia 
cooperation agreement should be postponed until the settlement of the crisis and the achievement 
of some progress over the implementation of the economic reforms planned by Prime Minister 
Markovic. 
By this time, the House was fully aware of the serious institutional, political and 
economic crisis which was "shaking the foundations of the .. Federation with the risk of rendering 
it ungovernable and bringing about its dissolution" (OlEC C 10611991, 168). The EP's view 
appeared slightly ahead of that of EC governments in recognizing the likely demise of the 
Yugoslav Federation and accepting the right of the republics and autonomous provinces to decide 
over their political future in a peaceful and democratic way "and on the basis of recognized 
external and internal borders" (OlEC C 10611991, 169). 
In May 1991, following the constitutional crisis caused by Serbia's veto over the 
nomination of the Federal President, the European Parliament warned "the Yugoslav Government 
that a seizure of power by or with assistance from the army would bring about the immediate end 
of all assistance or preferential treatment accorded by the Community". While reiterating the EC 
"preference" for maintaining a single, federal Yugoslavia, as wished for by Serbia and 
Montenegro, the EP acknowledged the right to self-determination of the constituent republics and 
autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia. As such, Parliament emphasized that "full respect for multi-
party democracy and regard for the freely expressed will of all peoples [was], to the European 
Community, a fundamental principle that [could] not be sacrificed to any opportunistic 
consideration" (OlEC C 158/91, 242-243). Words of appreciation and encouragement were 
addressed to the Federal Presidency for its efforts to find a peaceful solution to the country's 
difficulties. Parliament stressed that "the European Community, the United Nations and the CSCE 
should be prepared to assist in any way in maintaining the peace within Yugoslavia if so requested 
by the legitimate Federal authorities" (OlEC C 15811991, 242-243). The House voiced its 
deepening concern about the growing tensions in Yugoslavia, calling for the intervention of the 
CSCE. 
The Joint Resolution, drafted by all political groups with the exception of the European 
Right and the Left Unity, placed respectively on the extreme right and extreme left wings of the 
European Parliament. notably warned the parties that their recourse to military means would bring 
Chapter V 179 
about an immediate cessation of all Community's aid or preferential treatment (OlEC C 
158/1991). Criticism was focused on the delays of the EP delegation in charge of following the 
Yugoslav crisis to gather promptly. This was regarded as "an example of the laziness, the 
slowness and the complicity of [the European Parliament] or at least of some political bodies 
within it" (Aglietta, 12/5/1992,71-72). 
In June 1991, ambassador Crnobrnja spoke before the House about the grave economic 
situation of his country, stressing the importance of the implementation of the third financial 
protocol of the EEC-SFRY cooperation agreement, the PHARE programme and transport 
negotiations (Crnobrnja, 20/6/1991). The European Parliament criticized the inability of the EC 
member states to act jointly on foreign issues as well as the tendency to align themselves with 
external powers, rather than work autonomously (Buffotot, 1994, 208-209). This problem was 
addressed in the Resolution on the prospects for a European Security Policy of 10 June 1991, 
based on a Report drafted by the German Christian Democrat MEP Poettering, on behalf of the 
Defence Subcommittee of the Political Affairs Committee (A3-107/91). 
On 27 June 1991, following the news of the clashes between the JNA and the Slovenes, 
the EP Political Affairs Committee issued a statement whereby it called for an immediate 
cessation of the fighting, requesting a CSCE meeting and urging the Community to act as a 
mediator between the parties in order to find a peaceful solution (EPP Report, 7/1990-7/1991, 
30). 
A few days later, the House fiercely condemned the violence perpetrated by the JNA in 
Slovenia and called on the Yugoslav authorities to secure an immediate withdrawal of the troops. 
It "recognize[d] the democratic legitimacy of the Presidents, Parliaments and Governments of 
Slovenia and Croatia, elected in free, peaceful and democratic elections in April 1990". It also 
welcomed the decision by the Slovenian and Croatian governments to suspend the implementation 
of their declarations of the independence with the objective of seeking a suitable political and 
institutional solution which would take into consideration human rights, minority rights as well 
as the respect for internal and international borders (OlEC C 240/1991, 137-138). 
Although no urgent meeting was convened at plenary level during the summer recess, the 
activities of the Parliament did not cease altogether. Oostlander, in his capacity of rapporteur for 
the EP Political Affairs Committee made a visit to Yugoslavia in July 1991 (EPP Report, 7/1990-
7/1991, 30). Two extraordinary meetings of the Political Affairs Committee took place in August, 
chaired by the Italian MEP Maria Luisa Cassanmagnago Cerretti. These resulted in declarations 
condemning the Serbian military attacks perpetrated under the federal flag and blaming Milosevic 
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for his obstinacy and unwillingness to cooperate to find a peaceful solution (Declaration, 
12/8/1991; Avgerinos, 10/9/1991, 84). The Community was also invited to seek a negotiated 
solution, whilst the Committee declared its readiness to consult directly with parties (Commission 
politique du PE, 12/8/1991). At the end of the meeting held on 30 August, it was decided that 
the EP President would invite the Yugoslav Federal Parliament and the Parliaments of the 
republics to Strasbourg in order to open a dialogue and to seek possible solutions to the crisis (EP 
Document C/JN/46/91). All the parties, with the exception of Montenegro, replied to the EP 
invitation and discussions took place on 12 and 13 September. They also signed a joint statement 
whereby they expressed their hope that the EC peace conference could lead to an agreement, 
based on the principles of self-determination, rights of minorities and democracy (Info Memo 141, 
13/9/1991). 
At the September session, the House restated its condemnation of the ferocious actions 
of the Federal Army and the paramilitary elements fighting in Croatia. It also called for the 
participation of a democratically elected representation from Kosovo and Vojvodina Parliaments 
in the peace conference. Moreover, EP forwarded the proposal to set up "a regional and possibly 
institutional grouping on a strictly voluntary basis". Solidarity was expressed for the protests of 
soldiers' mothers and hopes were articulated for a more direct involvement of political parties, 
churches and social organizations to foster the peace process (OlEC C 267/1991). 
From 25 September 1991, a few MEPs participated in the 'European peace caravan', 
sponsored by the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly and organized by the Peace Association along with 
the Italian branch of the Cultural association ARC!. 16 The caravan consisted of two convoys 
which left from Trieste and from Skopje respectively and crossed most of the territory of 
Yugoslavia to finally converge in Sarajevo. The journey came to a close with a final 
demonstration, speeches, songs in many languages and "a long human chain ( .. ) linking the 
Catholic cathedral, the Orthodox cathedral, the mosque and the synagogue". This experience 
convinced Alexander Langer that the European Community should encourage similar initiatives 
"which play an important role in spheres where governments cannot intervene so easily" (Langer 
Report, PE 153.297, 10/1991). 
On 9 October, Mesic denounced before the European Parliament the brutal war raging 
in his country and the impotence of the Federal government and Parliament. Whilst denying that 
16 The Members of the European Parliament who participated in the initiative were Castellina, De Piccoli and 
Rossetti (FUL, Italy). Cramon Daiber (Greens. Germany), Langer and Melandri (Greens. Italy) along with 
Formigoni (EPP. Italy). van den Brink (Socialist. Netherlands) was also supposed to take part. 
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the contlict had erupted as the inevitable consequence of ethnic clashes, he accused the lNA of 
carrying out a military coup with the purpose of preserving its privileges and blamed the Serbian 
leader, Slobodan Milosevic, of pursuing an expansionistic policy aimed at creating a Greater 
Serbia. Mesic finally appealed for the taking of clear and definitive measures in order to halt the 
carnage, to be achieved by first distinguishing the victims from the aggressor (The Week, PE 
155.623, 29). The House admitted that the Yugoslav break-up had become irreversible, and that 
the Community should acknowledge the questions of independence of Croatia and Slovenia. 
However, Parliament pointed out that the Community should undertake relationships with the 
breakaway republics only if they provided sufficient guarantees for human and minority rights 
(OlEC C 280/1991, 127). The EP condemned the lNA's role in the Serb-Croatian conflict, 
rejecting its claims of fighting to maintain the unity of the country and safeguard Serbian 
minorities (De Piccoli, 9/10/1991, 167). Finally, it expressed its reservations at the sending of 
an armed force to the area, believing that "only a peace-keeping force should be deployed, and 
then only with the agreement of all parties involved and once a cease fire hard] been firmly 
agreed" (OlEC C 280/1991, 127). On 25 October, the EP President urged the Serbian authorities 
to cease bombing the Croatian town of Dubrovnik, reiterating that it had become evident that the 
lNA was no longer representative of the Yugoslav Federation, but had fallen in the hands of 
Serbian command (Info Memo 173,25/10/1991). 
The EP recognized the right of the Yugoslav people to self-determination, whilst pointing 
out that this principle had to be implemented along with full respect of human and minorities 
rights, not excluding the possibility of a subsequent change in internal borders, provided it was 
done peacefully and with the agreement of the parties concerned. As to the steps to be taken, 
Parliament supported, under the assent procedure, the Council's decision to freeze the cooperation 
agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia because of the latter's continued use of force. It also 
implemented restrictive measures against Yugoslavia, with the exception of those republics which 
responded positively to the EC's peace efforts. Concerned about the negative repercussions on 
the economy of some regions in Greece and North-Eastern Italy arising from the enforcement of 
embargo against Yugoslavia, Parliament supported the decision to grant them assistance (The 
Week, 18-22/11/1991,28; OlECC 280/1991,127). The EP supported the combined deployment 
of United Nations and European Community peacekeeping troops in Yugoslavia, on condition that 
the ceasefire would last. 
On 20 December 1991, the Enlarged Bureau of the EP convened especially to discuss the 
decision taken four days earlier to establish a timetable for the official recognition of Slovenia and 
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Croatia with the EC President, the Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, as well as 
Commissioners Matutes and Andriessen. This led to the setting up of a crisis unit, consisting of 
the EP President, the Chairman of the Political Affairs Committee and the Head of the EC-
Yugoslavia Delegation. The EP Political Affairs Committee called for an emergency meeting of 
the CSCE Foreign Ministers and asked the Community to exert its 'good offices' to assist the 
Yugoslav republics to find a peaceful solution. 
Seen through the eyes of the German Socialist MEP Jannis Sakellariou, within the EP 
only a very small minority was truly aware of the tragedy unfolding in Yugoslavia, while the 
majority, approximately 80 percent of the MEPs, had only a vague knowledge of the drama, 
receiving information only from media coverage. Finally, there was a faction which, nourished 
by anti-Serb propaganda, tended to demonize MiloseviC's government (Sakellariou interview, 
1996). 
The above overview of the EP's stance during the months preceding the recognition shows 
that there was a clear desire within the House to look for a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav 
crisis. Faced with an increasingly grave situation, the EP felt obliged "to shoulder anew its 
responsibilities towards the peoples who [were] the victims of a bloody war which ( .. ) caused so 
much loss and destruction" (De Piccoli, 9/10/91, 167). The events unfolding in Yugoslavia were 
discussed at length both at Committee and plenary level. The perception shared by many 
Europarliamentarians of an imminent tragedy looming over the Balkans was, nevertheless, 
overlooked by the Community, which failed to recognize the signals of alarm. Moreover, the 
House did not limit itself to issuing general declamatory statements on Yugoslavia, but it strove 
to take an active part in the handling of the crisis. At first, it supported the economic and 
constitutional reforms in the SFRY aimed at preserving the unity of the country, but it realized 
soon that the will of the Yugoslav people, their desire for independence could not be ignored. It 
therefore opened a dialogue with the parties by sending delegations and participating in several 
meetings and arranging a joint interparliamentary session in Strasbourg attended by both the 
Yugoslav Federal Parliament and the Assemblies of the republics. The European Parliament 
backed diplomatic channels, the provision of humanitarian aid for refugees and the deployment 
of peacekeeping forces if agreed by the parties involved. Despite these efforts, the EP was unable 
to 'get down to the business' of forging a European foreign policy towards the crisis. 
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3.2 Post-Recognition Stage 
Although the first parliamentary session of 1992 was dominated by the election of a new President 
and did not consecrate any space for a debate, the EP passed a Joint Resolution which 
acknowledged the fait accompli of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, insisting that the rights 
of all ethnic groups should be respected and the international commitments previously made by 
the Yugoslav Federation should be maintained by the newly-born independent states. In addition, 
the Resolution backed the recognition of other republics complying with the EC guidelines and 
urged the convening of a referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EP called again for the 
cessation of fighting and endorsed the deployment of European forces to join the UN 
peacekeeping contingent in the unfortunate event of the hostilities continuing (OlEC C 39/1992, 
130). 
During the Question Time on European Political Cooperation held on 15 January, the Portuguese 
Socialist MEP Maria Belo asked the EC President Joao de Deus Pinheiro to provide Parliament 
with an insight concerning the rationale and criteria followed by the Council over the decision 
to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, whilst denying such a status to other republics. For this 
purpose, she requested that the contents of the Badinter Report be communicated to the 
Parliament, obtaining the reply that "this was not a decision taken by the Council. It was a 
decision taken at national level on which the twelve Member States [had] agreed". As to Belo's 
second request for the European Parliament to be informed about the contents of the Badinter 
Report, Deus Pinheiro answered that "unless the Foreign Ministers agree to divulge the contents 
of that report, the presidency should not do so of its own accord". This once again evidenced the 
deficiencies of the mechanisms of European Political Cooperation, in this case at the expense of 
the European Parliament which was denied the right to obtain important information other than 
through newspaper leaks (Belo; Deus Pinheiro, 15/1/1992, 70). 
Between 28 February and 3 March 1992, an ad hoc parliamentary delegation led by 
Avgerinos was sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina with the task of monitoring the referendum on 
independence. The Members of the European Parliament met political leaders, representatives of 
the Bosnian government and the President and Vice-President of the Chamber of Communes and 
Citizens which constituted the Bosnian parliamentary assembly. During a subsequent visit to 
Belgrade, the delegation had the opportunity to consult the Greek and French ambassadors as well 
as the Commission representative. The referendum was held under acceptable conditions, despite 
some minor technical irregularities and amidst a climate of growing tension which escalated into 
the killing of a Serb in the Muslim quarter. Members of the delegation tried to use all their 
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political contacts in order to arrest clashes and, in particular, the Dutch MEP Arie Oostlander 
undertook a visit to the barricades to negotiate freedom of passage for the observers and civilians 
who wanted to leave Sarajevo. Eventually, the delegation returned safely to Brussels, albeit after 
twenty-four hours' delay to their schedule, together with approximately one hundred people 
(Avgerinos Repon, March 1992). 
On 9 April 1992, the European Parliament passed by RCV, as requested by the EPP, a 
Motion for a Resolution tabled by the Christian Democrats themselves. The text endorsed "the 
recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and its Members States". 
It also "called EPC, Council and Commission to do their utmost to: 
-have the existing border recognized ( .. ) and guarantee the integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
-extend the mandate of the UN forces, so that they [could] also be deployed to 
avert war in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
-safeguard the republics' political cohesion 
-safeguard the rights of minorities in the republic" (OlEC C 125/1992, 220). 
In its Joint Resolution of 14 May 1992, the EP expressively referred to reports by human 
rights organizations including Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch on civilians held in 
concentration camps in Serbia, Vojvodina and Croatia. Parliament stipulated that it would 
consider the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and Montenegro as a new state, only if it complied with 
the same general guidelines previously applied to the other republics on recognition, concerning 
the protection of minorities, the "disavowal of territorial claims against other republics" and the 
full restoration of the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina (OlEC C 15011992, 234-235). 
In June, Parliament adopted a Resolution based on a Report on Relations between the 
Community and the Republics of the former Yugoslavia, tabled by the Dutch Christian Democrat 
MEP Arie Oostlander on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security. This 
represented the most comprehensive parliamentary document regarding Yugoslavia. Unlike the 
resolutions drafted by the political groups, the above text provided more detailed and complete 
insight into the historical background and included a more accurate political analysis (Silvestro 
interview, 1996). It dealt specifically with a host of issues such as the question of recognition of 
the republics, the rights of minorities, human rights, borders within Yugoslav territory, the armed 
forces, observers and peacekeeping troops, regulation of relations between parties in the fields 
of the economy, internal trade, transport, the environment, the legal system and foreign policy. 
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At the following session, Parliament called "for initiatives to establish and maintain safe 
zones and humanitarian corridors as soon as possible, thus ( .. ) preventing further displacements 
and ( .. ) establishing favourable conditions for the return of the temporary refugees to the Republic 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia" (OlEC C 24111992, 145). The House 
condemned the summary executions of Croatian citizens in Belgrade and the outrages perpetrated 
by the JNA regarded as a clear breach of international law and urged the Community to warn the 
Serbian authorities that stricter sanctions would be imposed unless this practice of illegal trials 
and death sentences was put to an end (OlEC C 24111992, 147). 
Within the parliamentary forum a welter of disparate opinions which extolled the virtues 
of political, humanitarian and military options emerged, often transformed into nothing more than 
a sense of impotence. Nevertheless, the EP inability to exert its political clout over the Council 
in relation to policy-making on Yugoslavia can be ascribed to the lack of necessary political and 
institutional instruments (Imbeni interview, 7/2/1996). Until the Parliament acquires such means, 
as the Italian Communist MEP Luigi Colajanni emphasized, it will remain "a voice in the desert". 
In the case of former Yugoslavia, the European Parliament could not determine any political 
orientation, but only raise its protests louder (Colajanni interview, 3111/1996). 
The European Parliament undertook consultations with EC institutions, member states' 
national governments and national parliaments. Exchanges of information also took place with the 
United Nations, the Congress and government of the United States, WEU, NATO and embassies 
at parliamentary and occasionally at PG levels (Alavanos, Rocard, Bergamaschi, D' Alimonte 
written interviews, 7-9/1995). Non-governmental organizations, voluntary groups and the Bosnian 
government itself lobbied the European Parliament, raising the question of the value of this 
instrument as an expression of democracy. The phenomenon was regarded by the leader of the 
Left Unity Rene-Emile Piquet as unacceptable and unbearable: "Le lobbying est dans tous les 
bureaux, tous les couloirs, toutes les reunions. L'interlocuteur s'installe sans meme donner la 
possibilite aux deputes de juger l'opportunite de la rencontre" (Piquet interview, 3111/1996).'1 
It is not feasible for the House to function on the basis of external pressures, especially when the 
source remains unknown. Lobbying certainly raises problems about the quality of democracy and 
the fulfilment of MEPs' obligations towards their institution, the political party to which they 
belong as well as to their electorate. More appropriately, Piquet felt that the EP could develop 
17 "Lobbying is carried out in all offices. all corridors, all meetings. The interlocutors place themselves [in the 
European Parliament] without even giving MEPs the possibility of deciding for themselves whether or not 
they were willing to meet" (author's translation). 
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exchanges with other international organizations and countries in order to obtain information. It 
could appoint interparliamentary delegations with the task of listening to its interlocutors in 
addition to just conveying the official EP opinion. 
Conclusion 
The inability of the international community to promote a peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis 
during 1991-1992 dented the euphoria following the fall of the Iron Curtain, diminishing and 
denigrating "the spirit of integration and cooperation which prevailed in international institutions" 
in search of a new identity in the post-Cold War era (Gow, 1992, 1). 
The European preventive and reactive strategies for dealing with the civil wars raging in 
former Yugoslavia did not flatter the Twelve. In Nuttall's words, "It is a truth universally 
acknowledged that the [Community] ( .. ) did not pass the Yugoslav test with flying colours"; 
indeed it shamefully failed in all the attempts undertaken with the instruments at its disposal in 
the SEA framework (Nuttall, 1994, 13). Notwithstanding the clear opposition expressed by the 
Slovenian and Croatian governments, opposition parties, and people, the Council was persistent 
in its anachronistic position of support for a federal state, which was interpreted as an indirect 
way of taking the Serbian side. However, this position was later reassessed in the light of 
MiloseviC's intransigence and refusal to reach any political compromise with the other republics, 
and of the brutality of the actions perpetrated by the Serbs under the flag of the lNA. 
The Twelve were not united over the policy of recognition - with Germany pushing for 
it to come into effect immediately - nor over "the wisdom of intervening without strong military 
support - whether for humanitarian relief purposes or as a threat to impel a ceasefire and the end 
of all hostilities" (Lodge, 1993, 3). Such divergences risked jeopardizing the equilibrium of the 
Community and the relations between its member states on the eve of the Maastricht summit 
(Alendar, 1992, 20). 
Institutional inadequacies within the existing EPC framework prevented the member 
states from coordinating with one another and promptly defining a common strategy, whilst the 
absence of a European security framework precluded the realization of such a strategy. In the 
circumstances, the Community did just about as well as it could have been expected, appearing 
once again as an economic giant and a political dwarf. This can explain the dominantly economic, 
as opposed to political, approach with respect to the crisis. However, it must be also borne in 
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mind that economic instruments were used for political purposes and as a way of implementing 
EPC policies. 
As in the Gulf case, the Yugoslav crisis triggered a debate on the prospect for the 
Community ever to become an international actor. Some maintained that the crisis represented 
"an indictment of the whole concept of European unity, a powerful refutation of the arguments 
for a single foreign policy with majority voting, let alone a United States of Europe". Others 
argued that the experience served as a lever for bolstering the demands for a common foreign and 
security policy for the United States of Europe (Owen, 1995,3; Lodge 1993,2). 
As to the EP's response to the events unfolding in Yugoslavia, the House turned its 
attention to the unrest of the Albanian population in the Serbian province of Kosovo, even before 
other EC institutions and member states did so. Yet, parliament's warning call remained unheard 
and it was unable to persuade the Community to address promptly and efficiently the Yugoslav 
emergency. 
MEPs from all political orientations and nationalities agreed that the EC member states' 
diplomacies had failed vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, while acknowledging that the Community had no 
effective powers to engage in the management of the crisis (Rocard, 2217/1995). Throughout the 
1991-1992 period, the European Parliament adopted political resolutions in which its Members 
hid behind the screen of rhetorical expressions where it condemned, reproved, reaffirmed, urged, 
called upon, demanded and supported actions and policies of the parties concerned. Already in 
November 1990, and subsequently from March 1991 up to July 1992, Parliament concerned itself 
at nearly every sitting with the developments of the situation in Yugoslavia, not least in view of 
the latter's geographical proximity to the Community and its strategic importance for the security 
of the whole continent. Following the often inconclusive missions and visits carried out by 
delegations or individual MEPs in Yugoslavia, public declamation appeared to be the only 
instrument at the disposal of Parliament: an open admission that it was powerless to determine 
or influence a concrete outcome. And yet, its role was useful in terms of publicising issues and 
mobilizing public opinion. 
The European Parliament, although initially not favourable to the fragmentation of the 
SFRY, took a more flexible stance over the constitutional future of the Yugoslav Republics. 
While expressing its "preference" for one Yugoslavia, Parliament stressed that this could not be 
used as a pretext for military intervention. In addition, it recommended the creation of a regional 
organization based on the EC's model, albeit on a voluntary basis, explicitly recognizing the right 
of self-determination of each of the six republics and the two autonomous provinces of Kosovo 
Chapter V 188 
and Vojvodina. 
Visitors from Slovenia, Croatia and Kosovo were invited to address the House whereby 
they requested EC and EP missions to investigate the situation and called for the Community and 
its members states to intervene. The European Parliament consistently supported all peaceful 
initiatives, political negotiations and humanitarian actions whilst rejecting the resort to violence. 
Although it initially sought to maintain an impartial stance among the parties, as the conflict 
escalated, Parliament acknowledged, ahead of the EC Foreign Ministers, that the Serbs were the 
principal aggressors, cautiously showing a sympathetic attitude towards the breakaway republics. 
In summary, it has to be acknowledged that the EC and EP's failure to address the crisis was also 
due to the fact that "[t]he goals set were too high and the situation in Yugoslavia too complex" 
(Crnobrnja, 16/6/1992, 1). 
Time will assist political analysts in lifting the veil of mist which still surrounds the 
Yugoslav crisis and lead to a better understanding of the EC's reaction. Yet, it cannot be denied 
that the commitment made fifty years ago by the then Six, in a surge of idealism, to create a new 
way of life and to prevent, by all means, the conflagration of another conflict on the European 
continent has not been fulfilled, just as the idea that Europe would never again experience the 
physical devastation and moral ravages of war has turned out to be a myth. 
VI The Role of the Political Groups in Forging the European 
Parliament's Stance on the Yugoslav Crisis 
This chapter aims firstly to identify the attitudes of the EP political groups towards the Yugoslav 
crisis during its pre- and post-recognition stages. Secondly, it attempt to evaluate the respective 
levels of transnationality of the individual groups as well as the voting similarities and cooperation 
between the PGs in relation to the crisis. This aspect is particularly important considering that no 
majority group exists in the Europarliamentary spectrum. 
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Table 6. List of Roll-Call Votes on the Yugoslav Crisis 
Stage Date Resolution Recital! Paragraph I OJ I Page 
Pre--Rec 1 15-Mar~91 
15-Mar~91 
16-May .. 9.1 
: .. 06 
1.~-117 : 
157-158 
Chapter \'1 191 
1. The Political Groups' Positions vis-a-vis the Yugoslav Crisis 
1.1 The Socialist Group 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
As early as February 1991, the Socialists within the European Parliament addressed their attention 
to the events unfolding in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, particularly in the Serbian 
province of Kosovo. They urged the Yugoslav government to stop its discriminatory policies and 
flagrant violations of human rights perpetrated against the Albanian population, if it intended to 
continue and develop further its relations with the Community (Desmond, 211211991, 271). 
In the following month, the Socialists expressed concern at the constitutional crisis faced 
by the SFRY by stressing that the Yugoslav people should be left free to find their own solution. 
Only in this way could peace in the Balkans and security in Europe be achieved. However, they 
expressed consternation at the idea that in order to promote democracy "every manifestation of 
nationalist identity and every separatist movement" should be recognized and supported 
(Avgerinos, 14/311991,218-219). 
Although the reaction of the Yugoslav people was understandable, considering their 
troubled history and long years of repression, the Greek MEP Paraskevas A vgerinos argued that 
"high-flown expectations [would] not solve their problems".1 The focus should be, instead, on 
the reorganization of their society with the objective of building a solid system of parliamentary 
democracy. This meant, first of all, restoring economic order, depoliticizing public 
administration, establishing a new institutional framework as well as promoting respect for human 
and minority rights and only then calling for free and democratic federal elections. The whole 
state apparatus had to be dismantled and replaced by a completely new constitutional, political and 
economic structure with the consensus of all the Yugoslav republics. 
The Socialists fiercely believed that the survival of the SFRY depended on the 
establishment of democracy and the fortification of its key institutions. For this purpose, the 
European Community had to support, both politically and financially, the reform proposed by the 
Prime Minister Ante Markovic (Avgerinos, 14/311991, 218-219). As the Italian MEP Nereo 
Laroni emphasized, "after the glorious season when the walls [between Western and Eastern 
Europe] came down, another seem[ed] to be looming, insidious and widespread: a season in 
The Greek MEPs showed great concern at the events unfolding in former Yugoslavia, by participating 
assiduously at the debates and often by taking the floor. This high level of participation in conjunction with 
an extraordinary level of absenteeism amongst the members of the other nationalities resulted in a Greek 
dominance at the EP dehates, which is reflected in the larger space devoted to them in this chapter. 
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which every difference becomes a pretext for clashes, conflict and imbalance" (Laroni, 14/3/1991, 
221). He also contended that Europe had remained deaf to the foreboding signals and persistent 
requests for assistance launched by the Yugoslav leaders and failed to deter the resort to arms by 
persuading the parties to solve their disputes diplomatically and peacefully. Furthermore, the 
Community should open the door to a united Yugoslavia and discourage separatist trends which 
would leave the problems of minorities unresolved (Laroni, 14/3/1991, 221). Also, it should 
endorse a negotiated solution, halt arms export to the area and support the suspension of economic 
relationships with Yugoslavia until the parties had opened a dialogue over possible formulas of 
government (Woltjer, 9/7/1991, 68-69). This view was not shared by the French Socialist MEP 
and former Foreign Minister, Claude Cheysson, who stressed that it was not through economic 
sanctions, but via economic benefits that the Yugoslav people would establish a common future 
and identify peaceful answers to the right of self-determination (Cheysson, 9/7/1991. 82-83). The 
Labour MEP Stan Newens also pointed out that, although this right could not be denied to the 
Yugoslav people, "at a time when economic integration [was] in the logic of history, small 
independent republics [were] not viable and could lead to instability and war" (Newens, 9/7/1991, 
84). 
On 28 June 1991, the Socialists condemned the violence perpetrated by the JN A in 
Slovenia. In Jean-Pierre Cot's words, "however provocative the unilateral declaration of 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia might be, nothing could justify the use of military force. 
( .. ). It is not sufficient for the federal government to call for a cessation to hostilities as if it were 
an innocent bystander: it should command the army to withdraw its forces from the streets". Any 
attempts to mediate in order to solve the crisis were to be undertaken with willingness to listen 
and take into consideration the needs and wishes of all parties without any "preconceived idea of 
what is the most desirable outcome from a West European perspective" and without seeking to 
use political and economic muscle to impose a solution which is unacceptable to the peoples of 
Yugoslavia" (Cot's statement, 28/6/1991). 
In September 1991, the Socialists admitted that neither the Community nor the European 
Parliament had succeeded in achieving a common standpoint on the measures to be taken in 
Yugoslavia. While the Community was trying to convince the parties involved in the crisis to 
agree to sit together at the negotiating table, some among the member states such as Germany 
were taking opposite steps, threatening to recognize "the fragments of Yugoslavia". The view was 
reiterated that" [u]nilateral, unforced, de facto recognition of one or some republics at this time 
would lead, at best, to annihilation of the substantial minorities living in that republic, and at 
worst to conflict not only inside the country but along its external frontiers as well" (A vgerinos, 
10/9/1991, 84). There was a general fear that the process of recognition of the breakaway 
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republics might trigger a chain reaction whereby each group would proclaim itself as an 
independent nation. However, as the time passed, the group became increasingly divided over the 
issue of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. According to Newens, with hindsight, Germany 
and Austria should not have pushed for recognition before the republics concerned had provided 
sufficient guarantees for the safety and welfare of their minorities. He also noted that during the 
Cold War the West widely supported Tito's regime and the maintenance of the political status 
quo, but with the fall of the Iron Curtain Yugoslavia had lost its strategic geopolitical position. 
This had diminished the interest of the West to grant sufficient economic aid, precipitating the 
Yugoslav crisis (Newens interview, 26/3/1997). 
In the Socialist eyes, "outsiders clearly had no moral right to dictate the state, inter-state 
or supra-state structures ( .. ) in Yugoslavia, even though it [was] in our backyard". However, as 
an official Gareth Williams remarked, "they [the Socialists] would appear to be lagging hopelessly 
behind events, and incapable of a meaningful policy, if [they failed] to adopt [an] approach ( .. ) 
which recognize[d] the reality .. that while the Yugoslav crisis [was] not a simple one, it [was] 
not one in which blame [was] to be equally apportioned to all parties" (Williams, 1991). 
Conversely, according to Sakellariou, the entire responsibility for the deterioration of the situation 
could not be attributed to the Serbs, despite their blatant violations of the most basic principles 
of international law (Sakellariou interview, 31/ 1/ 1996). 
In October 1991, the group endorsed the Council's policy, stressing that it was "not 
within the competence of the European Community to send troops to Yugoslavia or anywhere 
else". Only in exceptional circumstances could the member states be encouraged to intervene in 
the region as a buffer force, notably if a genuine mandate existed, a ceasefire held and upon 
consensus of the warring parties (Sakellariou, 9/10/1991, 165-166). Following his meetings with 
Yugoslav leaders, the Chairman of the EP Delegation A vgerinos claimed that the fervour 
demonstrated by extreme nationalists augured badly for peace in the country (Avgerinos, 
9/10/1991, 168). 
In November 1991, the group raised the issue relating to the status of the EEC observers, 
requesting that Parliament be regularly informed about their activities. The Socialists welcomed 
the long advocated decision of the Council of Ministers to impose an arms embargo, compensated 
by granting humanitarian assistance directed to alleviate people's suffering, especially in the 
republics which had demonstrated their willingness to find a diplomatic solution (Sakellariou, 
20/11/1991, 155). During the first stage of the Yugoslav crisis, between January 1991 and 
January 1992, the approach of most Socialists could be described as prudent and impartial with 
the parties involved in the conflict. Yet internal tensions arose within the group especially on the 
key issue of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. A majority of German MEPs supported the 
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policy adopted by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) aimed at accelerating the 
process while other Socialist MEPs maintained a more cautious approach, believing that the 
fragmentation of Yugoslavia would worsen the problems in the area (Newens interview, 
26/3/1997). The view that all German MPs and MEPs had embraced a pro-recognition policy was 
contested by Jannis Sakellariou. To provide an example, he stated that in Autumn 1991 during 
a meeting of the Working Group on Foreign Policy of the German Bundestag in which he 
participated as the Spokesman of the Socialist MEPs, one third of the members opposed the 
immediate recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Sakellariou interview, 31/1/1996). 
Once the independence of the new republics was recognized, the Socialists regained a 
certain unity over the economic and diplomatic measures to be adopted in order to halt the 
fighting. Stress was once again put on the actual ruling out of violence and the pledge of fully 
respecting human and minority rights, in accordance with the principle that peace is an absolute 
requirement for democracy (van den Brink, 9/10/1991, 173-174). In the light of Gorbachev's 
formula, envisaging the framing of a union of sovereign states, speedy recognition of the 
independence of the new republics was advocated as "perhaps .. by being separated, ( .. ) they may 
be united" (Baget Bozzo, 9/10/1991, 174). 
As to the intervention of the army in the area, the Socialists opposed the use of force until 
the grenade attack in Sarajevo, after which the majority of them started to consider it as a viable 
option. A small part, instead, among whom was Sakellariou, remained steadfastly against the use 
of the military option even after this attack (Sakellariou interview, 31/1/1996). Over this stage, 
despite the divisions emerged during the debates, it is interesting to notice an extremely high 
index of agreement of 91.56 percent on the RCVs taken over the crisis yet with a fairly high level 
of absenteeism of 63.21. 2 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
In March 1992 Sakellariou welcomed the outcome of the referendum held on 29 February 1992 , 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but stressed that the EC's official recognition of the republic should only 
occur following a conference concerning the possible implications arising from its independence 
(Sakellariou, 11/3/1992, 91). For Avgerinos the Community had foolishly rushed to recognize 
the independence of the breakaway republics prior to settling an appropriate institutional structure 
to safeguard the rights of minorities. The Yugoslav drama was feared to be only in its first act 
and that worse was to follow (Avgerinos, 12/5/1992, 73). 
The average index of agreement is computed on all 9 RCVs of the first stage. 
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As for the case of Macedonia, independence should be endorsed only after a revision of 
its constitution with respect to "its aggressive provisions" towards Greece (Sakellariou, 1113/1992, 
91). The British Labour MEP Brian Simpson pointed out that the international community had 
two options, either to ignore the events in Yugoslavia or to continue promoting peace in the area 
by imposing sanctions, carrying out UN peacekeeping operations and recognizing or 
derecognizing the new republics (Simpson, 12/5/1992, 75-76). 
According to Avgerinos, "the European Parliament [could] not condemn to starvation a 
people [who were] paying the price of [their] historical contrasts and the irresponsibility of [their] 
leaders in blood" by sanctions which did not affect the leaders but rather the population. The EP 
should demand the lifting of the embargo for all republics. As regards Bosnia, external pressures 
should be averted as it could lead to the sparking of a civil war. The Community should not 
interfere but remain close to the republics as a "trustworthy reference-point" and an impartial 
arbiter (Avgerinos, 1113/1992, 94). Laroni pointed out that as events were irreversible it was 
pointless to reproach the Community's policy in Yugoslavia, but lessons should be drawn and 
further mistakes prevented. The Community should ensure that the Helsinki principles were fully 
honoured in the independent Republic of Bosnia (Avgerinos, 1113/1992, 94). 
At the May 1992 session, the majority of the group stressed that although all the warring 
parties involved in the Serb-Bosnian conflict were to be blamed, it had become clear that the 
Serbian government was pursuing the ambitious design of creating a Greater Serbia, using for this 
purpose the federal army. Following the failure of the European Community in its negotiating 
role, the Socialist group was concerned about the further escalation of violence and the destiny 
of the EEC observers (Woltjer, 12/5/1992, 70). 
According to the group, the inability of the European Community to act efficiently in 
Yugoslavia was due to the absence of authority in the field of foreign policy and security and the 
shortage of the necessary instruments to carry out peacekeeping operations. Criticism was levelled 
at the Portuguese Presidency of the Council, as well as at the previous Italian and Luxembourg 
Presidencies for the way the Community had handled the Yugoslav emergency. Slovenia and 
Croatia had been recognized only following the threat by the German government that it would 
proceed alone, with or without the other EC partners. Yet some amongst the Socialists felt that 
the guidelines for the recognition of the independence of the Yugoslav republics drawn by the 
Badinter Report were virtually ignored (Sakellariou, 12/5/1992, 77). 
The Socialists stressed the necessity for the European Community to act with great caution 
and undertake initiatives to assist the hundreds of refugees fleeing from the troubled areas 
(Woltjer, 12/5/1992, 70, Medina Ortega, 12/5/1992, 76). The group supported the Oostlallder 
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Report,3 on the ground that changes in the internal frontiers of Yugoslavia were regarded as 
intolerable and the recourse to violence and the aggressive policy by the Serbian government were 
strongly attacked. The group tabled some amendments expressing support for UN Resolution 757 
calling for a total embargo including oil as a last attempt to halt the massacre prior to taking up 
arms. 
It objected to the amendment introduced by Oostlander on behalf of the EPP group which 
urged selective WEU air and naval strikes directed against specific targets as any decision to 
undertake military intervention in former Yugoslavia should be taken neither by the Community 
nor the WEU nor the CSCE but only the UN Security Council (Woltjer, 9/6/1992, 54). 
By contrast, for Avgerinos peace could not be achieved in the region "unless the borders 
[were] changed and populations [were] exchanged". He then expressed his firm opposition to the 
military option proposed in the amendment submitted by Oostlander, concluding that "Peace 
[could not be] made through warfare" (Avgerinos, 9/6/1992, 58). On 7 July 1992, the Socialist 
group reiterated its view that Croatia should not be included in the PHARE programme because 
of its still very unclear role in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Woltjer, 7/7/1992, 103). 
Overall, the Socialist group's position towards the situation in Yugoslavia, and 
particularly Bosnia, became clearer after some degree of initial confusion and contradiction. 
Notwithstanding some resistance from a few quarters led by Avgerinos, the group's policy was 
anchored on the support of sanctions and selectively targeted military operations to be 
accompanied by humanitarian missions under the aegis of the United Nations. 
The second stage showed a decreasing level of cohesion with an IA of 84.93 percent 
combined with a negligible increase in the level of absenteeism of 61.01. With respect to the last 
Joint Motion for a Resolution (taken into consideration within this research) which was passed 
by the House on 9 July 1992, the group was split down the middle with 37 Socialist MEPs voting 
in favour, 40 against and 3 abstentions (B3-0973 and 1049/92). Among the MEPs opposing the 
text were 14 from the British Labour Party, 8 Spanish, 6 German, 6 Greek, 3 Belgian, 2 French 
and one Portuguese. Among the supporters of the Motion for a Resolution were 8 German, 6 
French, 6 Spanish, 6 British, 4 Dutch, 3 Portuguese, 2 Belgian, one Irish and one Luxembourg 
MEPs. 
3 Two Greek MEPs. Panayotis Roumeliotis and Konstantinos Tsimas. rejected the report whilst the Belgian 
MEP van Hemeldonck and the German MEP von der Vring abstained from the vote. 
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The overall cohesion coefficient4 reached 87.91 percent which, although not reflecting 
full consensus, still indicated a fairly high cohesion, given the large numeric size of the group and 
the high level of participation at the roll-call votes. If compared to the other EP groups, the 
Socialists registered a fairly high index of absenteeism of 62 percent. It is arguable whether the 
high index derived directly from the ability of the group to enforce discipline among its members, 
although a correlation certainly exists. According to the Socialist internal rules, dissent from the 
official view of the group is condoned only for serious political reasons. In other words, MEPs 
can vote freely recurring to the so-called conscience clause only exceptionally, when for instance, 
a vote bears significant national implications (Ladrech and Brown-Pappamikail, 1995, 269). 
1.2 The European People's Party 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
During the February 1991 session, the European People's Party drafted a Motion for a Resolution 
on the crisis and human rights violations in Kosovo. During the debate on topical and urgent 
matters the German MEP Doris Pack stressed that over the previous two years and in particular 
since February 1989, Kosovo had been in a state of emergency characterized by a repressive and 
discriminatory policy carried out by the Serbian authorities with the closure of Albanian schools, 
the dismissal of its teachers and the ban of the only independent trade union for the whole 
Albanian workforce. An appeal was addressed to the Community not to abandon these people to 
their fate, but to consider the question as a European rather than a purely internal matter (Pack, 
2112/1991,270-271, B3-279/91). 
In the EPP's view, a precondition to the conclusion of the third financial protocol of the 
EEC-Yugoslavia cooperation agreement should be for the conflicting parties to resume 
negotiations5 (Sarlis, 14/3/1991, 215-216, B3-197/91). In addition, the leader of the Albanian 
minority in Kosovo should be admitted to the negotiations. Despite their decision to depart from 
the Yugoslav federation, the Slovenes and the Croats did not exclude the possibility of a political 
compromise and the Bosnians and the Albanians had shown themselves to be open to seeking a 
non-violent solution while the Serbs were the only ones who did not show any inclination to "seek 
4 The overall index of agreement has been calculated on all 20 Roll-Call Votes on Yugoslav ia between January 
1991 and July 1992. 
The EEC-Yugoslavia Agreement was directed to promoting cooperation in the field of industry. environment, 
telecommunication and transport infrastructures. 
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the peaceful route of dialogue" , continuing their repressive measures in Kosovo (Pack, 14/3/1991, 
221-222). 
Although a signatory of the Joint Motion for a Resolution of 15 March 1991 (B3-0395, 
0397/fin, 0399, 0403, 0431 and 0482/91), the EPP did not want to be associated with the EC 
policy supporting the territorial integrity of the SFRY. Consequently, the Christian Democrats 
strongly opposed the adoption of such policy, rejecting the inclusion of Paragraph 2 of the text 
of the EP Resolution and requested a roll-call vote. Out of the 22 members participating in the 
RCV 20 voted against and only 2, the Greek MEPs Sarlis and Stavrou voted in favour. 
Considering that Sarlis and Pack were the drafters on behalf of the EPP, Sarlis may have felt 
somehow compelled to support the general line of the Parliament, even though this meant going 
against the official position of his group. Neither the attendance register nor the record of the 
RCV for 15 March 1991 makes mention of Pack being present. In May 1991, the Christian 
Democrats stressed that a long-lasting peace could only be achieved in Yugoslavia if people's 
rights to self-determination were respected (Habsburg, 16/5/1991,266-267). 
The EPP was the first group to send a small delegation, consisting of Habsburg, Pack, 
Oostlander and Sarlis, to Slovenia and Croatia between 29 June and 1 July 1991 and to propose 
the dispatch of an official parliamentary delegation to Yugoslavia. At the July 1991 session, 
following four consecutive visits since January 1991, Pack stressed that the SFRY, as conceived 
by Tito, had long ceased to exist, regardless of the efforts made by Slovenia and Croatia to 
maintain a loose federal formula within a programme of political, institutional and economic 
reforms. In her opinion, the Slovenian and Croatian attempts had been wrecked due to the lack 
of effective and genuine support on the part of the federal government which, despite the change 
of its political summit from the appointed Markovic to the democratically-elected Mesic, remained 
strictly under the control of the Serbian government (Pack, 9/7/1991, 69). 
The group believed, in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the 
CSCE Paris Charter of 21 November 1990 acknowledging the people's right to self-
determination, that all EC member states should accept the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, 
fiercely supported by their respective parliaments and people. No change in the existing frontiers 
or in the language and cultural configuration of the various republics would be admissible (B3-
1223/91). The Community should not grant funds to Yugoslavia, as it would only strengthen the 
Serbian aggressor and the Council should take into greater account the opinion of Parliament 
which should also act as mediator in the negotiations between the Yugoslav parties during the 
three months' moratorium (Pack, 9/7/1991,69, Oostlander, 9/7/1991. 78-79). The adoption of 
the principle of self-determination by the Slovenes and Croats should be fulfilled in accordance 
with other democratic principles and responsibilities towards all the ethnic groups (Oostlander. 
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10/9/1991, 89-90). The German Liberal MEP von Alemann denounced the incoherent behaviour 
of the German Christian Democrats at national and European level. While in the Bundestag they 
had urged vehemently for such recognition, pointing the finger at the Serbs for their aggression 
against Slovenia and reproaching Foreign Minister Genscher for not having recognized early 
enough the independence of the secessionist republics, at the EP level they did not even propose 
the inclusion of this request in the text of the September resolution (von Alemann, 10/9/1991, 
85). 
In October 1991, the Christian Democrats pleaded for an immediate ceasefire with a clear 
condemnation of any violation of this agreement from either Serbian or Croatian parties (Sarlis, 
9/10/1991, 168). In the following month, they emphasized that the Community should have 
enforced sanctions much earlier, as argued by Parliament since December 1990, so that to express 
condemnation of the human rights violations against the Albanians in Kosovo. A distinctive view, 
yet in line with the group, was taken by Habsburg who compared the arrival of Serbs in Vukovar 
with the Nazi occupation of Vienna during the Second World War and believed that the conflicts 
in former Yugoslavia were not civil wars, but "national struggle[s] by people who have been 
oppressed" and wish to free themselves from the Serbian domination (Habsburg, 20/11/1991, 
159-160). 
From the beginning, the EPP supported the recognition of the new republics which had 
democratically chosen their independence and elected their own parliaments. In Habsburg's 
words, "Ceterum autem censeo Croatiam et Sloveniam esse recognoscendam" (Habsburg, 
9/10/1991, 165).6 The Christian Democrats also stressed the importance of apportioning war-
guilt, hence implying that the Serbs were unquestionably to blame for the conflict. This allegation 
was supported by the fact that the fighting had been taking place especially in the areas where 
Serbian guerrillas had infiltrated, supported by the Federal Army and effectively consisting of 
Serbian troops. Finally, the group condemned the sluggish EC's response to the Yugoslav crisis 
highlighting the need to realize that the "Council speaks only for the Governments, not for the 
people of Europe" (Habsburg, 9/10/1991, 165). 
Unlike the Socialists, the Christian Democrats within the European Parliament clearly 
appeared from the beginning to be on the side of the Slovenes and Croats, sustaining their quest 
for independence. They also considered the Serbian government accountable for the deterioration 
of the events in former Yugoslavia. During the first stage, the Christian Democrats registered a 
very high index of agreement of 86.27 yet combined with a high level of absenteeism of 72.68. 
6 "After all, I do helieve that Croatia and Slovenia should be recognized" (author's translation). 
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b) Post-Recognition Stage 
After the official recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and following the positive outcome of the 
referendum on Bosnian independence, the Christian Democrats argued that the Community should 
accept the will of the Bosnian people and endorse the legal international personality of the 
republic, whilst ensuring the continuation of peaceful negotiations between the various ethnic 
groups (Oostlander, 11/3/1992, 89-90). 
The group emphasized that it was necessary to enforce a total oil embargo both by air and 
by land against Serbia (Howell, 12/5/1992, 76-77) and undertake military actions against the 
Serbian aggressors, by deploying UN and WEU forces, in order to contain the slaughter and to 
stop the action of ethnic cleansing (Habsburg, 9/4/1992, 273-274, Pack, 12/5/1992, 75). The 
government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was praised for its efforts to maintain cooperation between 
the various parts of the population and for its commitment to the search of a peaceful solution. 
Sympathy was expressed for the population of Sarajevo besieged by the JNA army as well as the 
people of several villages in Bosnia, victims of Serbian bombardments (Oostlander, 9/4/1992, 
274). In addition, it was felt that the new Serbia and Montenegro were to be recognized only if, 
like the other republics, it followed the guidelines set by the Badinter Commission (Pack, 
12/5/1992,75). Habsburg denounced the partiality and the bias of the press agency Tanjug which 
provided only pro-Serbian propaganda and retained monopoly over newsbroadcasts (Habsburg, 
12/5/1992, 73-74). 
There was concern about the possible involvement of Croats in the alleged plan to divide 
the lands in the Bosnian Republic and regain disputed territories inhabited by its population. This 
seemed therefore to justify the intervention of the Serbian forces in the above area, in order to 
protect Bosnian Serbs (Robles Piquer, 12/5/1992, 76). 
The necessity of a forceful action by the international community was elaborated further 
in June by Oostlander in his Report on Relations between the European Community and the 
Republics of the former Yugoslavia, where he stressed that "the course of peaceful means [had] 
been followed at great length", but despite some progress, reached through negotiations under the 
leadership of Lord Carrington and through the imposition of sanctions, the situation was doomed 
to deteriorate. For this reason, the EPP should call for a limited intervention by air and sea forces 
to pinpoint limited military targets, to neutralize the air space and to ensure that the Yugoslav 
Navy cease shelling the villages and towns along the Dalmatian coast (Oostlander, 9/6/1992, 52-
53). 
As to the plan of resettlement, Habsburg defined it as a "barbarity from the Second World 
War" that had to be fiercely resisted. A statute regarding the rights of ethnic groups should be 
drawn up, the implementation of which should be secured by the European Community 
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(Habsburg, 9/6/1992, 58-59). The British Conservative MEP Edward Mcmillan-Scott, whose 
group, the ED, had joined the EPP since May 1992, advocated a military operation within the 
framework of the WEU or the CSCE and with the consent of the United Nations to secure 
Bosnian air space as well as the Adriatic sea (Mcmillan-Scott, 9/6/1992, 54-55). 
A minority view was instead taken by the British Conservative MEP Derek Prag who 
disapproved of the Oostlander Report and accused the Community of having "got itself hooked 
on the principle of self-determination" without properly defining the criteria according to which 
people were entitled to such a claim. The main fault of the Report was to assume that the 
existence of a multi-ethnic state was a positive solution, without regard for the wishes of the 
population involved. The principle of non violation of the internal frontiers was criticized in view 
of the fact that those borders had been imposed by a dictator who had ignored the fact that over 
2.5 million Serbs had remained outside Serbia, and so compelling them to become a minority "in 
what had been their own South-Slav, Yugoslav country". For this reason, a political settlement 
involving a change of borders could not be rejected and the Community should appoint several 
commissions each of them with the respective task of studying possible modifications of borders, 
monitoring human rights and defining the rights of minorities (Prag, 9/6/1992, 59-60). 
In July 1992, the majority of the Christian Democrats opposed the granting of economic 
assistance and the extension of the PHARE programme to Croatia, due to the absence of accurate 
information about its actual involvement in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Doubts were 
raised over the effective existence of a Serb-Croatian political agreement envisaging the partition 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina between them. Furthermore, uncertainty still remained on whether the 
Republic of Croatia had fulfilled the necessary requirements on human as well as minority rights 
(Moorhouse, 7/7/1992, 103-104). 
The dissenting voices within the EPP group included Pack and Habsburg who pointed out 
that given the difficult situation in Croatia arising from the arrival of 650,000 refugees from 
Bosnia and Slavonia and in view of the fact that Croatia had proved to be more favourable to 
refugees than the EC member states, the Community could not deny them some kind of assistance 
(Pack and Habsburg, 7/7/1992, 105). To face this emergency, Oostlander proposed to establish 
an alternative programme in accordance with the terms suggested by the UN High Commission, 
while confirming the group's condemnation of the policy of cantonizing Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Finally, Oostlander pointed out the inconsistency of the Community'S policy, which had visibly 
neglected the case of Macedonia (Oostlander, 7/7/1992, 105). 
During the second stage, the EPP group maintained and even reinforced its anti-Serbian 
stance. Since all other means had failed to produce any results. the Christian Democrats were 
favourable to the idea of a targeted military intervention to halt the hostilities in the area. The 
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adhesion of the ED members to the EPP in May 1992, did not determine any substantial alteration 
in the level of group congruity7 over the Yugoslav crisis so that the IA of ReVs registered only 
a negligible fall to 85.08 percent. 
Throughout the whole period under examination, the EPP achieved the very high average 
index of agreement of 85.62 percent. This figure, marginally lower than that registered by the 
Socialists, represented the sixth highest outcome among parliamentary groups. However, this level 
of cohesion needs to be seen in light of the high rates of absenteeism of 72.68 percent in the first 
stage and 70.06 in the second stage, averaging 71.24 percent. 
1.3 The Liberal Democratic and Reformist Group 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
In February 1991, the Liberals turned their attention towards the incidents in Kosovo, drafting 
a Motion for a Resolution B3-302/91 which eventually became part of a joint text adopted by the 
House. At the debate in the plenary, the group raised the question relating to the repression of 
the Albanian population in Kosovo and urged the Federal Yugoslav and the Serbian authorities 
to comply with the basic principles of human and minority rights. "Our claim is to make 
Parliament realize that something must be done and that in the light of our experiences in Western 
Europe, we have to use our influence to see that repression of this kind no longer takes place in 
Yugoslavia" (von Alemann, 2112/1991, 270). 
At the following session, the group reiterated its call to the Serbian government to 
abandon the use of force and find a solution by taking into consideration the opinions of the 
opposition leaders and the wishes of the people in the constituent Yugoslav republics. Yet, the 
LDR group clearly confirmed that it neither intended nor could interfere in the discussion about 
the future of Yugoslavia as a federation or a confederation. Nevertheless, it questioned the idea 
that dismantling the Yugoslav Federation was the only solution to meet the demands of the people 
to self-determination, especially in view of the fact that the demise of the Yugoslav federation 
might lead to the upsurge of extreme nationalistic attitudes. In addition, in the group's view, 
unless the persecution against the Albanians in Kosovo ceased, negotiations for the third financial 
protocol should also be suspended, as the Community should exploit to the maximum its 
bargaining power in order to ensure a peaceful settlement to the internal disputes in Yugoslavia 
(von Alemann. 14/3/1991, 222). 
1 ED members are included within the EPP in the last six RCVs and precisely from the 15 to 20. 
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In May 1991, the Dutch MEP Jan Willem Bertens voiced his regret at the Yugoslav 
failure to establish a democratic form of government and to protect the rights of minorities. He 
also stated that the EC should not interfere with the decision of the Yugoslav people to continue 
to live together and that "it [was] ( .. ) not right for the European Community to make assistance 
dependent upon Yugoslavia continuing as a single state". Whatever the decision of the republics 
and autonomous provinces might have been, the rights of the minorities had to be fully honoured 
as a condition for the development of relationships with the European Community (Bertens, 
16/5/1991,267). 
The group identified three priorities for Community action. First, it argued that the EC 
would not accept the force of arms as a possible solution to the emerging problems in Europe and 
that those countries perpetrating violence should be excluded from EC financial assistance as well 
as prevented from establishing and maintaining privileged economic relationships. Second, it 
posited that the Community should promote a process of democratization by ensuring that all the 
negotiating parties were democratically elected, that the final decision would receive proper 
democratic endorsement and that the aspirations of Slovenes and Croats would be taken into 
account. Third, the group shared the Community's preference for the preservation of the 
Yugoslav federation, yet democratically orientated, as it was European credo that "in the modern 
world, some responsibilities are better shouldered by large groupings than by fragmented states" 
(Giscard d'Estaing, 9/7/1991, 69-70). The EC institutions should therefore continue to promote 
peace and democracy in the Balkans, as elsewhere. 
The group, in line with the policy adopted by the Federation of Liberal and Democratic 
Parties at the Poitiers Congress a few weeks earlier, called for the establishment of a European 
army capable of carrying out peacekeeping operations as well as humanitarian actions in cases 
such as the Yugoslav conflict. Faced with the escalation of violence, the group stressed that the 
Community should recognize the international legal personality of Slovenia and Croatia, condemn 
MiloseviC's aggression and impose an embargo exclusively on the Serbia, call for a ceasefire to 
be monitored by an international police force (von Alemann, 10/9/1991, 85, Lamassoure, 
9110/1991, 166-167). The LDR deprecated the Community's double standard of denying the 
deployment of a buffer force in Yugoslavia, on the request of the victim of the aggression while 
considering this option on the request of the assailant (Lamassoure, 20/11/1991, 156). 
In summary, like the EPP, the Liberals advocated the recognition of independence of 
Slovenia and Croatia in line with the wishes of their people. They also condemned Serbian 
pugnacity, recommending the imposition of economic sanctions, the resumption of aid to the 
parties that were behaving cooperatively and the intervention of an international peacekeeping 
force (Lamassoure, 20/ll/l99l, 156). During the first stage, among all the political groups the 
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Liberals registered the lowest index of agreement of 77.32 combined with a high percentage of 
absentees equal to 71.88 percent of the component members. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, the Liberals expressed concern at the 
escalation of violence in Croatia and at the prospect of further widening of the fighting in Bosnia 
(Bertens, 11/3/1992, 91-92). The siege of Sarajevo seemed to dash forever hopes of a peaceful 
settlement, replaced by public outcries for a military intervention and for an ultimatum to the 
Serbs, especially after the official independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. In the LDR 
view, military steps should be carried out under the auspices of the UN, CSCE and WEU in 
order to deter the continued JNA attacks on the Croatian and Muslim population, to protect 
Sarajevo airport and to secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies (von Alemann, 9/4/1992, 
274, De Clercq, 71, Bertens, 74, 12/5/1992). The Liberal group supported the Oostlander Report 
as well as the amendment relating to selective military operations if the sanctions failed to bring 
an immediate cease fire . 
In addition, the group strongly believed that the same guidelines set up by the Badinter 
Committee for recognition should be applied to all the individual republics in former Yugoslavia, 
including the new Serbia and Montenegro. Strong opposition was expressed to its automatic 
recognition and its taking over the role once played by the SFRY within the UN and CSCE (von 
Alemann, 59, Bertens, 55-56, 9/6/1992). As to the case of Macedonia, given that it had fulfilled 
the Badinter's requirement of providing sufficient guarantees for the rights of minorities, the 
Community should not delay further its recognition, especially after the Macedonian government's 
reassurance concerning the absence of any dispute over Greek territory (Bertens, 11/3/1992, 91-
92). MEP von Alemann argued that the EP should approve the proposal by the Commission to 
grant technical assistance to Slovenia and Croatia and that allegations concerning a Serb-Croatian 
agreement for the partitioning of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be substantiated prior 
to taking the arbitrary decision of denying Croatia assistance (von Alemann, 7/7/1992, 104). 
Overall, the Liberal group shared the view that the European Community should 
undertake military operations in order to halt the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The second stage marked a substantial increase in the group's cohesion with an extremely high 
figure of 92.77 percent but with a further increase in the level of absenteeism of its members up 
to 73.94. This rise in the level of consistency may well be due to this factor of absenteeism and 
to the departure from the group of its leader Giscard d'Estaing together with other French MEPs 
left who decided to join the EPP group. 
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On the whole, the Liberals reached a very high IA of 85.82 percent coupled with, 
however, a non-flattering percentage of absenteeism of 73.01. However, among the LDR 
members von Alemann was particularly concerned about the Yugoslav issues, acting on a few 
occasions as a 'free-agent' by signing on her own behalf and participating in the drafting of the 
text of Joint Resolutions together with other groups. 
1.4 The European Democratic Group 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
The European Democrats supported the initiatives of Prime Minister Markovic, a Croat and 
moderate, to re-establish economic order in the SFRY. They believed that the Community should 
not favour the break-up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into six separate republics "based 
on extreme, intolerant nationalism" and therefore backed the attempts of Borislav JoviC's 
presidency to prevent the disintegration by the means of negotiation. In the group's view, the 
Community had an interest in seeing a "strong, prosperous and democratic Yugoslavia .. at the 
heart of the Balkans" (Prag, 14/3/1991, 222-223). 
In addition, they accused Serbian leaders of promoting "the worst kind of nationalism" and 
expansionism directed at creating a greater Serbia. 
The ED argued that if a peaceful solution was not found by the parties and without their 
commitment to democratic principles and human rights, the Community should cancel the EEC-
Yugoslavia Trade and Cooperation agreement of 1980 and stop the negotiations for the third 
financial protocol (Prag, 14/3/1991,222-223, Jackson, 9/7/1991, 70). In the group's view, the 
Community should not impose its own solution to the Yugoslav constitutional crisis, but 
discourage armed confrontation by threatening to suspend any assistance. An outstanding paradox 
and contradiction could be found in the Yugoslav constitutional structure for, whilst the republics 
had been allowed a democratic voice for their own parliaments and governments, at the federal 
level no elections had been called (Beazley, 16/5/1991, 267-268). 
The ED condemned the aggression carried out by the JNA, insisting that all troops should 
return to their barracks and that negotiations should start on 1 August 1991. The dispatch of EC 
observers to Slovenia and Croatia was welcomed while similar initiatives should be extended to 
Bosnia and Kosovo. Respect for human rights along with the setting up of government by consent 
on a region by region basis were the requisites for achieving stability as well as economic growth 
in Yugoslavia as elsewhere (Jackson, 9/7/1991, 70). 
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In Christopher Jackson's words, 
the history of the peoples of this Community whom we in this hemicycle represent is ( .. ) 
the history of peoples .. long divided by bloody conflicts. We have replaced conflicts by 
a Community and .. we can pass on something of our experience, not only of building 
a Community, but the spirit of bringing peace and prosperity out of war, to [the people 
.. of Yugoslavia (Jackson, 9/7/1991, 70). 
Similarly, the republics of the Yugoslav Federation could also overcome their legacy of enmities 
finally prosper together in peace (Jackson, 10/9/1991, 85). 
By September 1991, the ED group acknowledged that Yugoslavia as a state no longer 
existed, calling for the EC recognition of the new republics. The group clearly blamed the Serbs 
for the escalation of the fighting. The ED also disapproved the suggestion of imposing a 
generalized embargo in the area which would "be like denying David stones for his catapult 
against Goliath", stressing that sanctions should be enforced against Serbia (Spencer, 9/10/1991, 
165) . Yet the group welcomed the Commission's decision to provide aid to the population through 
non-governmental organizations, in particular the Red Cross, demonstrating that the quarrel was 
not with Serbs as such, but with their dissolute and ruthless government (Prout, 10/9/1991, 93-94). 
The British Conservatives supported the text of the compromise resolution and proposed 
the inclusion of Paragraph 6, which foresaw that if a ceasefire and separation of forces had not 
proven effective the Community should begin to move towards recognition of Croatia and 
Slovenia in order to enable the UN Security Council to act without breaching Article 2 paragraph 
7 of the UN Charter which prohibits any interference in the internal affairs of a state. In addition, 
in accordance with Article 42, where diplomatic and economic measures prove inadequate, the 
Security Council could authorize military action by air, sea or land in order to restore 
international peace (Jackson, 9/10/1991, 168-169). The group stressed that "the Southern Slavs 
cannot wait while [the EC member states] argue over the creation of a European defence identity" 
(Spencer, 9/10/1991, 165). 
Following the Kurdish plight in the aftermath of the Gulf War, a new phase in 
international relations had been opened, where limits to sovereignty seemed to be being imposed 
by the international community. Given that the USA was no longer prepared to fulfil the role of 
'policeman' of the world as in the Gulf War, the Community, although not ready to take over this 
responsibility, should at least undertake humanitarian actions in order to assist the Albanians in 
Kosovo (Jackson, 20/11/1991, 156) and the Macedonians (The Week, 20/1111991, 28). 
Along with the Christian Democrats and the Liberals, the British and Danish 
Conservatives MEPs soon identified the Serbs as the aggressors and accused them of a breach of 
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the basic principles of international law. After having initially supported the maintenance of the 
unity of the Yugoslav Federation, the group shifted to the side of the breakaway republics, 
endorsing their international recognition in accordance with people's right to self-determination. 
Throughout the first stage, the European Democrats boasted a remarkable internal congruity, 
reaching an index of agreement of 91.05, but registering a fairly high level of absenteeism, 63.73 
percent. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
The position of the group cannot be fully assessed over the second stage given that from 1 May 
1992 the European Democrats joined the European People's Party group as affiliated members. 
In fact, the plenary session of March 1992 was the last occasion that the ED, as a distinctive 
group, expressed its opinion over the crisis in former Yugoslavia. Support was given to 
humanitarian actions promoted by the Commission and the Council, while praising the work 
carried out as well as the courage demonstrated by the EC observers. "It is through discussion, 
through negotiation, through the good offices of the European Community, through the United 
Nations and indeed, through other agencies that ( .. ) a solution" to the autonomous aspirations of 
the various republics could be found. Recognition had to be achieved in due course only if the 
conditions guaranteeing the rights of each member of the population were fulfilled (McMillan 
Scott, 11/3/1992, 92). 
A distinctive line was taken by Derek Prag who argued in favour of the possibility of 
changes in the Yugoslav internal borders along ethnic lines, although these changes ought to be 
realized peacefully and by negotiation and not on the basis of the conquest of territory by force 
(Prag, 10/9/1991, 90-91, 11/3/1992, 94). In his opinion, the Community bore the responsibility 
for having spurred Croatia to declare independence which led inevitably to the outbreak of war. 
Prag urged the Community to discourage the rise of extreme nationalistic positions and promote 
cooperation leading to a customs union between the republics (Prag, 1113/1992, 94). 
In the 5 RCVs of the second stage in which the ED participated as a distinct political 
group in the European Parliament, total unanimity was displayed but along with a high rate of 
absenteeism of 79.41 percent. Out of 14 roll-call votes, unanimity was reached on 10 occasions. s 
Overall, throughout the whole period between January 1991 and July 1992, the ED reached an 
extremely high index of agreement of 94.25 overshadowed by a fairly high level of absenteeism 
of 69.33. 
8 In the remaining three cases, one member abstained and in one case, specifically on amendment 1 of the loint 
Resolution of 11 September 1991, MEP Edward Kellett-Bowman went against the group's oflicia1 poSition. 
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1.5 The Greens 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
In March 1991, largely drawing on his personal experience as a member of the German minority 
in the Italian region of South Tyrol/Alto Adige, Alexander Langer expressed the Greens' dismay 
at the Yugoslav situation. The fulfilment of the autonomous aspirations of the Southern Slavs did 
not represent a viable solution to the fundamental problems afflicting the country which, would 
inevitably re-emerge within the six or eight sovereign republics (Langer, 14/3/1991, 223-224). 
The events, which followed with the fragmentation of the SFRY and the outbreak of a vicious 
civil confrontation, proved the accuracy of this prediction. 
The group supported a process of democratic reform in the SFRY aimed at protecting the 
rights of all ethnic groups. The future of the country had to be decided not under threat of force, 
but through negotiations among the representatives of all nationalities, including those of the 
autonomous provinces. Despite the fact that the Community respected and welcomed "the sense 
of identity, self-government and independence of .. peoples .. ", it had to reject the solution which 
pointed to using ethnic incompatibilities with the objective of creating divisions and drawing 
supposedly neat borders, moving frontiers or creating more states (Langer, 14/3/1991,223-224). 
They called for the cessation of fighting, the resumption of diplomatic and political negotiations 
and the enforcement of an embargo (Monnier-Besombes, 16/5/1991, 269). 
In September 1991, the Greens expressed their discontent that hardly any principles 
contained in their Motion had filtered into the Joint Resolution negotiated with the Socialists, the 
Christian Democrats, the EDA and the EUL groups (Langer, 10/9/1991,85-86). The compromise 
resolution represented a "chapter of good intentions unable to put a stop to a conflict which was 
already under way" (EP Debate, 10/9/1991). 
The group clearly blamed the Serbs for the bloodshed and the continuation of the war. 
By October, the majority of the Greens had tipped in favour of the recognition of the new 
republics (Monnier-Besombes, 9/10/1991, 167). The group also proposed the sending of a UN 
mediation force to the area, which without taking the form of a military expedition, would take 
over the custody of demilitarized zones. The initiative was welcomed of convening a conference 
in The Hague where the opposing parties in Yugoslavia would finally speak together. The Greens 
hoped that the Community would provide assistance to the separation process by duly monitoring 
that fundamental rights were not infringed (Langer, 9/10/1991, 169-170). 
At the November session, incredulity and shame were expressed with regard to the 'wait-
and-see' approach taken by the Community towards the events unfolding in Croatia. Reference 
was made to the analogous case of Kosovo when the EC had also remained silent vis-a-vis the 
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martyrdom of the Albanian people (Taradash, 2011111991, 157). 
Although the Greens initially endorsed the maintenance of the territorial and political 
integrity of Yugoslavia, they shifted in favour of recognition of the new republics because of 
MiloseviC's brutal policy. The group therefore advocated the dispatch of a buffer force to the 
area. The option of dividing the country along ethnic lines was also ruled out as being against the 
principle of peaceful coexistence on which the European Community was first conceived and 
founded. The first stage of the crisis found the Greens relatively cohesive in their voting 
behaviour, with a very high IA of 83.41 percent but with a fairly high rate of absenteeism of 
63.51 percent. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
During the March 1992 session, the Greens reiterated their opposition to the ethnic division into 
cantons of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, they expressed their support for the recognition of 
Macedonia as this would not bring any dangerous implications for the territorial integrity of 
Greece (Langer, 1113/1992, 93). 
Langer put forward the view that "virtually nothing ha[d] been done to support the 
peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia" and that the Community had failed to back Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia. He entreated the CSCE forces to intervene in order to halt the 
hostilities, whilst granting EC assistance to refugees and Serbian deserters seeking asylum 
(Langer, 12/5/1992, 74). 
At the June 1992 session, Langer conveyed to the House the common position reached 
between 30 May and 1 June by peace groups from all parts of former Yugoslavia,9 aimed at 
ending the armed confrontation The sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro were a clear 
condemnation of the aggression perpetrated in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they alone would neither 
halt the war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina nor prevent the spreading of war in other 
neighbouring areas such as Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Sandrak. 
The international community was called on to recognize the Republic of Macedonia and to allow 
the Albanian representatives lawfully elected in Kosovo on 24 May 1992 to sit as legitimate 
partners at the negotiating table. Furthermore, the Serbs had to be persuaded to undertake 
negotiations to solve the crisis. Only upon a final settlement should the embargo be lifted. After 
imposing a definitive ceasefire, the international community had to secure peace by placing the 
affected zones under military supervision (Langer, 9/6/1992, 56). 
9 Between 30 May and 1 June 1992. peace groups from Croatia. Serbia. Kosovo. Slovenia. Macedonia. Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Capodistria and Dalmatia gathered together at the invitation of Austrian university students and 
the Serb-Croatian initiative and discussion group to draw up a common position. 
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During the second stage the Greens felt that combined diplomatic, economic and restricted 
military means should be employed in order to stop the massacre in Bosnia. There was stem 
opposition to any form of ethnic cleansing while unwavering support was given to plans to assist 
refugees. The second stage registered a small increase in the index of agreement up to 85.97 
along with a rising degree of MEP participation in the RCV s reflecting medium average 
percentage of absenteeism of 52.53. 
Throughout the whole period, the Greens achieved a very high level of cohesion at 84.82 
percent with the lowest rate of absenteeism among the political groups, 57.47. As such, David 
Bowler and Shaun Farrell's overall criticism of the Greens as being "unwilling or unable to 
adequately pool their strategies and resources as a group" cannot be extended to the 1991-1992 
Yugoslav crisis, showing, instead, a fairly cohesive voting behaviour and a less accentuated level 
of absenteeism compared to the other political groups (Bowler and Farrell, 1992, 134). 
1.6 The European Unitarian Left 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
In March 1991, the European Unitarian Left was especially concerned about the critical 
developments of the situation in Yugoslavia which was seen as a Community problem that could 
alter the geopolitical balances of the Balkan region and especially affect neighbouring countries 
such as Austria, Italy, Germany and Greece. The group stressed that in order to defeat the 
emerging forms of authoritarianism, the EC member states had to work together for achieving 
a democratic and multi-ethnic European Union, of which the Yugoslav federation could become 
a part in the future (De Piccoli, 14/3/1991, 216). The EUL was in favour of the territorial 
integrity of the Yugoslav state, although it stressed the necessity to promote institutional reforms 
with the aim of safeguarding the autonomy of every region, granting a certain degree of 
independence to each republic and respect for human rights and all the ethnic groups. The 
Community should also adopt the third financial protocol with Yugoslavia and verify whether an 
association agreement could be concluded, provided that the crisis was resolved and that 
fundamental rights were fully respected (De Piccoli, 14/3/1991, 216). 
In May 1991, the group claimed that "the Council should take action to safeguard the 
integrity of the Yugoslav state". The Italian MEP Trivelli pointed out that the agreements between 
the Italian government and the Yugoslav federation, finally sealed by the Osimo Treaty of 1975, 
should remain in force. Peaceful solutions should be promoted and civil wars should be prevented 
at any costs by trying to achieve an understanding between the various ethnic enclaves (Trivelli. 
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16/5/1991,268). 
By July 1991, the EUL had tipped towards a more flexible stance over the future of 
Yugoslavia. The group congratulated the Community Troika consisting of Foreign Ministers from 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal on their success achieved at Brioni. The European 
Unitarian Left condemned the ferocity of the JNA attacks against Slovenes and Croats. It argued 
that the European Community should not propose the preservation of the Yugoslav state, nor 
regard its disintegration as inevitable. A revision of the constitutional positions of Yugoslavia 
should be undertaken, yet the Community should not be allowed to dictate the terms. Negotiations 
should be carried out by taking into consideration the right of self-determination of the Yugoslav 
people as well as the rights of the minorities (Napolitano, 9/711991, 76). However, the group 
rejected the creation of homogeneous national microstates based on the banishment or repression 
of minorities. In the words of the Italian MEP Rossetti, "[i]t would be anachronistic to consider 
the creation of states on a purely ethnic basis" (Rossetti, 10/911991, 86-87). 
The President of the Council should address the Southern Slavs with a televised message 
inviting them to desist from aggressive nationalistic attitudes and to seek peaceful ways of 
coexistence. As the Italian MEP Giorgio Napolitano pointed out, the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia represented "a test ( ... ) of the European Community'S ability to act in situations of 
acute crisis in [Europe] and .. a test of how far it [was] possible to transform the existing Central 
and Eastern European structures, without causing savage disintegration" (Napolitano, 9/7/1991, 
76). 
Once they had achieved their independence, the various republics of former Yugoslavia 
should encourage forms of voluntary association of economic and institutional nature. In October 
1991, the EUL expressed concern at the proliferation of "war mentality between the parties" 
which, by appealing to the most fanatical nationalistic attitudes, would precipitate political and 
religious confrontation. By contrast, the group advocated negotiation without laying down time 
limits (De Piccoli, 911011991, 167). However, if the appeals for a ceasefire were to remain 
unheard, steps should be taken at the CSCE and UN levels to dispatch a peacekeeping force to 
the area in order to prevent the spreading of the fighting to other cities and to the Republic of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Support should be given to the enforcement of a strict embargo on arms 
sales, the UN embargo on petroleum products and the suspension of the cooperation agreements 
as well as the compensatory measures for the cooperative republics (De Piccoli, 20/11/1991, 
157). 
The EUL was initially in favour of preserving the Federation, albeit introducing 
institutional reforms and a certain degree of autonomy for the republics. However. over the 
summer 1991 its official view shifted towards pro-recognition and the deployment of peacekeeping 
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forces. Over the first stage, the members of the European Unitarian Left boasted a remarkable 
degree of congruity of 95.06 with one of the lowest, though still high rate of absenteeism of 
71. 03 percent. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
In March 1992, the European Unitarian Left expressed concern about the situation in the territory 
of former Yugoslavia (De Piccoli, 11/3/1992, 92). The group acknowledged the decision of the 
people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to seek independence. However, it insisted that prior to proceeding 
to the official recognition of the new republic, the Community should prevent the partitioning of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina into cantons and encourage peaceful cohabitation of the various ethnic 
groups. The EUL also urged the Community to give "a new and strong impetus" to the Peace 
Conference which, in conjunction with the actions carried out by the UN peacekeeping forces, 
should pave the way for the settlement of the crisis. Finally, the necessity was stressed for the 
Community to undertake negotiations for establishing cooperation agreements with the new 
republics (De Piccoli, 11/3/1992, 92, Trivelli, 9/4/1992, 274). 
On 12 May 1992, the European Unitary Left stressed that the Community had to search 
for a solution to the crisis by ensuring the inviolability of borders and respect for minorities. The 
group criticized the EC political leaders who seemed to follow the events in Yugoslavia "just like 
newspaper readers rather than as responsible political forces" (Papayannakis, 12/5/1992,71). The 
group also endorsed the Stavrou ReportlO which proposed the suspension of extending the 
PHARE programme to Croatia until the rights of the Serbian as well as the Italian minorities were 
full y recognized (Rossetti, 7/7/1992, 104). 
Throughout the second stage, the EUL placed emphasis on the survival of a multi-ethnic 
society in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the rights of all groups should be duly respected. The stage 
saw a marginal decline in the level of group cohesion to 89.09 and with a higher percentage of 
absenteeism 80.25 percent. Between January 1991 and July 1992, the group reached an extremely 
high index of agreement of 91. 78 percent yet accompanied by a high rate of absenteeism of 
76.10. 
10 The Sravrou Repon amended the Commission proposal of extending economic aid to Slovenia and Croatia. 
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1.7 The European Democratic Alliance 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
As early as March 1991, the European Democratic Alliance expressed the view that the 
Community should not interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs, but should press for its political 
viability by financially assisting the country's economic development and promoting a process of 
democratization. Only by achieving these two objectives, rather than "through interference, 
dissension and outbreaks of nationalist unrest" would the Balkan states be able to reach stability 
(Nianias, 14/3/1991, 225-226). 
In July, the EDA stressed the importance of taking into account the wishes of the 
Slovenian and Croatian populations especially as their demand for independence was "broad-
based, peaceful and democratic" (de la Malene, 9/7/1991, 76-77). 
At the September session, the group supported diplomatic and political measures while 
encouraging the dispatch of a large peacekeeping force to secure the rights of the minorities. The 
threat of non-cooperation was also envisaged as an ultimate deterrent to the continuance of the 
conflict and the consequent violations of fundamental rights (Alliot-Marie, 10/9/1991, 87). 
Criticism was directed at the Twelve for exercising contradictory national policies that prevented 
the achievement of a common stance. With reference to the referendum held in Macedonia, the 
Greek MEP Dimitrios Nianias pointed out the irregularities surrounding the voting procedure and 
the atmosphere of intimidation which prevailed. In addition, the creation of another independent 
state joining "the ring of states hostile to Serbia" would deteriorate further the situation in the 
territory of former Yugoslavia. Finally, the Greek MEP denied the legal or ethnological existence 
of a Macedonian nation, defining it as nothing but "a distortion of history". There was no 
Macedonian national or cultural identity as its population consisted of a mixture of Slavs, Serbs, 
Bulgarians, Greeks and Albanians (Nianias, 10/9/1991, 91). This is a very contentious point since 
the Macedonians believe that they have a separate identity. 
Overall, the group discouraged the formation of a multitude of small countries in the 
Balkans on the grounds that they were not economically self-sufficient and would inevitably fight 
for resources (Nianias, 9/10/1991, 170). As such, the only wise policy for the Community was 
to promote dialogue between the parties in order to achieve peace and unity. 
The group supported the Council's decision to enforce sanctions on Yugoslavia, while 
introducing compensatory measures for the Slovenian and Croatian Republics which had proved 
to be willing to cooperate for the attainment of a peaceful solution to the crisis. In addition, the 
EC firm opposition concerning the abolition or the change of borders was shared by the EDA 
members (Nianias, 20/11/1991, 157). 
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The policy espoused by the European Democratic Alliance in relation to the Yugoslav 
crisis was in line with the position taken by Lord Carrington and the Community as a whole and 
could be simply summarized in a three-word slogan: peace, unity and democracy. Over the first 
stage, the EDA displayed a very high index of agreement of 88.89 percent accompanied by the 
highest rate of absenteeism of 83.84 percent. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
At the May 1992 session following the statements by Council and Commission on the situation 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the group stressed that its policy was not addressed against Serbs but 
against Belgrade's government. The Council's decision to set a deadline of 18 May for the INA 
to leave the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was strongly endorsed (de la Malene, 12/5/1992, 
72). Nianias pointed out that his prophetic statement that the creation of mini-states in the territory 
of former Yugoslavia would lead to civil war had unfortunately proved to be right. He also voiced 
his uncertainty about the full and parallel implementation of two opposing principles, maintenance 
of the existing borders and empowerment of minorities (Nianias, 12/5/1992, 74-75). 
In June 1992, the group rejected the adoption of the amendment introduced by Oostlander 
to his own Report concerning a military option. Doubts were once again raised by the Greeks 
concerning the recognition of Macedonia, as its constitution incorporated the principle of self-
determination, which held within the ambition of reuniting neighbouring regions even those 
belonging to other states. This was interpreted by Greece as a veiled threat of war. In addition, 
by naming the republic as 'Macedonia', the communist leader Kiro Gligorov sought to find 
further legitimation for his expansionist design. The Community had by all means to avert the 
spread of the conflict and prevent American military intervention in the region (Nianias, 
9/6/1992, 56-57). The European Democratic Alliance perceived the Serbian government as 
responsible for the bloodshed in Bosnia, though remaining against the military alternative in the 
belief that the crisis would not be solved by bullets. 
The second stage saw a small decrease in the voting cohesion of the group which reached 
81.82, compensated however by a lower level of absenteeism which dipped slightly to 79.65 
percent. Over the whole period, the average index of agreement was 85.00 percent while the rate 
of absenteeism was a marked 81.54 percent. 
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1.8 The European Right 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
As early as March 1991, the ER supported the quest for independence of the Yugoslav republics, 
distancing itself from the other political groups. The group drafted various Motions for 
Resolutions urging the international community to recognize the will of the Slovenian, Croatian 
and Macedonian peoples to become independent partners (Blot, 14/3/1991, 218) and to ease their 
journey from communism to democracy. 
The group attributed the main causes of the flare-up of the civil wars in former 
Yugoslavia to the paradoxical and unthinkable coexistence of communist and democratic regimes 
(Blot, 10/9/1991,87). It was inconceivable, for instance, for the Croatian government to promote 
the principle of a market economy "when federal laws still carr[ied] the stamp of the communist 
totalitarian regime" (Blot, 16/5/1991, 267). The Yugoslav Federation was destined to fragment 
as, among its members, some had opted for while others had rejected communism and intended 
to follow the path towards the establishment of a market economy (Blot, 917/1991, 77). 
Other factors were identified as the root cause of the crisis, notably the obstinacy of 
maintaining the Communist status-quo inherited from Marshall Tito, the federalist illusion, pan-
Serbian imperialism and Yugoslav open migratory policy which had sketched out an inextricable 
ethnic map (Blot, 917/1991, 77). 
In the ER view, the Community should recognize the new republics and endorse the inviolability 
of the internal borders. Both principles should be secured by the presence of buffer force on the 
ground that by monitoring the enforcement of ceasefires between belligerents would create a more 
conducive climate for negotiations. At a later stage, the question concerning the redrawing of 
frontiers could be readdressed as perhaps the most definitive solution to the problem of minorities 
(Blot, 10/9/1991, 87-88). The European Right also condemned the pressure exercised by the US 
Administration on the Slovenes and Croats to prevent the implementation of their declarations of 
independence, thus denying them the right of self-determination (Blot, 16/5/1991,267). 
Criticism was also levelled at the Community institutions and member states for their idle 
policy on recognition and embargo which, due to the uneven distribution of arms provisions in 
favour of the Federal Army, would accentuate the disparities between the fighters by privileging 
the Serbs (Blot, 917/1991, 77). 
In the following month, the group tabled a Motion of censure against the 
Commission with the purpose of indirectly hitting the Council. The ER reiterated its opposition 
to the proposal of enforcing an arms embargo in the region as it would only accentuate the 
imbalance between the parties to the benefit of the Serbs. In view of their geographical proximity 
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to the troubled area, the Community should be closely involved in the settlement of the war (Blot, 
9/1011991, 164-165). It also condemned the two-faced approach taken by the Community with 
regard to the Gulf and the Yugoslav crises (Antony, 20/11/1991, 158). 
The European Right deplored the fact that the Community had failed to prevent the Serbs 
from attacking Slovenia, Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina. It also blamed the Ee's 
unreasonable policy of discouraging the Slovenian and Croatian quest for independence, because 
it would inevitably lead to chaos in the Balkans. Criticism was levelled at the weak response of 
the Community to the Serbs, especially at the inability or perhaps unwillingness of the EC 
member states' governments to identify the gUilty party in the war. The ER most definitely leaned 
in favour of the internationalization of the conflict and therefore the deployment of a considerable 
military contingent in order to oppose the creation of a Greater Serbia and to prevent the 
Communist Serbian army from committing further ravages (Blot, 22 November 1991, 346). 
During this stage, the position of the ER group towards the Yugoslav crisis was unanimous, as 
the analysis of the RCVs also confirms, but its level of absenteeism was also high, equal to 76.39. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
In the group's view, the tragic events occurring in the territory of former Yugoslavia revealed 
the reality of "an artificial state with several nationalities locked into a straitjacket, in which some 
[sought] to dominate others, some [sought] freedom, autonomy and independence and others 
[used] force imperialistically in order to stifle this quest for freedom". In addition, the Yugoslav 
crisis revealed the inability and inactivity of the European Community which failed immediately 
to recognize the independence of the Slovenian and Croatian republics and to take strict and firm 
measures against the Serbs. Furthermore, the US Administration should be blamed for having 
played "the centralist card in Yugoslavia" for reasons of selfish commercial interests (Dillen, 
11/3/1992, 93-94). 
In the group's opinion, the Twelve could halt the war in Yugoslavia by taking joint 
actions against Milosevic's imperialistic ambitions (Dillen, 9/6/1992, 59). A decisive military 
intervention was therefore advocated to put an end to the genocide carried out against the Muslim 
population. The ER members firmly believed that the French and the British naval and air forces 
alone could defeat the Serbian artillery in a short period of time. However, for this to happen, 
the sovereign states within Europe had to come to an agreement (Antony, 9/6/1992, 57). 
In both stages, the group reached unanimity in its voting stance. This exceptional result, eased 
by the homogeneous composition of the group, needs to seen in the context of the high rate of 
absenteeism that oscillated between 76.39 and 81.17 percent over the two stages, resulting in an 
average rate of 79.02 percent. 
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1.9 The Rainbow Group 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
As early as February 1991, prior to the flare-up of the armed confrontation in former Yugoslavia, 
the Rainbow group drafted a Motion for a Resolution on the crisis in Kosovo. lI The Serbian 
policy of imposing its own language and culture on the Albanian minority was strongly 
condemned. The group highlighted the necessity of suspending trade negotiations until the Federal 
government had provided explicit guarantees on the safeguarding of human and minority rights. 
The group went further in stating that any future association agreement with the SFRY or 
financial assistance from the European Investment Bank had to be subject to an official 
commitment from the Yugoslav government to respect human rights and pluralism (Simeoni, 
14/3/1991, 216-217). The same preconditions had to be fulfilled if the Yugoslav government 
wished to join the Council of Europe (Vandemeulebroucke, 21/2/1991, 270). 
The Rainbow group challenged the view shared by the majority of the European 
Parliamentarians, that nationalist movements were the cause of conflicts in Yugoslavia. Therefore, 
it refused to sign the text of the March 1991 Joint Resolution which entailed "the commitment not 
to reinforce ethnic or nationalist differences which are irreconcilable with a European approach" . 
During the topical and urgent debate held on 16 May 1991, the group expressed its 
concern with the developments of the Yugoslav crisis, which had already "cost many human lives 
and the effects of which [were] unpredictable, [and] liable to fester at the gates of the 
Community". It condemned the policy espoused by the Council and Commission supporting the 
territorial unity of Yugoslav federation as a precondition for the country's membership of the 
Community. This policy was used as a coercive instrument by the reactionary forces in 
Yugoslavia. In rejecting paragraph 7 of the compromise resolution, the group insisted that "states 
[should not be seen] as sacred at the expense of democracy, which cannot exist without respect 
for the rights of individuals and peoples" (Simeoni, 16/5/1991,268). 
The Community should adopt a positive stance in the negotiations over the Yugoslav 
constitutional future starting on 1 August and be open to all options from that of a federal system, 
to a confederation, an association of states or simply of independent states. The Community had 
neither the authority nor the right to decide over the destiny of Yugoslav people, but they 
themselves had to decide whether they were prepared to live together. The group insisted that the 
July 1991 resolution make reference to the principle of self-determination, warning that. 
otherwise, it would not endorse the text (Vandemeulebroucke, 9/7/1991, 75-76). At the 
II Motion for a Resolution tabled by MEPs Jaak Vandemeulebroucke and Winifred Ewing. 
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September session, it stressed that the JNA was clearly acting as the Serbian government's 
military force. This intervention was regarded as exceeding the official task of protecting the 
external border of the Federation and therefore "equivalent to a military coup". The country's 
internal frontiers were also considered as not "immutable", although any change had to be 
achieved by peaceful means (Barrera i Costa, 10/9/1991, 87). The group denounced the EC's 
stubborn attitude of insisting upon the preservation of the unity of the Yugoslav Federation which 
supported "the Serbian dominance" (Vandemeulebroucke, 9/711991, 75-76, 9110/1991,166). The 
Rainbow MEPs reproached the EC-EPC for its inability to distinguish between the aggressor and 
the victim. It also censured the choice of extending the arms embargo in the area, as it would 
inevitably penalize the Slovenes and the Croats more than the Serbs (Vandemeulebroucke, 
9110/1991, 166, Christensen, Ib, 20/1111991, 176-177). The group envisaged the military option 
under the auspices of the WEU, UN or CSCE and only upon the consent of all warring parties 
(Christensen, Ib, 2011111991, 176-177, 22/1111991, 346). 
For the Rainbow group, the Serbian government was undoubtedly responsible for the 
flare-up of the conflict. The international community ought to help the republics in question to 
withstand MiloseviC's aggression first of all by seeking a solution through diplomatic channels. 
The Rainbow MEPs presented a united front during the RCVs of the pre-recognition stage, 
including, of course, the amendment proposed by them to the Joint Resolution of September 
1991. However, members' absenteeism reached the high level of 74.81 percent. 
b) Post-Recognition Stage 
During the March 1992 sitting, the Rainbow group expressed anxiety at the threat of the Serbian 
government not to withdraw the JNA from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, irrespective of 
any request from the Bosnian government. In the group's view, the Community should impose 
severe economic sanctions, insist on the removal of the JNA from Croatia and Bosnia as well as 
demand guarantees for the rights of Romanians in Kosovo and ensuring that no policy of 
settlements and annexation was carried out. The Spanish MEP Barrera i Costa endorsed the 
French President Mitterand's proposal for a "loose European Confederation where the Community 
would be associated with European countries" which had not yet fulfilled the requirements for full 
membership (Barrera i Costa, 1113/1992, 93). 
In May 1992, the group praised the EC observers for their courageous actions aimed at 
assisting the civilians and ensuring that ceasefires were upheld. There was disappointment at the 
response of the international community to the Yugoslav crisis, which had enormously differed 
from that directed to Saddam Hussein, following his invasion of Kuwait (Canavarro, 12/5/1992, 
72). 
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In the group's opinion, the European Community had limited itself to undertake a so-called 
'preventive diplomacy' by organizing a peace conference, without making real pressures on 
Yugoslavia for instance by suspending it from participating in the CSCE proceedings, by sending 
UN intervention troops with the task of compelling the Serbs to withdraw from the new republics, 
by disarming the local militias and so bringing the war to an end. The group strongly underlined 
the point that the Community should deny the official recognition of the new entity consisting of 
Serbia and Montenegro until peace was restored and the principles of inviolability of internal 
frontiers, respect for democracy, human rights and rights of minorities had been entirely fulfilled 
(Canavarro, 12/5/1992, 72). 
During the post-recognition stage, the Rainbow group sanctioned the use of diplomatic 
and economic means, envisaging UN military intervention solely as a last ditch effort to halt the 
conflict. The group's level of unanimous voting dropped drastically to 59 percent, displaying, 
however, a slight decrease in the rate of absenteeism of its members to 63.03 percent. Overall, 
the average index of agreement was of 74.95 percent accompanied by a percentage of absenteeism 
of 68.33. 
1.10 The Left Unity 
a) Pre-Recognition Stage 
During the March 1991 parliamentary debate, the spokesperson for the Left Unity, the Greek 
MEP Vassilis Ephremidis expressed the view that, considering the destabilizing repercussions in 
the Balkans and, generally, in the whole of Europe that the Yugoslav crisis might have caused, 
the Community had rightly taken a cautious and impartial attitude. Its actions had to be directed 
towards the economic sphere by granting financial assistance to the Yugoslav federation and 
towards the institutional political structure by favouring the necessary reforms aimed at averting 
the break-up of the Yugoslav state (Ephremidis, 14/3/1991, 226-227). 
While acknowledging the right of the Yugoslav people to self-determination, the Greek 
MEP Dimitrios Dessylas warned against the internal and external repercussions of the 
fragmentation of the Yugoslav state by challenging those countries which so ardently supported 
recognition to call with the same enthusiasm for the application of this principle when "the winds 
of Aeolus would bring this tactic howling into their own backyards and homes". He also warned 
against the peril of USA interference in the Balkans and the creation of a "German Europe from 
the Adriatic to the Baltic states which pose[d] a serious danger for the peoples of Europe 
including the Germans themselves" (Dessylas, 10/7/1991, 167). In September 1991, the Greek 
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MEP stated again his suspicion about German and American imperialistic ambitions in the area. 
He also accused "those who sow[ed] discord and [sold] arms to Yugoslavia" of lighting "the fuse 
of Europe's powderkeg" (Dessylas, 11/9/1991, 162). 
The LU was especially concerned about the vacuum and chaos which would result 
following the formal dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the dangerous 
repercussions in the rest of Europe. The group argued that motives of economic self-interest as 
well as of strategic political influence were behind the hurried decision to acknowledge the 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia (Ephremidis, 9/10/1991, 167-168). For the French MEP 
Philippe Herzog, the Community should neither back Serbian expansionism nor Croatian 
nationalism (Herzog, 10/9/1991, 88-89). Criticism was therefore directed at the text tabled by 
other groups within the EP as it would not fulfil the obligation towards peace in the Balkans and 
in Europe (Ephremidis, 9/10/1991, 167-168). 
At the November 1991 session, the LU voiced regret that within the Community some 
member states ("that did not need to be named") intended to exploit the disintegration of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the proliferation of small republics in order to gain 
influence in the area. It then expressed opposition to the policy of sanctions which inevitably 
would affect the civilian population without solving the crisis. Finally, it called for an effective 
involvement of the United Nations in the search for a peaceful solution (Ephremidis, 20/11/1991, 
157 -158). As to the strategies to be adopted to solve the crisis, the group realistically envisaged 
the possibility of having to resort to the use of arms, stressing that in such event the CSCE along 
with the UN should take the lead in the management of the military operations (Herzog, 
10/9/1991, 88-89). 
As confirmed by the leader of the Left Unity Rene-Emile Piquet during the course of an 
interview, the official line of the group was against immediate recognition of Slovenia and 
particularly of Croatia. These strong reservations were founded on the realization that a policy 
backing the independence of the constituent republics from the Federation was not the most 
positive approach in the quest for a suitable and peaceful solution. The recognition of the 
secessionist republics by Germany, soon followed by the other EC member states, made the 
Yugoslav problem intractable. Recognition meant that the battles fought in former Yugoslavia 
were no longer civil but interstate wars. As to measures to be taken, the Community should bring 
its contribution to the negotiation of a peaceful solution without having to resort to arms (Piquet 
interview, 1996). Over the first stage, although the Left Unity's index of agreement over the 
RCVs on Yugoslavia was rather high, at 80 percent, the rate of absenteeism was also very high 
at 82.54. 
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b) Post-Recognition Stage 
At the March 1992 session, the group urged the Community to grant all possible humanitarian 
assistance to the republics of former Yugoslavia and to advocate political solutions. It also 
stressed that with hindsight the question of recognition should have been fully discussed first and 
foremost by the parties so that the outbreak of violence could have been prevented (Alavanos, 
11/3/1992, 95). The Community had to avoid repeating in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the 
same mistake made with respect to Croatia, viz recognizing the independence of the republic 
(Ephremidis, 1113/1992, 95). Finally, as to the case of the Republic of Macedonia, Ephremidis, 
who shared the concern of many Greek MEPs, confirmed that the opposition of Greece was 
motivated by the fear of possible territorial claims towards its own province by its namesake in 
former Yugoslavia (Ephremidis, 1113/1992, 95, 12/5/1992, 75, 9/6/1992, 57-58). 
The brief contribution of Alavanos to the May debate consisted in addressing some 
questions to the Portuguese Presidency requesting more detailed information about Council's 
decisions over the Yugoslav crisis. Specifically, if and when unilateral actions had to be taken by 
the Community regarding the Republic of Macedonia and which measures had to be adopted in 
order to protect minorities in the above republic (Alavanos, 12/5/1992, 73). 
In May 1992, the group defined the EC's behaviour vis-a-vis Yugoslavia as "the policy 
of Pontius Pilatus". It also criticized the view that the Serbs were the only party responsible for 
the conflict and the fact that the Community had recognized states which did not fulfil all 
conditions. (Ephremidis, 12/5/1992, 75). 
With regard to the Oostlander Report, the LU group put forward strong reservations over 
the need of greater military involvement by the Community. The crisis had to be settled under 
the aegis of the United Nations by insisting on compliance with the principle of inviolability of 
the national borders set after the Second World War and respect for minorities (Ephremidis, 
9/6/1992, 57-58). A more extreme view was expressed by the Greek MEP Dimitrios Dessylas, 
according to whom the only solution to the Yugoslav conflict required that the people fight for 
peace and social development by expelling imperialist adventurers such as the USA, NATO, 
EEC, WEU, "the NATO-ized CSCE and the Americanized UN". People had to reject war, 
racism, nationalism, dictatorship, forceful modification of borders as well as violation of minority 
rights (Dessylas, 9/6/1992, 59). 
At the July 1992 session, LU opposed the proposal to extend the PHARE programme to 
Croatia in view of its coresponsibility for the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The group also 
deplored the fact that both the European Parliament and the Community had ignored the worrying 
developments that led to further fragmentation in the territory of former Yugoslavia (Alavanos. 
7/7/1992, 104-105). 
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Overall, the impact of the Left Unity group on the definition of the EP's stance on the 
conflict was modest, often with an adversary position, its contribution consisted mainly in the 
introduction of amendments (Alavanos written interview, 7/1995). The cohesion figures 
marginally improved over the second stage with an increased rate of cohesion of 83.64 percent 
accompanied by a higher MEP participation, producing a level of absenteeism of 78.32 percent. 
Overall, the index of agreement showed a very high average figure of 82 percent along with a 
rate of absenteeism of 80.22 per cent. There was an especially high level of absenteeism among 
the French MEPs who were not as keen to participate to the debates over Yugoslavia as their 
Greek colleagues. 
EP 
Chart 25a 
___ Absenteeism 
--.- IA 
EP Average 
Chart 25b 
X-AxiS 
_ Absenteeism 
_ IA 
l 
EP Index of Agreement and Level of Absenteeism: Yugoslav Crisis 
eft. 
~ 0 
100 
80 >--- . , _. \ f\ /' ~ .,. 
60 
40 
20 1----
o 
2 3 4 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
t S~g~1 69.41 61 .18 
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
ReVs 
Stage 2 
68.25 
64.70 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
-- ~. t=-=---
± 
Overall 
68.77 
63.12 
"I ' 
PG and EP Indices of Agreement: Yugoslav Crisis 
Chart 26a 
100 I 
l-
80 , 
6O r-
'#. r-
40 
20 
o r 
clallst 
Group 
~ I So 
~ J EP 
.. D LD 
I ED 
~ I Gr 
I EU 
~ I ED 
I ER 
RB 
I LU 
tnd 
I EP 
D 
~ 
~ens 
L 
A 
:::R 0 
100 
I 
8O ~ 
L 
I 
6O ~ 
40 
20 
o 
-
--
--
--
Political Groups' Level of Absenteeism: Yugoslav Crisis 
Chart 26b 
.=--=-~~ 
Stage 1 Stage 2 
63.21 61.01 
72.68 70.06 
71 .88 73.94 
63.73 79.41 
63.51 52.53 
71 .03 80.25 
---
83.84 79.65 
--
76.39 81 17 
74.81 63.03 
82.54 78.32 
88.89 87.88 
-----
69.41 6825 
- --- . 
-
- - -
I----
r- --
--
-
-
-
Overall 
62.00 
71 .24 
73.01 
69.33 
57.47 
76.10 
81 .54 
79.02 
6833 
80.22 
88.33 
68.77 
2. Level of Transnationality in Political Groups' Voting Behaviour on 
the Yugoslav Crisis 
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The creation of the EP political groups not along national lines but according to political 
affiliation was designed by the founding fathers of the European Community in order to overcome 
the rigidity of national divisions and eventually achieve a supranational dimension. The following 
section aims to assess if, despite the MEPs' natural inclination to bring with them their individual 
national identities to the EP, this experiment has succeeded and if and to what extent nationality 
remained one of the major factors determining group voting outcome in relation to the Yugoslav 
crisis. Concomitantly, an attempt is made to establish whether heterogeneity can be considered 
a factor deterring the achievement of a high level of cohesion. The indices of transnationality of 
the various PGs on Yugoslavia have been calculated on 20 RCVs. 
Chart 27 shows that the level of transnationality in voting within the various political 
groups was fairly high with the exception of the ED, ER, EUL. The highest degree of 
transnationality of .819 was registered within the Christian Democrats, immediately followed by 
the Liberals with .817 and the Socialist group with .807. When considering the rate of 
transnationality in relation to MEP voting behaviour, the actual composition of each political 
group and, more specifically, the number of effective nationalities contained within it, needs to 
be considered. 
As expected, the larger groups showed a much higher degree of transnationality when 
compared to the smaller groups, except for the LDR and Green groups. The national element 
remained strongly present among most Greek MEPs with regard to the thorny question of the 
recognition of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (or the Republic of Skopje as they 
preferred to call it). A comparison of the tables on PGs' indices of transnationality on the RCVs 
(ITv-s) on Yugoslavia and on PGs' composition (lTc-S)12 shows that the former was less than 
the latter for most PGs, albeit to a different degree. Conversely, an opposite trend was registered 
by the EUL which appeared to be more cohesive and more multinational in its RCV on 
Yugoslavia than in its configuration. By way of conclusion, the data prove that no direct 
relationship existed between the heterogeneity of the EP political groups and their level of 
cohesion. 
12 For the Itv-s on the individual RCVs see Appendix. For the Itc-s of the various Pgs. see Tables la-If in 
Chapter II. 
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3. MEP National Allegiance Versus Political Group Loyalty 
By comparing the results of the indices of agreement of PGs and of national delegations in the 
European Parliament with respect to the Yugoslav crisis, it can be concluded that group allegiance 
was higher than national solidarity when voting on Yugoslavia, except for the Rainbow group 
which, as previously stated in the thesis, spanned a rather wide ideological spectrum. The 
delegations from Luxembourg, Great Britain, Greece and Spain displayed high levels of 
agreement. Cohesion within a delegation as small as the one from Luxembourg is not difficult to 
understand. However, national solidarity does not seem to conflict with MEPs' allegiance to their 
respective groups and generally goes along with their strong Europeanist sentiments. Also in the 
case of the Spanish MEPs, it can be said that group allegiance was more of a concern than 
national imperatives. In fact, a closer look at the RCVs for the Socialist, EPP, LDR, EUL and 
Rainbow groups shows that despite the appearances, political allegiance prevailed over nationality. 
In the case of the Greek delegation, the high level of solidarity resulted from the 
perceived threat that an expansionistic policy lay behind the recognition of the Republic of 
Macedonia, a name also borne by one of Greece's provinces, and the ambition of reuniting 
Macedonian people. However, it was only in a few RCVs that Greek MEPs formed a cohesive 
front, disregarding the positions of their respective groups. Overall, they endorsed the official line 
of their groups. 
The high level of cohesion of the British delegation was the result of the very high level 
of absenteeism of British MEPs within the EPP group with no members turning up to the ReV 
session between votes 1 and 14. It is interesting to note that after the merger with the ED group 
in the last 5 votes, the group had some representatives at the voting sessions that fully agreed with 
the official policy of the EPP group. However, the British Labour delegation which regularly 
attended the voting sessions, also followed the preferences indicated by the Socialist group with 
only one exception, in vote 6, when the British contingent was split with 16 members abstaining 
and 13 voting in favour, in line with the official group standpoint. 
In the case of the Greens, the British members turned up on three occasions only, but did 
support the group majority while in the case of the Rainbow group, the British MEP only 
bothered to turn up on one occasion, abstaining from the vote and failing to support the voting 
preference of the group majority. 
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4. Political Groups' Voting Similarity on the Yugoslav Crisis 
The purpose of this section is to gauge the distance between the EP political groups over their 
respective twenty roll-call votes on the 1991-1992 Yugoslav crisis. Table 7 illustrates the voting 
similarity percentages (VSPs) reached by the PGs in the two stages of the crisis as well as during 
the whole period. Despite the obvious divergences of views between the EP political groups in 
the Yugoslav case, the data indicate that quite a high voting similarity percentage resulted between 
the Socialists, the Christian Democrats, the EUL and the EDA members. By virtue of their 
'historical alliance', the two major groups, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats showed 
similar voting behaviour. The highest VSP of 87.48 percent was, however, achieved somewhat 
surprisingly between the ED and the EUL groups, while the lowest of 23.40 percent was 
registered between the ED and the ER groups. Voting behaviour analysis has also confirmed that 
the Left Unity, albeit closer to the Socialists and the EUL, remained distant from the other 
groups. 
Throughout the whole period, the ER seemed ostracized from the rest of PGs. Yet, its 
spurned participation in the drafting of joint resolutions did not discourage its members from 
going it alone with their endeavours to formulate policies over Yugoslavia. The Rainbow 
members appeared virtually equidistant from their colleagues in five of the other EP political 
groups, their voting gap increasing in relation to both the extreme wings, the European Right and 
the Left Unity. A comparison of the VSPs between the various groups conclusively refutes the 
existence of a neat left-right cleavage in the chamber with regard to the Yugoslav issue. A certain 
voting discipline was imposed within the various groups as the official party line generally 
prevailed despite a few defecting members. The above statistics also revealed that the bigger the 
group, the greater its chances to act as a political magnet to the other groups, irrespective of their 
ideological colours. 
Table 7. Political Groups' Voting Similarity on the Yugoslav Crisis 
SOC EPP LOR EO GREEN EUL EOA ER RB LU INO 
Overall 80.58 68.65 75.41 62.48 87.33 81.44 25.13 52.16 68.91 69.96 
- -SOC stage 1 80.03 59.49 74.95 61 .67 84.61 91.40 3.72 42.92 7929 7758 
r---
stage 2 81.03 76. 14 7p.24 63.14 89.55 73.28 42.25 58.04 60.42 66.49 
Overall 80.58 80.37 82.32 67.03 74.41 80.94 33.74 64.25 50.81 70.93 
- --EPP _ stage 1 80.03 63.85 77.19 58.68 68.31 73.79 24.22 52.97 60.92 71.33 
stage 2 81.03 93.88 91.55 73.86 79.41 86.78 41.35 71.43 42.54 7075 
Overall 68.65 80.37 70.99 75.57 64.24 77.12 45.33 67.24 43.50 74.42 
LOR stage 1 59.49 63.85 56.89 78.91 47.79 61.74 49.30 60.56 51.70 7684 
~ 
--
stage 2 7f3.14 93.88 96.36 72.84 77.71 89.70 42.16 71 .SO 36.80 72.42 
Overall 75.41 82.32 70.99 71.62 87.48 81.85 23.40 62.34 43.91 54.58 
-
-EO stage 1 74.95 77.19 56.89 55.85 87.19 71.76 25.52 41.87 63.86 4917 
-. 
-
stage 2 76.24 91.55 96.36 100.00 88.00 100.00 20.00 91.00 8.00 60.00 1 
Overall 62.48 67.03 75.57 71.62 57.00 69.40 28.79 77.48 45.45 65.73' 
-GREEN __ stage 1 61.67 58.68 78.91 55.85 49.21 64.65 46.02 68.18 7131 65 76 
--
stage 2 63.14 73.86 72.84 100.00 63.38 73.29 15.00 83.40 24.29 65.71 
Overall 87.33 74.41 64.24 87.48 57.00 79.22 26.17 46.34 66.44 57.92 
- 1-- r-- --EUL I- stage 1 84.61 68.31 47.79 87.19 49.21 8457 13.89 30.16 75.43 53.33 
- -
stage 2 89.55 79.41 77.71 88.00 63.38 74.85 36.00 56.65 59.09 60.00 
Overall 81.44 80.94 77.12 81.85 69.40 79.22 25.93 66.79 51.67 65.63 
-- -
_.-
--EOA __ stage 1 9140 73.79 61.74 71 .76 64.65 84.57 6.25 50.00 73.33 7333 
~- - - - ' -
stage 2 7328 86.78 89.70 100.00 73.29 74.85 41.67 77.47 33.94 62. 12 
Overall 25.13 33.74 45.33 23.40 28.79 26.17 25.93 42.68 48.89 42.22 
-
- -
. - -
-
ER stage 1 3.72 2422 49.30 25.52 46.02 1389 6.25 57.14 23.75 2667 
- - - - - - -
stage 2 42.25 41 .35 42.16 20.00 15.00 36.00 41.67 3255 69.00 SO. 00 
Overall 52.16 64.25 67.24 62.34 77.48 46.34 66.79 42.68 35.54 57.99 
I- - - - - - -RB stage 1 4292 5297 60.56 41.87 6818 30 16 5000 5714 44.29 46.67 
- - - - - - - - -
-
stage 2 5804 7143 71 .50 91 .00 8340 56.65 77 47 32~ 29.96 8314 
Overall 68.91 50.81 43.50 43.91 45.45 66.44 51 .67 48.89 35.54 47.92 
- .. 
- -- - - -- --
LU ._ _ stape .1 7929 6092 5170 8386 71.31 7543 73.33 23.75 44.29 55.33 
---- - -
- -- - - - -- --
stage 2 6042 4254 36.80 800 24.29 5909 3394 6900 2998 44 55 
Overall 69.96 70.93 74.42 54.58 65.73 57.92 65.63 42.22 57.99 47.92 
- - -- -- - - - -
INO stage 1 77 58 7133 78.84 4917 6576 53.33 73.33 26.67 46.67 5533 
- - -- - -- I-
stage 2 66.49 7075 7242 60.00 65.71 6000 6212 5000 6314 44 55 
Chapter VI 2-t2 
5. Intergroup Cooperation in Shaping the European Parliament's Stance on the 
Yugoslav Crisis 
This inquiry does not illustrate all 20 RCVs taken on the Yugoslav case, but only the most 
controversial. 13 The first RCV was held by the EP on 15 March 1991 and concerned paragraph 
2 of the Joint Resolution on the situation in Yugoslavia (B3-0395, 0397/fin, 0399, 0403, 0431 
and 0482), stating that the EP "reaffirm[ed] ( .. ) the position frequently expressed by Parliament 
and the Council and more recently by EPC in favour of 'the unity and territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia"'. The Joint Motion, tabled by the Socialists, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, 
the Greens, the European Unitarian Left and the European Democratic Alliance, found 
overwhelming consensus in the House, except for the aforementioned paragraph which was 
opposed by the EPP. 
The crisis was discussed only very briefly during the May 1991 session where all groups, 
with the exception of the Left Unity, presented their own individual texts of Motions for 
Resolutions. However, on 16 May, a joint text, which was tabled by the Socialist, the EPP, the 
LDR, the ED, the Green, the EUL, the EDA and the Rainbow groups, was endorsed by the 
House by 101 votes in favour and only 2 against. The EPP managed to secure the inclusion of 
a new Recital expressing concern "at the constitutional crisis which had been caused by the refusal 
of the Serbian representatives to elect to the Presidency the Croatian member of the Praesidium 
pursuant to the principles of the Constitution" (OlEC C 158/1991, 141). 
The Rainbow group requested a split vote on paragraph 7 which read "[the European Parliament], 
while reiterating the preference of the European Community and the international community 
more generally for the maintenance of one federal Yugoslavia, insists that this cannot and must 
not be seen as a willingness to countenance the suppression of democracy and human rights". The 
efforts of the Rainbow group were in vain, as the paragraph was adopted and included in the text 
of the Joint Resolution. 
In September 1991, the Socialists, EPP, EUL and EDA groups tabled a Joint Motion for 
a Resolution on the Situation in Yugoslavia, which was adopted by the House by roll-call vote, 
as requested by the Liberals. 14 As a result, the majority of LDR members abstained from the 
vote while 2 MEPs Defraigne and Holzfuss voted against. The Greens also abstained from the 
vote with the exception of the Italian MEP Falqui who supported the Joint Motion. As expected, 
13 Full details of all RCVs are illustrated in the Appendix.. 
14 Joint Resolution B3-1325. 1360. 1371, 1372 and 1390 of 11 September 1991 tabled by Socialist. EPP. EUL. 
EDA and Prag. 
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due to the role of opposition often taken by the ER, the text of whole resolution was unanimously 
rejected by the group, whilst being passed by the House with 208 votes in favour, 10 against and 
70 abstentions. An amendment presented by the Rainbow group, urging the international 
recognition of the breakaway republics in case of continued attacks by the JNA, was rejected by 
157 votes against, 46 in favour and 8 abstentions. The amendment was taken by a roll-call vote 
at the request of the Christian Democrats. The second part of paragraph 19 was also subject to 
a roll-call vote following the request of the Rainbow group and finally approved by 196 votes out 
of 215. All 7 Rainbow members present at the sitting along with the Irish MEP Patrick Cooney 
rejected the inclusion of the paragraph. Among those abstaining from the vote were all 4 ER 
members present, 3 British Labour MEPs, Peter Crampton, Brian Simpson and Alex Smith, and 
4 Liberals, the Dutch MEP Gijs de Vries, the Spanish MEP Carles-Alfred Gasoliba i Bahm, the 
French MEP Jeannou Lacaze and the Danish MEP Tove Nielsen. On 22 November 1991, the 
whole text of the Joint Motion for a Resolution was adopted by RCV, as requested by the EPP, 
after a long voting marathon imposed by the Greens. 15 
On 12 March 1992, the House passed a Joint Resolution on the situation in former 
Yugoslavia especially focusing on the Bosnian crisis, after having scrutinized the different parts 
of the text. 16 As requested by the EUL paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and second part of paragraph 23 
were voted by roll-call vote. 17 While the first three paragraphs were approved respectively by 
an overwhelming majority, the last was rejected by a slim majority of 83 out of 165 with 7 
abstentions from all ER members attending the vote as well as the German Christian Democrat 
MEP Bernhard Salzer, the Italian Communist MEP Pasqualina Napoletano and a German 
Independent. The first three aforementioned paragraphs were the object of many disputes, 
especially by Greek members. In the first case, the Greek contingent was split down the middle 
15 The Greens requested a split vote on Recitals A,B, Recitals C,D and Paragraph 1, Paragraph 2, Paragraph 
3, Paragraphs 4-5, Paragraphs 6-8, Paragraphs 9-10 and Paragraphs 11-12. 
16 On 12 March 1992, EP approved the Joint Resolution B3-405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411 and 413/92 
drafted by the Socialist, the EPP, the LOR, ED, EUL, Green, EDA and Rainbow groups after going through 
a series of votes on amendments, Recital 0, paragraph 14 which was subject to split vote requested by the 
Greens, paragraph 21, paragraph 23 which was also subject to a split vote on three parts. Finally, paragraphs 
11, 12, 15,23 (2nd part) were adopted by a RCV requested by the EUL group. 
17 11. [The European Parliament] takes note of the request from the former Yugoslav 'R~public of M.acedonia: 
for diplomatic recognition on the basis of the referendum of 8 September 1991, the .vle~s of the Badl.n.ter 
Commission on this request, and the Council decision of 16 December 1991 on the gUIdelines for recognition. 
12. Urges that any change in the constitutional status of Macedonia mus.t be accompanied by u.nequivocal 
undertakings by the Macedonian Government and Parliament that they WIll not seek any terntonal changes 
in the frontiers of their republic. 
15. Believes, however, that it is totally unacceptable for political disagreements between Members States to 
be pursued by economic means: welcomes the condemnation of popular initiatives of this sort by the 
authorities of the Members State concerned. 
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with 5 EPP members in favour and 6, including 2 Socialists, 2 EPP, one Rainbow and one LU 
members, against. In the second case, among the Greek members attending the vote only 2 EPP 
members voted in favour while the remaining 9, including 4 Socialists, 3 EPP and 2 LU 
members, voted against. Amongst the Greek MEPs, paragraph 13 was supported by 2 members 
from the EPP and rejected by 9, specifically 4 Socialists, 3 EPP and 2 LU members. 
On 9 April 1992, the House passed a Motion for a Resolution on the crisis in Kosovo 
tabled by the LDR group, after having accepted two amendments and after a split vote on 
Paragraphs 3 and 4, as requested by the Socialists (OlEC C 125/1992). At the same sitting, the 
Christian Democrats tabled a Motion for a Resolution on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
requesting that it be put to a roll-call vote. After the introduction of three amendments, the text 
was adopted by the House, with 145 members voting for, 3 against and with just one abstention. 
On 11 June, after the drafting of three versions, Parliament finally adopted the Oostlander 
Report which concerned relations between the European Community and the republics of former 
Yugoslavia. This was passed by RCV at the request of Socialists and Christian Democrats with 
129 votes in favour, 3 against and 8 abstentions (Oostlander Repon, OlEC C 1761198). 
Coalitions were created across the parliamentary spectrum between the Socialists, Christian 
Democrats, Liberals, Italian Communists and French Gaullists. At the margins of the 
parliamentary debate there were the European Right as well as, yet to a lesser degree, the Left 
Unity and the Rainbow group whilst the Greens appeared generally distant from the other party 
groups. As expected, the larger groups continued to dominate the votes in the Parliament. It must 
be remembered that throughout the period in question, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats 
held respectively 180 and between 128-162 seats in the Chamber while, for instance, the 
European Unitarian Left and the European Right held only 29 and 14. Hence, it is not surprising 
that the internal proceeding of each group varied accordingly. Both Socialist and Christian 
Democrat MEPs had the possibility of an extreme specialization while the members of the smaller 
groups, such as the EUL and ER, had to share more competencies and their coverage could not 
be as meticulous and exhaustive. As a result, their chances of making an impact on the EP's 
stance were greatly diminished. Despite the evident shortcomings of the smaller groups, 
exceptional circumstances need to be considered. An example was provided by the Greens, and 
in particular by Langer who revealed a genuine commitment to promote peace initiatives in 
Yugoslavia. As his voice remained unheard beyond the parliamentary walls, the Yugoslav tragedy 
acquired the dimension of a personal battle which unfortunately ended with his untimely death. 
The Yugoslav case confirmed MEPs' tendency to acquire a certain expertise in a 
particular field often through their membership to a specific committee. By proving the quality 
of their interventions and affirming their competence, these MEPs become influential amongst 
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their colleagues and their opinions are generally followed and adopted as the official group 
position. The Socialists and the EPP cooperated to gain the majorities required to forge a 
parliamentary stance on the Yugoslav crisis with the result that the political centre was bound to 
vote together. Yet, the European Parliament did not fully succeed in speaking with one voice on 
the issue, reaching a fairly high IA for the whole period of 63.12 percent. Certainly, this does 
not represent an outstanding figure, but when considering the multiplicity of the political groups 
within the parliamentary spectrum, it is reasonable to claim that the EP's cohesion was 
nevertheless fairly impressive. If compared to the Gulf crisis, the Yugoslav case showed some 
progress with regard to the level of parliamentary cohesion. This positive outcome was, however, 
overshadowed by the higher level of absenteeism which touched the average percentage of 68.77. 
The high absenteeism at the RCV sessions suggests that, even more in the Yugoslav case, 
a sense of scepticism and frustration prevailed within the House due to the incapacity of the 
European Parliament to make any impact in the formation of EC/EU foreign policy, lacking 
effective powers over the Council. Throughout the two stages of the crisis, the EP tended to 
secure a multigroup coalition without relying on the participation of the ER, confirming the 
latter's marginalization within the Chamber. With extreme nationalism being the central issue in 
Yugoslavia, the fact that the far right was associated with a fervently nationalistic outlook may 
have had a significant bearing on this matter. In fact such a connection could be altogether 
unjustified as the policies advocated by the ER, whilst being to a certain extent nationalistic, were 
based on the respect of principles of democracy, ethnic tolerance and the right of people's self-
determination. Such exclusion is striking as the same policies envisaging both recognition and 
limited military intervention were ultimately adopted by the Chamber. As clearly substantiated 
by the following tabulations of statistics, the Christian Democrats seemed to be most active and 
influential in moulding the EP's stance on Yugoslavia. However, the presence of the two largest 
groups, the Socialist and the EPP was a constant factor in the adoption of parliamentary joint 
resolutions. The data show just one exception, the July 1992 text which was tabled only by EPP, 
EDA, Rainbow groups and von Alemann in her own name (OlEC C 24111992, 145-146; 134). 
As Woltjer confirmed, the call for an EC-CSCE selective air and naval intervention could 
certainly not gain the agreement of the Socialists who "were definitely not a party to it" (Woltjer, 
9/7 /1992, 243) and any decision on military intervention should be urgently and exclusively taken 
within the UN Security Council (Woltjer, 9/6/1992, 54). 
able 8. Breakdown of Adopted and Non-Adopted Motions for Resolutions on the Yugoslav Crisis 
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Table 9. Intergroup Cooperation: Adopted Joint Resolutions on the Yugoslav Crisis 
S EPP LDR ED EDA V EUL ER RB Ll' 
S x 9 7 6 6 6 8 0 5 1 
EPP 9 x 7 6 7 6 8 0 6 1 
LDR 7 7 X 5 5 6 6 0 5 I 
ED 6 6 5 x 3 5 5 0 3 I 
EDA 6 7 5 3 x 4 6 0 5 0 
V 6 6 6 5 4 x 5 0 4 I 
EUL 8 8 6 5 6 5 x 0 4 I 
ER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 
RB 5 6 5 3 5 4 4 0 x 0 
LU 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 x 
Between January 1991 and July 1992, the EP adopted 16 resolutions, of which 10 were 
drafted by political groups, 4 from individual political groups (2 from the EP, one from the 
Socialists, one from the EPP and 2 from committees. As Woltjer emphasized, the Socialists 
regretted that a Joint Resolution had not been produced by all political groups on the topic raised 
by Oostlander. This did not mean, however, that the Socialists did not share the view that both 
the Community and the EC member states' governments had to face the emergency stemming 
from the increasing flow of refugees from Bosnia as well as other corners of Yugoslavia. Among 
the adopted resolutions, 10 consisted of Motions negotiated and drafted jointly by political groups 
and 4 were Motions drafted by individual PGs: one by the Socialists, 2 by the Christian 
Democrats and one by the Liberals. For instance, in October 1991 the Joint Motion for a 
Resolution tabled by EPP, RB, EUL and Greens failed to reach a consensus so that the individual 
groups tried, to no avail, to get their respective\ Motions passed. Eventually only the Motion for 
a Resolution tabled by the Socialists succeeded and that by electronic vote. 
The European Right performed the function of an opposition within the parliamentary arena. A 
similar critical role was also occasionally exerted by the Rainbow group which played 'devil's 
advocate', to quote an example in the joint text of 16 May 1991 when, despite being one of the 
drafters of the Joint Motion, the group requested a split vote on paragraph 7. 
No Motions for Resolutions were passed from texts tabled by MEPs in their own name 
and hence without the official support of, their respective groups, showing that the groups and 
their network were dominant. The case provides examples of close intergroup cooperation: the 
'historic alliance' between the Christian Democrats and the Socialists proved successful on 9 
occasions when, along with various other groups, Joint Motions for Resolutions were adopted. 
The EUL and Christian Democrats as well as the EUL and the Socialists both cooperated on 8 
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occasions. Similarly, the LDR collaborated with the Socialists and the EPP respectively on 7 
occasions. The data illustrate equally numerous cases between the EDA and the Christian 
Democrats, whilst registering only 6 alliances with the Socialists. 
Apart from the ER, the other group which seemed lacking in its involvement in 
parliamentary coalition was the group at the opposite extreme of the Chamber, the Left Unity. 
Only once, and specifically in July 1991, was the LU involved in drafting a joint text together 
with the Socialists, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, European Democrats, the Greens and 
the European Unitarian Left. 
In the Yugoslav case, the level of consensus within the Europarliamentary forum was 
higher than that achieved during the Gulf crisis (Piquet interview, 311111996). The intensity of 
the control by political groups in parliamentary activity with respect to the Yugoslav crisis is 
mapped in Chart 28. 
PG Impact - Yugoslav Crisis 
Chart 28 
(15.4%) SOC 
(10.8%) EDA 
(12.3%) EUL 
(18.5%) EPP 
(10.8%) GREEN (12.3%) LOR 
(9 .2%) ED 
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The level of activity did not always reflect the degree of control over the formulation of the EP 
policies over Yugoslavia, as, for instance, the ER was rather prolific in tabling and forwarding 
Motions, albeit unsuccessfully, to the House. As the voting analysis demonstrates, no exclusive 
line-up arose on the Europarliamentary horizon during the Yugoslav crisis, coalitions being 
generally spread over the parliamentary arena. The voting records display a frequently recurring 
convergence between the Christian Democrats and the British Conservatives, which eventually 
led to the affiliation of the ED group to the EPP group in May 1992. On the other side of the 
Chamber, the Socialist and EUL groups revealed a similar political approach, confirmed by their 
voting behaviour, which seemed to presage the eventual joining of the EUL to the Socialist group 
in January 1993. 
The Christian Democrats dominated the parliamentary debate and the policy-definition on 
the Yugoslav crisis. This could be attributed to the British Conservatives' adhesion to the EPP 
group in the Strasbourg Parliamentary arena. This hypothesis can, however, be dismissed as the 
merger only occurred officially in May 1992 and could not have perceptibly determined the 
shaping of any policy. 
The European Right reached unanimity in its voting behaviour pattern, assisted both by 
the modest number of its members and by the relatively narrow national basis of the group. 
However, this exceptional outcome needs to be seen and evaluated against a high level of 
absenteeism during the above RCV sessions. As MEP Antony observed, "while the cemeteries 
are being filled in Croatia, this Chamber is empty" (Antony, 20/11/1991, 158). Similar 
considerations apply to the European Democrats and to the European Unitarian Left who also 
registered a high level of conformity in their voting behaviour with barely lower levels of 
agreement and absenteeism. It is also interesting to note that, although the impact of the Socialists 
in moulding parliamentary policies was less than that of the Christian Democrats, the level of 
agreement of the former was higher than that reached by the latter. In addition, the Socialists 
showed their traditionally high level of discipline, registering one of the lowest levels of 
absenteeism amongst all political groups. 
Conclusion 
EP political groups exhibited a fairly high index of agreement with regard to the Yugoslav crisis, 
all exceeding 80.00, with the exception of the Rainbow group. The rank ordering the political 
groups with regard to these indices from the most to the least cohesive was: the European Right, 
the European Democrats, the European Unitarian Left, the Socialist, the LDR, the EPP, the 
EDA, the Greens. the Left Unity. with the Rainbow group taking up the rear with an index of 
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agreement even lower than that achieved by the Independent MEPs. The Socialists were ahead 
of their main rivals, the Christian Democrats, although both achieved impressive le\"els of 
congruity, especially when considering their heterogenous composition, resulting from the various 
nationalities and parties represented within the political groups. After the Socialists and only just 
ahead of the EPP were the Liberals whose cohesion improved substantially between the first and 
the second stages of the crisis. 
In particular, a comparison of the levels of cohesion attained during the pre- and post-
recognition stages reveals no fluctuation in the case of the European Right, virtually no fluctuation 
for the EPP, marginal shifts towards cohesion for the Left Unity, the Greens, the ED and a 
tangible rise for the Liberals of 15.45 from 77.32 to 92.77. An increasing level of fluctuation 
away from cohesion was instead recorded in the case of the EUL, the Socialists and the EDA. 
Over the post-recognition stage, the Rainbow group saw its unity broken, registering the most 
substantial loss of cohesion amongst the political groups, by 41 percent from 100 to 59. 
Up to January 1992, the Chamber showed a scarcely lower rate of agreement, although 
this remained higher than the 60 percent threshold, still indisputably higher than the figures 
registered throughout the three stages of the Gulf case. The centre-right consisting of the EPP, 
LDR, ED and EDA groups scored higher on the rate of agreement than the left comprising the 
Socialists, EUL, LU, the Greens and the controversial Rainbow group. However, by omitting the 
last two groups from the alignment, the balance shifted slightly in favour of the left. When 
considering attendance, however, the left wing of the House could claim a higher figure, due 
mainly to the Socialists and the Greens. Despite this, there was still a very high level of 
absenteeism at the RCV sessions on the 1991-1992 Yugoslav events. While the data illustrated 
that the House reached a not-displeasing level of cohesion, attendance was alarmingly poor with 
just over 31 percent of members actually "bothering to turn up to the voting sessions". 
John Fitzmaurice's remarks of 1975 still apply in relation to the Yugoslav case, albeit to 
a much lesser extent: 
If any group gives the appearance of a party group in a national parliament then 
it is the Socialists. ( .. ) outright opposition to the point of voting against the party 
line in a roll-call vote is rare in the Socialist group .. the Christian Democrats and 
the Liberals, appear a great deal less cohesive than the Socialists (Fitzmaurice, 
1975,164-166). 
Overall, the data reveal that, at least when votes were taken on the Yugoslav crisis, the 
various PGs within the European Parliament acted as proper groups. As a result, the allegation 
that there is an absence of an adequate group dimension within the parliamentary spectrum proves 
therefore to be inaccurate. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that, while differences still exist 
within EP political groups, these disparities also surfaced within political groups at national 
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parliamentary level, for instance within the Spanish or Italian legislative Assemblies on the basis 
of the region of provenance of the individual members (Written interview of a Spanish EPP 
official, 7/1996). The problem of cohesion in the PGs needs therefore to be kept in the context 
of the difficulty of maintaining agreement in any parliamentary group. 
In relation to the political distance between PGs' cultures, the case revealed that the 
European Parliament was far from adversarial as no clear demarcation arose between the two 
wings of the parliamentary arena. The leaders of the various PGs strove to cooperate and combine 
their forces to mould and/or back policies, ultimately succeeding in hammering out compromise 
positions. It was felt that political alignments were required in order to enable the House to 
function: "where Yugoslavia is concerned ( .. ) Parliament must all times speak with a united 
voice" (Avgerinos, 16/5/1991, 268-269). 
More specifically, efforts at achieving intragroup cohesion and intergroup coalition proved 
necessary for Parliament to improve its chances of influencing the Council and therefore 
contributing to foreign policy-making. Within the Socialist group there was no cohesion over the 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and over the necessity of military measures to be adopted in 
Yugoslavia. This lack of internal cohesion among the Socialists made them more than ever aware 
of the necessity of finding a compromise with other PGs (Crampton interview, 31/1/1996). The 
Christian Democrats retained slightly greater power than the Socialists because of their willingness 
to enter into coalition with almost all other groups. Naturally, the case showed a greater 
proliferation of coalitions between the EPP and the Socialists to which the majority of the 
remaining groups, the EUL, the LDR, the EDA, the ED, the Greens and the Rainbow, also 
participated. Although the PGs had slowly tended to coalesce over the recent years, the Socialists 
and the Christian Democrats remained by far the most influential groups within the EP spectrum. 
And yet, as Christopher Bennett argues, although politicians may continue to "pontificate" 
about the values of justice, peace and democracy, their endeavours "rarely imping[e] on foreign 
policy where ethical considerations come a poor second to narrowly defined national interests" 
(Bennett, 1995, 174). Furthermore, the above study has shown that during the Yugoslav crisis 
group cohesion was rather high with regard to the voting outcome, however with an effective 
MEP presence lacking on the floor. This can be seen as a measure of the disenchantment of 
members with the institution they represented. 
CONCLUSION 
This concluding chapter aims to draw together the various strands of the previous discussion by 
briefly reviewing the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, the stances of the European Community and the 
European Parliament, summarizing and comparing the results attained in the intra- and intergroup 
analysis on both events and evaluating the competence of the European Parliament in foreign 
affairs. In the light of the above, the central hypotheses about the emergence of a supranational 
Parliament and cohesive and transnational political groups at European level are assessed. Some 
theoretical implications on the role of the European Parliament and its political groups in the 
integration process are sketched out. Finally, future developments are briefly addressed. 
1. The Gulf and the Yugoslav Crises 
Parallels can be drawn between the Gulf and the Yugoslav cases: subsequent to the invasion of 
Kuwait, the international community led by the United States launched a campaign depicting Iraq 
as an 'outlaw' state and demonizing its leader Saddam Hussein as a cruel dictator who had proved 
himself capable of using biological and chemical weapons during the war with Iran and against 
the Kurds. He was also deemed responsible for violations of human rights against his own people. 
A similar campaign, albeit on a smaller scale, was launched against Serbia's President Slobodan 
Milosevic for pursuing an expansionistic policy aimed at creating a Greater Serbia, for his 
repressive policy aimed at destroying Albanian identity and culture in Kosovo, and for his 
aggression against Slovenia and Croatia which led, in the second case, to bloodshed. 
In the Gulf crisis, Saddam had violated the territory of one pro-Western oil producing 
Arab country, and had his army lined up along the border of another, Saudi Arabia. The potential 
effect on the world economy and the power base within the Middle East was a threat that had to 
be checked promptly and efficiently, at least in the eyes of the West, so as not to destabilize the 
international order. Tanks bearing the Iraqi colours made an easily recognizable enemy and public 
opinion generally confirmed this. In the Yugoslav case, where world economic interests were not 
at stake, where neighbour turned against neighbour and where human rights violations were taking 
place within what initially seemed to be a delicate domestic crisis. it was far more difficult to 
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distinguish the good from the bad and to pinpoint a discernible enemy The situation was far more 
confusing, both practically and morally and there was less to be gained from 'getting involved', 
ultimately causing it to drag on. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that while Saddam and Milosevic were considered 
responsible for the Gulf and Yugoslav crises respectively and for crimes against humanity, as a 
result of the atrocities they had perpetrated, neither of them was apprehended and put on trial. 
Indeed, they even persevered in their discriminatory and violent policies: the Kurdish and 
Albanian dramas continue to resurface to public attention, making the headlines, and still await 
a definite solution. Finally, the increasing international dimension of public opinion highlighted 
the need to render foreign policy more democratic and more transparent. 
2. The Response of the European Community to the Gulf and Yugoslav Crises 
The Gulf and the Yugoslav crises have shown the failure of the European Community to act as 
a real international player, revealing the difficulty of overcoming national divisions and 
undertaking common actions. Overall, the nation states remained the principal international actors, 
just as the realist tradition would predict. 
The Twelve meeting within the framework of European Political Cooperation showed 
their inability to reconcile their different interests and objectives and to formulate a common 
policy. The consensus requirement inevitably hampered a swift and smooth decisional process. 
Both cases clearly evidenced the shortcomings of the intergovernmental structure of EPC, 
highlighting the need for a European foreign policy latu sensu, which would incorporate both 
economic and political aspects, and the need to set up a military structure which would enable the 
European Community (now the European Union) to participate actively and efficiently in the 
management of international crises. And yet, the Community was able to mobilize resources in 
trade and aid, as well as to impose sanctions, showing that when given the will, it could find the 
means to act promptly and efficiently. The multiplicity of actors and the variety of the role played 
in the various economic, diplomatic and military fora made it difficult to discern the identity of 
the interlocutor, raising once more Henry Kissinger's question: "When I want to speak to Europe, 
who do I phone?" 
In the crucible of the Gulf and Yugoslav Wars, the issue of the definition of a common 
foreign policy became acute. The two examples pointed to the need for reform in order to provide 
the Community with the instruments to face its international responsibilities and to act not only 
as an economic, but also as a pol itical power. Undoubtedly, the crises acted as catalyst for the 
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adoption of the Second Pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, which for the first time encompassed 
foreign policy and defence. Both the Gulf and Yugoslav crises served the purpose of contributing 
to cast doubts on "whether collective action [by the EC member states] can be sustained over time 
without a further leap into federalist obligations and structures" (Hill, 1994, 123). 
The European Union seems increasingly aware that it has to view its international 
responsibility as a combination of self-interest and moral imperative. Christopher Hill has detected 
six principal ways that involvement in international politics could be expanded: first, as a 
"replacement for the USSR in the global balance of power"; second, as a "regional pacifier" and 
therefore a magnet and model for Central and Eastern European countries; third, as a "global 
intervenor" in international crises; fourth, as "mediator of conflict"; fifth, as "bridge between rich 
and poor" and sixth, as "joint supervisor of the world economy" (Hill, 1994, 110-112). To these 
another element can be added, namely the EU as a champion of human rights and democracy, 
a role fervently emphasized and often taken by the European Parliament. Whether the European 
Union will be able to fulfil these tasks remains a key question for the future. 
3. The Response of the European Parliament to the Gulf and Yugoslav Crises 
It is interesting to look at the similarities and differences of the parliamentary attitudes towards 
the Gulf and Yugoslav crises bearing in mind the difficulty of this exercise due to the multiplicity 
of the factors involved and the different nature of the cases. The EP response to the Gulf case was 
slow to arrive, partly because the House did not convene until September 1990. Conversely, in 
the Yugoslav case, Parliament attempted to act as an opinion former by bringing the successive 
events unfolding in the SFRY to the attention of the other EC institutions and the world before 
the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence and the outbreak of the hostilities. In 
both cases, the EP issued general declarations. It unanimously condemned the Iraqi occupation 
of Kuwait which was regarded as an act of aggression and of violation of international law. The 
dissolution of Kuwait as an independent state and its incorporation in Iraq as its nineteenth 
province was never taken into consideration as an acceptable solution since it resulted from a 
unilateral decision of Iraq's government which was not supported by the Kuwaiti population. By 
contrast, in the Yugoslav case, the European Parliament discussed at length the demise of the 
SFRY and the question of recognition of the secessionist republics, since these decisions had been 
taken with wide support of the governments and parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia as well as 
their people. The dispatch of the Yugoslav army to Slovenia and Croatia was at first seen as a 
legitimate act to re-establish order on the command of the federal authorities, but when it became 
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apparent that behind this operation were hidden Serbian expansionistic ambitions, the EP strongly 
called for the JNA's withdrawal and advocated the recognition of these republics. 
The European Parliament's stance on both cases was vague and ambiguous, as it resulted 
from a precarious equilibrium between forces pulling in different directions, showing that its 
policies were based on the art of compromise and resulting from a process of accommodation 
among different groups. The European Parliament was a vociferous participant in lobbying with 
respect to both cases and was itself subject to lobbying by the various parties, but it did not 
succeed in raising its international stature. 
In both cases, the EP appeared to be united in its defence for human and minority rights, 
the granting of aid to refugees and compensation to countries hit most severely by the crises. 
Diplomacy and the application of sanctions were also unanimously advocated. Support was shown 
for the positions of the Council and Commission, while the House was reluctantly and belatedly 
acquiescent in the Community's decision to endorse military intervention in the Gulf, albeit with 
strong opposition from the left. In the Yugoslav case, the EP called for the sending of observers 
and of peacekeeping forces. In July 1992, it urged the deployment of UN naval forces to halt the 
bombing in the Adriatic coast without however envisaging full military intervention in the region. 
By way of summary, it can be argued that the EP did not succeed in expressing a firm and 
unanimous position on the above international events. 
The voting records on the Gulf and Yugoslav crises displayed a frequently recurring 
convergence between the Christian Democrats and the British conservatives, which led to the 
affiliation of the ED group to the EPP group in May 1992. On the other side of the Chamber, 
the Socialist and EUL groups revealed a similar political approach, confirmed by a high VSP, 
which, it can be argued with hindsight, seemed to prelude the eventual joining of the EUL into 
the Socialist Group in January 1993. 
4. The Political Groups' Positions vis-a.-vis the Gulf and Yugoslav Crises 
The following section summarizes and compares the specific results of RCV analysis undertaken 
on the Gulf and Yugoslav cases with respect to their levels of absenteeism. their indices of 
agreements and transnationality as well as their levels of voting similarities. Since these findings 
relate to two cases and to a limited number of roll-call votes, they do not pretend to offer a fully 
comprehensive assessment, but provide a snapshot of the overall state of cohesion of the PGs. In 
addition, it must be borne in mind that the use of percentages, which is inevitable for this kind 
of survey. has a disproportionate effect on the various groups, depending on their size. For 
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instance, in a group of 10, only a few members are sufficient to alter drastically the total levels 
of absenteeism, cohesion and similarity since each MEP has a magnitude of 10 percent. 
Conversely, in a large group, say of 100 MEPs, the magnitude of the impact of one member is 
much smaller, equivalent to only 1 percent. 
4.1 Political Groups' Levels of Absenteeism 
The Socialist group registered a much higher level of absenteeism in the Yugoslav case than in 
the Gulf case, going from 33.17 to 62 percent. An even higher level prevailed within the EPP, 
from 39.69 in the Gulf case to 71.24 percent in the Yugoslav case. The most striking increase 
in the level of absenteeism was registered by the ED Group which went from 29.41 in the Gulf 
crisis to the significantly higher percentage of 69.33 in the Yugoslav crisis. In both cases the 
EDA Group registered the highest level of absenteeism among all PGs, reaching 62.36 and 81.54 
percent in the Gulf and Yugoslav cases respectively. This record of absenteeism was beaten only 
by the independent members who reached 69.11 in the Gulf case and 88.33 percent in the 
Yugoslav case. 
A general negative trend can be observed in the levels of absenteeism of the political 
groups which almost doubled during the RCVs on Yugoslavia. Indeed, without considering the 
Independent groups, the highest rates of absenteeism, 62.36 and 57.57 reached by the EDA and 
the LV in the Gulf case corresponded almost to the lowest rates of absenteeism, 57.47 and 62.00 
reached by the Greens and the Socialists respectively in the Yugoslav case. 
Deserting the House could be seen as a strategy for the MEPs to elude the embarrassment 
of having to disclose dissent with their respective group and to avoid the dilemma between 
political conscience, acquiescence to the national party and group loyalty. However, the difficulty 
which arises from any evaluation of the level of absenteeism is that such a consideration is highly 
speculative, since unless explicitly stated by MEPs, there is no evidence to prove a direct 
correlation between absenteeism and opposition to the group line. The Yugoslav crisis, even more 
than the Gulf crisis, exposed a higher level of MEP absenteeism. This result may suggest that the 
latter, was more important for the EP with a higher rate of attendance while the Yugoslav case 
was more peripheral, with a lower attendance. 
It must be remembered, however. that absenteeism is not confined uniquely to the two 
foreign policy cases, where it can be argued the EP did not possess decisional powers. It 
represents, instead, a common negative approach and self-destructive modus vivendi of 
Europarliamentarians. MEPs' negligence in carrying out the duties inherent to their office offends 
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their electorate and does little to foster belief in the House as a proper institution. Absenteeism 
represents a lack of conformity with disciplinary measures and lack of respect by MEPs for their 
group and for the parliamentary institution they represent. And yet, some attenuating elements 
need to be considered. The problem of poor turnout in the Chamber may be linked to the 
geographical dispersion of the EP's working place and the frequency of the travel required to and 
from MEPs' constituencies. In addition, on many occasions, MEPs were not present at the 
plenary sessions because they were attending political group and committee meetings. 
Absenteeism may also result from a pragmatic approach, for instance, where agreement 
had already been reached on a certain policy among the various groups, such that there was no 
need for all members to attend the voting session in order to ensure its adoption. This is 
especially true in the case of the two largest groups. Conversely, the members of smaller groups 
may sometimes be discouraged from participating, since even if all group members were to turn 
up and vote en bloc, their effort would make no difference to the overall parliamentary outcome. 
The so-called 'effect of hopelessness' pervaded the European Parliament and frustration prevailed 
among the members, who grew disenchanted by their inability to influence EC/EU foreign policy-
making. l In addition, as Martin Westlake argues, absenteeism is partly connected to the 
phenomenon of 'loss leaders' on group electoral lists. These represent famous national politicians 
who lead their parties' lists, knowing that they will not participate in the EP's life (Westlake, 
1994a, 207). Anecdotes flourish within the House on diligent MEPs who end up at the bottom 
of their parties' lists or are even excluded as they neglected national party headquarters, whilst 
negligent MEPs who privilege their domestic party contacts, have better chances of re-election 
(Westlake, 1994a, Note 3, 213). Poor attendance can also be considered a measure of how little 
confidence members place in the institution in that it represents a reflection of people's lack of 
understanding and appreciation of MEPs' actual functions. Lastly, besides the fact that this 
phenomenon is particularly detrimental for the European Parliament's image and working, it also 
produces a distorting effect on measurement of both the indices of agreement, transnationality and 
intergroup similarities. It would be interesting to see whether a more active whipping system 
would decrease the level of absenteeism within the groups. However, this is a speculative issue 
with no basis for substantiation. 
This expression was originally used by Pelf Kopecky (1996. 10) with regard to the first Czech Parliament. 
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4.2 Political Groups' Indices of Agreement 
The statistical data calculated on 50 and 20 RCVs respectively demonstrate that the Socialist gro 
up was far more in agreement over the Yugoslav crisis than the Gulf crisis, since it reached the 
index of agreement of 87.91 in the former and 73.28 in the latter. The opposite can be said for 
the EPP, which attained the index of agreement of 91.15 in the Gulf case, and registered the 
slightly lower figure of 85.62 in the Yugoslav case. Similar to the Socialists, the Liberals saw an 
improvement in their degree of cohesion with regard to the Yugoslav case, with its IA rising by 
6.77 points from 79.05 to 85.82. In both cases, the ED exhibited a very high level of cohesion. 
albeit with an almost imperceptible decrease from 94.83 to 94.25. The Greens, who were 
particularly active in the Yugoslav case, also saw an increase in their index of agreement of 7.86 
points from 76.96 to 84.82 percent. The EDA's level of cohesion improved by 12.36 points from 
72.64 in the Gulf case to 85 in the Yugoslav case. The EVL reasserted its traditional solidarity 
by recording a minimal rise in its lA, from 91.10 to 91. 78, respectively in the Gulf and Yugoslav 
cases. 
The ER boasted the optimal index of agreement of 100 percent in the Yugoslav case, 
substantially improving from the previous IA of 82.93 registered in the Gulf. The Rainbow Group 
also signalled a growth of 11.48, from 63.47 in the Gulf case to 74.95 in the Yugoslav Case. By 
contrast, the LV did not follow this positive trend, marking a 10.28 fall in its IA between 92.28 
in the Gulf and 82 percent in the Yugoslav cases. In brief, the political groups in the European 
Parliament generally succeeded in reaching a comfortable majority internally with respect to the 
cases in question. 
Overall, the PGs from the most centralized, including the EPP, ED and the Communist 
groups, where the option exists for the leaders to resort to disciplinary measures in order to 
ensure cohesion, to the more liberal, including the LDR, EDA, Greens and Rainbow groups. 
where power remains diffuse, all registered fairly high indices of agreement. As such, the cases 
did not confirm the hypothesis that a strong whipping system is necessarily required to achieve 
a high level of cohesion. 
4.3 Political Groups' Indices of Transnationality 
A comparison of the indices of transnationality in PG voting behaviour on the Gulf and Yugoslav 
cases reveals that the highest lTv was registered by the EPP in both cases, while the second 
highest index was claimed by the Socialists and the Liberals in the Gulf and Yugoslav crises. 
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respectively. The ER saw a negligible decline in its lTv, from .454 in the Gulf case to .438 in 
the Yugoslav case. As a reflection of its almost mononational composition, the ED registered in 
both cases the lowest index of trans nationality , rising slightly from 0.070 to 0.074. It was 
followed in the Gulf case by the EDA with an IT of 0.293 case and in the Yugoslav case by the 
LU with an IT of 0.203. Overall, seven of the EP political groups registered lower levels of 
transnationality in the Yugoslav than in the Gulf cases with the exception of the LDR, ED and 
EUL. 
The ED and EUL examples suggest that the lower the indices of trans nationality with 
respect to group composition (ITc) , the higher the levels of congruity within the groups. 
However, the EPP demonstrated that even a big and multinational group can reach a high level 
of internal cohesion. In summary, cleavages within the EP did not often appear along national, 
but rather along group affiliation or ideological lines. Similarly, within the groups, divisions did 
not often occur along national lines. There is no clear evidence that a correlation exists between 
group heterogeneity and cohesion. The capability of aggregating interests within political groups 
is not in any way proportional to the number of nationalities within the groups. Therefore, the 
two cases revealed that heterogeneity does not represent an obstacle to group cohesion. 
Overall, the Yugoslav case displayed a lower level of transnationality with respect to 
voting. However, with the exception of most Greek MEPs over the Macedonia question and, to 
a lesser degree, the majority of the German MEPs over the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, 
the views and voting patterns of Europarliamentarians did not reflect purely national priorities and 
concerns. When looking at the difference between the ITv-s for the cases, only two groups in 
particular stood out. These were the LU group where the lTv fell from 0.515 to 0.203 and the 
Rainbow Group where it also fell, albeit to a lesser degree, from 0.669 to 0.554. 
4.4 MEP National Allegiance Versus Political Group Loyalty 
A glance at the European Parliament shows that the level of cohesion within the various PGs was 
much higher than the level of cohesion amongst the various nationalities in the Chamber as a 
whole, for both the Gulf and Yugoslav cases. As such, it can be argued that the variable of 
'nationality' had less of an impact than the allegiance to the respective PGs. However, an 
exception can be found in the Rainbow group. which never asserted for itself a clear ideological 
line nor aimed at being elevated to the rank of a truly European political group. and was formed 
only for technical reasons. 
The MEPs from Luxembourg and Spain registered a high level of cohesion. However. 
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in the first case, this outcome is not surprising due to the small number of Luxembourg' S 
members. In the second case, the high level of agreement amongst Spanish MEPs may lead to 
a deceptive interpretation that group allegiance was of less concern than national imperatives. 
Indeed, a closer inspection of ReVs for the Socialist, EPP, LDR, EUL and Rainbow groups for 
both the Gulf and Yugoslav cases reveals that the loyalty of Spanish MEPs to their group was 
higher than their national allegiance. It may be therefore concluded that the high index of 
agreement amongst the Spanish MEPs was rather coincidental. Furthermore, as a delegation, they 
averaged higher figures than their respective groups as a whole and generally helped to keep 
cohesion high. 
Another example which deserves mention is that of the Greek members who appeared 
more cohesive in the Yugoslav than in the Gulf case. This increased level of solidarity was mostly 
due to the commonly perceived danger to Greece's territorial sovereignty which stemmed from 
an alleged expansionistic policy of the neighbouring Republic of Macedonia. However, just in a 
few ReVs Greek MEPs disregarded their respective group standpoint, bound together in their 
national solidarity. Indeed, on the majority of the 20 ReVs, Greek Socialist, EPP and LV 
members still supported the official line of their groups. 
With regard to the issue of military intervention in the Gulf, British Socialist MEPs found 
themselves in a quandary, torn between their loyalty to national party and to political group. And 
yet, contrary to the spontaneous tendency of 'going native', MEPs increasingly adopted 
'Europeanist' views in parliamentary debate, to the embarrassment of their own national 
government (Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991, 14). The British delegation registered an increase in its 
level of cohesion in the Yugoslav case, yet this outcome was due to the extremely high level of 
absenteeism. 
In both cases, the assumption that MEPs are naturally inclined to conform to national 
policies and follow the guidelines dictated by their national party headquarters did not prove to 
be accurate. The findings prove that only on rare occasions, MEPs distanced themselves from the 
rest of their group on the basis of national 'egoism' or concern. Overall, political groups 
succeeded in reaching a level of cohesion by surmounting those obstacles set by distinct national 
traditions, when only a few years ago this claim would have been considered utopian. In John 
Fitzmaurice's words, "[this conclusion] is what one would expect if the political groups are to 
acquire any significance" (Fitzmaurice, 1975, 170). 
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4.5 Political Groups' Voting Similarities 
The RCV analysis on the Gulf and Yugoslav cases revealed a high level of voting similarity 
between the various groups to the extent that left-right divisions did not seem very pronounced 
in the European Parliament. The overall trend of all political groups' voting similarity was higher 
in the latter case than in the former, except for the ER and Rainbow Groups. The Left Unity and 
the European Right registered the lowest voting similarity in the Gulf and the Yugoslav cases, 
respectively. Surprisingly, the ER highest voting similarity percentage in the Gulf Case was found 
with Rainbow, followed by the Independent members and the Greens. This similarity between 
extreme left- and right-wingers, ideologically hard to reconcile, can however be explained in the 
light of the role of opposition that both the ER and the Rainbow groups, and to a lesser extent 
the Greens, often sought to take on within the European Parliament. However, while the ER was 
ostracized from coalition-building, the other two groups acted as a counterbalance within the 
coalition by putting forward constructive criticisms and securing, on some occasions, the adoption 
of amendments to the texts of joint resolutions. 
5. Intergroup Cooperation within the European Parliament 
By looking at the European Parliament's attitude towards the Gulf and Yugoslav crises, this study 
reveals an increasing trend in terms of parliamentary cohesion, and therefore of institutional 
efficiency and stability, with an overall index of agreement of 47.33 in the first case and of 63. 12 
in the second. Overall, the voting surveys indicate in both cases that the European Parliament was 
far from adversarial and that it required cooperation among its political groups, given that none 
of them enjoyed a majority in the House. The RCVs did not display a clear demarcation between 
the two wings of the parliamentary arena. By contrast, a careful reading of the parliamentary 
debates makes it clear that no consensus was reached between the various groups. On one side, 
the extreme left (LU, EUL) voted with the Greens and Rainbow groups against military 
intervention in the Gulf and Yugoslavia. On the other side, the centre-right (EPP, ED, EDA) 
supported the resort to armed force and. in the middle, the Socialists were split between the two 
camps. Unexpectedly, the ER, led by the French leader Le Pen, traditionally inclined to a pro-
military position, took instead an anti-interventionist policy in the Gulf case. The inconsistency 
between the results that emerged in the quantitative analysis of RCV s and those that emerged in 
the qualitative analysis of parliamentary debates and resolutions may be ascribed to se\'eral 
factors. The first is due to the extraordinary level of absenteeism at the ReV sessions which 
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meant that members often declined the opportunity to support, reject or abstain from voting and 
there is no certain way to establish how the absent members would have voted had they turned 
up. The second is that only a small proportion of resolutions was actually subject to RCVs, 
especially in the Yugoslav case, and often RCVs were carried out not only for whole resolutions. 
but also for amendments of individual recitals, paragraphs or sentences of resolutions. Finally, 
the possibility cannot be excluded that MEPs might have changed their minds over a certain 
policy in the light of new elements that emerged during the debate, or might have agreed to 
support its adoption following considerable modifications to the text. 
Both analyses reveal that long debating and voting sessions were necessary between the 
various groups in order to enable Parliament to adopt resolutions. As expected, the two largest 
groups, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, remained the most influential in terms of 
forging the official EP policies on the two crises. However, whilst in the Gulf case, the Socialists 
seemed to dominate parliamentary debate, in the Yugoslav case, the pendulum appeared to swing 
slightly in favour of the Christian Democrats. The traditional gap which separates the parties on 
the left from those on the centre-right was narrowed. This blurring of group differences can be 
seen in the gradual broadening of the range of coalition alternatives or as a consolidation of the 
oligopoly of the two main blocs: the Socialists and Christian Democrats. The groups tended to 
support those texts tabled by themselves in conjunction with others and to oppose those motions 
which were not drafted by themselves. And yet, the European Parliament's policy with respect 
to both crises resulted from a strategy of interbloc compromise and alliances between most 
political groups which participated in the tabling of texts of joint motions for resolutions. Overall, 
the PGs did not appear ideologically streamlined, but showed a certain propensity to cooperate 
and to settle on a common, although often general position. They contributed with roughly 
proportional degrees of influence, to the drafting of joint motions for resolutions and thus the 
definition of the EP policies on both cases. 
A 'splendid isolation' on purist ideological positions seemed out of the question even in 
the case of the ER which did not deliberately choose to alienate itself, but rather seemed to be 
ostracized by the rest of the PGs. This search for a compromise appeared as a sign of political 
maturity and responsibility on the part of the PGs. 
However, it is arguable whether they effectively reached a common outlook or if they 
camouflaged their opinions behind vague expressions. The texts often contained rather general 
and rhetorical statements based on compassionate feelings, in line with both Christian Democrat 
and Socialist beliefs. Furthermore. it can be claimed that since no immediate political effect stems 
from EP declarations and resolutions. the members felt more available and more naturally inclined 
to accommodate others' partisan and territorial concerns. In addition, it must be borne in mind 
Conclusion 264 
that, on some occasions, the PGs formulated general texts, whilst having different objectives and 
different policy interpretations. Indeed, most PGs tended to search for wide agreement. aware that 
texts drafted by them individually, although more ideologically coherent, would not get through 
the House and thus cause a lapse in the ability of the EP to impress its views on the Council. 
Yet, as the findings indicate, divergences of opinions emerged within the House, 
highlighting a variety of attitudes amongst the various PGs as well as less accentuated internal 
deviations within individual political groups. Whilst the latter succeeded in mobilizing their 
respective members into a reasonably united front, the EP did not reach an overwhelming 
consensus and failed to present itself as a strong, even a discernible political entity. This lack of 
intra-institutional cohesiveness may be seen as a reflection of the emergence of transnational 
political groups and may result from a process of politicization and party development at 
European level. The findings suggest that, only after a long and excruciating process. broad 
policies were forged between the various political views represented in the parliamentary 
spectrum. The following conclusion by Martin Westlake did not prove to be fully valid in either 
the Gulf or Yugoslav cases. 
The European Parliament has a potential vested interest in intra-institutional solidarity in 
a way that occurs only occasionally in other parliaments, generally when their powers are 
perceived to be under threat (Westlake, 1994a, 8). 
Fulvio Attina's assumption that the EP is inclined to agree on foreign issues since its declarations 
do not entail immediate and direct domestic consequences could not be proved. This was mainly 
due to the fact that in both cases vital interests were at stake and crucial decisions were to be 
debated in the Chamber, especially over military involvement. In fact, Luciano Bardi's 
observation that parliamentary consensus decreases when defence implications arise was accurate. 
Despite a margin of improvement in the Yugoslav case, both crises confirmed that 
Parliament is neither a monolithic bloc nor "a unity obtained by a single, united thrust", but an 
institution resulting from a variety of forces (Rose, 1946, 46 cited in Bale, 1996, 1).2 
The research has revealed the eagerness of the PGs to express their own distinctive 
views, thus satisfying the need for democracy and pluralism. The image of political groups as 
"molecules ofthe parliament", where "atoms are [identified with] individual members", accurately 
reflects the polychromatic configuration of the EP spectrum (Hagevi. 1996, 1). A corollary to this 
is the question of whether Parliament can tolerate the discrepancies arising from the aggregation 
of such multifarious views which undermine its credibility as an institution and still be able to 
Richard Rose's reflection was originally addressed to British political parties. 
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claim more powers. 
It is maintained that if the EP intends to gain more influence in the development of 
foreign policy and play a propelling role in this sector, it should become more cohesive rather 
than engage itself in a hopeless ideological struggle between its groups. Speaking with one voice 
seems the only strategy for the European Parliament to become a strong institution capable of 
upstaging the Council over decisions on foreign affairs, whilst fulfilling the ambition to raise its 
international profile. As John Fitzmaurice claims, "disunity makes the opinions of the parliament 
easier to ignore" (Fitzmaurice, 1975, 163). The "lure of power politics" (Johansson, 1997,215) 
demands that institutional imperatives prevail, meaning that political groups have to de-emphasize 
their differences and follow the ebbs and the flows of the parliamentary mainstream. 
The ancient Greek axiom envisaging politics as "the art of the attainable and compromise" 
still proves to be cogent and remains valid within the macrocosm of contemporary politics as well 
as with regard to the microcosm of the European Parliament. Yet, this quest for unity and 
efficiency could undermine the principle of democracy which certainly constitutes the foundations 
of any parliamentary construction and could deprive the EP of its essence as a forum for 
discussion where all distinct views and opposing interests are represented. 
In summary, the controversies arising from the 'efficiency-versus-democracy' debate have 
not found an easy and smooth solution. Nevertheless, it may be comforting to think that any 
adverse effects which may arise from the prevalence of one factor over the other will be only 
transitory until such a time as when the EP establishes its full authority and a perfect balance is 
finally reached between these two exigencies. 
6. The European Parliament and Foreign Affairs 
Despite the progress achieved with the institutional reforms introduced by the 1986 Single 
European Act, the 1992 Treaty on European Union and the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, the EP's 
catalogue of powers remains limited in the field of foreign affairs. It consists of the right of assent 
on most international treaties, including accession and association agreements, as well as the right 
of consultation "on the main aspects and basic choices of the common foreign and security policy" 
(Article J. 7 TEU). Its competence extends to a veto power over the ratification of the treaties and 
to consultation on CFSP issues, if it is agreed that they fall within the definition of the article. 
which is rather loose and therefore subject to interpretation. Finally, the EP has no supervisory 
role over the Council of Ministers and the European Council, the main institutions which deal 
with foreign policy issues. 
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In light of this, many MEPs have become gradually disenchanted at their own vain efforts 
to influence change. A sense of incompleteness, unevenness and disappointment pervades the 
European Parliament with regard to the progress towards further integration and the realization 
of a European foreign policy. To the great frustration of many of its members. the EP is not yet 
in a position to act as an effective international player. 
On a brighter note, it must be said that despite its limitations, the EP is considered by 
third countries' statesmen and politicians as an institution that should be addressed. Over the 
years, it has increasingly become a target for a wider number of lobbyists. suggesting that its 
international profile is likely to rise in the future. 
There is no reason to be too pessimistic with regard to possible reforms. The history of 
the European Parliament has shown that this institution over the years has been very 
successful in fighting for more influence in the decisionmaking process. A silent 
revolution - and regional integration is nothing else - needs time (Schmuck, 1991, 43). 
The cases brought to light once more the peripheral nature of parliamentary involvement 
in foreign policy and the need for more powers in this area. A premise to this thesis is that the 
EP's role in foreign affairs cannot be dismissed as irrelevant, since it is representative of public 
opinion. However, only by accruing its power will the EP be able to gain in international status 
and become the preferred platform for debate and deliberation. This will certainly capture the 
interest of its own members, resulting in a higher turnout at EP sessions and a closer involvement 
and participation in parliamentary and group activities. Recognized in their role of active 
politicians who can make a real impact on the international agenda, MEPs will feel the necessity 
to prove themselves in the eyes of their electorate beyond the obvious declamatory calls for peace, 
freedom and democracy. 
The EP's grand design to foster a federal Europe with an autonomous European foreign 
policy is slowly, but steadily taking shape. With the increasing public interest in foreign policy, 
the European Parliament seems sure to be central to any development that might occur in this 
direction. According to Juliet Lodge, one way forward would be for the European Parliament and 
the political groups to develop a 'foreign policy memory' so that changes in the European 
Parliament's composition after each election would not result "in contradictory policy statements 
or partial institutional amnesia" (Lodge, 1988, 132). 
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7. Towards a Supranational European Parliament and European Political Groups? 
Since its inception and particularly after gaining full legitimacy from its direct election in 1979. 
the European Parliament has claimed to be a promoter of European integration. Despite this, 
Parliament reveals some inherent contradictions which prevent it from effectively proceeding 
along the path of Europeanization. 
The first relates to the adoption of different electoral systems in each member state. The 
lack of uniform criteria to determine eligibility for voting means that member states still take 
decisions individually as whether to allow Community citizens to vote in their country or to 
restrict this to their own nationals. Another contradiction inherent to the European Parliament is 
the recourse to national quotas which represents, as Martin Holland points out, "an anathema to 
the notion of a supranational election". By accepting these national boundaries, the perception is 
reinforced that EP elections represent more a kind of national election than a supranational one 
(Holland, 1993, 145-146). Paradoxically, MEPs' legitimacy is not EU-wide, but geographically 
tied to the individual member states (Abeles, 1992, 184). A truly federal integrated Europe has 
to adopt an electoral system that reflects the characteristics of the European electorate, reinforces 
the links between citizens and their representatives and revive the concept of European identity 
against the prevailing intergovernmental approach reinforced through the adoption of national 
quotas (Holland, 1993, 102). 
The establishment of a list of candidates to the Euro-elections according to nationality is 
incompatible with the supranational objective and federal orientation of the European Parliament. 
When a common electoral system is adopted the necessity for fixing national quotas will disappear 
and group lists will then become effectively supranational. Only recently did British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair agree to introduce a proportional system in Euro-elections. The adoption of 
a uniform procedure, which was unimaginable just a few years ago, is likely to become a reality 
at the next EP elections. This could be a first step towards making these groups less dependent 
on and less vulnerable to their respective national parties. It also could ease the development of 
genuine European parties which will draw up their own lists of candidates as well as the switching 
of MEPs' allegiances from national parties to political groups. As Maurizio Cotta argues, 
" if one looks at the history of parliamentary institutions their powers weren't given free, 
they have been slowly conquered by new political [e) lites that could oppose a stronger 
legitimation to the old elites. This suggests that the empirical test of institutional build up 
at the supranational level will be the formation of a European political [e) lite (Cotta, 
1984, 124, cited in Westlake, 1994a, 7). 
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80th cases illustrate that forging transnational parliamentary groups remains an 
outstanding and ambitious experiment which has not yet fully succeeded. It is daring to assert that 
a new European political elite in the making has emerged in the EP. In Fulvio Attina's words, 
[t]he EP political groups still have not gone beyond the organizational threshold of 
decisional centralization on how to amalgamate [the] demands and expectations of the 
interests they represent into coherent supranational programmes (Attina, 1990, 576). 
Nevertheless, they have embarked on a transnationalization process on the way to becoming real 
European parties. The PGs enrich political dialogue and serve as catalysts for integration. 
According to Sicco Mansholt, former President of the Commission, "[i]f there is a hope for 
Europe, it is from them that it will come" (Mansholt, 1974, cited in Baron Crespo, 1989, 39). 
This view is fully shared by Cotta who concludes by warning that 
.. unless an institutional embryo of a European system develops, all the opportunities that 
might materialise ... will not be exploited in the direction of further supranational 
integration but may even produce a setback in the process and promote a renationalisation 
(Cotta, 1984, 123, cited in Westlake, 1994a, 9). 
In future, they may well work at cross-purposes with governmental leaders in their home 
countries or when dealing with the Council, which possesses the formal authority to issue foreign 
policy decisions. The destiny of political groups is inextricably linked to the future of the 
European Parliament, subject to the development of the powers of the institution itself. Indeed, 
increasing the functions of the PGs within the EP will serve no purpose whilst the EP remains 
a secondary institution. Only by giving full consideration to the European Parliament as a whole 
will the nature and extent of the influence of its constituent political groups and their role in 
policy-making become more meaningful. 
The EP provides a laboratory where, following a process of political alchemy, 
interactions take place between actors of various national origins and political traditions with the 
aim of overcoming partisan and individualistic impulses and transcending national boundaries. The 
ultimate test to prove that a truly supranational parliamentary institution and genuine federal 
parties have emerged is to assess whether in cases of conflict between the European and national 
views, the former effectively prevails. 
On the basis of the findings that emerged in the quantitative and qualitative analysis on 
the two cases. this dissertation claims that although the process of elimination of the old 
nationalistic barriers is still far from being completed, some embryonic supranational elements 
can be detected within the European Parliament. Indeed. a slow but steady process has started 
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within the European Parliament whereby perceived national interests and identities expressed by 
the various MEPs are gradually overcome within the political groups, which seem on the way to 
becoming effective and cohesive parties at European level. 
Finally, the research argues that it is possible to pursue a holistic approach and forge joint 
policies and supranational solutions within the parliamentary laboratory even on questions of 
international politics. The inquiry seems to suggest a certain degree of optimism. Undeniably, on 
the parliamentary front at the level of political groups, a Europeanization process seems to have 
started, confirming Graham T Allison's observation that "[w]here you stand depends on where 
you sit" (Allison, 1971, 176). 
This thesis concludes that it is becoming obsolete to think about these groups as pursuing 
essentially national interests, and to deny that a process of erosion of national boundaries is under 
way. Despite their flaws, political groups playa decisive role in the dynamics of the European 
Parliament and have a great potential with regard to the definition of European politics. The PGs 
are becoming more cohesive and transnational while the intensity and frequency of contact 
between MEPs is increasing and their prospects of turning into genuinely integrated "parties at 
the European level" is growing. It is undeniable that a kernel of transnationality runs through the 
political groups and is spreading within the EP. 
While many, and especially the realists, will disagree with this interpretation, it is only 
through continuing debate and analysis of this kind that it will be possible to unravel whether a 
real phenomenon of Europeanization will affirm itself within the political groups and the 
European Parliament. 
8. Theoretical Implications of this Research 
Through a survey of the main theoretical approaches to International Relations and European 
integration, it emerged that no single theory can provide all necessary explanations to understand 
the various facets of the dynamics and the extent of the involvement of the European Parliament 
and its political groups in the integration process. Rather, various approaches, and in particular, 
those of federalism and neofunctionalism, contain strands of thought relevant to defining the 
triangular relationship between European Parliament, political groups and European integration. 
Due to its normative character, federalism remains today the theory which can best 
explain and support the active involvement of the EP in the integration process. Federalists assign 
great importance to the European Parliament, in particular for its potential to act as a constituent 
assembly and draft a constitution for the United States of Europe. Within the federation. the 
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European Parliament could maximize its competence and increase its influence by holding 
effective supervisory powers over the executive. Neofunctionalists also lay great store in the EP 
developing habits of behaviour at the supranational level, enabling political parties to organize and 
focus activities at that level, substituting national divisions with transnational ideological ones, 
providing a supranational channel of communication and developing a body with an interest in 
further integration. The father of neofunctionalism Ernst Haas espoused a code of conduct that 
makes it appropriate for MEPs to exert "the right to be continually consulted by executive 
agencies, to put forward programmes not clearly and previously declared to be national policy. 
to organise, investigate and criticise on the basis of opinions and convictions developed as a result 
of contacts with ideologically kindred but nationally different colleagues" (Haas, 1958,437). Haas 
attached great importance to the transformation of political groups into European party groups 
which would replace national divisions with ideological ones and would result in the formation 
of a European elite. In addition, by furthering "the growth of practices and codes of behaviour 
typical of federations", the political groups can help to assess the process of community 
formation. The development of transnational PGs at the EP level can also become a way to 
legitimize the integration process. Haas himself noted that this trend is not fundamentally different 
from conduct in "typical" federal parties (Haas, 1958, 390-450). Insights from neofunctionalism 
and federalism can help explain the dynamics of parliamentary activity and the role of political 
groups in the so-called "community building" resulting from a process of social and political 
learning. Both approaches, albeit for different factors, are particularly relevant to the phenomenon 
of group cohesion, cooperation-building and transnationalization. 
The results of the ReV analyses on the Gulf and Yugoslavia refute the realist/neorealist 
view which denies any possibility of a genuine phenomenon of trans nationalization and sees 
national positions directly reflected in the EP arena and at political group level. PGs attempted 
to resolve their differences managing to reach the necessary majorities in order to enable the EP 
to pass resolutions. The EP did not present itself as a monolithic institution and did not pass its 
cohesion test with flying colours, as a result of divergences of view based on political rather 
national views. The cases display an increasing level of congruity and a more pronounced pattern 
of transnational convergence at PG level, by virtue of the phenomenon of socialization. This 
aspect that is directly relevant to the political groups is expressed with different overtones by the 
functionalists, neofunctionalists and pluralists. All recognize the existence of this process, albeit 
they attribute a different level of importance to it. Most approaches of European integration accept 
that an associative bond develops and solidarity is also deemed to emerge between members of 
the same political group. 
The case studies give credibility to the theoretical perspective of transnationalization 
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within the EP political groups. International Relations and European integration theorists are faced 
with a new analytical challenge offered by the rising phenomenon of trans nationalization within 
political groups in the EP and therefore at European level. Pluralists and functionalists rely upon 
the generalized process of 'social learning' while neofunctionalists focus their interest on a more 
restricted process of attitude change among those individuals within a political group or within 
the Europarliamentary arena characterized by an active reorientation towards political life and by 
a high rate of political participation. Over this last point the data show rather disappointing results 
with a very high level of absenteeism of MEPs during RCV sessions. 
In conclusion, it can be argued that neither the realist assumption that the states remain 
the essential building-block of the wider association, nor the functionalist assumption seeking to 
underline the salience of non-state actors can be denied. This theory conceives the gradual 
receding of the sovereignty of the EC member states in various fields including, ultimately. the 
most sensitive domain of foreign and security policy. 
This thesis takes the view that while the state is still present in the management of 
Europe's international relations, an undeniable if somewhat slow transnationalizing movement 
within the political groups and within the European Parliament needs to be recognized. It seems 
that the realist view underlying that "the state in most cases retains its hard shell" (Viotti and 
Kauppi, 239) and the Kantian tradition underlying the power of an entire new range of 
transnational actors who attempt to break down interstate barriers will need to be accommodated. 
9. Future Developments 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty failed to lay the foundations for a fully-fledged European foreign 
policy, exposing member states' hesitation or even reluctance to accept further political 
unification. Subsequently, the most recent Intergovernmental Conference, culminating in the 
signing of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, did not solve the conundrum relating to the inability of 
the Union to playa significant role on the international stage, due to its well-known institutional 
deficiencies, on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the member states to relinquish some of 
their traditional sovereignty prerogatives, on the other. In this context, the basic question 
concerning the identity and purpose of the Union will have to be addressed. Only by solving these 
fundanlental issues, will the European Union be able to confront the internal and external 
challenges looming on the political and economic horizon. As Susan Strange aptly suggests. the 
paradox of power seeking domestic politicians voluntarily pooling aspects of national sovereignty 
within the European Union (Strange, 1994, 11) requires the supervision of the European 
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Parliament, which professes to have a supranational and European vocation. It is very difficult 
to eliminate raw national interests to create ex novo European interests and it will take time to 
overcome the most difficult obstacle to the establishment of a supranational European Union. 
namely the psychological dimension of nationalism. 
The unification of Europe, like all peaceful revolutions. takes time - time to persuade 
people, time to change men's minds, time to adjust to the need for major transfonnations 
(Monnet, 1978, 432). 
As Fred Halliday comments, 
There is no doubt that any ( .. ) evolution will involve uncertainties and disappointments: 
a world in which the state is no longer conveniently taken to represent the totality. and 
in which 'nation-state', 'sovereignty' and 'national interest' are no longer secure 
landmarks, will be harder to chart (Halliday, 1994, 93). 
On the eve of the twenty-first century, the ideal of forging a European identity seems to have 
found resolute supporters as well as fierce adversaries in the various member states. And yet, 
only by cultivating the concept of European identity, will a revival of nationalism within the 
territory of the Union be deterred. Furthermore, through the definition of a common European 
foreign policy, the European Union will be able respond effectively and coherently to external 
challenges. The evolution of transnational political groups will help the fostering of the European 
unification process, the European Parliament being the ideal political forum where all distinct 
views can be expressed, debated and acted upon. 
EPILOGUE 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Some areas have been touched upon briefly in the thesis that could lead to further in-depth 
research, such as the relationships between EP political groups and national parties of the various 
member states. It would be interesting to look at the relationships between the European 
Parliament and the individual member states' parliaments and governments in order to assess the 
extent of their inward and outward influence as well as the leverage of the national parties on EP 
political groups with regard to the Gulf and Yugoslav crises. Such an investigation would provide 
a complementary outlook on the results achieved by this thesis. 
Since the focus of this research has been introspective of the dynamics within the political 
groups and the European Parliament rather than on their impact on other EU institutions, another 
aspect which may warrant a more in depth investigation is the study of the effect (if any) of the 
EP's policies on the decisions of the Council, in these two cases. The preceding chapters may, 
arguably, highlight the need to investigate in greater depth the complex and varied relationship 
between the EP including its political groups and foreign policy. This may be done for events that 
have occurred in the Gulf and the Balkans beyond the periods allotted within this thesis, for issues 
of a nature more diverse and far less dramatic than international military conflicts, and with 
respect to the political evolution of the European Union since 1992. 
In addition, this thesis does not assess whether and to what extent PGs are actively 
pursuing European integration per se. However, as the expansive integration dynamic predicts, 
it is undeniable that the unintended consequences of their actions may have an impact on the 
construction of supranational policy and the deepening of integration. As such the EP, along with 
its political groups, may function as a "midwife for the integration process" (Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, 1991,6). 
For some authors such as Simon Hix, an explanation of the reasons why MEPs gather in 
transnational party groups together with the structure of their interests, incentives and institutional 
constraints, cannot be found in integration theory, but in theories of comparative politics (Hix, 
1994). The application of these theories certainly deserves attention and may open up a whole 
new area of research. 
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Finally, the activities and the evolution of the political groups and the European 
Parliament deserve to be explored more in-depth both empirically and theoretically. It is hoped 
that this thesis has already in part redressed this omission in the academic literature and has built 
a platform on which further investigations can be taken forward. 
APPENDIX 
1. Fonnulae 
1.1 Index of Agreement (lA) 
The roll-call analysis is carried out by using the same index of agreement (IA) proposed by Fulvio 
Attina and based on a variant of Stuart Rice's formula. While Rice's index gauges only positive 
and negative votes, displaying scores from 0 to 100, Attina's index takes into consideration "the 
relation exist[ing] between the three modalities of votes - in favour, against and abstention - cast 
by the members of a Group; more exactly it is the percentage measure of the relations between 
(a) the difference between the highest numbering modality and the sum of the other two 
modalities in a vote by the MEPs of a Group and (b) the total number of votes cast by the 
Group": 
IA = highest modality - sum of the other two modalities x 100 
total number of votes 
Whilst admitting that abstention represents a neutral position, undoubtedly it increases the voting 
power of the opposition and, as such, may be regarded as non-compliance with the official group 
line. For the purpose of this inquiry, the number of abstainers, provided that they are not the 
majority of the group, is added to the modality that represents those members not following the 
official party line. Similar considerations could be extended to absentees who resort to this 
strategy to conceal opposition to their group's stance. However, since absences occur for a 
multiplicity of reasons, more evidence would be required to justify such an indictment and, 
therefore, absences are removed from the equation. The index is equal to 100 when all the 
members of a PG vote unanimously, while it is 99 and 1 when the agreement decreases but still 
more than half of the deputies express the same vote respectively. '0' (zero) indicates a split in 
half of the votes in two modalities while in three modalities one of these corresponds to the sum 
of the other two. The index assumes a negative value when the highest voting modality is less 
than half of the total number of group votes, reaching -33 when the group voting is equally 
divided between the three options. 
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1.2 Voting Similarity Percentage (VSP) 
~he voting. affinity between groups is assessed by employing Stuart Rice's 'index of voting 
hkeness'(Rlce, 1928), referred to in this dissertation as Voting Similarity Percentage (VSP). 
VSP (IVL) = 100 - (A-B) where 
A = percentage of party group A voting pro on resolution x 
B = percentage of party group B voting pro on resolution x 
(A-B) = absolute value of A-B 
The overall VSP has been calculated by adding the VSP on individual votes on the situation in 
former Yugoslavia and dividing the sum by the number of votes. The VSP ranges between 0 
percent which indicates the maximum disagreement and 100 percent complete identity in voting 
behaviour. Average VSPs are calculated by computing the sum of the VSPs on individual votes 
and then dividing the sum by the number of votes (Hurwitz, 1983). 
Table 10. Key for Index of Agreement and Level of Absenteeism 
The following table can serve as a parameter (key) to read percentages of IA,l level of 
absenteeism and VSP: 
90 - 100 
80 - 89.99 
70 - 79.99 
60 - 69.99 
50 - 59.99 
40 - 49.99 
30 - 39.99 
20 - 29.99 
10 - 19.99 
o - 9.99 
extremely high 
very high 
high 
fairly high 
medium average (slightly above average) 
medium low (slightly below average) 
fairly low 
low 
very low 
extremely low 
1.3 Indices of Transnationality on PG Composition (lTc) and Voting Behaviour (lTv) 
Two formulae based on Douglas Rae's index of fractionalization indices are used to compute 
groups' degree of trans nationality on PG composition and on PG voting behaviour with regard 
to the Gulf and Yugoslav crises (Rae, 1967). 
n 
IT = 1 - (L SC)2 
i=l 
As regards the degree of transnationality of PG composition, 'SC' indicates the respective share 
of members from the various countries within a group, whilst On' refers to the number of 
countries concerned. As regards the degree of transnationality of the PG voting behaviour. 'SC' 
represents the share of members who voted according to the PG official policy line (which was 
assumed to be the highest modality of vote for each group) and On' is the number of nationalities 
present in each political group. 
For an evaluation of negative percentages with regard (0 lAs. see Section 1.1 above. 
Table 11. 
Political Group 
Socialist 
EPP 
LOR 
ED 
Greens' 
EUL 
EDA 
ER 
RB 
LU 
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Chairmen/women of the Political Groups between June 1990 and June 1991 
Chairmen/women 
lean-Pierre Cot 
Egon Klepsch 
1992 
Uo Tindemans 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing 
(till November 1991) 
Yves Galland 
(from December 1991) 
Christopher Prout 
Alexander Langer Chairman, 
Maria Santos' Co-Chairwoman 
from 15/311990 to 31/10/90 
Adelaide Aglietta Chairwoman 
Paul Lannoye Co-Chairman 
from 1/11/1990 to 31/5/1991 
Paul Lannoye, Chairman 
Adelaide Aglietta, Co-Chairwoman 
from 1/6/1991 till 31/1111991 
Adelaide Aglietta, Chairwoman 
Paul Lannoye, Co-Chairrnan 
from 1/1211992 
Luigi Colajanni 
Christian de la Mal~ne 
lean-Marie Le Pen 
laak Vandemeulebroucke 
Birgit B jornvig 
Rene-Emile Piquet 
Source: Lists of Members of the European Parliament between 11 June 1990 and 11 June 1991 
As Martin Westlake observes. "[The] originally patrician principle of rotating leadership is adopted by the 
Greens and the Rainbow Group" (Westlake. 1994a. Note 3. 25). 
J Maria Santos joined the Socialist group on 22 July 1991. 
EP Composition by Political Group: June 1991 
Chart 29a 
(2.7%) LU (2.3%) INO 
(5 6%) Green. 
(8S'I4) EO 
(g 5'14) LOR 
. -... ,-----
---
(:l3e'14}EPP 
(5.2%) Greens 
(00%) EO 
(87%) LOR 
, 
"-
EP Composition by Political Group: July 1992 
Chart 29b 
(2.5%) LU (2.3%) INO 
" 
(313%) EPP 
I 
I EP Composition by Nationality: June 1990 - July 1992 
Chart 30 
81 (15.6%) France 
24 (4 6%) Greece 
1613.1%) Denmark 
15 (2 goA» Ireland 
24 (4 6%) Betglum 
81 (166%) Italy 
25 (4 8%1 Nelhe!1ends 
24 (4 6%) Portugal 60 (11 6%) SpaIn 
Table 12. Adopted Joint Resolutions according to PG Contribution on the Gulf Crisis 
Soc:iaIBt EPP LDR ED GREEN EUL EDA ER RB LV 
Sep.cmber 1990 I 83-1602 1 83-1600 1 83-1604 1 83-1600 - 1 83-1623 1 83-1603 - - -
I 
October 1990 (1 a) - - - - - - - - - -
October 1990 (I b) 1 83-1844 1 83-1844 I 83-1844 1 83-1844 1 83-1844 1 83-1844 - - 1 83-1844 I 83-1844 
IPG 83-1843 IPG 83-1846 
October 1990 (2a) 1 83- 1889 - - - - 1 B3-1881 - - - -
November 1990 2 B3-2027 283-2017 I 83-2009 - - I B3-2043 I B3-2062 - - 1 B3-2083 
83-2023 83-2023 
December 1990 1 83-2188 - - - - I B3-2189 - - - I B3-2232 
IPG 83-2190 
JaJ'IJary 1991 1 B3-0127 - - - - - - - I 8 3-0123 -
February 1991 2 B3-0359 283-0311 - I B3-0334 - 283-0341 1 B3-0338 - - 2 830343 
& 83-0382 83-0392 83-0389 & B3-0347 
B3-0388 B3-0387 
March 1991 1 B3-0398 1 B30402 - 1 83-0426 283-0477 2 B3-0429 - - - 2 B30450 
B3-0466 B3-0458 B30470 
April 1991 283-0552 2 B3-0562 283-0619 1 83-0556 283-0555 2 B3-0564 I B3-0621 - I B3-0622 2 B30565 
B3-0624 B3-0618 B3-0660 B3-0560 B3-0623 B3-0620 
May 1991 1 83-0811 2 B3-0746 2 B3-074O - 2 B3-0777 I B3-0765 - - - I B30755 
B3-0751 B3-0741 B3-0798 
& B3-0744 
:-: 
--
';', . ,'-"-- ',,'," . 
...... :.: ';~ ;.~ ::::- ,', ,': 
Taltal --. U -.. ::-:_ >:.:::~-:.:! 11 7 :-: 
.:. 
-::5--" :::. :.:.:.~. -:::1 U 4 0 :3 lit _: 
---
-- - - ---
.. . . . ..... ---~ -----~~ 
IPG = Individual Political Groups ' Resolutions 
Table 13. 
Sepcember 1990 
October 1990 (J a) 
GulflKuwail 
October 1990 (1 b) 
Oil price 
October 1990 (2) 
lntmlational issues 
November 1990 
December 1990 
J atIl3!)' 1991 
February 1991 
March 1991 
April 1991 
May 1991 
ToW 
Individual PG Non-Adopted Motions for Resolutions on the Gulf Crisis 
Socialist EPP LDR ED Green EUL EDA ER RB LV 
F B3-InO 
W B3"{)558 
F B3..{)589 
F B3-1809 
R B3-2185 
R B3-2196 
R B3"{)109 
W B3"{)570 
R B3-1845 
F B3-1890 F B3-1883 
R B3-2060 
R B3-2182 R B3-2187 
R B3"{)108 W B3-OO70 
R B3"{)111 
F B3-OO88 
F B3..{)428 
F B3-1618 
F B3-1799 F B3-1800 
F B3-2051 
W B3-2067 
W B3-2072 
F B3-2184 
R B3"{)1l6 R B3"{)1l3 
W B3-OO85 
R B3"{)333 
F B3"{)391 
F B3..{)655 W B3..{)561 
F B3-1829 
R B3-1847 
F B3-2197 
F B3-OO81 
R B3"{)1I5 
F B3..{)448 
F B3"{)569 
W B3-1601 
F B3-1622 
F B3-In2 
F B3-1882 
F B3-2032 
F B3-2186 
R B3"{)119 
R B3"{)101 
R B3"{)393 
F B3"{)597 
F B3"{)804 
I· 3 .' ..• ~<.:. 'i<': ' I ' ~' ...... ,...:<., .. ,;:; ':;;:':'1': '[: :::'.j::::./'\;" :':'" ::::'::::I:~:::~:::::;::;:::::::::;r:::::::::;{:::':~;:J;I#.[:[:[:\:::·:t ::~:::j![:::l:::::::::[l:;i):::[:::::j:i:[]:::]:::;::;·:::::::·:·:::ifl::~::j~·::·:·::;:::,=:;~[t:::!::::::::;[rl::::jE:::::::::::::: ;::::::': 
F B3-1624 
R B3 1842 
F B3-2194 
F B3..{)465 
~ ::<::.:/ 
F B3-1656 
F B3- 1894 
W B3-2191 
R B3-0117 
F B3"{)587 
W B3 0559 
6 
Table 14. Adopted Joint Resolutions according to PG Contribution on the Yugoslav Crisis 
Socialist EPP LDR ED Green EUL EDA ER RB LU 
February 1991 1 1 B3-0379 1B3-0302 1 1 
- - -
1 B3"{)336 -
March 1991 1 B3-0399 1 B3-0403 1 B3"{)395 1 B3-0431 1 B3"{)397 1 B3-0482 1 - - -
Apri1 1991 - - - - - - - - - -
May 1991 1 B3..{)822 1 B3..{)745 1 B3..{)779 1 B3..{)786 1 B3"{)826 1 B3"{)806 1 B3"{)794 - 1 B3"{)807 -
JUIIC 1991 - - - - - - - - - -
July 1991 1 B3-1216 1 B3-1223 1 B3-1222 1 B3-1119 1 B3-1220 1 B3-1217 - - - 1 B3- 1218 
September 1991 1 B3- 1372 1 B3-1390 - - - 1 B3-1371 1 B3-1360 - - -
& B3-1325 
OtlOber 1991 IPG B3-1604 - - - - - - - - -
November 1991 1 B3- 1882 1 B3-1886 * 1 B3-1896 - 1 B3-1890 - - - -
December 1991 - - - - - - - - -
Jan 1992 1 B3-OO37 1 B3-0047 1 B3-0045 1 B3-0049 1 B3-0042 1 B3-OO37 1 B3-0040 - 1 B3-OO38 -
Feb 1992 
-
-
- - -
- - - -
March 1992 1 B3-0407 1 B3-0405 1 B3-0410 - 1 B3-0413 1 B3-04092 1 B3-0408 - 1 B3-0406 -
Apr-IJ 1992 - 1PG B3"{)532 IPG B3"{)528 - - - - -
May 1992 1 B3-0679 1 B3.{)675 1 B3.{)682 - - 1 B3..{)681 1 B3..{)680 - 1 B3-0677 -
JIme 1992 - - - - - - - - - -
July 1992 - 1 B3..{)973 .. - - - 1 B3..{)973 - 1 B3..{)973 
& B3-1049 & B3-1049 & B3-1049 
" 
.. .. ,. 
. - ..• , ....... ,.' .... ... ' ... , ... '.-, ... ' .•.. , ... 
,.. 
. ,: .: ~. . 1& 7 6 
" 
S 7 0 ~ 1 
.. 
PG - Individual Political Groups' Resolutions 
The November 1991 Joint Resolution was cosigned by von Alemann on her own behalf 
• The July 1992 Joint Resolution was cosigned by von Alemann on her own behalf 
Table 15. Individual PG Non-Adopted Motions for Resolutions on the Yugoslav Crisis 
Socialist EPP LDR ED Greens EUL EDA ER RB LV 
February 1991 F 83-0297 
March 1991 F 83-0400 R 83-0394 F 83-0396 
April 1991 F 83-0654 
May 1991 F 83-0782 
Jwx: 1991 
July 1991 F 83-1219 F 83-1137 F 83-1221 
August 1991 
Sepc.ember W 83-1324 F 83-1383 F 83-1329 F 83-1374 F 83-1375 F 83-1373 F 83-1407 
1991 W 83-1391 
October 199.1 W 83-1567 R 83-1587 F 83-1614 R 83-1580 F 83-1623 F 83-1615 R 83-1578 F 83-1608 F 83-1626 
NovembeT F 83-1888 F 83-1894 F 83-1895 
1991 
DecembeT 
1991 
Jm..wy 1992 F 83-0043 
February 1992 
March 1992 F 83-0411 
April 1992 F 83-0459 
May 1992 F 83-0683 F 83-0678 
Jwx: 1992 
July 1992 
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2. European Parliament Resolutions and Motions for Resolutions 
All adopted EP Resolutions on the Gulf and Yugoslav crises and related matters respectively between 
August 1~~0 and ~ay 1991; January 1991-July 1992 are printed in the Official Journal of the European COmmU~ltIeS, ~ene~ C. The texts of the non-adopted Motions for Resolutions are not published and are 
not kept 10 the ~Ibranes of the European Parliament, but only in the Archives of the Translation Division 
of the Secretanat of the European Parliament in Luxembourg. 
2.1 Adopted EP Resolutions on the Gulf Crisis 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-1600, B3-1602, B3-1603, B3-1604 and B3-1623 of 12 September 1990 tabled 
by Cot on behalf of the Socialist group; Habsburg, Penders, KJepsch and Chanterie on behalf of the EPP 
group; d'Estaing and De Clercq on behalf of the LDR group; McMillan-Scott and Newton Dunn on 
behal~ of t.he ED. group; Vecchi on behalf of the EVL group; de la Malene on behalf of the EDA group; 
FOrmIgonI, ChaIrman of the ad hoc Delegation, OlEC C 260 of 15 October 1990, p. 74. 
Joint Resolution B3-1844/90 of 12 October 1990 tabled by van Putten and Sakellariou, on behalf of the 
Socialist group, Robles Piquer and Verhagen, on behalf of the EPP, Capucho on behalf of the LDR, 
Newton Dunn, on behalf of the ED, Aulas on behalf of the Greens, Vecchi on behalf of the EVL, 
Wurts, on behalf of the LV and Vandemeulebroucke and others on behalf of the Rainbow group, on the 
rise in oil prices, OlEC C 284 of 12 November 1990, p. 185. 
Joint Resolution B3-1881 and 1889/90 of 25 October 1990 tabled by Verde i Aldea, Woltjer and Sakellariou 
on behalf of the Socialist group and Colajanni, Gutierrez Diaz, Papayannakis and Iversen on behalf of 
the EUL group on topical political issues in the Community and at international level, OlEC C 295 of 
26 November 1990, p. 186. 
Joint Resolution B3-2009, B3-2017, B3-2027, B3-2043, B3-2062, B3-2083/90 of 12 November 1990 tabled 
by Woltjer and Dury on behalf of the Socialist group, Robles Piquer on behalf of the EPP group, Veil 
and Bertens on behalf of the LDR group, Newton Dunn on behalf of the ED group, Vecchi on behalf 
of the EVL group, de la Malene on behalf of the EDA group, Ephrernidis, Piquet, Miranda da Silva and 
De Rossa on behalf of LV group on the attempt by Iraq to destroy Kuwait, OlEC C 324 of 24 
December 1990, p. 200. 
Resolution B3-2023 of 22 November 1990 tabled by Visser and Woltjer on behalf of the Socialist group 
and van Ray and Robles Piquer on behalf of the EPP on the effects of the Philippines of the earthquake 
on 16 July 1990 and the Gulf crisis, OlEC C 324 of 24 December 1990, p. 217. 
Joint Resolution B3-2188/90, B3-2189/90 and B3-2232/90 of 12 December 1990 tabled by Cot and 
Sakellariou on behalf of the Socialist group, Colajanni on behalf the EVL group, Ephrernidis, De Rossa, 
Piquet, Miranda da Silva on behalf of the LV group on the Situation in the Gulf, OlEC C 19 of 28 
January 1991, p. 76. 
Resolution B3-2190/90 of 12 December 1990 tabled by Ford on behalf of the Socialist group on 
contingency measures in the event of a crisis in the Gulf, OlEC C 19 of 28 January 1991, p. 78. 
Resolution B3-0120 of 24 January 1991 tabled by Price, Tindemans, von der Vring, Capucho, Beumer, 
van Velzen, Speroni, de Clercq, Collins, von Wechmar, Herman, Tomlins, Penders, Navarro, Kofoed, 
Ewing, Ruiz-Gimenez, Vandemeulebroucke, Pronk, Maher, Simpson A., Roth-Behrendt, Tongue, 
Garcia Amigo, Muntingh, Randzio-Plath, Pimenta, Jepsen, Prag, de Vries, de Donnea, Arias Caiiete, 
Sonneveld, Newton-Dunn, McMillan-Scott, Jackson, C., Welsh, Patterson, Moorhouse, Beazley, c., 
Beazley, P., Simmonds, Nicholson, Cooney, Cushnahan, Porto, Salema, Carvalho Cardoso, Vohrer, 
Cox, Bertens, Larive-Groenendaal, Defraigne, Adam, Hughes, McGowan, Elliott, Howe, van 
Hemeldonck, Goedmakers, Wynn, Onur, Peter, van Outrive, Cassidy, Daly and Valverde Lopez on the 
Gulf and the Baltic States, OlEC C 48 of 25 February 1991, p. 66. 
Joint Motion for a Resolution replacing B3-0123 and B3-0127 of24 January 1991 tabled by Sakellariou on 
behalf of the Socialist group and Ewing, Vandemeulebroucke and Christensen on behalf of the Rainbow, 
on the Conflict in the Gulf, OlEC C 48 of 25 February 1991, pp. 115-116. 
Joint Resolution replacing 83-0311,0334,0338,0341,0343,0347,0359 and 0382/91 of 21 February 1991 
on the economic and social consequences of the Gulf crisis, OlEC C 72 of 18 March 1991, p. 129. 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-387, 388, 389 and 392/91 of 21 February 1991 tabled by LV, on the Gulf 
War, OlEC C 72 of 18 March 1991, p. 141 
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Joint Motion for a Resolution replacing B3-0398, 0402, 0429, 0450 and 0466/91 of 14 March 1991 tabled 
by Sakellariou on behalf of the Socialist group, Cassanmagnago-Cerretti, Penders and Pesmazoglou on 
behalf of the EPP group.' McMillan-Scott on behalf of the ED group, Aulas and Langer, on behalf of 
the Green group, Vecchl on behalf of the EUL group, Miranda da Silva, Piquet, Ephrernidis and De 
Rossa on behalf of the LU group. OlEC C 106 of 22 April 1991, p. 122. 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-458, 470 and 477/91 of 14 March 1991 tabled by EUL on the Kurds OlEC 
C 106 of 22 April 1991, 120. 
Joint Motion for a Resolution replacing B3-0552, 0555,0562,0564,0565 and 0660/91 of 18 April 1991 
tabled by Sakellariou on behalf of the Socialist group, Penders, Verhagen and Poettering, on behalf of 
the EPP group, Capucho, Lacaze, Bertens and Holzfuss, on behalf of the LDR group, Jackson, on 
behalf of the ED group, Aulas and Langer on behalf of the Green group, Iversen and Porrazzini, on 
behalf of the EUL group, Vandemeulebroucke, on behalf of the LU group on Gulf crisis and arms trade, 
OlEC C 129 of 20 May 1991, p. 139. 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-556-560-618-619-620-621-622-623 and 624/91 of 18 April 1991 tabled by 
Dury on behalf of the Socialist group, Penders and Cassanmagnago Cerretti on behalf of the EPP group, 
Bertens and Calvo Ortega on behalf of LDR group, Jackson and McMillan-Scott on behalf of the ED 
group, Roth and Langer on behalf of the Green group, Colajanni on behalf of the EUL group, de la 
Malene on behalf of the EDA group, Vandemeulebroucke of the Rainbow group and Piquet on behalf 
of the LV group on the situation of the Kurds, OlEC C 129 of 20 May 1991, p. 141. 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-0740, 0746 and 0798/91 of 16 May 1991 on the Situation of the Kurdish 
Refugees, OlEC C 158 of 17 June 1991, p. 247. 
Joint Resolution replacing B3-0741, 0744, 0751, 0755, 0765, 0777 and 0811191 of 16 May 1991, OlEC 
C 158 of 17 June 1991 tabled by Socialist group, EPP, LDR, Greens, EUL, LU on the Situation in 
Kuwait, OlEC C 158 of 17 June 1991, p. 247. 
2.2 Motions for Resolutions on the Gulf 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1618 of 10 September 1990 by Aulas, Telkamper Lannoye, Santos and Langer 
on behalf of the Green group on the Gulf crisis. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1624 of 12 September 1990 by Ib Christensen, Vandemeulebroucke, Ewing, 
Simeoni, Moretti, Blaney, Garaikoetxea Urriza, de los Santos, Speroni, Bjemvig, Bond and Sandbrek 
on the behalf of the Rainbow group. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1843/90 of 12 October 1990 by Metten and others, on behalf of the Socialist 
group, on the rise in oil prices. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1821190 of 8 October 1990 tabled by Aulas, Melandri, Santos, Langer, Tazdait 
and Telkamper behalf of the Green group on the situation in the Gulf. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1816/90 of 8 October 1990 tabled by Jackson and Newton-Dunn on behalf of 
the ED group. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1829/90 of 11 October 1990 tabled by de la Malene on behalf of the EDA on 
humanitarian consequences of the Gulf crisis. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-1847/90 of 12 October 1990 tabled by de la Malene and Musso on behalf of 
the EDA on oil prices. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-2032 of 19 November 1990 tabled by Le Pen on behalf of the Technical group 
of the European Right on the situation of the hostages in Kuwait and Iraq. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-0115/91 of 23 January 1991 tabled by de la Malene on behalf of the EDA 
group on the Situation in the Gulf. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-0125/91 of 24 January 1991 tabled by the following Members: Aglietta, 
Ainardi, Alavanos, Aulas, Barros Moura, Barzanti, Bettini, Bontempi. Buchan, Calvo Ortega. 
Canavarro, Castell ina, Cramon Baiber, Crampton, Ceci, Coates, De Rossa, Domingo, Elmalan, Elliott, 
Ephremidis, Falconer, Femex, Gutierrez Diaz, Hindley, Hughes, Kostopoulos, Langer, Lannoye, 
Lomas, Mayer, McCubbin, McMahon, Megahy, Miranda da Silva, Moretti, Morris, Napoletano, 
Newens, Newman, Papayannakis, Piquet, Puerta, Quistorp, Regge, Ribeiro, Seal, Smith A., Smith L., 
Speroni, Stewart, Tsimas, Vecchi, West, White and Wurtz on the Gulf War. 
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2.3 Adopted EP Resolutions on Yugoslavia 
Joint Resolution 83-0302, 0336 and 0379 of 21 February 1991 tabled by Oury and Sakellariou on behalf 
of the Socialist group, Pack on behalf of the EPP group, von Alemann on behalf of LOR group, i'.'ewlon 
Dunn on behalf of the ED group, Langer and Monnier-Besombes on behalf of the Green group. 
Vandemeulebroucke on behalf of the Rainbow group on the crisis on Kosovo, OlEC C 72 of 18 March 
1991, p. 131. 
Joint Resolution B3-0395, 0397/fin, 0399, 0403, 0431 and 0482 of 15 March 1991 tabled by Avgerinos 
on behalf of the Socialist group, Sarlis and Pack on behalf of the EPP group, von Alemann on behalf 
of ~e LOR group, Langer on behalf of the Green group, Rossetti on behalf of the EUL group de la 
Malene on behalf of the EOA group Prag on behalf of the ED group was also signatory on the Situation 
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group of the European Right on Yugoslavia. 
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situation in Yugoslavia. 
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of the EPP group. 
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group on the situation in Yugoslavia. 
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Yugoslavia (Article 63 of Regulations). 
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of the Greens on Yugoslavia. 
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Motion for a Resolution B3-1895 of 22 November 1991 tabled by Antony and Uhideux on behalf of the 
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Motion for a Resolution of 11 December 1991 tabled by Rovsing on behalf of the ED on "Pax Europea" 
in Yugoslavia. 
Motion for a Resolution of 11 December 1991 tabled by Romeos on behalf of the Socialist group on 
protection of journalists in Yugoslavia. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-0040 of 14 January 1992 tabled by de la Malene on behalf of the EDA group 
on the Community'S foreign policy on Yugoslavia. 
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Motion for a Resolution B3-0411 of 12 March 1991 tabled by the ER group on humanitarian aid for people 
in the former Yugoslav Republics who are the victims of military operations. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-0678 of 14 May 1992 tabled by Antony and Uhideux on behalf of ER group 
on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Motion for a Resolution B3-0680 of 12 May 1992 tabled by de la Malene on behalf of the EDA group on 
the Civil War in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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